Annotation on Al-Qawa‘id wa al-Fawa’id
Annotation on Al-Qawa‘id wa al-Fawa’id
Bibliographic Information
Author: Muhammad Reza Nekounam (b. 1948)
Title: Annotation on Al-Qawa‘id wa al-Fawa’id (Commentary)
Publication: Eslamshahr: Sobhe Farda Publications, 2014
Physical Description: 83 pages; 9.5 × 19 cm
ISBN: 978-600-91763-5-9
Catalogue status: FIPA
Language: Arabic
Notes:
- This book is a marginal commentary on Al-Qawa‘id wa al-Fawa’id by the First Martyr, Muhammad ibn Makki.
- Second edition; previous edition published in Qom by Zuhoor-e Shafaq, 2007.
Subjects: - Muhammad ibn Makki al-‘Amili (The First Martyr), 734–786 AH — Al-Qawa‘id wa al-Fawa’id — criticism and interpretation
- Ja‘fari jurisprudence — 8th century AH
Added Entry: Muhammad ibn Makki al-‘Amili — Al-Qawa‘id wa al-Fawa’id — Commentary
Classification: - Library of Congress: BP182/3 Sh90q9037 2014
- Dewey Decimal: 297/342
National Bibliography Number: 3675760
Table of Contents
Introduction
Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds, and blessings and peace upon the chief of the Messengers, Muhammad, and his pure family.
The compilation of jurisprudential rules from ancient times until today has been a matter of great concern for jurists. Among the foremost in this field is the eminent scholar, martyr, and profound jurist Abu Abdullah Muhammad ibn Makki al-‘Amili, famously known as the First Martyr (may his secret be sanctified). His valuable book, Al-Qawa‘id wa al-Fawa’id, contains nearly 330 principles, in addition to around 100 benefits, not including notes and branches. Collectively, it encompasses the most important legal issues. This is a concise and noble work comprising general guidelines under which many jurisprudential branches are classified, employing comparative methodology for the most part, indicating his extensive knowledge and mastery of juristic opinions across different schools of thought. It is no surprise that he narrated from about forty Sunni scholars from the farthest regions.
The present treatise is a commentary on the most significant of these rules, emphasizing and valuing the freedom of scientific and practical understanding in grasping objectives and bases of legal rulings, and understanding subjects and particularities of matters and things. It contains important issues and principal fundamentals of our jurisprudential system and its distinctions and disputes with what is commonly accepted among jurists.
Our final invocation is that all praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds.
Categories of Acts of Worship
Rule [3]: “Acts of worship are systematically arranged except for what is permissible…” (3).
There is an issue in the actual realization of what is permissible, which is a customary matter, caused by the failure to comprehend reality as it truly is.
“As for contracts, they are causes upon which legal rulings are contingent…” (4).
The previous source, vol. 1, p. 30.
Contracts are conventional causes, and their conventionality is intrinsic to their very nature.
The Purpose in the Acts of God
Rule [4]: It has been established in kalām theology that God’s actions are purposeful, and that the purpose cannot be reprehensible, nor can God return to it. Hence, the purpose must be one that relates to the accountable individual… (1).
Everything in this rule is an explicative statement in kalām without any valid proof from reason or Sharia in this kind of exposition. The truth, as reason suggests, is that the Exalted does not consider the lowly; God’s actions have no purpose, and the basis of rulings are matters intrinsic to the command itself, established by the command itself, not by any external cause or substitute.
Worship and Expiation
Rule [5]: “There is a general and absolute particularity between worship and expiation: every expiation is worship, but not every worship is expiation…” (2).
The reality of worship is the servant’s seeking to attain the truth, with all other matters being subsidiary. Worship varies accordingly.
The previous source, vol. 1, pp. 33–34.
The worship of the infallible (peace be upon them) is thus not expiation for any wrongdoing, even though the levels of worship among the infallibles differ.
Transactions
Rule [6]: “Every legal ruling whose main purpose is worldly benefit, whether for gaining benefit or averting harm, is termed a transaction…” (1).
A transaction is that for which the principal aim is gaining benefit or averting harm, and from this perspective there is no difference between worldly and otherworldly transactions, though one may speak of worldly and otherworldly transactions. Hence, most acts of worship are transactions between the servant and the Truth, rather than acts of worship proper, which are solely causes for the servant to attain the Truth.
The phrase: “Whether the benefit or harm is intended essentially or incidentally, the former is what is perceived by the five senses; each sense has a share of the legal rulings…” (2).
