What Do the Akhbari and Usuli Say?

What Do the Akhbari and Usuli Say?
(With respect)

Ayatollah Mohammadreza Nekooham

Publisher: Sobh Farda Publications
Publication Year: 2014 (Second Edition)
Pages: 360
ISBN (Second Edition): 978-600-6435-600

Preface

Endless salutations to the pure soul of the Noble Prophet of Islam, the Seal of Prophethood, and to the shining stars of the Islamic world, the Imams of Guidance, the Infallibles. May God’s peace be upon the pure souls of those who have followed the true path of guidance, the followers of purity, infallibility, Imamate, and Wilayah—true Shia Muslims and supporters of Amir al-Mu’minin, the axis of the world of existence, Imam Ali, the seekers of the Mount Sinai of occultation, the aspirants and vigilant hearts of Imam al-Zamana (the awaited Mahdi), the redeemer of humanity and the world from the chains of Satan.

Before delving into the contentious discussions of the Akhbari and Usuli schools—both torchbearers of Shia faith and Wilayah—it is necessary to first consider the obvious and hidden hands of imperialism in religious doctrinal conflicts. This will provide a brief background for a more profound understanding of the topic.

Hidden and Visible Hands

Before entering the prolonged debate between the Akhbari and Usuli schools, a question arises: Why is it necessary to renew old theological wounds by reviving the debates and disputes of the past few centuries? Why should we bring up the outdated and worn-out Akhbari school that is now on the decline, particularly in the context of the Shia state where Usuli scholars are in charge? What purpose does reviving their weak and destructive beliefs serve when the cause of their decline has already been established? What is the result of such discussions?

In response to this question, one must say: Throughout history, there have always been hidden and invisible forces that seize the opportunity to manipulate seemingly ordinary and even necessary theological differences, sowing seeds of chaos and conflict. These forces provoke society and people into debates that, in turn, allow them to further their own agendas and secure their enduring interests. These challenges have consistently appeared in Islamic societies, where, on one side, there is religious retrogression and tyranny, and on the other, the Akhbari and Usuli schools. Furthermore, the advent of modernity and unprincipled progressivism exacerbates these conflicts, leading each side to unwittingly submit to the oppressive forces of imperialism. In the end, such efforts result in the distortion of religious truths and realities in Islamic societies. It is necessary, therefore, to identify the hidden hands of imperialism and exploitation, the ignorant reactionaries, and the uncommitted modernists among the simple-minded masses, and to remove these obstacles with full awareness.

Yesterday and Today

One must ask: Why have the Akhbari and Usuli schools, which once held intense animosity toward each other, now entered into a period of peace and reconciliation? Why do Usuli institutions today print and publish the works of the Akhbari scholars of the past and treat them as Usuli scholars? What has become of the hatred, hostility, and curses of the past? How is it that today, without any ideological conflict, these issues are being revisited, and Usuli scholars either accept or reject some of the claims made by the Akhbaris, without engaging in strife?

The answer lies in the fact that the agents of imperialism and those who fuel divisions, now, only due to a change in the positioning of scholars and intellectuals, have rekindled the flames of ideological warfare under the guise of other issues. If we closely examine their tactics, scholars and thinkers will realize that it is possible to follow a path of mutual understanding, without giving further ammunition to the enemies of truth.

The Cause of Disputes

From what has been discussed and many untold matters, it becomes clear that the cause of the long-standing conflict between the Akhbari and Usuli schools was not the diversity of thoughts and beliefs but was, in fact, due to two main factors: the hidden forces and the naivety of individuals, especially religious scholars. These two factors led scholars, who were all adherents of the Wilayah and who shared fundamental religious principles, to engage in a protracted dispute—a historical event that brings about a sense of embarrassment.

It should be noted that the discussion, dialogue, and exchange of different views within religion is not only harmless but also provides the best ground for the growth, advancement, and revival of lofty scientific and religious ideas. The differences in opinion and their exchange are not only beneficial but necessary. What is harmful and detrimental is war, conflict, and strife, which imperialists exploit. Therefore, it is imperative for religious scholars and, consequently, the faithful people to engage in discussions and exchange ideas without becoming pawns in the hands of hidden agents or victims of the misguided biases of the ignorant.

Today and Every Day

A brief review of the history of such disputes and divisive conflicts serves as an urgent reminder to religious scholars and the Muslim community. They must ensure that Muslims, scholars, religious figures, families, and especially the youth—who are most vulnerable to such manipulations—understand and commit to the importance of engaging in dialogue and discussion in the appropriate manner while abandoning conflict and strife, which have always been, and will continue to be, harmful.

Inciting such disputes in the history of our emotional and warrior-like Iranian nation has caused turmoil. This continues today and will undoubtedly be exploited by imperialists in the future. However, awareness and vigilance within the community, particularly among scholars of both religion and the world, can prevent these conflicts from escalating. If discussions and the exchange of ideas occur in a manner free from strife, ethical misconduct, and harmful disagreements, they can lead to the growth of ideas, intellectual unity, and the moral and spiritual development of the Islamic community, thus distancing religious societies from unworthy anomalies.

Thus, the purpose of discussing these matters is twofold: with regard to the past, it involves critique, analysis, and research on various theological issues, establishing the truth and falsity of each without engaging in conflict and animosity between the Akhbari and Usuli schools, both of which, despite their differences, hold Wilayah and share the same fundamental religious values. With regard to the future, it involves the intelligence and awareness to choose among the various plans and ideas being presented in society every day, ensuring that they do not lead to ethical challenges, social unrest, political conflicts, or division among the nation.

For the health and well-being of the individual and the community, the necessity of two principles must be acknowledged: one is the importance of dialogue, the exchange of ideas, and the pursuit of research, and the other is the avoidance of unfounded prejudice and disruptive conflict, which have regrettably been sowed by the agents of falsehood since the early days of Islam, as the Prophet (PBUH) himself warned about the division of the Muslim Ummah.

Abu Abdullah (7) said: “People are divided into three categories: the scholars, the students, and the refuse. We (the Imams) are the scholars, our followers are the students and sincere companions, and the rest of the people are the refuse.”

In this statement, Imam al-Sadiq (7) explains that all people are divided into three groups: scholars, students (those who are loyal and sincere to the Imams), and the worthless (refuse, meaning those who are devoid of value and substance). The latter group, he says, consists of people who are hollow, void of meaning, and ignorant, regardless of their numbers or affiliations. He further clarifies that other than the Imams and their sincere followers, no one possesses true knowledge or understanding, and in fact, those who oppose the truth are akin to a lifeless body without a soul.

This hadith is difficult to comprehend, as it asserts that only the Imams and their followers are the possessors of true knowledge and understanding, regardless of their small number, while the rest are misled and in error. It teaches that the followers of the Imams are the true believers, and anyone who is not aligned with them is essentially worthless, regardless of how many they may be or how powerful they appear.

In this narration, Imam al-Sadiq (7) reveals a profound secret from the family of Muhammad (9), a secret that may be difficult for many to accept or understand. However, the true Shi’a is one who believes in this and strives to make it a reality across the world, despite the challenges and the complexity of grasping such a deep concept.

3. The Mirror of Truth

Abu Abdullah (7) said: “If all the beings on earth were to deny the leadership of Amir al-Mu’minin (7), God would punish them all and cast them into Hell.”

Imam al-Sadiq (7) further explains that if all the creatures on earth were to reject the authority of Amir al-Mu’minin (7), God would punish them and cast them into Hell. Thus, denying the leadership of Amir al-Mu’minin is equivalent to rejecting the oneness of God and the divine faith itself. This rejection could encompass all beings on earth, making them all deserving of eternal punishment.

The hadith emphasizes that belief in the oneness of God is inherently linked to the recognition of Amir al-Mu’minin (7). Rejection of him is tantamount to rejecting the true faith, and this can lead to the damnation of all beings, irrespective of their status.

This leads to the question of what “all those on earth” means in the context of Imam al-Sadiq’s (7) statement. Does it refer only to human beings, or does it include all creatures? And if, hypothetically, even prophets, saints, and pious individuals were to oppose the leadership of Amir al-Mu’minin (7), would they also face divine punishment? While such a hypothesis is impossible—since all prophets and saints are bound by love and devotion to Amir al-Mu’minin (7)—the principle is universally applicable.

Indeed, Amir al-Mu’minin (7) is the embodiment of truth, and truth itself is inseparable from him. Opposition to him is equivalent to rejection of truth, and it brings about disbelief, polytheism, hypocrisy, and ruin, even if the opponents are numerous. Thus, belief in Amir al-Mu’minin (7) is the criterion of faith, and opposition to him is the measure of disbelief.

4. Do Not Doubt!

Imam al-Ridha (7), quoting his ancestors, narrated from the Prophet Muhammad (9): “O Ali, you are the best of creation. No one doubts you except a disbeliever.”

This statement means that to doubt in Ali (7) is equivalent to disbelief, and belief in him is synonymous with belief in God. Doubt in Ali (7) is the same as doubting God, and belief in Ali (7) is aligned with faith in God. The true meaning of doubt here is genuine uncertainty, and disbelief refers to a true, real disbelief that cannot be reconciled with outward faith.

5. The Source of Purity

Imam al-Sadiq (7) said: “Everything that does not come from this house is false.”

The house in question refers to the house of the Prophet (9) and the Imams (7), whose knowledge and teachings are the only true and valid source of guidance. Anything that emerges from outside this house is inherently false and cannot be considered as truth.

Thus, the truth is that which emanates from the Ahl al-Bayt (7), and everything outside this is falsehood. This includes knowledge, religion, and any other aspect of life. The closer something is to the house of the Imams (7), the more true and genuine it is. All that deviates from this house is erroneous and lacks substance.

6. Where Angels Descend

Imam al-Sadiq (7) said: “Our words are difficult and incomprehensible. Only a closely aligned angel, a prophet, or a believer whose heart has been tested by God can accept them. So, take what your hearts recognize and return what you do not understand to us.”

The teachings of the Ahl al-Bayt (7) are so profound and difficult to grasp that only a few can truly comprehend them—those who are spiritually pure and enlightened, such as the angels or the prophets. For others, it is recommended that they accept what resonates with their hearts and leave what they do not understand to the Imams (7).

This hadith highlights the depth and complexity of the teachings of the Imams (7), which are not easily understood by ordinary individuals. Only those who are divinely guided are able to fully appreciate their significance.

7. Prophets Kneel

Imam al-Sadiq (7) said: “Some of our teachings are beyond the comprehension of even a close angel, a sent prophet, or a devout believer.”

The teachings of the Ahl al-Bayt (7) are so lofty and profound that even angels, prophets, or the most devout believers may find them beyond their capacity. When asked who could comprehend such teachings, Imam al-Sadiq (7) replied, “We ourselves can bear them.”

This statement indicates the extraordinary nature of the Imams’ knowledge and wisdom. Their teachings are not simply accessible to anyone—only those with the highest levels of spiritual insight, such as the Imams themselves, can fully understand them.

Conclusion:

From these narrations and others like them, it becomes evident that only one group—those who adhere to the teachings of the Twelve Imams (7)—are considered saved and on the right path. All other groups are misled, regardless of their size or status. Furthermore, the knowledge and truth that emanate from the Ahl al-Bayt (7) are the only valid sources of guidance, and any deviation from this is considered falsehood.

The beliefs of the Shia, which include the acceptance of the oneness of God, the resurrection, the Prophethood, and the Imamate, are rooted in this understanding. Only those who adhere to these beliefs, including the rightful leadership of the Imams (7), are considered to be on the true path, while all others are considered to be misled and in error.

From the Emergence of Islam to the Present Day

Since the inception of Islam, throughout the Islamic lands and in most parts of the world, the religion has been represented in various opposing forms by groups such as the Hanbalis, Hanafis, Shafi’is, Malikis, and other seemingly Islamic sects. Colonial powers, under the leadership of figures like Satan and the devils among jinn and humankind, have fragmented Islam into factions and groups. As a result, the history of Islam, marked by such sectarianism, has seen nothing but decline and defeat for Muslims. Despite its completeness and magnificence, Islam has been caught in the hands of corrupt and powerful rulers who outwardly claim to be Muslim. Today, the Islamic world, with over a billion so-called Muslims, finds itself under the domination of Israel, with no path forward except either decline or revolution. Such a revolution can only be achieved through an Islamic government, led by the true followers of Amir al-Mu’minin, the general deputies of the Awaited Mahdi (may God hasten his reappearance).

It is hoped that, in time, a day will come when Muslims return to their roots and, through intellectual power, mental strength, and the arm of action, reform both themselves and the world.

Internal Splits within Shia Islam

The group of the saved and those destined for salvation, the Shia, has itself become divided into many factions. Each group, whether intentionally or not, has paved its own way and, at a certain stage, halted its progress. Some have deviated, elevating non-infallible figures as their imams, until in the recent centuries, colonial exploitation and imperialist policies actively came into play, identifying sect-making as a fundamental means of destroying religion. They were never negligent in this pursuit and, in time, created the Babi and Bahá’í sects, bringing with them numerous superstitions that became subjects of mockery. At times, figures like Kasravi would emerge, proposing new religions, writing about “Shi’ism” and creating a Quran called “Warjavand,” which brought nothing but confusion, deviation, misguided thoughts, and betrayal. Though his superstitions had some effect on naive individuals, leading them to absorb false ideas.

At one time, figures like the Barqis wrote books such as “The Inquisition” and “Reason and Religion.” These individuals, who found themselves wandering in the valley of divine guardianship and religion, with their hollow and meaningless rhetoric, sought to teach guardianship to those who were already adherents of it. However, through their compounded ignorance, they injected superstition in place of guardianship, reason, and religion.

The Age of Civilisation and Diarrhea of Pens!

In this era, where pens have become as prolific as diarrhea, a kind of intellectual chaos has erupted. Everyone, like an actor on the stage of belief, weaves stories and targets the pure souls of the people, especially the youth.

Some attack Shia beliefs, others criticize the clergy, while some foster pessimism about the entire religion. They invite our precious youth towards “science, civilisation, progress, and modernity,” yet, like the figures before them, they have no knowledge of science nor any effect of civilisation.

In today’s dark and brutal world, where killing, plunder, betrayal, and deception are rampant, all these seemingly beautiful and eloquent words serve only to obscure the truth of religion, the way of the prophets, and the essence of Shia spirituality. Their goal is to extinguish the light of guardianship and Shiaism.