The ruling is not related to the senses, nor is the ruling concerned with what is perceived by the senses. Rather, the ruling pertains to the accountable individual themselves, and the senses are conditions or objects of this relationship.
Categories of Means
Rule [7]: “Means are fivefold, one of which is the causes that confer possession, and they are six…” (1).
These are rational causes and are not exclusive to Sharia in their general aspects, although their specifics derive from the Legislator, leaving no room for reason therein.
The phrase: “Because congregation is necessary for the accountable individuals, and a source of dispute, there must be a decisive arbiter, which is the Sharia, and it must have a ruler, namely the Imam and his deputies…” (2).
The Imam referred to here is the infallible, as is clear. However, the important matter is the resolution of disputes and appointment of a ruler during the occultation. The matter is not satisfactorily resolved merely by the title of deputies in general except when the conditions are ascertained in them and their superiority over all others is evident; otherwise, it would be neglect or coercion in the appointment.
Definition of the Ruling
Rule [8]: “The ruling is the legal address related to the actions of the accountable individuals…” (3).
The legal address is expressed in the language of what is customary, both in its imposition and obligation.
The previous source, vol. 1, pp. 36, 38.
Definition of Cause
Rule [9]: “The cause, linguistically, is that which leads to another…” (1).
A cause is either natural or conventional, and both types exist in their respective actualizations through natural or conventional existence.
Categories of Causes
Rule [11]: “Causes include those in which the relation is not apparent though it exists in the matter itself…” (2).
In natural causality, the cause and effect always coincide, whereas in other cases, they exist through convention, where precedence or delay may occur according to designation. The same applies with regard to relevance and irrelevance.
Verbal Cause
Rule [12]: “A cause may be verbal, such as a contract or declaration…” (3).
A cause is broader than just natural, conventional, rational, or rationalistic causes.
The Consideration of Time in Causes
Rule [13]: The statement: “The divisions of cause and effect with respect to time are threefold: the first is what coincides with the effect…” (1).
Refer to previous annotations.
Interference of Causes
Rule [14]: “Causes may interfere with each other; for example, the events requiring purification, if one intends to remove one, all are removed unless another is intended to be removed, which invalidates purification…” (2).
Purification is not invalidated, but the intention is void concerning the actualization of the original purification.
Multiplicity of Causes
Rule [15]: “Causes may multiply and the ruling imposed by them may differ, categorized as follows: those where combination is impossible, such as one killing a group either simultaneously (by poisoning them, collapsing a wall, drowning, burning, or wounding) so that the effect extends to all sequentially…” (1).
In the first case, all are considered killed due to the singular cause even if the effect occurs at different times; some say killing one by lot or appointment of the Imam is sufficient, with others receiving blood money. This is a confusion between cause and effect.
Conditionality on Will
Rule [20]: “If the declaration of ‘dhihar’ is conditional on her will, dislike, or love, the apparent effect occurs and her statement is accepted… Conditionality on will requires expression… If conditional on the boy speaking…” (4).
Conditioning disrupts the actualization of ‘dhihar’, whether the condition relates to will, desire, speech, or other such factors.
Time as Cause of a Legal Ruling
Rule [22]: “Some times are not causes, such as Zakat al-Fitr, rather the sighting of the new moon is a complete cause for its obligation; time thereafter is neither cause nor part of the cause, thus it is recommended for one whose puberty, Islam, or ease renews during it…” (1).
In fact, time is also a cause in this category as before; the moon sighting governs it, but realization of this cause is at the moment, so time is not the condition for the accountable person, and presumption (istishab) supports this.
The phrase on Ramadan: every day is a cause for obligation for one who meets the conditions; its parts are not causes. Thus, a Muslim during the month, or one who is pure during menstruation or postpartum, is not obligated unless all parts exist.
Piety
The resources of piety are multiple:
- Eating without fullness even from certain lawful food;
- Refraining from eating unnecessarily or from non-essential foods;
- Absence of desire in eating even necessary food;
- Abstaining or limiting eating from others’ wealth even if lawful.
All these must be feasible and reasonable; otherwise, piety requires avoiding all these and maintaining balance even with minimal amounts.
Categories of Means
Rule [31]: “Means are categorized as follows: those unanimously prohibited by the community, such as digging wells on the Muslims’ path or throwing obstacles, since they cause harm and are unanimously forbidden…” (1).
Such rulings are derived from the wisdom of the rational community, with Sharia following these rulings generally; consensus is not established here.
Sources of Legal Rulings
Note: “The sources of rulings in our tradition are four: the Book, the Sunnah, consensus, and rational proof. From these, five extracted rules may be used to trace rulings and their relevant matters…” (2).
Some rulings from the Book are understood directly; from the Sunnah, some are certain knowledge.
The previous source, vol. 1, pp. 61, 74.
The Dependence of Action on Intention
Primary rule: “The dependence of action on intention is derived from the Prophet’s saying, peace be upon him and his family: ‘Actions are judged by intentions’…” (1).
The dependence of action on intention applies exclusively to acts of worship, not to all actions. The intended actions are likewise acts of worship, and the limitation applies accordingly. The intention is the specific direction towards the purpose of the act. Intention is the spirit of worship, the act its body, with the essential meaning here being nearness to God — understood as attaining and ascending to the Truth.
On this general and unrestricted sense, everything not contradicting the truth can be placed in intention for nearness, whether it be nearness to God, His reward, or other commendable aims. The meaning of nearness to God is widely understood and exemplified, and the Qur’anic expressions in this regard vary with regard to obligation, acceptance, exclusivity, or other relevant matters.
The Effect of Ostentation (Riya)
The statement: “Worship invalidated by ostentation means the loss of reward, but does it imply abolition of obedience and freedom from punishment? The correct view is that it does not necessarily imply that…” (1).
Ostentation causes the invalidity of worship, with no reward, and no reward is given, but it may be replaced by God with something else.
Possibility of Secondary Intention
The statement: “It may be said that the primary motive is nearness, then a subsequent nearness upon trial in the action…” (2).
The correct view here excludes the third possibility, and it does not occur in the first two views, as the fourth option nullifies them.
Specifications of Intention
Rule [4]: “It is obligatory in intention to specify the distinguishing characteristics of the act distinct from others; thus, intention for the genus of the act and then its particular branches and distinguishing features such as obligation and recommendation…” (1).
It is not obligatory in intention to specify all detailed characteristics; rather, what matters is the general presence of what is intended as far as differentiation from others is evident.
The statement: “If intention for obligatory and recommended are combined in one act, such as intending purification and Friday prayer, it invalidates the two intents because they are contradictory…” (2).
Worship is not invalidated by combining intention of recommendation with obligation; both may apply to a single act with different aspects.
Intention in Prayer
The statement: “Intention in prayer includes both its obligatory and recommended parts; it is not necessary to specify the intention for the recommended part distinctly, nor for the obligatory due to its obligation and recommendation because the recommended is considered subordinate to the obligatory, and intention for the principal suffices for the subordinate.” (3).
Intention relates to the essence of the act as such and does not contradict multiple aspects or differing rulings relating to parts and conditions.
Certainty in Intention
Note [7]: “Certainty is obligatory in the specifications of intention, such as determination, performance, fulfillment, obligation, and recommendation when possible, and doubt is not permissible where certainty is possible, because intention to act is only realized with certainty…” (1).
Certainty in intention regarding the essence of the act and absence of doubt is necessary; however, this does not apply necessarily to all specifications of intention with respect to one act.
Intention in Acts of Worship
Note [8]: “Intention is considered in all acts of worship when they can be performed in two ways, except for the defining gaze due to knowledge of God, for it is worship…” (2).
This gaze is not worship in the technical sense though it is the best gaze, but it results in knowledge and enables worship from the servant.
When No Difference in Intention Is Possible
The statement: “Where no difference in intention is possible, such as returning a deposit or settling a debt, no specific distinguishing intention is required, though to merit reward, the intention of nearness to God is required.” (1).
The difference in intention regarding returning a deposit or settling a debt pertains to whether the deposit is returned or the debt not settled. The Legislator classifies these acts as worship due to this consideration.
The Obligation of Avoiding Prohibitions as a Conceptual Duty
Benefit Ten: The statement, “It is obligatory to refrain from prohibited acts, and it is recommended to avoid disliked acts…” (2).
Although obligation (wājib), prohibition (ḥarām), recommendation (mustahabb), and dislike (makrūh) are all conventional categories reflecting the nature and mode of an action, there is a distinction, for instance, between the obligation of prayer and the obligation of refraining from prohibitions. The obligation in the former case is an intrinsic obligation directed towards performing the act itself, whereas in the latter case, the obligation arises necessarily from the prohibition of the act. In other words, the obligation relates to the duty (wājib) and the prohibition to the forbidden (ḥarām), which are external attributes linked to the actual act. However, the obligation to refrain from prohibited acts is a conceptual quality of the mind’s action. The same applies to the recommendation and dislike categories.
Source: Ibid., vol.1, pp.89-90.