All of these misguided factions are oblivious to the fact that religion, guardianship, the way of the prophets, and the Shia clergy are protected and safeguarded by a mighty and exalted power, both in the visible and the invisible realms. The venomous harm these lowly individuals seek to cause will have no effect other than creating distress in society.

Of course, the religious community, especially the Shia and the clergy, must stand firm against all the misguided factions, just as their spiritual and historical ancestors did. They must rise up and expose every heretical and false sect worldwide so that, eventually, all the misguided ideologies are obliterated. May that day come soon.

The Rise of the Akhbari School and Usuli Approach

From the early days of Islam and the time of the Imams, until the period of occultation and beyond, scholars and jurists have followed two distinct schools of thought: one group was more free-thinking, contemplating religious issues with intellectual insight and wisdom, while the other strictly adhered to the words of the Infallible Imams and avoided any independent reasoning. The former was known as the Usuli school, while the latter was known as the Akhbari school.

Though these two groups did not have the same structure and had differing methods in issuing fatwas and interpreting religion, their primary distinction was that those who were solely dependent on the narrations of the Infallible Imams were termed Akhbari, whereas those who also considered the Quran and logical reasoning alongside the narrations of the Imams were known as Usuli.

Despite both groups supporting the principles of guardianship, religion, infallibility, and the Imamate, they often criticized one another. The Akhbaris accused the Usulis of deviating from religion and becoming attached to foreign influences, while the Usulis saw the Akhbaris as rigid, conservative, and simplistic, akin to two brothers fighting over inheritance.

The Akhbari school traces its origins back to the time of the Imams and views itself as the true supporter of their teachings. Figures like Shaykh Hurr al-‘Amili in response to the claim that the leader of the Akhbari school was Shaykh ‘Istraabadi, the author of Fawa’id al-Madaniyyah, commented: “It is astonishing to claim that the leader of the Akhbari school is the author of Fawa’id al-Madaniyyah. How can this be proven when the true leaders of the Akhbari school are the Prophet and the Infallible Imams, as they did not engage in Ijtihad, but followed the narrations from the Imams in all matters? This tradition has been followed by their special companions and the rest of the Shia for over seven hundred years.”

The Beliefs of the Akhbari School

The Akhbari school has a broad range of beliefs, and this writing will only address the main and important points. In order to help the reader understand the intellectual atmosphere of the Akhbari school, these ideas will be presented from the perspective of the Akhbari thinkers, leaving the evaluation and critique to the Usulis for now.

One of the central beliefs of the Akhbari school is their view of the relationship between Islam and human needs. Akhbaris argue that if someone looks at Islam with fairness and insight, they will see that Islam has fully blossomed within the context of revelation, Imamate, and the infallibility of the Imams. Islam, during the time of the Prophet (PBUH) and the Infallible Imams, revealed all its laws, both general and specific, and nothing is lacking in its teachings.

During the time of occultation, the scholars and narrators continued to preserve the teachings of the Imams, and the religion was followed in this way, relying on the narrations of the Imams, aligning their thoughts, beliefs, and practices accordingly. The Hadith of Thaqalayn (“I am leaving among you two precious things…”) encapsulates this method: the Quran and the family of the Prophet (PBUH) are to guide the Muslim community together.

A Summary of the Beliefs of the Akhbaris

The most significant beliefs of the Akhbaris, along with their other fundamental and root convictions, can be outlined as follows:

A – The method of ijtihad employed by Shia jurists is invalid, and both reason (‘aql) and consensus (ijma’) are ineffective.

B – Imitation (taqlid) in the branches of religion is invalid. In this regard, scholars who believe in imitation are misguided, and their general representation (niyabah) is not accepted.

C – Imitating the most learned (a’lam) is contrary to religion, fabricated, false, and an innovation (bid’ah).

D – Acquiring Islamic sciences is a waste of time and misguidance. These sciences are rivals to the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Religion, in their view, is simple and does not require such studies for understanding. Principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) have no scientific value and are merely the invention of philosophical scholars, not considered a religious science. Usuli scholars, in reality, follow analogy (qiyas), ijtihad, and maslahat mursalah (public interest), rather than adhering to religion.

E – The study of philosophy and rational sciences is prohibited for anyone, regardless of their status, because rational sciences were propagated by the Greek philosophers and are seen as a serious competitor to religion.

F – Earning a livelihood for scholars, just like for everyone else, is an obligatory personal duty (wajib ‘ayni). Therefore, working while studying is a requirement for scholars.

G – Any income from religious sources such as khums, the share of the Imam, zakat, and the public treasury (bayt al-mal) is forbidden for scholars, whether its use is obligatory or recommended.

H – Khums and the share of the Imam are permissible for all Shia, and giving them to the Sayyids and other scholars is unnecessary.

I – The Qur’an and the Islamic holy book have been altered and corrupted.

J – Taqiyyah (dissimulation) is required for everyone, anywhere, and under any circumstances, unless criticizing Shia scholars, but only to the extent that it does not harm religion.

K – Testifying to the leadership of Amir al-Mu’minin Ali (peace be upon him) in the adhan (call to prayer) and iqamah (second call to prayer) is forbidden and an innovation.

L – The congregational Friday prayer is obligatory, even if performed under a tyrant, and its abandonment is forbidden and contrary to the clear command of the Qur’an.

M – Usuli scholars are worldly and corrupted, filled with jealousy and involved in political scheming.

Following the summary of the beliefs of the Akhbaris and the Usulis, a critique, analysis, and discussion of each will be presented in separate chapters.

Final Remarks:

1. Any critique or evaluation of the beliefs of the Akhbaris or Usulis will be conducted without prejudice or bias. Each discussion will be presented freely and supported by evidence and truth, regardless of whether it aligns with the Usulis, the Akhbaris, or neither. It is reason, proof, and the truth of the matter that must be pursued, not sectarianism or stereotypes.
2. Just as there are differences among Usuli scholars of different schools of thought, there are also differences among Akhbari scholars. Some, like Amin Estarabadi, are very harsh, while others, such as the author of Hada’iq, are seen as being close to Usuli thought. Similarly, Usuli scholars vary, with some prioritising the principles (usul) more, and others focusing more on narrations (akhbar). The key distinguishing feature between the Akhbaris and Usulis is the unbalanced and inappropriate attacks that some Akhbari scholars make, which should be eradicated from all scholarly communities.
3. By “Akhbari”, we refer to those who, due to a lack of ability or weakness of character, ascribe words and beliefs to God and the Prophet without understanding or awareness. However, the great scholars, who are the foundation of the religion and Shiaism, and who possess reasoned and insightful words, do not deserve to be called Akhbari. Similarly, being Usuli does not mean a complete and perfect understanding of religion, as even among them, one can find errors, deficiencies, and deviations.

The Akhbari Perspective from the Viewpoint of the Usulis

The Usulis regard the Akhbaris as naive, simplistic, undereducated, misguided, and erroneous in their thinking. They see them as individuals whose lack of intellectual capacity and personal growth has led to distortions in both their fundamental beliefs and practices. However, the term “Akhbari” is used in the same way as the term “Sunnis”, who deny the leadership of the infallibles (Ahl al-Bayt). In this sense, both terms are misapplied: the “Akhbari” does not fully grasp the concept of “news” (akhbar), just as the “Sunni” does not truly follow the “Sunnah” (tradition of the Prophet).

In reality, the Akhbaris possess the ability to preserve and narrate certain Hadiths but lack the capacity to properly understand or interpret them. In contrast, the Usulis, through precise reasoning and intellectual foundations, bear the full weight of the entire body of Hadith and defend it, recognising and interpreting the authentic sayings of the infallible ones. However, it should be noted that not every narration or Hadith, especially those found in books from opponents, is considered reliable. Books filled with fabrications, Isra’iliyyat (Judaic traditions), and forgeries need to be scrutinised carefully. This is a scholarly task that only Usuli scholars possess the tools and expertise to undertake.

In essence, it is the Usulis who follow both the Sunnah and the Akhbar, provided certain conditions are met. They accept the Hadiths with gratitude but under two strict conditions: firstly, that the Hadith is from an infallible source; and secondly, that the chain of transmission (isnad) is verified as authentic by scholarly experts. The Usulis reject any narration that does not meet these standards, as it is seen as unreliable and ordinary.

Religious Practice and Deviations

The Akhbaris often begin by claiming to awaken people from spiritual negligence and restore religion to its pure, unaltered form. They argue that they are saving Islam from corruption, innovation, and excess. However, unknowingly or otherwise, their rhetoric and actions have caused significant harm to religion, serving as a tool in the hands of those who seek to mislead others from the true path. In the end, they may unknowingly align themselves with the enemies of the true faith.

In contrast, the Usulis, who are rightful supporters of Amir al-Mu’minin Ali (peace be upon him), have consistently stood as bright stars in the firmament of Islamic scholarship, not paying heed to the baseless claims and rhetoric of any group, including the Akhbaris. Their steadfast faith is a model for others to follow.

The Accursed Group and the Corruption of the Faith

There have always been oppressive and criminal groups who were enemies of the Ahl al-Bayt and sought to distort the truth, concealing it from the people. They sowed seeds of oppression and crime throughout history and introduced numerous innovations (bid’ah) and distortions into the religion. The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) had warned of the necessity of confronting such groups, as indicated in the Hadith on innovation:

“When innovations appear among my Ummah, the scholar must make his knowledge apparent. Whoever does not do so will incur the curse of Allah.” (al-Sunan al-Kubra)

Innovation is anything newly introduced into the religion that was not part of it originally. While innovation in worldly matters can be good or bad, innovation in religious matters is always rejected, prohibited, and sinful.

The Qur’an emphasizes the severity of punishment for those who introduce innovations into religion, as seen in numerous verses that condemn the altering of divine commands.

The Prophet (peace be upon him) also stated:

“The best guidance is the guidance of Muhammad, the best speech is the Book of Allah, and the worst of matters are innovations. Every innovation is a misguidance, and every misguidance leads to the fire.” (Sahih Muslim)

In this regard, the Usulis maintain that any interference in the religion by anyone other than the divinely authorized sources is a deviation and leads to corruption. They stress the finality and sufficiency of the Qur’an and the Sunnah (through the Ahl al-Bayt) as the sole, unaltered sources of Islamic guidance.

The Essence of Innovation in Religion

The terms bid’ah (innovation), ibda’ (creation), and khalq (creation) are related but distinct. Khalq refers to the creation of something with a unique quality, while ibda’ is the creation of something that did not previously exist. Bid’ah refers to introducing something new into religion that has no basis in the original practice, which is considered an undesirable deviation.

In religion, innovation is never permissible, and introducing something new or altering divine laws is always considered corrupt and harmful. Only Allah is the true legislator, and any alteration or addition to His revealed laws is a form of misguidance.

Although any innovation originating from human authority is commendable and praiseworthy, innovation and novelty in religion is a form of deviation and misguidance; it is an irregular act employed in the pursuit of deficiency and imperfection. Religion is a well-organized system given by the Divine, and any innovation within it endangers its integrity. For instance, if a person has the power to build a structure and exercises this authority on his own property, his action is commendable. However, if this power is used to construct an unauthorized or unjust building on someone else’s property, his action is blameworthy and condemned as an act of transgression. Similarly, introducing new elements into religion—based on the teachings and rules given by God—equates to an unjust act of constructing something in the realm of religion. Moreover, the religion of Islam has been perfected with the finality of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and is free from any deficiency that would require further refinement or completion. Therefore, according to various hadiths, every innovator in religion is considered to be misguided. The Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) himself, in this regard, ascended the pulpit and sternly stated:
(O gathering of Muslims, the best guidance is the guidance of Muhammad, the best speech is the Book of God, and the worst of matters are its innovations. Every innovation is misguidance, and every misguidance leads to the Fire).

Several points in this noble hadith are worth noting:

1. The narration highlights the concern and discontent of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him).
2. The Prophet’s concern arises from the introduction of innovation into the religion, which constitutes an encroachment upon the Divine domain.
3. The Prophet (peace be upon him) considers his own guidance and the Qur’an as the best of guidance and speech, and does not place anything at the same level as these two.
4. Any matter placed alongside the Qur’an and Sunnah is harmful, and its adherent is misguided because the innovator implies that the religion is incomplete and needs to be perfected through innovation.

In another narration, a man approached Imam Sadiq (peace be upon him) and said: “I have invented a prayer.” The Imam sharply rebuked him, saying: “Leave me alone with your invention.”

With this introduction, the statements and claims made by the Akhbari school regarding innovation and their accusations against the Usuli scholars will be critiqued and examined.

It must be stated unequivocally that the Akhbari understanding of innovation—both in its conceptualization and its practical application—is erroneous. Beyond this misunderstanding of meaning, they also conflate concepts and examples. Moreover, they recklessly and without respect for human dignity level accusations against the Usuli scholars.

The assertion that the foundation of the sacred religion of Islam is based on the Qur’an and Sunnah is incontrovertible and not a subject of dispute between the Akhbari and Usuli schools. Furthermore, it is true and sincere to say that the infallible Imams are the authentic interpreters and explainers of the Qur’an; however, the claim that they are not the legislators is a gross exaggeration. For example, the well-known Hadith of Thaqalayn, which is accepted by the Akhbari school, refers to the Sunnah as one of the “weights.” Of course, religious scholars are merely interpreters of religion, not lawmakers in the strict sense, as they, like other Muslims, must also follow the law.

Another point to consider is that although the Qur’an is a boundless and profound ocean of knowledge, accessible only to the Infallibles and those directly addressed by it, it is not completely silent or incapable of being understood by ordinary human beings. The Qur’an is the only heavenly book revealed for all of mankind, and it is not beyond the reach of general understanding. While it may be too deep for ordinary human minds to fully comprehend, it is not so obscure that no interpretation can be made by regular people, even with the guidance of the Infallibles.

Furthermore, adherence to the true religion is not synonymous with dogmatism or ignorance. Blind adherence is not about following every word of the Infallibles without understanding, but about understanding their teachings correctly. This includes the Akhbari belief that Usulis are misguided for their deviation from the words of the Infallibles. This belief itself constitutes an innovation.