Intention (Niyyah) in Compliance
Benefit Eleven: The statement, “Nevertheless, intention is not obligatory in this context, meaning that compliance is attained without it, although the merit of reward for refraining depends on the intention for seeking closeness…” (1).
Compliance cannot be realised without at least a foundational or basic intention. Achieving success in avoiding prohibited acts by someone else’s command is not sufficient on its own. Hence, if a person forms an intention to avoid possible or habitually difficult prohibitions, even generically, the reward could be realised due to the formation of the appropriate legal title; however, this remains a separate issue.
The phrase “discrimination achieved through intention sometimes serves to distinguish acts of worship from habitual actions…” (2) indicates that acts of worship, although distinguishable, may coexist with habitual practice, allowing for a conceptual union of both within formal worship.
Furthermore, “sometimes intention serves to differentiate between individual acts of worship…” (3) clarifies that an action can be distinguished either regarding the category of the act itself or concerning specific characteristics of the act of worship. The first form of distinction is required for the act itself, while the second is necessary for its essence. Accommodating the distinguishing features is not necessarily obligatory in the intention.
Source: Ibid., vol.1, pp.90-91.
Intention as a Single Act
Benefit Thirteen: The statement, “The foundational principle is that the presence of intention is required in every component of the act, as the evidence applies universally to all parts since they are also acts of worship…” (1).
Intention is a single act by virtue of its real current unity that persists with the act even in the absence of explicit mention, relating to the unified whole of the act and its conditions gradually in external reality. The need for determination during verbalisation also entails the existence of a present moment intention following an initial resolved intention, such that the intention remains present during the action even if explicit mention is absent at times.
Multiple Intentions
Benefit Fifteen: The statement, “It is permissible for the intention of one act of worship to coincide with another, such as the intention of zakat and fasting during prayer…” (2).
There is no objection to the simultaneous existence or multiplicity of intentions.
Source: Ibid., vol.1, pp.93, 96.
Intentions of Disobedience and Accountability
Benefit Twenty-One: The statement, “The intention of disobedience does not affect punishment or blame unless it accompanies the act, as established in reports indicating forgiveness…” (2).
The intention behind disobedience is a negative disposition within the soul and a blameworthy act of the heart; forgiveness granted by the legislator indicates generosity towards the servants and non-condemnation from wise persons due to the absence of outward manifestation.
Source: Ibid., vol.1, pp.97, 108.
The Intention as the Spirit and Reality of the Act
Benefit Twenty-Two: The statement, “It was reported from the Prophet (peace be upon him and his family): ‘The intention of the believer is better than his deed,’ and it was also reported: ‘The intention of the disbeliever is worse than his deed,’ followed by questions regarding which is superior since it was narrated: ‘The best act of worship is the most arduous,’ and there is no doubt that the deed is more arduous than the intention…” (1)(2).
The intention is the firm resolve to realise the act, and its goodness or badness affects the act since the intention is the spirit and essence of the act. The act is the effect and manifestation of the intention and is material, subject to multiplicity and unity of meaning. The intention is the origin and cause; the act is the branch and consequence. The cause is better and precedes the effect. We do not concede that the deed is more difficult than the intention, rather the opposite in quality if not quantity.
Source: Mustadrak Safinat al-Bihar, vol.7, Qom, Islamic Publishing Institute, first edition, 1419 AH, p.436; Al-Qawa’id wa al-Fawa’id, vol.1, p.109.
Ritual Legal Rulings (Al-Aḥkām al-Ta‘abbudiyyah)
Rule [96]:
“Pure ritual devotion (ta‘abbud) has been established in instances where the underlying cause is scarcely discernible—such as the beginning of the arm’s apparent and inner parts in ablution, or the two leafy branches, even if not justified by warding off punishment as long as they remain green…” (2)
Legal rulings are contingent upon benefits and harms across various aspects; it is impossible for a ruling to exist without a cause or wisdom. The causes of rulings vary in their clarity and concealment. The meaning of ritual devotion is the belief in the existence of a cause and wisdom, even if their precise forms remain unknown to the thinker. Many such instances do not constitute pure ritual devotion, given the possibility of conceptualising the ruling and its causes therein.
The Principle of Presumption
Rule [97]:
“What is established contrary to evidence due to a perceived necessity may be estimated accordingly and may even become an independent principle; hence, disagreements arise in such cases, including…” (1)
The principle applies to instances where no specific evidence exists.