Moreover, believing that many renowned religious scholars and, by extension, the Shia people are misled is itself a form of misguidance. According to this belief, the religion of Islam, after having been handed over to the Usulis 800 years ago, became corrupted by many innovations. This view is absurd and unacceptable to any rational Muslim. The Akhbari misunderstanding of innovation in religion results from confusing the introduction of something new in religion with the true process of deriving religious rulings from the Qur’an and Sunnah.

The Usuli approach, in contrast, does not introduce anything new into religion but rather derives from the existing teachings of the Qur’an and Sunnah. The mechanism of deriving religious rulings and understanding what the Shari’a entails is not innovation; it is the process of faithfully interpreting and applying the original religious texts. To mistake this for innovation reflects the Akhbari’s simplistic and misguided understanding of religious science.

The Akhbaris also oppose the Usuli method of ijtihad, seeing it as contrary to the Qur’an and Sunnah. According to the Akhbari view, the only sources of authority in Islam are the Qur’an and Sunnah, with no room for reason (aql) or consensus (ijma’) to be considered as valid sources of religious knowledge. Over time, these two sources—reason and consensus—were adopted by Shia scholars, and according to the Akhbaris, they are baseless and corrupt the ijtihadi approach, which they claim leads to a mixture of human ideas with divine principles.

The primary critique the Akhbari school levels at the Usuli method is: why did the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and the Infallible Imams not mention these two sources (reason and consensus) if they were meant to be part of religious practice? The Akhbaris question how these sources could have been discovered by Usuli scholars but not by the Prophet and the Imams themselves, implying that if they were legitimate, they would have been mentioned in the Qur’an or by the Prophet.

The Usulis’ approach to ijtihad is based on the assumption that religious knowledge must come from the Qur’an and Sunnah, and any attempt to introduce new sources or methods is seen as an innovation, a deviation from the correct path.

A mujtahid, with utmost sincerity and precision, presents an interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah to the people. The mujtahid carries the essence of the words of Allah, the Prophet, and the Imams. They consider themselves, unlike ordinary individuals, bound to follow these teachings, but with the significant difference that a jurist (faqih) has access to the primary and foundational sources, and what they convey to the people is a translation of these sources. The public, in turn, follows the mujtahid or faqih, who is knowledgeable and aware of the religious rulings, thus following the Book and Sunnah through them.

A faqih or mujtahid never regards their own opinion as independent. The people also believe that the faqih only conveys what is from the religion itself and nothing else. They neither subtract nor add anything to the religion. A clear testament to this can be found in the legal treatises (risāla-‘amaliyya) of the Shia jurists. A careful examination reveals how scrupulously the Shia jurists avoid making statements without evidence. Hence, throughout these treatises, the terms “most cautious” (ahwat), “precaution” (ihtiyāt), “most excellent” (ajwād), and “preferable” (awlā) frequently appear, indicating that the jurist has no stronger evidence than what they have presented. This method of deduction in Shia jurisprudence and their commitment to truth leaves no room for doubt or objection regarding their sincerity and the integrity of their guardianship of the Divine trust.

However, in this context, one must not overlook the scholarly system and approach of the Shia jurists, nor their use of terms such as “most cautious” and “precaution” and the associated concepts, which reflect an emphasis on caution. This warrants an analysis, which can be discussed in the following aspects:

A) Precision and Caution in Legal Rulings

It is undeniable that Shia jurists, with utmost sincerity and piety, strive to acquire the religious rulings and the foundations of religious law. The use of terms like “most cautious” and “precaution” reflects their moral purity, sincerity, and scholarly piety. Nevertheless, one criticism that can be raised in contrast to their sincerity and piety is that many of their legal opinions are accompanied by doubt and uncertainty, which could affect their authority among the Muslim population.

It might be argued that for a mujtahid, there is no better way to demonstrate their piety and sincerity than by openly declaring how they arrived at their conclusions. However, this claim can be countered by saying that while certainty or well-grounded belief is sufficient in acquiring religious rulings, not every instance in which the term “precaution” or “most cautious” is used falls under this category. At times, this usage may result from a lack of complete investigation, insufficient understanding of the religious principles or the issues at hand, haste in issuing a ruling, or other challenges. As such, numerous Shia legal rulings are infused with terms like “precaution” or “most cautious” not due to exhaustive research, but because of an unclear or incomplete understanding of the matter, which may lead to reliance on cautious approaches.

B) The Concept of Ijtihād and Research

When jurists define ijtihād (legal reasoning), they state, “Ijtihād is the exertion of one’s utmost effort to derive a legal ruling from the sources” (al-ijtihād isfarāgh al-wus‘ fi tahsīl al-ḥukm ash-shar‘ī). Furthermore, regarding practical principles, it is stated: “One can resort to practical principles like presumption of permissibility (al-barā’a) or the presumption of continuity (al-istishāb) only after exhaustive inquiry and despair of finding further evidence.” Yet, a close examination of legal opinions and rulings reveals numerous instances where this is not the case. Many of the opinions reflect narrow-mindedness, negligence, insufficient research, and hastiness in issuing rulings, even in cases of definitive legal opinions, let alone those relying on caution or precaution.

Hence, while jurisprudential scholars may not be on par with the traditional scholars of hadith in terms of meticulousness and investigation, it is not the case that their work throughout the thousand-year history of jurisprudence has been free from error or shortcomings. Therefore, it is essential for the ḥawza (Islamic seminaries) and its scholars to thoroughly re-evaluate the foundations, premises, and issues of fiqh and ensure that they approach religious rulings with utmost diligence, research, and analysis, avoiding haste in issuing judgments or carelessness in investigation. Why should a jurist, in their relatively short life, strive to issue rulings on all matters of fiqh or even all religious propositions, when such an approach is bound to be flawed? Why should the research process be simplistic, and why shouldn’t a jurist focus their research on a few issues or even one matter, conducting thorough and detailed analysis? It would be more beneficial than superficial judgments or opinions on a vast number of issues.

C) The Need for a Fresh and Thorough Review of Shia Jurisprudence

In conclusion, just as scholars of hadith have been criticized for lacking depth, care, and investigation, Shia faqīhs must also remain vigilant to avoid such pitfalls.

D) The Issue of Israeli Narrations

Another criticism that scholars of the hadith school (akhbariyyah) level against the usūlī jurists is that while the latter place great emphasis on hadiths and act upon them, there are many instances where they disregard or criticise numerous hadiths, or subject them to interpretation, turning instead to rational or literal reasoning. Examples of this include ignoring hadiths on the permissibility of khums (a form of alms), the obligation of Jumu’ah (Friday prayer), and others.

To address this misconception, it must be stated that the usūlī scholars do, in fact, firmly believe in the hadiths of the Infallibles, and they are the true adherents to these teachings. The issue arises when scholars find certain hadiths to be spurious or weak, and they seek evidence from other sources such as reason or consensus, based on their understanding of what aligns with the Shia tradition and the teachings of the Imams.

Discussion of the Foundations and Principles of Jurisprudence (Usul al-Fiqh)

It is necessary, in this context, to raise the same points that were discussed regarding the sciences of Rijal (the study of narrators of Hadith) and Dirayah (the science of Hadith criticism) in relation to the issues, topics, and foundational principles of the science of Usul al-Fiqh (Principles of Jurisprudence). Although a jurist (faqih) and a mujtahid require knowledge of Usul al-Fiqh in order to derive legal rulings, it is not the case that the foundations and rules of Usul al-Fiqh are free from flaws, distortions, or deficiencies, nor that Usul al-Fiqh itself becomes a proof for deriving legal rulings. Rather, the rules, foundations, and criteria of Usul al-Fiqh, aside from the possibility of deficiencies, serve merely as a means and tool for correctly delineating legal proofs. Furthermore, it is not the case that these foundations do not undergo development, growth, and transformation; on the contrary, they may continually evolve and become more dynamic with time. Therefore, the critiques from akhbari (traditionalist) scholars concerning the development and expansion of Usul al-Fiqh are completely unfounded.

Although the formulation of jurisprudential principles requires the application of Usul al-Fiqh criteria, these criteria themselves require ongoing development and advancement from the part of the usuli jurist and the religious scholar. It is not conceivable to be free from Usul al-Fiqh, just as Usul itself is always in need of scholarly investigation. Thus, it must be stated explicitly and decisively: the foundations and principles of legal rulings, like the external topics and legal rulings themselves, are ever-growing and dynamic.

Scholars of Usul al-Fiqh and the Derivation of Legal Rulings

Here, for a general understanding of the type of legal proofs, the system of issuing fatwas (juridical verdicts), and the method of deriving legal rulings, a brief overview is provided:

The proof used by a jurist in deriving legal rulings is either rational or textual, and both types of proof are binding and obligatory.

A textual proof may be verbal, such as: the Qur’an, or the sayings of the Infallible (ma’sum), which constitute a significant part of the Sunnah, or it may be non-verbal, such as the actions of the Infallible, which, along with their sayings, make up the entirety of the Sunnah.

Rational proofs also fall into two categories: the first is independent rational principles (such as rational perception of the goodness or badness of things and the independent rational implications that emerge from the solid reasoning of human thought), and the second is non-independent rational rulings, which derive from the perceived logical connection between a religious law and another religious or rational law.

The rational proof and the ruling of reason do not contradict the Qur’an and Sunnah. Rather, the rational understanding is the cause of certainty regarding a religious ruling. In the case of conjecture, speculation, analogy (qiyas), and istihsan (juridical preference), there is no foundation for establishing a religious ruling. It is clear that certainty and conviction are not matters that the divine lawgiver has either revoked or interfered with, as certainty is a gift from God to humanity, over which He has no direct control.

Thus, by “rational proof,” we mean the connection between theoretical reason and an established divine ruling, or any other rational evidence available to individuals, which has been further clarified and expanded by the efforts of Shiite scholars. With these independent rational implications and sound innate reasoning, issues such as tawhid (the oneness of God) and risalah (prophethood) are established, and their foundational topics are pursued, without any partnership with the Qur’an or Sunnah. All sharp criticisms from akhbari scholars regarding this issue stem from ignorance.

Consensus (Ijma’)

Much has been said about ijma’ (consensus) since the early days of Islam, with various Muslim groups offering different interpretations. Among them, the Shiite scholars have no disagreement regarding the validity of ijma’, considering it equivalent to the Sunnah itself, because the validity of ijma’ is established only if it is narrated from the Infallible, and their saying is itself part of the transmitted Sunnah. What confuses akhbari thinkers concerning ijma’ is the interpretation offered by Sunni scholars, which creates a misunderstanding between the two. However, the weakness of their reasoning does not apply to the elevated thought of Shiite scholars.

Based on the above, the general principles and foundational rules that are firmly established in the science of Usul—such as reason, consensus, custom, istishab (presumption of continuity), bara’ah (presumption of innocence), and rational implications, as well as the certain premises and other accepted topics in Usul—are not in opposition to the Qur’an and Sunnah. On the contrary, they are necessary for the proof of the Qur’an and Sunnah and are inspired by the realities underlying these foundations.

Shiite scholars, in their method of deduction, have not deviated from the two main sources of Islam—Qur’an and Sunnah—which are the twin pillars of the Shiite faith. They have only made use of what has been inherited from the Qur’an, Sunnah, and the Infallible Imams.

Erroneous Attribution: Analogy and Other Methods

Another issue that disturbs akhbari scholars is why Shiite scholars use analogy (qiyas) in their reasoning, accept rational preferences (istihsan), and consider public interest (masalih mursalah). These methods, they argue, have been rejected by the divine lawgiver, who has even labeled the proponent of analogy as Satan.

To respond to this doubt, let us first briefly explain the concept of analogy, its types, and the acceptability of istihsan and masalih mursalah, and then discuss their validity or invalidity.

In general, analogy comes in two types: logical and jurisprudential. The analogy discussed by logicians is rational proof or argument, while jurisprudential analogy refers to logical reasoning based on comparisons.

Logical Analogy

Logical analogy, which is essentially rational proof, is formed from two premises (minor and major) in one of the four forms of syllogism known in logic. If the conditions are met, the conclusion is self-evident. For example: “The universe is changeable, and anything changeable is a phenomenon. Therefore, the universe is a phenomenon.” In this case, the middle term is “changeability of the universe.”

It is clear that logical analogy is not the subject of discussion here, as its critique is implicit in the form of the analogy itself. Logical analogy is foundational to the thought and culture of the Qur’an, the Sunnah, and human language, and no rational person can speak, reason, or engage in argumentation without using this form of analogy.

Jurisprudential Analogy

Jurisprudential analogy, on the other hand, comes in three types:

1. Analogy with a specified cause: This involves the application of a ruling to a new case that has a similar cause to a case whose cause has been explicitly specified by the lawgiver. The reasoning behind this type of analogy is that, due to the similarity of the causes, the ruling should be the same.
2. Analogy of priority: This occurs when a stronger case is deduced from a weaker one that has an explicit ruling, and the ruling for the weaker case is applied to the stronger case by reason of priority.
3. Unspecified analogy: This type of analogy involves applying a ruling to a case where the cause of the ruling has not been specified, based purely on comparison with a similar case whose cause is known.

Shiite scholars accept the first two types of analogy as rational and in accordance with the law. However, the third type of analogy, which involves unspecified causes, is rejected.

Istihsan and Masalih Mursalah

Istihsan (juridical preference) refers to an unwarranted preference given by the jurist to a particular view, even in the absence of a clear text. Similarly, masalih mursalah refers to the consideration of public interests in legal rulings when there is no clear religious text. Both of these methods are generally rejected by Shiite scholars as invalid and contrary to the principles of jurisprudence.

The attribution of these methods to Shiite scholars is a grave mistake or misrepresentation, stemming from ignorance or malice.

Conclusion: The Role of Usul al-Fiqh in Shiite Jurisprudence

The most important issue causing akhbari scholars to distance themselves from Usuli scholars is the academic rigor of the science of Usul al-Fiqh. Akhbari scholars are so averse to the complexities of this discipline that they openly express fatigue and aversion to it, deeming it a misguided approach to deriving legal rulings. They claim that religion is meant for all people, both ordinary and extraordinary, and that the people should be able to understand the foundations of religion without resorting to scholarly terminology or complex academic constructs. This rejection of Usul al-Fiqh stems from a lack of understanding of its importance in the process of legal deduction and an inability to engage with its nuances.