Imitation in Intellectual Matters
Rule [112]:
“It is impermissible to imitate in intellectual matters or in the essential principles of transmitted knowledge; however, imitation is permitted in other matters for those incapable of apprehending the proof…” (2)
Imitation and instruction govern all human knowledge, from nomadic understanding to intellectual and transmitted certainties, terrestrial and celestial. Rational matters either pertain to monotheism and religious principles or to other issues. The prohibition of imitation in the former category is inherently obvious but requires explanation, which in turn requires the arrangement and kind of premises to be imitated. In the latter category, there is no need nor possibility for heartfelt belief from the ignorant. The essential matter lies in detailing and explanation, dependent on arranging premises, and the core lies in the outcomes of affairs. The prohibition of imitation applies specifically to accepting conclusions. This is a general statement; detailed scrutiny is necessary for its particulars, which few worshippers of gratitude undertake.
Conflict of Indicators
Rule [113]:
“If indicators conflict for the jurist, the ruling is either choice (ikhtiyār) or suspension (waqf)…” (1)
Choice prevails without the need for suspension, as elaborated in the principles of jurisprudence.
Delegation of Judicial Authority
Rule [148]:
“It is permissible for individuals, when judges are incapacitated, to undertake individual judicial actions, preferably; regarding whether collecting zakat and khums from the incapable and distributing it to rightful owners, as well as other duties of judges unrelated to litigation, there are two opinions…” (2)
Legal obligations are tied to their appointed times and fulfillment of conditions. Their principles and complete actualisation are relative and gradual; however, with the existence of a rightful government, exercising authority in these matters is conditional on permission. In the absence thereof, it is incumbent on all, individually and collectively, to enforce rulings to the extent of their capability, respecting priorities concerning knowledge, action, and capacity in applying the rulings.
Two Conceptions of Sin
Benefit 19:
“Sin and fulfilment cannot coexist; reports permitting delaying prayer until the end of the prescribed time apply only to those with valid excuses, while for others they serve as warnings. Similarly, reports stating the beginning of the time is God’s satisfaction and the end is His forgiveness—if accepted—do not preclude sin.” (1)
The sin in this context differs from the technical definition in theology, where sin and fulfilment cannot coincide, though their general separation is preserved.
Abundance and Scarcity of Reward
Benefit 22:
“Predominantly, reward in abundance or scarcity follows the action’s increase or decrease, because hardship is the essence of the duty leading to reward; the greater the hardship, the greater the reward, although exceptions exist…” (1)
Reward depends on the quantity and quality of action, as well as increase and decrease. Quantity and quality also contribute to the magnitude of reward. Despite this elucidation, there is no contradiction between the two, provided quantity and quality are considered. Moreover, observing quality in action is often more arduous than enduring the burden of quantity.
On the Honour of Mecca and Medina
Rule [189]:
“The majority of scholars hold that Mecca, which God has honoured, is the best place. Others argue Medina is superior…” (1)
Mecca is the locus of blessings and the origin of orientations for the distant and near. It has been sanctified by God in all eras, from pre-Islamic times to Islam, and is the place of divine unity worldwide. Medina is the sanctuary of God’s people and the land of the innocent saints, historically oppressed, a land of endurance, peace, dignity, guardianship, and leadership.
Variation in Virtue among Places
Rule (5):
“Apart from Mecca and Medina, there are places differing in virtue…” (1)
The variation of places, things, and beings in dignity and virtue is evident. The crucial matter is identifying their respective statuses with clear evidence. Many cases are easily understood logically or transmitted; others are ambiguous or unclear. Distinguishing the matters is not wholly criteria-based, especially regarding transmitted traditions. Rational consideration is essential for determining all matters.
Accepting Remuneration for Communal Obligations
Rule [190]:
“Some scholars prohibited remuneration for judicial duties, leadership, and the call to prayer, permitting income only from public funds…” (2)
There is no objection to receiving payment for all communal obligations, whether acts of worship or otherwise. The intent is not harmed by receiving remuneration, given justifications in between. The wage becomes their property through exchange and compensation, even if this compensation is nobler than usual.
Ostentation (Riyaa)
Benefit:
“Any act of worship intended for anyone other than God, to be seen by people, entails ostentation; whether done for closeness to God or not. However, if the aim is a legitimate worldly or otherworldly purpose, the intention with closeness to God is not called ostentation—such as a warrior seeking God and spoils, or an imam reciting in prayer and teaching for proper understanding…” (1)
Acts of worship may have multiple aims due to various worldly and spiritual reasons. Ostentation is distinct, a defect and a form of associating partners, nullifying worship even if minutely present. The perfection of the believer lies in purifying the self from ostentation in worship and all commendable actions.