Those who have even a basic understanding of Islamic sciences and the method of deriving legal rulings know that correct legal deduction is only possible when one first grasps the rules of Arabic language and the terms used in the Qur an, then moves to the study of Hadith, and, finally, learns the rules of Usul al-Fiqh to apply them effectively in legal deduction.

The Underpinning of Inference

Like other Islamic sciences, the science of Usul al-Fiqh (Principles of Jurisprudence) not only has a historical background but also constitutes one of the intellectual fields and arts of the Muslim community. This science demonstrates the extent to which Muslims are devoted to the sacred religion of Islam and its subtleties, as well as their efforts to comprehend it. Therefore, like other Islamic sciences, it has its own specific terminology, which must be explored in detail for each subject. Additionally, it is essential to critique, review, and foster the growth and dynamism of this field, as the great jurists and scholars of Usul have done to the best of their abilities up until the present day.

Thus, one should not, due to limited intellectual resources or insufficient academic knowledge, deny the foundational principles or scientific bases that underpin Shia jurisprudence and the essence of the religion. Rather, one must carefully examine the rules and principles of any science, including Islamic Usul al-Fiqh, and then present an appropriate response, either in support or rejection, based on solid evidence. Discussing matters in a superficial or layman’s manner, without careful consideration, is not worthy of any rational person and merely reflects ignorance or feigned ignorance.

All the objections and misconceptions raised by this group regarding Usul al-Fiqh stem either from mental fatigue and lack of intellectual resources or from a failure to logically understand the meanings and issues of the science. Here, I will briefly address some of these points that have been criticized and scrutinized by the Akhbari group.

The Difference Between Fiqhah and Ijtihad

A) The Akhbari school believed that a narrator (rawi) and a jurist (faqih) are distinct; although both follow the Book and the Sunnah and obey the religion, the jurist holds a higher rank due to their more profound reflection on legal matters. The Akhbari school rejected the concept of ijtihad, claiming that the term ijtihad is not a religious term, and that what is mentioned in the religion is fiqh and jurisprudence, not ijtihad, which they considered a creation of the Usuli school. The Akhbari interpretation of ijtihad is fundamentally flawed, for their claim could be dismissed in two ways: one is the incorrect assertion that the term “ijtihad” and its root “juhd” are not Arabic and have not appeared in the Qur’an and Sunnah, which is clearly mistaken since these terms, in various forms, are prevalent in both the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and the Arabic root is well-established.

Additionally, the Akhbari argument that because obedience to religion and understanding the words of the infallibles does not require great effort or struggle, the use of this term (ijtihad) by the Usuli school is invalid, is incorrect. The Akhbari school fails to acknowledge that, in fact, ijtihad is a rigorous intellectual effort to derive religious rulings, and this understanding should not be confused with a superficial approach to religious comprehension.

The difference between a faqih and a rawi or between a jurist and a mujtahid should be recognized similarly. Although these terms reflect various intellectual depths, they all refer to individuals with expertise in religious law, and all require citation from the Hadith to issue a ruling or fatwa. Therefore, the claim that ijtihad is not a religious term and that fiqh is the true religious term is an oversimplification, revealing a lack of intellectual understanding.

Scientific Premises

B) The scientific premise, which the Akhbari group pursued with much controversy, is neither contrary to the Book and Sunnah nor an innovation in religion. Instead, it is a rational approach to understanding religious duties. In examples such as washing for ritual purity (ghusl) and ablution (wudu), if one is washing the face or hands or other parts of the body and intends to be meticulous, it is impossible to ensure the exact amount of the required area is washed unless they exceed the minimal amount slightly. Rationally, it would be wise to wash slightly beyond the required area to ensure sufficiency.

People routinely apply this principle in many aspects of daily life. A merchant ensures they give a bit more than required to avoid fraud, a driver takes a little extra space when overtaking to avoid accidents, and an individual leaves earlier to catch public transport. These practices are universally adopted and do not depend on religious affiliation, reflecting a basic rational behavior that is also evident in religious observance. The criticism by the Akhbari school in this regard reflects a lack of intellectual rigor, as the same principles are applied routinely in secular matters.

Correct and General

Another issue the Akhbari school raised was the distinction between “correct” and “general” (sahih and a’m), which is an issue of semantics and societal understanding rather than specific to a particular field of study. It revolves around whether the meaning of a term refers to a valid instance or can include both valid and invalid cases. This question is both practical and logical, and it is not confined to the sciences of religion. In religious law, the same issue applies, for example, in the case of a defective prayer: should a prayer that is performed with mistakes be considered a prayer, or should the term only apply to a prayer that is performed correctly? This is a matter of applying a concept to its corresponding instance, and such distinctions are recognized in the wider intellectual community, not just in jurisprudential studies.

In the broader intellectual context, the debate over fiqh and ijtihad, or the difference between a jurist and a narrator, highlights the depth and complexity of Islamic jurisprudence and underscores the intellectual rigor required to navigate the vast corpus of Islamic law.

The Open Table of Religion

The accessibility and simplicity of religion is a noble and elevated slogan, especially in Islam, a point emphasized by the Akhbari group. It is true that anyone, even a person living on a mountain, can attain basic knowledge of Islam, but they cannot achieve a high level of understanding and application of religious teachings without the help of scholars and jurists. Without the guidance of scholars, not only would a person in a remote location be unable to understand their religious obligations, but even educated and enlightened individuals in modern societies need the expertise of scholars to properly understand and implement the teachings of Islam.

Thus, the accessibility of religion for the masses does not contradict the necessity of having precise scientific and practical rules. Islam, which is fundamentally the Qur’an and the Sunnah, provides a vast table of knowledge that welcomes everyone—from the ordinary person to the greatest intellectuals. Everyone, regardless of their level of knowledge, needs to rely on religion for guidance.

In other words, just as no one can claim to be fully self-sufficient without relying on Islam, no one can claim to be completely independent of religion, as it provides the necessary spiritual and intellectual nourishment. This vast, rich, and precise table of religion is available for all to partake in, and no one is left without benefit from it, except those who possess animosity, arrogance, or ignorance.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the issues raised by the Akhbari school, which have been identified and analysed, pertain mostly to the Sunni jurisprudential tradition rather than to Shia jurisprudence. The critiques attributed to the Usuli scholars by the Akhbari school were based on misunderstandings of the jurisprudential methods and principles employed by Shia scholars. The fundamental principles of Shia jurisprudence, based on the Qur’an, Sunnah, reason, and consensus, remain intact, and further analysis of these principles will be provided in future discussions.

Tradition and Narrations

Although the Akhbari group claims to support the tradition and narrations as their core principles, they simplistically encounter problems with the narrations and are unable to resolve them. They are not in a position to effectively use the narrations when faced with conflicts and contradictions in legal rulings and fatwas.

The Usuli scholar, on the other hand, while very successful in interpreting narrations and utilizing them effectively, should not restrict the application of narrations to abstract theoretical discussions, nor entertain unreasonable doubts about them. They should not limit themselves to the multiple, famous, or widely transmitted narrations, disregarding the hadith of a single narrator if it does not contradict the Qur’an, other narrations, or reason. The scholar should not easily fall into the trap of practical jurisprudence without examining the context and time of the narrations, their subjects, and the occasions of their revelation and narration.

It is possible that a narration, even though it is authentic in both its chain of transmission and its content, cannot be applied in certain cases. Conversely, weak narrations may be applied due to practical necessity. It is the jurist who must believe in the conditional validity of a narration in their process of legal inference. The author of these principles has placed great emphasis on this in their scholarly discussions, although further elaboration on this issue is beyond the scope here.

To summarise, while the Akhbari group may not be able to effectively use the narrations, the Usuli scholar should not approach the narrations without a thorough understanding of the Qur’anic context, the subject matter, and the historical conditions in which the narrations were delivered. They should accept the conditional validity of narrations from the infallibles, which at times may involve relying on weak narrations while at other times overlooking authentic ones.

Reason and the Premises of Legal Judgment

Regarding the role of reason in the system of legal inference, as previously discussed, the author’s view is that there is no content-based critique of the Usuli scholar in this regard. The critique and objection are directed at the Akhbari scholar. However, it must be clearly stated that intellectual discussions are the method of proving and establishing the premises for deriving legal rulings, not the evidence for the rulings themselves. As mentioned in the Hadith al-Thaqalayn and similar narrations, the foundation of fatwas and legal rulings in Islam is the Qur’an and Sunnah, and reason is not the proof of legal rulings but rather a means for understanding the Shari’ah. Reason serves as the lens through which we interpret the Qur’an and Sunnah, and these two sources are like a guiding light, without which reason itself is ineffective. Yet, reason without the Qur’an and Sunnah is also insufficient for religious practice.

Thus, the fundamental evidence and basis for legal rulings in Islam remain the Qur’an and the Sunnah, with reason serving as the path that guides us through the darkness of ignorance. One should not ignore the necessity of reason while engaging with the Qur’an and Sunnah, nor should reason be placed as an equal partner to these two sacred sources. It is erroneous to claim, as some Akhbari scholars do, that reason is misleading, and one should rely solely on the Qur’an and Sunnah. Without reason, the understanding of these two sources would be darkened.

The same logic applies to the acceptance of the miracles of the Prophets and the final Prophet of Islam. It is reason that verifies and affirms the miracles; those who accept miracles as divine acts are using their reason to confirm them. Similarly, reason should not be considered merely one of the premises of legal judgment but should remain firmly within the bounds of Shari’ah.

Ijma’ (Consensus): A Groundless Pillar

One of the critical areas that needs more attention in legal rulings is Ijma’ (consensus), which the Akhbari group tends to avoid, while the Usuli group engages with it through subtle tactics. It is necessary to explicitly and clearly address this issue and establish its true meaning.

In Shia jurisprudence, the only valid sources for legal rulings are the Qur’an and Sunnah, as reason merely provides understanding of the rulings, not the rulings themselves. Ijma’, as understood in the Sunni tradition, has no solid basis in Shia jurisprudence. The concept of Ijma’ is rooted in the Saqifah (the political gathering following the Prophet’s death) and the Sunni tradition, where it is given a place of importance. Unfortunately, this notion has gradually found its way into Shia thought. However, there is a clear distinction between the Ijma’ of the Sunni and Shia schools. No Shia scholar accepts Ijma’ in the same way that it is understood in Sunni jurisprudence, which often attaches a specific religious status to the companions of the Prophet. Shia scholars, while not denying consensus entirely, view it as a tool to uncover the opinions of the infallible, rather than as a binding source of law in itself.

Thus, when Ijma’ is adopted by Shia scholars, they face difficulties in providing clear arguments for its legitimacy. Many of them consider Ijma’ to be a mere reflection of the views of previous scholars, without independent legal authority. According to this view, Ijma’ is not a binding source of legal proof and is only valid if it can be traced back to the teachings of the infallibles. In the final analysis, Ijma’ cannot be considered a source of Shari’ah law because there is no clear, definitive evidence for its legitimacy.

The Method of Usuli Jurisprudence

The method of Ijthad in Shia jurisprudence holds that the fatwas of a jurist, provided they maintain justice and perform Ijthad, are essentially interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunnah. Reason is the guiding principle for understanding these rulings. Ijma’ holds no legal value, and all Usuli and Akhbari scholars agree on this point, putting aside sectarian differences. They agree that each should avoid blind imitation (taqlid) and adhere to the Qur’an and Sunnah directly.

The Akhbari scholars view taqlid (imitation) as a baseless and misguided practice, which leads people away from the true teachings of Islam. They argue that people should not blindly follow scholars but should instead directly follow the Qur’an and Sunnah. They maintain that any effort to follow human interpretations, like taqlid of scholars, is not only misguided but also forbidden in religion. Akhbari scholars believe that anyone can learn the necessary legal rulings from the Qur’an and narrations directly without needing specialized scholars. They reject taqlid because it leads individuals to become unaware of the true principles of Islam.

As mentioned earlier, Akhbari scholars view Ijthad as a form of taqlid, which they argue leads to misguidance. According to them, blindly following the Usuli scholars makes believers unaware of the Qur’an and Sunnah, and they become followers of individual fatwas instead of directly engaging with the sacred texts.

Ijthad, they argue, has become a recent innovation, which was introduced after centuries of Islam and is a departure from the original practices of the early scholars of Islam.

The Meaning of Taqlid

A traditional definition of taqlid (imitation) is as follows: Taqlid is a blind practice that distances believers and those under religious guardianship from the Quran and Sunnah, replacing adherence to God, the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him), and the Imams of Guidance with obedience to ordinary individuals. Thus, taqlid has three main characteristics: first, blind obedience; second, following misguided persons; and third, as a consequence, estrangement from the Quran and Sunnah, resulting in abandoning religion and Islam.

Reasons for Taqlid

Scholars of Islamic legal theory (usul al-fiqh) differ in justifying taqlid and arguing for the validity of the actions of laypeople. One group asserts that taqlid means accepting another’s opinion and adhering to it even without acting upon it, whereas another group defines taqlid strictly as the act of following another’s opinion. Regarding the rationale behind taqlid, some argue it requires no proof since it is self-evident, innate, and natural; others consider it self-evident by reason; some claim it is self-evident by religious law (shari‘a); while yet others cite numerous Quranic verses and Prophetic traditions as evidence. Conversely, some deny that any verses or narrations explicitly indicate taqlid, or note there is disagreement on this matter.

One of the eminent scholars of usul, Akhund Khurasani, author of Kifayah, states in his book: “Taqlid in the branches of religion is self-evident, innate, and natural, and thus does not require proof, because people cannot knowingly act upon the commands of religion.” He adds: “This is the primary proof, and most other reasons offered are subject to debate.” According to him, the majority of other proofs suffer from difficulties, as there is no consensus or established practice supporting taqlid. Furthermore, the Quranic verses cited do not imply taqlid; for instance, the verse of nafar refers to conscious return (to knowledge), not blind imitation, and its subject is questioning the infallible, excluding others. Moreover, many Quranic verses condemn taqlid. Hence, to better understand, it is necessary to consider the akhbari viewpoint and their critique of the proofs of taqlid in a clear and straightforward manner.

Consensus and Practice

One of the main proofs that jurists commonly rely upon is ijma‘ (consensus), but no form of consensus exists on this subject. Moreover, ijma‘, like taqlid, is itself an ungrounded and unconscious practice. Neither is there an established practice (sunnah) of the rational or Muslim community supporting it. Practice itself is ungrounded and cannot be relied upon aside from the Book and the Sunnah. The claim of consensus and practice contradicts opposing consensus and practice because taqlid is a novel phenomenon, whereas the practice of religious scholars is contrary to it, as they have consistently urged people to return to the Quran and Sunnah.

The Holy Quran

Verses of the Quran claimed to permit or require general taqlid provide no indication of it. Conversely, other verses explicitly oppose taqlid and consider it misguidance. Jurists cite the following verses in support of taqlid:

• The Verse of Nafar:
  “Why does not a group from every sect among them go forth that they may learn about their religion and warn their people when they return to them, so that they might take heed?” (Quran 9:122)

They argue that if following the learned’s answers were not obligatory, the command to ask questions would be meaningless.

The akhbari critique this argument, noting:

1. The verse calls for warning and knowledge, not blind imitation.
2. Warning and preaching do not entail imposing acceptance or imitation.
3. The verse concludes with “perhaps they might take heed,” which does not support the claim that taqlid is obligatory.

• The Verse of Questioning:
  “So ask the people of knowledge if you do not know.” (Quran 16:43)

Legal scholars argue that following the scholars’ answers is obligatory, or the command to ask is pointless.

The akhbari response:

1. The verse concerns questioning, which leads to knowledge, not blind imitation.
2. The “people of knowledge” refers to the infallible, and questioning others is excluded.
3. Therefore, questioning is not proof of obligatory taqlid.

Condemnation of Acting on Speculation

In addition to the lack of evidence for taqlid, many Quranic verses condemn acting without knowledge, such as:
“Do not follow what you have no knowledge of.” (Quran 17:36)

The verse criticises acting on ignorance, which is the essence of blind imitation.

Other verses similarly condemn acting on conjecture:
“They think of Allah without knowledge,” “They have no knowledge except following conjecture,” “Most of them follow nothing but conjecture,” and “Indeed, conjecture does not avail against the truth anything.” (Quran 10:36, 53:28, 53:23, 40:24)

Hence, Akhund Khurasani stated that most arguments and verses cited for obligatory taqlid are questionable. His claim of self-evidence is itself debatable and should not be invoked whenever no conclusive proof exists. Otherwise, if taqlid were indeed self-evident and innate, such serious doubts would not have arisen among scholars.

Ultimately, following taqlid and relying on religious manuals without returning to the Quran and Sunnah results in misunderstanding religion and constitutes misguidance.

Are Contemporary Scholars the Same as Those Praised by the Imams?

The akhbari hold that nothing has contributed as much to the current condition as the ignorance of the people. Ignorance is the principal cause that has led society into ruin and estrangement from both religion and worldly knowledge, depriving people of the hereafter. Consequently, every innovation has been presented as “God’s religion” to the minds and culture of the people.

Had people been sufficiently knowledgeable in religious sciences, they would not have fallen into such innovations.

The akhbari attribute the main responsibility for backwardness to superficial religious scholars who have misguided both religion and the people. In every society, intellectual leaders play a crucial role in the guidance or misguidance of the populace. They are those from whom God has demanded to teach the truths of religion to people. However, this covenant has not been properly fulfilled. The akhbari therefore advise people to achieve progress by seeking a correct understanding of the Quran and Sunnah and to perform their religious duties accordingly, thereby becoming informed and knowledgeable.

Only then can they properly evaluate all the matters discussed in religious texts. At present, however, their knowledge is insufficient and often limited to reading a few books, which forces many to rely on simplified manuals such as the Persian “Risalah ‘Amaliyah” to learn their religious duties. Muslims must strive—by word, deed, and wealth—to pursue religious knowledge and avoid the consequences of ignorance.

A Critical Note on the “Three Categories”

The akhbari criticise the common classification that every religiously responsible person must be either a mujtahid (jurisprudential authority), a muqallid (follower), or a muhtat (cautious individual). They question whether this is comprehensive and whether religion—meaning the Quran and Sunnah—has no role here.

To clarify, every Muslim must understand their duties concerning religious rulings to progress toward felicity and perfection. The Quran says: “So ask the people of knowledge if you do not know.” The Prophet (peace be upon him) said: “A proper and worthy life is provided only for two categories: the knowledgeable whose speech is accepted, and the listener fully prepared to learn from the virtuous scholar.”

Furthermore, Imam Mahdi (may Allah hasten his reappearance) stated: “As for the events that occur, refer to the narrators of our traditions, for they are my proof upon you, and I am Allah’s proof.” Thus, people are generally divided into two groups: knowledgeable scholars and ordinary people who must follow those scholars.

Legal theorists, however, add a third category, the muhtat, which akhbari reject as baseless. A cautious person can perform religious duties meticulously because they possess full knowledge and effectively are a scholar themselves. Thus, the muhtat category is redundant. The correct classification is that people are either scholars or followers, and the category of mujtahid is distinct, involving independent jurisprudential reasoning.

Therefore, the legitimate religious authorities are a limited group among Shia scholars, not the broader categories proposed. Consequently, the matter of religious authority is complex for both those who assume this role and those who select them, and neither should act hastily. The public must approach this with great discernment.

Examination of the Authenticity and Meaning of Narrations on Taqlid

The first three narrations concerning taqlid have reliable chains of transmission and apparent clarity of meaning. The fourth narration, although weak in chain, is transmitted from the commentary attributed to Imam Hasan al-‘Askari (may Allah sanctify his secret). Scholars have compensated for its weak chain by reliance on its usage and acceptance among scholars. The great Shi‘i jurist Sheikh Ansari remarked that this narration bears signs of truth despite the weakness in its chain.

The narration explicitly defines the duty of the community in the time of occultation and has a suitable context of revelation. However, some misunderstandings need discussion, such as the narration relating to prophethood and creed, where imitation is generally deemed impermissible. Hence, the narration may not refer to taqlid in jurisprudential branches unless one holds that taqlid in the principles of religion is also permissible, a view the translator supports. This is because belief in the fundamentals of religion requires conviction, which can be attained by any valid means.

Many who deny taqlid in religious principles overlook that they themselves are imitators in belief and have not studied doctrinal principles sufficiently.

Additional Critiques by Akhbari

Some akhbari critics argue from resentment that scholars have no inherent authority in religion, and the concept of general deputyship (niyābat ‘āmmah) is an innovation. If by this they mean that scholars have independent opinions, that is true; but if they deny following scholars altogether, that is untenable since following qualified scholars is a foundation of religion. General deputyship refers to deriving rulings from the Quran and Sunnah and following qualified scholars in the time of occultation. Scholars are not the “lords” of religion; rather, they are intermediaries conveying divine knowledge from the Ahl al-Bayt to the people.

In the previous chapter, it was noted that the Akhbari scholars consider taqlid (imitation or following) in religion to be impermissible, since one should only follow God, the Prophet, and the Infallible Imams. They hold the view that believers must follow God and the Messenger, not the scholars, because the scholars themselves depend on the Imams.

Moreover, the Akhbaris do not regard religious practice as so complex that it requires a specialist or expert.

Definition of Taqlid

First and foremost, the meaning of taqlid must be clearly articulated so that its concept is properly understood, and after obtaining an accurate understanding, it can be affirmed.

Specifically, as stated in jurisprudential texts: “Taqlid is taking the opinion of another and following it in secondary religious matters without demanding evidence for their opinion.” Or, it has been said that taqlid is simply the practical adherence to another’s fatwa. Although there is disagreement regarding the precise meaning of taqlid, what is accepted here is that taqlid is the act of following, and knowing the fatwa or a practical commitment to it is a prerequisite rather than part of the definition itself. Although Akhund Kafāyah objected to this view, the response to that objection is found in the lessons of Kafāyah, affirming that this interpretation is accurate.

In any case, three points are understood from the meaning of taqlid:

a) Receiving directives from another;

b) Acceptance and adherence without requesting evidence;

c) Acting and following someone knowledgeable in matters requiring expertise.

Classification of Taqlid

After defining taqlid, the Usuli scholars divide it into two categories: valid and invalid taqlid. Valid taqlid occurs when a person obtains knowledge of matters they need but cannot ascertain or perform by themselves, and follows another without questioning the rationale or basis of that matter. Thus, three essential conditions are identified for valid taqlid:

1. The individual does not know and cannot independently undertake the action without help;
2. The other person knows the matter well and can easily perform it and guide others;
3. The person engaging in taqlid need not inquire about the evidence or basis of the issue, but, fully aware of the other’s expertise and integrity, submits themselves to that person without seeking justification.

From this, the meaning of invalid taqlid becomes clear, since any taqlid lacking one of these three features is invalid.

Valid Taqlid

Valid and proper taqlid is when a person cannot perform certain acts, by reason or natural intuition, which they need to do, without following or help from another—such as tasks that are necessary for the individual and society but cannot be performed without lengthy training and education. Since learning and performing these tasks depend on extensive effort and long-term education within the natural progression of life, e.g., professions and specialised fields that cannot be undertaken without long-term training. In summary, the first type of taqlid involves matters that require extensive learning and cannot be fulfilled by ordinary reason, natural understanding, or innate inspiration.

Invalid Taqlid

Invalid and unnecessary taqlid occurs when a person follows others in matters they can themselves manage without difficulty. Taqlid in areas where performing the task is within the reach of one’s intellect and ability, and where acting independently causes no problem, is an unnecessary imitation. Everyone can rely on their own discretion and address ordinary needs through natural intellect and thought. This includes aesthetic, social, ethical, and individual matters such as how one walks, dresses, speaks—actions that every person can carry out based on reason and natural insight.

The conclusion is that valid taqlid is not blind obedience, and the claim that religious ijtihad and taqlid are invalid is unfounded. Following a practical religious manual (risālah ‘amaliyyah) is, in fact, following the Qur’an and Sunnah. Moreover, the knowledge and practice encompassed in such manuals do not represent the entirety of jurisprudence or religious law. Rather, the issues contained therein constitute a small portion of the legal rulings, as jurisprudence itself forms just one branch of religion, and the manual includes necessary and essential rulings from that legal body.

Although manuals in this form and style did not exist in earlier centuries, jurisprudence and the application of religious rulings according to the statements of scholars and jurists have always been established. Over history, with the progress of jurisprudence and fuqaha (jurists), the writing of rulings and issue formulation by scholars from both Akhbari and Usuli traditions developed into a broad system, eventually becoming what is seen today.

This clarification establishes that growth, development, and novelty in form, style, or content are fundamentally different from bid‘ah (innovation). Although Akhbari scholars may fail to understand this, bid‘ah refers to introducing alien matters into religion, whereas taqlid is a legitimate facilitation and correct utilisation of the Qur’an and Sunnah, with the manual being a clear and accessible translation of these sources.

Based on the foregoing, the definition and classification of taqlid and the distinction between valid and invalid taqlid should not be neglected. Akhbari rhetoric often obscures this fact. Otherwise, just as invalid taqlid should be avoided, no rational and informed person refrains from valid taqlid.

Suppression of Talents

Invalid taqlid is when a person imitates others in matters they can perform independently through their own thought and taste. Reason and innate human nature do not permit losing one’s natural independence and psychological, spiritual qualities by becoming a mere copy of another. Each person must be themselves, living with their natural, God-given traits, not becoming a replica of someone else.

Reason dictates that matters which can be performed independently should be pursued personally; one should not relinquish independence or outsource their thought process, becoming a servant to others’ thinking. For example, dressing, walking, and speaking should reflect personal reason, emotions, and taste.

Indeed, if people use their minds in these areas and rely on themselves, what a beautiful, dynamic, and fresh world it would become, with vibrant energies flowing from human creativity. Conversely, if such imitation dominates society—especially when imposed through colonialism and exploitation, forcing uniformity in dress and lifestyle—humanity becomes a dry, rigid, old, artificial, lifeless, and dim world, which we see widespread today.

In such a world, there is no room for love, feeling, or affection—only rigidity and ruin prevail. This kind of taqlid is invalid, meaningless, and in some cases, forbidden. Avoiding this reprehensible taqlid is necessary for everyone, as it suppresses human talents, destroys people’s efficacy, and turns creative individuals into puppets of others.

Valid Taqlid and Human Cooperation

Valid taqlid is natural and essential for human life, fostering cooperation in society. Reason and innate human nature acknowledge its necessity. Indeed, this is the law of thought and action that has governed human society since the dawn of creation.

Following an expert by a person in need and the pupil’s inquiry to the knowledgeable teacher, following an Imam or knowledgeable guide—these are undeniable facts. Abandoning this method is impossible, irrational, and inconceivable, leading to chaos in society and human life. The resulting world would not even be comparable to a jungle, since such laws naturally govern even the animal kingdom, where survival depends on imitation and natural inquiry.

Is it possible that every person in society is their own doctor, teacher, carpenter, blacksmith, and builder, performing all life’s tasks alone and independently? Such a scenario is unimaginable and would mean the death of cooperation and the collapse of human existence.

How can one deny specialisation and division of labour in today’s vast and rapidly changing world except through thoughtlessness? Contrary to the first type of taqlid, the second type is futile and unnecessary; its avoidance does not cause harm but engaging in it is inappropriate and baseless, since one can easily satisfy needs without imitating others.

Thus, two distinct types of taqlid exist, both clear and self-evident, needing no further proof; taqlid of the expert is innate and requires only ordinary recognition. Of course, many arguments support both types, some of which have been mentioned, and denying such clear evidence is irrational.

After explaining the meaning and classification of taqlid and outlining some relevant proofs, two necessary notes arising from the nature of taqlid must be made to remove any ambiguity.

1. The Threefold Basis of Education

Human education has three general foundations and perspectives that have governed acquisition methods historically:

First perspective: The Teacher

The teacher, instructor, or mentor is one who has complete or partial knowledge or skill in a field and undertakes to teach others, whether for compensation or not, whether for the benefit of society or personal gain.

Second perspective: The Learner

The learner seeks to gradually acquire the teacher’s knowledge and skills, intending to inherit the teacher’s art and mind. The learner aims to understand the secrets of the teacher’s thought and become like or surpass them.

Third perspective: The Follower (Muqallid)

The follower is neither teacher nor learner. They have neither the aim of the teacher nor the goal of the learner. They are like a patient in need of a doctor, seeking immediate relief from their problem without wishing to learn the doctor’s knowledge. They only desire treatment and recovery, not the underlying medical science.