Wisdom in Permitting Four Wives
Rule [191]:
“The wisdom in permitting four wives, but no more in permanent marriage; and absolute permissibility in temporary marriage and the right of ownership…” (2)
Comprehending the wisdom in allowing four wives, but no more, is difficult and subtle. In Moses’ law, multiple wives were allowed without restriction for the benefit of men, while in Jesus’ law, only one wife was allowed for the benefit of women. This purified law considers both interests.
Detailed Wisdom Regarding Prohibited Relatives
Rule [192]:
“It is prohibited for a man to marry women who are his direct ancestors or descendants, their siblings, and similar prohibitions through breastfeeding…” (1)
This rule is replete with legal subtleties linked to divine wisdom rather than ordinary jurisprudence. It is incumbent upon the divine jurist to comprehend these legal subtleties, which involve intricate reasons for prohibition, consent, and limits in marriage.
Ritual Devotion in Numbers
Rule [203]:
“As a general rule, the number specified is an act of pure ritual devotion…” (1)
Ritual devotion here means the absence of our knowledge of the ruling’s cause while believing in the ruling itself. The wisdom underlying such matters is viewed holistically, not negated by specific exceptions.
Confession
Benefit:
“Cases where the ruling concerns confession and the judge’s knowledge…” (2)
Confession here means voluntary acknowledgement of spiritual and otherworldly intentions, through compulsion, limitation, punishment, deception, or other means used by tyrannical states worldwide. The judge’s knowledge must result from evidence; mere knowledge or claim is insufficient, considering possible error.
Difference Between Hudud and Ta‘zir Punishments
Rule [204]:
“There are ten distinctions between hudud (fixed) and ta‘zir (discretionary) punishments…” (1)
There is no essential difference in their nature; the difference lies in some sins having specified fixed punishments prescribed by law, while others are delegated to the discretion of the just judge, due to the impossibility of exhaustive enumeration with fairness. The lawgiver entrusted discretionary punishments to just rulers to avoid rigidity, excess, or neglect in penalties.
Prohibited Innovations (Bid‘ah)
Rule [205]:
“Innovations after the Prophet’s time are divided into categories; the term bid‘ah applies only to those forbidden. The first includes obligatory acts such as the codification of the Qur’an and Sunnah to prevent their loss, which is unanimously necessary for future generations…” (2)
Backbiting
Rule [206]:
“Backbiting is prohibited by the explicit text of the Qur’an and authentic reports…” (2)
Backbiting is prohibited to protect the honour of the believer. Exceptions occur in cases of injustice, wrongdoing, or innovation where criticism is necessary for correction. The obligation is to avoid backbiting unless justified.
Source as referenced, vol. 2, p. 159.
(60)
Disreputable Acts
“As for the kissing of the hand, it is also mentioned in the traditions… and as for embracing, it is likewise permissible according to established reports…” (1).
The matter of kissing the hand, embracing, and similar acts is likewise subject to reasoned judgement. The intellect provides insight into their rulings, and there is no prohibition in the Sharia regarding them, provided no harm or breach of trust results.
The statement: “Thus, we say it is befitting for the believer not to love such acts, and to discipline themselves to dislike them when inclined…” (2).
Love for such acts is a sign of weakness of faith and lack of personal strength, and it is incumbent upon the believer to gradually expel these tendencies from their soul.
Swearing by Allah, the Exalted, or by His Divine Names
Rule (5): “It is only permissible to swear by Allah, the Exalted, or by His specific Names…” (3).
Regarding oaths and divisions, there is generality and complexity from various perspectives concerning the names, attributes, and essence. This is not the place for such inquiries, but I shall briefly address some objections to dispel ambiguity.
Source as referenced, vol. 2, p. 162-165.
(61)
Theological Discourse
The statement: “And the second [case] is like our saying ‘by Allah’, which is a name of the Essence by virtue of the accompanying attributes…” (1).
If by the name ‘Allah’ the essence itself were meant, then some names in the first category would not be names of the essence, such as ‘Splitter of the grain’ and ‘Creator of the breeze’. If the intention were that the name Allah is both name and attribute, then no concept of the essence would remain to be referred to; in addition, there is a difference between the Necessary Being, the First, and the names like ‘Creator of the grain’ and ‘Creator of the breeze’. These names and attributes are not on the same level. If the name Allah is a name for the essence, then the flow of attributes and divine qualities would not apply to it. The name Allah, whether from ‘Ilah’ or ‘Walah’ or another root, does not explicitly and manifestly denote the essence as such, but is connected to the true or effective name and attribute, without a direct concept of the essence itself by any linguistic expression. Thus, the word ‘Allah’ is neither a mere name nor a mere attribute like other names and attributes. There is no difference between the name Allah and the names ‘Ar-Rahman’ and ‘Ar-Rahim’ except in terms of the relative comprehensiveness and scope of rank and status. Just as ‘Ar-Rahman’ and ‘Ar-Rahim’ denote singular meanings conceptually, so does the name Allah. These concepts primarily and naturally only denote the attribute of mercy and compassion without regard to the essence, even if…
Source as referenced, vol. 2, p. 165-166.