The follower does not possess knowledge or skill, nor the ability to learn, and thus resorts to following others without requiring evidence or proof. The follower’s position is fundamentally different from that of the learner and teacher.

2. Necessity of Distinguishing Between Learning and Following

It is essential to clearly differentiate between taqlid in the sense of following without evidence and the acquisition of knowledge through learning and inquiry. The latter involves effort, study, questioning, and understanding, whereas taqlid is practical obedience and adherence without seeking to understand underlying proofs.

If a Muslim wishes to access the commandments of God, the Messenger (ﷺ), and the Imams of Guidance—who lived over fourteen centuries ago—and to attain certainty in their transmission from the Sacred Lawgiver and comprehend their content, they must traverse a highly challenging path. Those who have devoted a lifetime to this pursuit, adhering closely to religious thought and principles, proceed with utmost caution and prudence. Ultimately, even they explicitly affirm: “Allāh knows best.”

How can it be conceivable that all people, including the lay public, within a short period, can deduce all the religious rulings required by their faith and discharge their duties accordingly? Such an assertion is a mere folly born of ignorance, for acquiring religious obligations is by no means so facile as to be classified under erroneous imitation (taqlid).

Rational necessity—given awareness of the subject matter of religion—dictates that mastering and deducing religious rulings is not an easy task. Rather, religion, like other systematic disciplines, requires the involvement of specialists well-versed in the methodology of legal deduction. Only through such expertise does practicing religion become easier, escaping hardship and complexity. Therefore, there must exist those with the capacity for ijtihād (legal deduction) and full awareness of religious knowledge, who, possessing specific qualifications, can address and fulfil the needs of the Muslim community.

Having explained the meaning and types of imitation (taqlid), as well as some associated difficulties and considerations, a general conclusion may be drawn: rational necessity commands that religious rulings be acquired, as with other sciences and fields, from those knowledgeable and learned in religion, and this ruling accords with human nature. What has been presented so far pertains to the verdict of reason and natural disposition, alongside some textual premises. It now remains to ascertain whether there is also a textual (shar‘ī) exposition concerning this matter.

The Dual Origin of Thought

In the realm of reasoning, there are always two types of evidence: either rational evidence stemming from conclusive intellectual reflection, or textual evidence deriving from the sacred law. Everyone encounters these two categories of proof within their intellectual domain.

The argument concerning the necessity of correct imitation (taqlid) presented above was based on reason. The next step is to examine whether there is any textual evidence supporting imitation, specifically regarding the general deputation (niyābat ‘āmah) of the Shi‘a scholars. Has the sacred law provided any proof for this?

Thus, after establishing the first type of proof—the rational imperative for imitation—the discussion moves to the second type of reasoning, namely textual proof from the Lawgiver. Two matters must be fully considered in textual arguments: first, the scrutiny, critique, and responses to the objections posed by hadith critics; second, the presentation of affirmative evidence from unequivocal and authentic Qur’anic verses and narrations on this subject. The detailed examination of these issues pertains to their proper scholarly context.

Response to Hadith-based Objections

It has been noted that, regarding imitation, there is certainly disagreement about its meaning and the foundational evidence for it, such as whether the proof is rational or textual, or whether the matter is self-evident and requires no proof. Whether textual evidence stems from Qur’anic verses or hadiths and which specific verses and narrations indicate the concept of imitation—all these debates are characteristic of scholarly inquiry. Such disagreement is natural and inherent to any scientific or academic discourse. However, this does not imply that imitation is invalid or that, due to scholarly disagreements, one must reject it altogether.

Disagreement is intrinsic to science and scholars; it is resolved through research and investigation rather than abandonment. Jurisprudential scholars hold various definitive opinions on all disputed matters, and this poses no issue. In this work, we have succinctly expressed our firm views on critiques and evidence presented to resolve the problem of disagreement.

1. Concerning whether the essence of imitation is commitment or the act itself, imitation is essentially following the original act, while commitment is a preliminary condition to the essence of imitation.
2. Although proofs for imitation vary, imitation is not a self-evident matter lacking proof. It has rational grounds and instinctive and natural basis, which does not contradict textual approval and guidance. Some textual evidence accompanies its affirmation, even though it is not self-evident from the sacred texts. Similarly, it does not require consensus, nor does any consensus explicitly revealing the Prophetic tradition on this exist or is claimed. Yet there is intellectual and conventional agreement among the religious scholars on imitation; even the Akhbārī school accepts imitation from Akhbārī scholars and practices it, objecting only to imitation of Usūlī scholars.

Regarding Qur’anic verses, while there are verses that criticize imitation—such as “Indeed, conjecture does not avail against the truth” (Qur’an 10:36)—these condemn wrongful imitation and following misguidance, not imitation in expertise and sound knowledge. The subject of such verses is conjecture without foundation, not following knowledge in submission to truth. Verses invoked in favour of imitation, like the Verse of Remembrance and the Verse of Understanding, are not unrelated to submission to truth in religious knowledge, though no explicit textual declaration is made.

Therefore, dividing imitation into correct and incorrect and the variety of proofs does not contradict the necessity and legitimacy of its principle. One must not reject and avoid it due to the complexities or different interpretations. Hadith critics, due to failure to comprehend the subject and inability to properly establish the foundations, resort to evasion and close their eyes to the Book and the Sunnah in the name of textual fidelity.

Qur’anic Verses and Imitation

Regarding imitation, the Qur’an contains numerous verses. Those negating imitation pertain to reprehensible imitation—following falsehood, conjecture, or baseless assumptions, as mentioned earlier. However, verses such as “Ask the people of knowledge if you do not know” (Qur’an 16:43) are not unrelated to correct imitation and will be further elucidated.

The Verse of Questioning

(“So ask the people of remembrance if you know not.”) [Qur’an 16:43]

Several essential remarks are necessary about this verse:

1. Although the verse addresses questioning, which is a means of acquiring knowledge, this does not exclude imitation, since questioning in its broad sense encompasses imitation. It is incorrect to assume that knowledge and awareness are absent from imitation, or that practical following is merely a physical or unconscious act.
2. Regarding “the people of remembrance,” while at the highest level these are the infallible Imams (peace be upon them), the verse is general and covers all those qualified, including those in non-religious fields such as experimental sciences, philosophy, and other disciplines. Thus, the verse conveys an external reality and ethical truth: whoever does not know something must ask someone knowledgeable, irrespective of the status of asker or respondent. Although at the highest level the infallible have priority in epistemological matters and religious affairs, the claim that the verse excludes non-infallibles is baseless.
3. Since the verse commands general questioning, encompassing imitation, and imposes no limitation on individuals, the person who asks seeks to resolve their ignorance.
4. The argument that the verse does not entail an obligation to accept the answer is mistaken. When it says “ask whatever you do not know,” it implies a coercive necessity to ask so as to remedy ignorance and act upon others’ knowledge in individual needs. Therefore, this verse does not conflict with the obligation or practice of correct imitation. The obligation here is advisory—if you do not want to err, consult knowledgeable religious authorities. If an act is done without referring to an expert but coincidentally is correct, no blame falls upon it; however, if done incorrectly without imitation, one deserves blame and possibly corrective measures.

Thus, this verse fully supports correct imitation.

The Verse of Delegation

The Verse of Delegation indicates the necessity of following learned religious scholars in rulings:

(“Why is it that from every sect among them there does not emerge a group who study the religion and warn their people when they return to them that they might be cautious?”) [Qur’an 9:122]

From this verse, the following is deduced:

1. The reference to studying religion encompasses religious rulings; it is not limited to preaching or exhortation alone, for religious knowledge includes rulings that may not be accessible to mere rational cognition.
2. Although the verse mentions warning (alarming), this is an intellectual admonition and does not conflict with advisory threats or penalties for ignoring learned scholars.
3. The verse establishes the duty of the knowledgeable and the ordinary people regarding religious scholars: some must pursue knowledge in every group to educate their people who might benefit from the scholars’ knowledge.
4. The claim that warning by scholars does not entail obligation or compulsion is baseless, since awareness and admonition by scholars aims for spread and acceptance, which is only meaningful if there is serious acceptance of their authority. This obligation is an intellectual directive, whose neglect brings divine punishment.

Other relevant verses exist but are beyond this scope.

In conclusion, the objections of Akhbārīs to proofs for imitation lack validity, reflecting insufficient scrutiny, despite similar objections existing in Usūlī works and addressed therein.

Correct Imitation in Tradition

Following the Qur’anic verses, it is appropriate to consider several narrations concerning ijtihād and religious imitation, so that proponents of the Book and Sunnah may appraise their stance toward these two foundational pillars of divine law and realize that their superficial support has been a cause of misguidance.

• The First Mujtahid: Abān

Najāshī, a renowned Shi‘a scholar of rijāl, in his authoritative book of rijāl, narrates from Imam Muhammad al-Bāqir (peace be upon him) addressing Abān ibn Taghlib:

“You are a mujtahid; it is incumbent upon the people to imitate you.”

This tradition unequivocally affirms the duty of the people to imitate qualified mujtahids.

• Instruction to Use Ijtihād

The Imams of Guidance (peace be upon them) stated: “The best among you are those who understand the religion, speak well, and practice legal reasoning.”

They highlight the role of ijtihād and legal reasoning in religious practice, implying that followers should accept rulings from such scholars.

Limitations of Religious Authority

In the book Wasa’il al-Shi’a, there are seven lengthy narrations from the interpretation of Imam Hasan al-Askari (peace be upon him) concerning the faults of Jewish scholars and the distinction between the emulation of Jews of their scholars and that of the Shi’a of their own scholars. The Imam states the following conditions for a scholar:
“As for the jurist who is self-disciplined, guardian of his religion, opposing his own desires, and obedient to the command of his master, it is incumbent upon the common people to emulate him. However, this applies only to some Shi’a jurists, not all.” [44]

In this narration, Imam Hasan al-Askari elaborates at length on the qualities of scholars and the Shi’a faithful in comparison to Jewish scholars and people. He cautions the community against corrupt and deviant scholars and warns against following them blindly. He then outlines four comprehensive conditions for a jurist, from which the concept of justice and its meaning can be derived—justice here being of a much higher order than the technical legal term of trustworthiness.

This narration explicitly affirms the principle of taqlid (emulation), distinguishing it clearly from the mere transmission of hadith or reports. Not every jurist can serve as a religious authority; the position of marja’iyya (religious reference) is a solemn and highly responsible role requiring special qualifications. It is stated that only some Shi’a jurists possess these qualifications, not all.

From the use of the qualifier “some”, it is evident that the role of religious authority is limited to certain jurists and not all scholars of Islam.

Final Conclusion: The Duty of Shi’a

The discussion can be summarised as follows: Shi’a individuals who lack sufficient knowledge or the capacity for independent legal reasoning must follow a qualified jurist who meets the necessary conditions. Just as the jurist’s evidence is the Qur’an and Sunnah, the evidence for the follower is the jurist’s scholarly efforts and reasoning.

A person who emulates a qualified jurist, having duly investigated and relied on an informed authority, is not only free from blame but is rewarded. This is because a believer during the occultation has no obligation beyond this. Many Shi’a scholars hold that if a Muslim’s actions are not consistent with the fatwa of a jurist they follow—and if that Muslim is neither a jurist nor particularly cautious—their acts are not deemed valid. However, opinions vary on whether acts done without taqlid but conforming to reality are valid, with some scholars allowing such validity.

If reason and societal norms confirm an act, and the Sharia does not disapprove of it, the practice remains valid. If Sharia explicitly consents to a societal practice and endorses it, there is no room for doubt regarding its legality.

Critique of Akhbari Opposition

The Akhbari school denies the legitimacy of emulation entirely and thus rejects the concept of following the a‘lam (most learned jurist). They deem this notion baseless, unsupported by either textual or rational evidence, and argue that the principle of taqlid lacks any real foundation. They assert that since the Qur’an advises consultation with knowledgeable people (Qur’an 16:43), one should question any learned person, not necessarily the most learned. Practically, people consult the nearest competent specialist rather than seeking the ‘best’ expert worldwide. It is impractical and unprecedented to demand following the most learned in every field for daily affairs.

They further criticise the principle of the necessity of one supreme religious authority for the sake of order. They argue that if such order were essential, the infallible Imam would have appointed a representative for the occultation period, which he did not. The injunction is only to refer to narrators of the Imams’ traditions.

The Akhbaris lament the current state of Islam and note that only an infallible Imam, possessing perfect knowledge and piety, can ensure proper religious governance. In the absence of such an Imam, ordinary individuals claiming leadership is untenable.

Pragmatic Necessity in the Era of Occultation

The practical policy for Shi’a during the occultation, as advised by the Imams, is to follow any trustworthy, pious, and knowledgeable jurist available. This approach preserves the community under difficult political conditions and protects core religious principles through the shield of taqiyya (dissimulation).

If multiple qualified scholars exist, people benefit from diverse teachings and protections. This is preferable to relying on a single weak individual whose personal affairs they cannot even manage.

The Issue with ‘Following the Most Learned’

Akhbaris also criticise the practical application of following the most learned jurist, pointing out that many jurists themselves do not uniformly endorse this principle. The identification of the ‘most learned’ is often impossible and divisive, leading to factionalism and conflict.

They further question the rationale that just as people consult the nearest competent professionals in other fields, so too should they consult any qualified jurist rather than an abstract ‘most learned’ authority.

From the Perspective of Akhbari Scholars

According to the Akhbari viewpoint, Taqlid (imitation) of the ‘A‘lam (more learned jurist) is regarded as invalid, contrary to religion, an innovation (bid‘ah), and a false belief. Furthermore, neither the Qur’an nor the Sunnah explicitly endorse such a concept, nor do rational principles support it, and it lacks any external factual basis.

From the Perspective of Usuli Scholars

From the Usuli standpoint, Taqlid of the ‘A‘lam means that every Muslim and Shi‘a must derive their religious rulings from the mujtahid or faqih who is more knowledgeable than other scholars and jurists, who possesses a greater understanding of the religion, and who excels in deriving rulings by analysing detailed principles and deducing branches from fundamentals better than his contemporaries. The majority of Usuli scholars hold that Taqlid of the ‘A‘lam is a mandatory precaution (ihtiyat wajib), or at least preferable and the safest course (awla and ahwath), and while not all scholars issue definitive rulings on this, the predominant opinion supports it.

Natural and Rational Grounds for Following the ‘A‘lam

It must be noted that Taqlid of the ‘A‘lam is not a concept artificially fabricated by scholars or unique to religion. Rather, in all areas of society, whenever individuals require specialists, especially when the matter is significant and fundamental, they seek out the most expert and knowledgeable figures within the relevant field. For example, if someone falls ill, they consult a physician; if the illness is serious, they seek the most skilled doctor available. Likewise, when constructing a tall and important building, people turn to the most competent architect, never entrusting such matters to novices or ordinary practitioners where risk and harm might ensue.

On this basis, any individual who wishes to avoid danger and harm in a matter of great importance is prepared to endure greater hardship and pay a higher cost to avert risk. This stems from human nature, and no reasonable person would deny it. Who would entrust their seriously ill loved one to any random doctor, or allow an inexperienced builder to construct an important building?

The ‘A‘lamiyyah and the Necessity of Reason

Usuli scholars refute the Akhbari misconception that reason does not mandate recourse to the ‘A‘lam as follows: While people generally consult knowledgeable individuals when needed, they rarely seek out the most knowledgeable specialists, as this would overwhelm the limited number of experts and lead to societal chaos. Since work is abundant but top experts are few, a balance must be maintained to meet the community’s needs.

Therefore, from a rational perspective, recourse to the ‘A‘lam is necessary in critical and significant matters, though not in ordinary or everyday issues. Moreover, the number of such critical matters is not so great as to exceed the capacity of the best experts. The concept of ‘best’ is always relative; if the number of ‘best’ experts is insufficient, appropriate planning must be implemented, or a leading ‘best’ expert must supervise others. Hence, no one should independently act contrary to the necessity of consulting the ‘A‘lam, even if their scarcity poses challenges. The rational mandate is uniform in all contexts; thus, recourse to the ‘A‘lam is obligatory only in important and weighty matters, not in trivial or routine ones.

The Practice of the Shi‘a and the Claim of the Civilised World

Another misconception is that recourse to the ‘A‘lam and the most learned in worldly or ordinary matters is unrelated to religion or the commandments of God and the Prophet (PBUH). Just because people seek the best in worldly affairs does not mean that God or the Prophet sanction this practice; for religious matters, people obey divine law rather than reason, consensus, or natural disposition.

In reply, Usuli scholars argue that the dictates of reason and natural disposition apply universally across all areas of life, and there is no distinction between worldly and religious matters. A Muslim is governed by both religion and reason in all spheres, and religion itself affirms this dual adherence. Religion is the fundamental basis of society and deserves priority. If a person seeks the most learned in worldly matters affecting only the body, how can it be acceptable not to do so in matters of religion that concern the soul and spirit? Conscience and sound reason command that critical and important matters, whether worldly or religious, material or spiritual, must be entrusted to the most competent individuals. Therefore, the rational mandate and natural principle are universal and govern all aspects of life.

Usuli scholars hold that the concept of Taqlid of the ‘A‘lam is a distinctive feature of Shi‘ism, which the modern civilised world merely espouses in rhetoric and incompletely at that. Shi‘a assert that matters must be entrusted not just to knowledgeable specialists, but to the most knowledgeable and learned at the helm of all significant affairs.

Those who today profess allegiance to science and expertise should recognise that Shi‘a have maintained for over a thousand years that mere expertise is insufficient for important matters; rather, the most learned and knowledgeable individuals must oversee such critical issues.

The Principle of Taqlid of the ‘A‘lam: A Natural and Rational Command

The matter of Taqlid of the ‘A‘lam is a natural principle and a rational injunction, immune to objection. The sacred Sharia not only does not reject this principle but explicitly endorses it on many occasions, a few of which are noted here:

Taqlid of the ‘A‘lam from the Perspective of the Infallibles

“Whoever calls people to himself while among them there is one who is more learned than him is a misguided innovator.”[^47]

This tradition implies:

1. The most learned individual should lead society and guide the people.
2. Leadership should be vested in a single individual, as there can only be one ‘most learned’.
3. If the ‘A‘lam exists, anyone who usurps leadership is deemed misguided and an innovator, subject to divine punishment.

Imam Abi Abdullah (AS) said: “You are the most juristically knowledgeable people when you understand the meanings of our words, for our words can be interpreted in seventy ways.”[^48]

From this narration:

1. The most knowledgeable is one who deeply comprehends the meanings of the Infallibles’ sayings.
2. Such profound understanding is not accessible to everyone; comprehending all meanings is almost impossible.

These and similar narrations demonstrate that ‘A‘lamiyyah (superiority in knowledge) has both rational and religious endorsement, with opposition to it regarded as misguidance and innovation. The religious tradition of following the ‘A‘lam reflects Shi‘a’s advanced intellectual and social approach.

The Issue of ‘A‘lamiyyah

Following presentation of Akhbari and Usuli views and their supporting arguments, the author provides his own chosen position. From our perspective, although the issue lacks religious authority and no conditional obligation from reason or Sharia requires such Taqlid, its practical implications are highly significant. The current Shi‘a jurisprudential and marja‘iyya system is largely predicated on the claim of ‘A‘lamiyyah—regardless of its validity or possibility, or whether the idea is positive or negative. Thus, thorough, explicit discussion and investigation are necessary. Importantly, arguments from both sides should be examined respectfully and without disparagement or accusations, as all scholars—Usuli and Akhbari alike—are within the domain of Wilayah, despite differences in jurisprudential details.

Although the author rejects the concept of ‘A‘lamiyyah as a condition for issuing fatwas, finding it unsupported by reason and Sharia and practically unobserved throughout centuries of Shi‘a jurisprudence, the author aligns with Akhbari views on this matter. Nonetheless, not all Akhbari arguments are accepted uncritically, as will be discussed.

Critique and Evaluation of Usuli Arguments

Usuli scholars do not unanimously or decisively mandate following the ‘A‘lam, but discuss it with various caveats. Their terminology in jurisprudential texts includes: ‘commonly accepted among the companions,’ ‘among Shi‘a this is undisputed,’ ‘there is consensus,’ ‘it is preferable and safest.’

Claims of consensus are exaggerated, lacking documented sources beyond common acceptance, which is itself insufficient as proof. The labels ‘preferable’ and ‘safest’ indicate uncertainty and ambiguity among jurists. Furthermore, if a scholar denies that ‘A‘lamiyyah is a condition for marja‘iyya, he risks accusation of ignorance, thus feels compelled to endorse the view.

The Practice of Rational People

One of the Usuli proofs is that in critical and foundational matters, especially those related to religious teachings linked to one’s spiritual welfare, it is prohibited to refer to anyone but the ‘A‘lam, assuming their availability.

This claim, however, is hardly defensible given the restrictive conditions imposed, which are individually addressed:

• Rational humans aim primarily to entrust important matters to trustworthy and knowledgeable people, not necessarily the ‘A‘lam. For religious matters, specific religious evidence is needed to mandate this; yet no such evidence exists, and contrary evidence is present.
• Even assuming the presence of an ‘A‘lam, recourse to a less learned individual occurs frequently, including the infallibles referring to others, underscoring that the Sharia and the Shi‘a tradition endorse referring to knowledgeable, trustworthy scholars generally, not strictly to the ‘A‘lam.
• The claim that religious texts are unrestricted applies only where there is no difference in rulings or virtue between the consulted scholars, which is unrealistic given evident differences in opinion and merit.

Consequently, requiring Taqlid of the ‘A‘lam is impractical and burdensome. The Imams (AS) never demanded more than following those scholars who were trustworthy and knowledgeable, without the necessity of being ‘A‘lam. 1. The Role of Deputies During the Minor Occultation vs. the Major Occultation

During the Minor Occultation, the Imam (may God hasten his reappearance) appointed specific individuals as his special deputies, maintaining direct communication with them. However, during the Major Occultation, the Imam did not designate any particular individual; instead, he limited his references to general characteristics, indicating that those transmitters of his traditions are trustworthy narrators.

2. The Status of the Narrators of Wilayah during the Occultation

The narrators of the Ahl al-Wilayah are considered by the Imam to be the proofs, authorities, and standards of religion during the occultation. He equates their status with his own and declares that they are his representatives, while he himself is the representative of God.

3. Specific Reference to the Special Deputy in the Traditions

In the authentic traditions, the Imam explicitly names and endorses the special deputy, praying for him and his father. In contrast, the narrators of traditions are only acknowledged with general titles and affirmation.

4. The Qualities Attributed to the Narrators

The description “Narrators of our traditions” is indicative of causality; it refers specifically to narrators who are pious, truthful, righteous, and loyal to the Wilayah, rather than merely anyone who transmits a tradition.

2. The Religious Authority During the Occultation

Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq (peace be upon him) said:
“Look to those among you who have narrated our traditions, who consider our lawful and unlawful rulings, and who know our commands, and be content with their judgment. I have appointed them as judges over you. If anyone rejects their judgment, he has indeed scorned God’s ruling and rejected us. Whoever rejects us has rejected God, and that is tantamount to associating partners with God.”[52]

The narrator reports that he asked the Imam: “O master, when disputes arise among your followers, what should we do?” The Imam replied: “See who among you narrates our traditions, knows what is lawful and unlawful, and understands our religious rulings; accept their judgment as mine. I have appointed them as your rulers. Whoever rejects their judgment rejects God’s law and us, and such rejection is equivalent to shirk (associating partners with God).”

It is clear that these noble traditions concern the acceptance of the religious rulings and words of the infallibles. The narrators serve as intermediaries for transmitting the Imam’s words, such that rejection of them is tantamount to rejection of God and the infallibles.

In this noble statement, the Imam does not specify particular individuals but refers to general titles such as “narrators of our traditions,” “those knowledgeable of lawful and unlawful,” and “those aware of religious rulings.”

Additional Points of Consideration

a) Although the subject of these two narrations concerns disputes and events among the Shi‘a, the texts generally specify the Shi‘a’s obligation regarding divine rulings and commandments during the occultation — namely, from whom they must derive religious knowledge and by what means they must understand divine rulings in order to act accordingly.

b) The style and content of these traditions address a general audience, using broad categories like “our narrators,” “those knowledgeable about religious rulings,” and “those possessing religious knowledge” without reference to superiority or proximity to the Imam. It is clear that the narrators or possessors of religious knowledge do not share equal rank, but the Imam has nevertheless designated all as sources of reference for the Shi‘a, without limiting it to the most knowledgeable or closest individuals.

Facilitation and Ease

The infallible Imams, by permitting access to any qualified scholar and not insisting on consulting the most learned, sought to ease the burden on the believers and provide a wide scope for religious guidance. While this may sometimes lead to difficulties arising from differing opinions and varying ranks, the greater benefit lies in accessibility and openness to religious knowledge. The Imams’ approach reflects a practical and realistic attitude toward religion and its followers, distancing itself from rigid, dogmatic, and overly speculative interpretations.

In modern times, the difficulties in religiosity among the masses and scholars alike arise from such rigid and speculative approaches. Therefore, timely reflection and critique of the perspectives of religious authorities and scholars are necessary, to prevent people from turning away from religion and losing sight of its true essence.

3. The Learned and Righteous Scholar

Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq (peace be upon him) stated:
“Look to a man among you who knows something of our religious rulings.”[53]

The phrase “knowing something of our judgments” includes the obligation to follow even the smallest ruling known with certainty and awareness.

The Imam also said:
“Authority belongs only to a scholar who is knowledgeable in judgment and just among the Muslims.”[54]

And:
“Whoever issues a ruling without knowledge and guidance from God, may he be cursed.”[55]

This curse applies to those lacking both knowledge and divine guidance.

The Imam further warned against two destructive traits, one of which is issuing judgments without knowledge.[56]

Qualifications of the Jurist

It is obligatory to consult a jurisprudent (mujtahid) who is just and loyal, with full commitment to following the infallibles and adherence to the Qur’an and Sunnah. This is an essential prerequisite of religious authority. Therefore, the person whom one refers to must:

1. Truly be a mujtahid in the complete sense of the term;
2. Be just;
3. Be firmly rooted in loyalty (wilayah).

Any deficiency in these areas disqualifies a person from being a legitimate reference. If a person fulfills these conditions, he is considered trustworthy in matters of religion and the world. Otherwise, his rulings hold no religious validity, and acting upon them is not binding.

Critical Review of the Akhbari and Usuli Views

While the author accepts many Akhbari narrations on this topic, he does not endorse all of their views, nor does he reject all Usuli arguments. Some key critiques include:

• The Akhbari rejection of the necessity of taqlid (following a jurist) and ijtihad (independent reasoning) is incorrect, since consultation of knowledgeable scholars who are aware of lawful and unlawful matters inherently involves taqlid.
• The Akhbari criticism of the concept of “most knowledgeable” lacks consistency, especially when they emphasize the role of reason and community consensus elsewhere.
• Usulis’ argument for a single religious authority to maintain unity is valid in theory but does not require exclusivity to the “most knowledgeable.” Multiple scholars can serve different regions or communities without causing conflict.

C. Foundations and Factors of Reputation and Individual Realisation

If the foundations and factors of a person’s reputation and realisation do not proceed through normal, natural, and sound channels—and the individual is aware of this—it results in a lack of qualification to be regarded as the most knowledgeable (a‘lam) for emulation. Conversely, if the individual is unaware of these issues, yet the abnormalities are so severe that they become manifestly obvious, this too causes difficulties for the individual, manifesting as weakness in authority, poor management, and incompetence. However, if the said factors are imperceptible and unrelated to the individual, no harm is inflicted upon them.

Analysis and Critique of the Usuli Beliefs

A brief summary of some criticisms levelled at the Usuli school’s beliefs includes:

1. The assertion that following the most knowledgeable (a‘lam) is an innate necessity of human nature is unfounded. No such necessity or innate disposition actually exists. Rather, there is sound reasoning supporting the referral to a knowledgeable and trustworthy mujtahid in cases of necessity. While reason obliges consulting a learned and trustworthy person, no such obligation extends specifically to the most knowledgeable.
2. The claim that rational or intellectual laws (ahkam ‘aqlī or ‘uqlā’) are universally binding, and that there is no distinction between worldly, religious, or eschatological matters, is accurate; however, there is no rational proof compelling the necessity of referral specifically to the most knowledgeable, and if such a proof exists, it does not differentiate between matters of this world and the hereafter.
3. The claim that following the most knowledgeable is a Shia doctrine and that it places the Shia above the contemporary civilized world is baseless. Referral to the most knowledgeable lacks Shia criteria and is unsupported by religious or rational evidence. Our current distance from the modern civilized world in such matters is considerable, and this is not the time to boast. It is more appropriate to value specialisations and regard anything beyond that as presumptuous.
4. The most significant argument in the Usuli texts about referral to the most knowledgeable, which complicates the position of the Akhbari school, is the narration “Man da‘ā an-nās”—“Whoever calls people to himself while there is someone more knowledgeable than him among them is a misguided innovator.” The narration states:

“Whoever calls people to himself while there is someone more knowledgeable than him, he is a misguided innovator.”