(62)
… the attribute cannot exist except through the essence, yet this existence is not connected to the concept.
The statement: “And ‘Al-Quddus’ (the Holy) is a name of the essence with a negative attribute…” (1).
All names and attributes are existential; there is no negative name for the Exalted Truth. Attributes such as ‘Halal’ (permitted) are existential like the attributes of beauty, even if conceptually they imply the removal of defects when considering understanding and communication. The limitation in names and attributes for the Exalted is on the conceptual level, not in reality. All names and attributes are absolute in reality in the full meaning of the word; for example, knowledge and power are attributes fully applicable to the reality, even if conceptually they are not so. There are also textual difficulties in the meanings of names, and the text follows the theological discourse; it is not the place for an extensive explanation of divine names and attributes here.
The statement: “And ‘Al-Baqi’ (the Everlasting) is a name of the essence with a relation and attribution; that is, Al-Baqi denotes the relation between existence and time, as it is the continuation of existence and times.” (2).
Source as referenced, vol. 2, p. 166-167.
(63)
Al-Baqi is not a relation between existence and times, nor is it the continuation of existence in times; for time is limited, while Al-Baqi is everlasting without specification or limitation to time. Permanence encompasses time and beyond, and divine attributes do not apply to time at all. Permanence is neither a relation nor an attribution.
The statement: “And Al-Abadi (the Eternal) is the one continuous with all future times; Al-Baqi is broader than it; and Al-Azali (the Ever-Existing) is the one whose existence coincides with all past actual and potential times.” (1).
This, too, has objections in regard to the terms Al-Abadi and Al-Azali.
The statement: “These considerations nearly come to the beautiful names according to the measure and explanation of them…” (2).
The comprehension and understanding of the meanings of divine names requires knowledge beyond the common literature among the people, because the available literature is confined to the material and anthropomorphic realm, arising from the theological mindset which can only grasp partial and limited aspects of material things. Moreover, understanding these matters is not restricted to literature alone, but requires attainment of true knowledge and spiritual insights. Most people lack much of this knowledge due to general lack, and those who possess it are few, often secretive and hidden.
On Killing and Forgiveness by the Injured Party’s Agent
Regarding killing, if the just person or the corrupt one hears of the agent’s pardon of the injured party and informs the representative of this pardon, but the latter refuses to accept it, the witness has the right to object and defend this agent against retribution as much as possible, even if it leads to the killing of the latter. This raises a difficulty… (1).
There is no permissibility for the listener regarding the killing, nor is there any obligation upon them to clarify, due to their knowledge that their testimony will not be accepted either because of their immorality or insufficient number. However, informing about the testimony is permissible and there is no prohibition; indeed, clarifying it is a personal duty for the informant despite the knowledge that their statement will be rejected. The agent’s action prior to knowledge of the pardon from the principal is valid without objection, though delaying retribution by the agent accords with caution.
The statement: “If objection leads to the killing of the objector, committing it is forbidden for what has passed. Many of the common people permit it, citing the Almighty’s saying: ‘And how many a prophet fought alongside many righteous men.’” (2)
These were killings on account of enjoining good and forbidding evil, which is accepted when carried out in the manner of jihad. They said that the killing of Yahya ibn Zakariya for forbidding the marriage of his stepdaughter was a prophetic duty different from our duties. They also quoted the Prophet Muhammad’s saying: “The best jihad is a word of truth in the presence of a tyrannical ruler.” (3) This implies risking one’s life even without distinguishing whether the words are of fundamental or minor sins.
We say this applies to the Imam or his deputy or to those who do not expect to be killed. They stated that a large group of the Tabi‘un (successors) rebelled alongside Ibn al-Ash‘ath against al-Hajjaj to remove his oppression and that of the Caliph Abdul-Malik; no scholar condemned them for this. We say they were not the entire community and we do not know that they anticipated being killed, rather they permitted effecting change and forbidding evil, or their uprising might have been with the Imam’s permission, hence obligatory obedience, like the uprising of Zayd ibn Ali and others from Bani Ali (peace be upon them). (1)
If objection leads to killing the objector or the disobedient, it is permissible according to the partial obligation based on enjoining good and forbidding evil; it does not require the guise of jihad, nor is there a difference in these two rulings between the prophets and other nations, provided the necessary conditions exist even though the prophets are chronologically prior.
The narration: “The best jihad is a word of truth before a tyrannical ruler” is general in scope and standard without distinction among anyone. It is not jihad in the technical sense but encompasses this occasion; additionally, stating a truth before a tyrant is a jihad of the self even if it is not armed combat, and it is the best jihad. It is not necessary to restrict this to specific individuals or groups, though it may be said this duty is recommended rather than obligatory. (2)
There is certainly no objection to its permissibility as it is self-sacrifice for the sake of elevating the Word of God. Speaking truth to a tyrant does not require a prospect of effect, nor is the ruler’s position like other circumstances; rather, the very act of speaking is effective, even if to someone other than the ruler, as the ruler is a symbol of arrogance.
Types of Deadlines (Ajal)
Rule [249]: “The deadline is of two types: one is that established by the origin of the law, such as puberty… The second is that determined by the responsible parties, which is divided into:
(a) That which is valid but not obligatory and whose knowledge is required—such as the deadline for the price of a sale, mortgage, suretyship, and estimation thereof in repayment, dowry, housing, and charitable trust.
(b) That which is obligatory and whose determination is a condition—such as the deadline for temporary marriage (mut‘a), contractual emancipation (kitāba), salam (advance payment contract) contrary to others, fixed-term tenancy, sharecropping, and irrigation agreements.” (1)
There is a distinction between the nature of obligation and condition: obligation pertains to the essential duration, and condition pertains to the quantity and extent of the duration.
No Duty on the Negligent
Rule [287]: “There is no obligation upon the negligent, as he is like the sleeper whose accountability is lifted…” (1)
There is no obligation on the negligent, though he may be asked about the cause of his negligence, unlike the sleeper who is not questioned in this regard.
Sincerity in Intention
Rule [302]: “Whenever intention to draw near to God is combined with what does not conflict with sincerity, it does not detract from the validity of worship; since the goal is fully achieved and the contradiction is not realized.” (2)
Sincerity excludes anything contradictory, whether prior or subsequent, but drawing near to God can coexist with other intentions that are rationally and legally commendable, and their presence does not harm or negate the act. Thus, combining the intention to draw near with cleanliness and waiting for the prayer leader and the one who leads the congregation is possible and commendable without objection.
The statement: “Among these is waiting for the imam during his bowing (ruku‘) if one senses being ahead of him to catch up in bowing; this assists the intended congregational prayer decreed by the Lawgiver, combining two acts of drawing near: the drawing near by bowing and the drawing near by assistance. Some common folk mistakenly thought this was shirk (polytheism) in worship, but it is not as claimed; otherwise, preaching the message, teaching knowledge, enjoining good and forbidding evil, the call to prayer and the iqama would be considered shirk in obedience, which is not so by consensus.” (1)
This is evidence of refutation, and the proof is valid because shirk in action occurs only when the servant’s obligation is the ultimate aim of the action, not when the ultimate aim is the Truth or the drawing near to God in respect of the action.
In Conclusion, Praise be to God, Lord of the Worlds
Sources of Verification
- Al-Sharbiini, Muhammad ibn Ahmad, Al-Iqna‘ fi Alfaz Ibn Shuja‘, Beirut, Dar al-Ma‘rifa.
- Al-‘Amili, Muhammad ibn Maki (the First Martyr), Al-Qawa‘id wal-Fawa’id, Qom, Maktabat al-Dawwari, Hijri Edition, 1396 AH.
- Al-‘Amili, Muhammad ibn Maki (the First Martyr), Al-Qawa‘id wal-Fawa’id, Qom, Maktabat al-Mufid, First Edition, 1399 AH, edited by Sayyid Abdulhadi al-Hakim.
- Al-Tusi, Muhammad ibn al-Hasan, Tahdhib al-Ahkam, Tehran, Dar al-Kutub al-Islamiyyah, Fourth Edition, 1365 SH.
- Al-Majlisi, Muhammad Baqir, Bihar al-Anwar, Beirut, Mu’assasat al-Wafa’, Second Edition, 1403 AH.
- Al-Nuri al-Tabarsi, Mirza Husayn, Mustadrak al-Wasa’il, Qom, Mu’assasat Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them), Second Edition, 1408 AH.
- Al-Nisaburi, Abu Abdullah al-Hakim, Al-Mustadrak ‘ala al-Sahihayn, Beirut, Dar al-Ma‘rifa, 1406 AH.