This narration appears at first glance to explicitly affirm the necessity of following the most knowledgeable. However, this is not the case, as the narration relates specifically to the infallible Imamate confronting the misguided, rather than to ‘a‘lamiyyah (most knowledgeability), because:

• The narration concerns the Imam calling people to himself, which pertains to the infallible Imam opposing misguided and unjust caliphs who falsely claimed succession to the Prophet (peace be upon him). The Imam states that anyone who independently claims the succession or leadership of Islam and calls people to himself is a misguided innovator. The narration discusses imamate, infallibility, and prophetic succession vis-à-vis opponents, not religious scholars. Jurists and mujtahids do not call people to themselves but to religion and the infallible Imams.
• Since the narration concerns infallibility and imamate, societal leadership must be singular because the infallible imamate is exclusive to one individual. If multiple infallibles existed simultaneously, only one holds the active imamate while others follow him. This differs from ijtihad and jurisprudence, where multiple jurists can issue rulings or lead communities without conflict, provided they do not encroach on each other’s domain.
• The proposition that whoever calls people to himself is misguided applies only to opponents of the infallible imamate. Those opposing the infallible Imam and claiming leadership are rightly called misguided innovators. However, when it comes to multiple jurists, even if there is a most knowledgeable among them or differing rulings, none are considered misguided innovators.

Thus, this narration clearly applies to opponents and misguided individuals against the infallible Imam and has no connection to jurists or the concept of ‘a‘lamiyyah.

Another narration cited by the Usulis also lacks connection to ‘a‘lamiyyah:

Imam Abi Abdullah (peace be upon him) said:

“You will be the most understanding people when you recognise the meanings of our words, for our speech can be interpreted in seventy ways.”

This narration indicates that those who comprehend the meanings of the Imams’ words are the most understanding (‘afqah’). The term ‘afqah’ here is not applied to a single individual but to a collective group of narrators and Shia jurists, indicating the profundity of the Imams’ teachings. It does not designate the most knowledgeable individuals nor establish the necessity of referral to the ‘a‘lam mujtahid.

The Akhbari Perspective on Islamic Sciences

Akhbaris neither consider extensive acquisition of the prevalent religious sciences necessary nor beneficial. Instead, they view it as an imposed substitute by the Usulis, diverting students from essential knowledge necessary for true religiosity. These sciences are deemed harmful and forbidden because many terms and concepts conflict with the Book and Sunnah, with origins aimed at diminishing or undermining religious rulings and the impact of the Book and Sunnah. They contend that these sciences have attempted to rival the two foundational weights of Islam.

From the Akhbari standpoint, the so-called Islamic sciences are nothing but convoluted, superfluous topics, unnecessary rules, fruitless matters, and baseless principles. Many of these sciences are remnants and fabrications pre-dating Islam, now rejected in all scientific centres except imperfectly and faintly by Usulis. True religiosity requires no borrowing from foreign sciences or imaginary terminologies; rather, many of these are tools of secularisation rather than genuine faithfulness.

The Akhbari argument for the futility or harm of these sciences rests on the completeness of the Book and Sunnah, which require no external supplements, and the utmost facilitation in learning these texts so that divine proof reaches all easily.

Disengagement from Extraneous Sciences

Those who spend years, from youth, in seminaries solely learning Usuli sciences, ultimately possess only a mind filled with terminology but lack practical knowledge. They learn thousands of legal maxims without mastery of Arabic, cannot converse ordinarily with native speakers, do not understand the Qur’an fully, and claim knowledge without grasping religious realities. Their so-called knowledge yields only fantasy and distance from religious science and practice.

Reading classical jurisprudential or literary texts such as those of al-Suyuti or al-Mughni results in wasted time and deprivation and is unnecessary. These sciences keep Usuli scholars entrenched in obsolete thought, preventing sound reasoning and free thought and obstructing engagement with the Book and Sunnah. Their study consumes a lifetime, leaving no room for reflection, awareness, or genuine religiosity. Consequently, contemporary aware students often avoid such studies except for modest stipends or compulsion, calling for a new methodology or system for them.

Usulis’ Historical Justification and the Place of Islamic Sciences

Usulis attribute Akhbari scepticism of Islamic sciences to historical roots and reject limiting it to that group alone. They argue many believe Islamic sciences, with their intricate and expansive scope, overshadow the Qur’an and Sunnah. However, such sciences emerge from the Book and Sunnah, which comprise more than literal recitation; rather, Islamic sciences express some of the infinite depth and content of the Qur’an and Sunnah, serving Muslims in deepening their knowledge.

While some Islamic sciences contain superfluous or unproductive topics, this does not negate the entirety of the discipline. Certain fields, such as philosophy and literature, have pre-Islamic origins, but Islamic scholars critically engaged with and refined them.

Islamic scholars have thoroughly examined all sciences, whether pre-Islamic or post-Islamic, integrating them into the service of true religion and generating new knowledge and understanding that cannot be compared to their historical origins.

Summary of Three Perspectives to Address the Doubts

a) Islamic sciences have not destroyed or undermined the Book and Sunnah but serve them and have fostered religious thought.

b) Although religious rulings are complete and need no external additions, Islamic sciences facilitate the application and comprehension of these rulings by unveiling the depths of religion.

c) While religiosity does not require exhaustive learning, and ordinary individuals can be faithful with basic knowledge and practice, scholarly understanding and deduction of rulings require significant time and effort.

Five Conditions for Acquiring Knowledge

A hadith from Imam Ali (peace be upon him) highlights this:

“Knowledge is attained only through five things: firstly, frequent questioning; secondly, persistent effort; thirdly, purification of actions; fourthly, serving scholars; and fifthly, seeking help from the Majestic One.”

• The student must ask many questions to resolve doubts.
• Engage diligently in study throughout life without cessation.
• Purify intentions and actions to ensure efforts are not wasted.
• Serve and attend the presence of scholars, which is a source of light and is not considered worldly time wasted.
• Finally, seek God’s assistance, recognising only God as the ultimate source of knowledge.
• Philosophy and Its Necessity
• No rational person ever denies this type of philosophy; because this meaning aligns with human perception and intellectual thought — a human who daily engages with numerous existential issues and their affirmation or negation.
• b) Philosophy is the knowledge of existential truths formulated within specific terminologies, upon which thoughts and ideas are established. This science, based on philosophical foundations grounded in logic and method, recognises no alternative paths for comprehending the realities of things, nor does it acknowledge the validity of other methods to prove or disprove a subject.
• Denying the philosophical meaning in its first sense is, in fact, an unconscious denial of one’s own self and intellectual faculty. Every individual, by rejecting philosophy, condemns their own thinking, since every rational person, after conceptualising a subject, either affirms or negates it and chooses a course of action. There is no escape from this meaning for any sensible person.
• However, with respect to the second — terminological — meaning of philosophy, there exist considerable sensitivities. Apart from the Akhbari group, various other groups throughout history have consistently condemned philosophy and shown great obstinacy in this belief. These views and all such interpretations stem from intellectual rigidity and narrow-mindedness. Merely inventing terms and establishing rules do not render a science forbidden, even though acquiring this science requires more specific conditions and time than other disciplines.
• Islam: The School of Reason
• Islam is a rational and philosophical school that, despite its simplicity, possesses infinite dynamism and strong reasoning. Any impartial and thoughtful individual who engages with the Qur’an and Sunnah and comprehends the concept of philosophy realises that many Qur’anic expressions and the statements of the Infallibles cannot be understood without philosophical insight and profound reasoning.
• Islam — the culmination of previous divine religions — possesses diverse yet subtle and straightforward dimensions, the depth of which only the Infallibles truly comprehend. Islam speaks simply but firmly, intertwining mysticism and intellect, and in all fields—worship, politics, spirituality, rationality—it surpasses others.
• Once one accepts the unquestionable foundational beliefs of the sacred religion of Islam and the essential tenets of Muslim faith, every responsible rational individual must investigate and attain conviction in these principles and strive towards their elevation. How then can one discredit, vilify, or forbid philosophical thought?
• Of course, simple expressions of beliefs do not require philosophical terminology, but in the deeper language of creed and grasping the subtleties of Islamic fundamentals, strong intellectual engagement and familiarity with terminology are necessary. Superficiality and rigidity can never lead to a profound understanding of Islam.
• Tragic Events in the History of Religions
• Throughout their history, Islam and divine religions have witnessed tragic and unfortunate events. Colonialism and exploitation, with all the cunning of devils, have striven to mislead the followers of religions and Muslims both intellectually and practically, diverting them from the blessings of religion.
• They have removed or subordinated the Qur’an, mosques, clergy, scholars, mysticism, philosophy, and other elements, distancing society and the people from their authentic benefits. They have relegated the Qur’an to mere tombstones and bedside books for children, portrayed mosques as places for societal outcasts, labelled scholars and clergy as mere elegists, turned the mourning of Karbala— which is the very soul of all human revolutions—into stagnation and weakness, confined mysticism to beggars’ bowls and sanctuaries, and branded philosophy as heresy and philosophers as heretics.
• Consequently, the benefits that should have accrued to society and the community from these realms have been tarnished or weakened. Moreover, religious and Islamic culture has been distorted to the extent that thinking is equated with disbelief, and reasoning and proof are considered irreligion! This is a great calamity that manifests daily in various forms, despite the fact that the entirety of religion is imbued with knowledge, wisdom, thought, and culture.
• Truly, how can many subjects and issues in the Book and Sunnah be understood and scientifically or practically utilised without wisdom and philosophy? This calamity is so profound that some Sunni sects, such as the Ash‘arites, out of ignorance and rigidity, attribute corporeal qualities such as hands, feet, heads, and thrones to God and reject the authority of reason, showing no inclination to think.
• The Replacement of Beauty with Ugliness
• Rigidity, superficiality, and disregard for reason have led to the attribution of human features—hands, feet, and throne—to the faultless God, who ought to be the witness to the thought and deeds of every human being. The Qur’an, which should be the constitution of the universe, has been relegated to the corners of mosques and houses as mere decorative dust. Mosques, which should be centres of human intellect and beacons of virtue, have been isolated.
• The clergy, who should bear the leadership of the community, have become mere elegists; the elegies, which should be educational for resisting oppression and tyranny, have devolved into superstition and falsehood. Philosophy, which should have nurtured noble human thoughts and introduced mankind to the mysteries of life, has been prohibited; mysticism, which should have filled the human world with love, purity, and kindness, has been confined to beggars’ bowls and sanctuaries. Consequently, the human world has been trapped in war, crime, betrayal, misguidance, corruption, and ugliness.
• At this juncture, it becomes incumbent upon every individual, especially Muslims, to rise against this calamity and human defeat, to liberate their lives from this painful death, and to fulfil their duty to humanity; so that humankind may be rescued from this historical failure and the human world restored.
• Narrations and the Prohibition of Philosophy
• Finally, it should be noted that some Akhbaris and opponents of philosophy attribute the prohibition and condemnation of philosophy to the Infallibles through numerous narrations, which they cite as incontrovertible evidence in their gatherings and writings. However, the narrations relied upon lack proper chain of transmission and reliability. Even if the chain were sound, it would be necessary to clarify what is meant by ‘philosophy’ and who the ‘philosopher’ is. History shows that numerous superstitions and deviations have been presented under the name of philosophy and philosopher, which no reasonable person accepts.
• It must be recognised that Islamic philosophy and Shi‘a philosophers differ from the findings of theologians or philosophers in the West and East. Shi‘a philosophers have always proceeded with caution, adhering strictly to evidence, reason, and logic, placing their thought in service of the Book and the Sunnah of the Infallibles.
• Distinction Between Khanqah, Church, and Philosophy and Mysticism
• What appears in some narrations and the words of prominent Shi‘a scholars and philosophers is a repudiation of the Sufi sect and a condemnation of their thoughts and lifestyle, which is clear and justified, and unrelated to Shi‘a philosophy and mysticism. The Sufis who grow up in Khanqahs and churches are the products of colonialism and oppose Islam and the mosque, using philosophy and mysticism as their banners. They are misguided individuals who, under the guise of philosophy and mysticism, cultivate markets for their lustful desires and have become puppets of colonial powers, consciously or unconsciously.
• Shi‘a philosophers and scholars unanimously reject and condemn these groups, as evidenced by the writings of Mulla Sadra—the master of the philosophers—who wrote Breaking the Idols of Ignorance to denounce them as misguided and ignorant. Hence, the deviation and condemnation of this sect bear no relation to Shi‘a philosophy and mysticism.
• The only criticism of philosophy that exists is the condemnation by some past scholars, who expressed dissatisfaction with teaching philosophy. This disapproval falls into three categories:
• a) Their criticism stemmed from concern over unqualified individuals entering this difficult science, to prevent the student from losing faith, becoming misguided, or slipping intellectually.
• b) Their disdain arose from those who lacked intellectual depth, were weary of thought, feared subtle ideas, and out of fatigue voiced opposition.
• c) Propaganda by colonial powers against intellectual thought in Islamic scholarly circles subconsciously influenced them. Hence, without study or reflection, they deprived themselves of philosophy and erroneously advised others to abandon it. Fortunately, such prejudices have diminished or ceased in contemporary scholarly circles, though regrettably, with the widespread popularisation and commercialisation of philosophy, its depth has diminished and fewer well-informed and outstanding individuals remain.
• Therefore, the dissatisfaction of some scholars derives from these three sources, all of which exist in reality.
• Islam, especially the authentic Shi‘a school, has never distanced itself from correct thought and reasoning. The perspective of the Qur’an and Sunnah aligns perfectly with this mode of thought. Philosophy and philosophers of Shi‘a differ fundamentally from theologians and pseudo-philosophers of the East and West, Sufis, Khanqahs, churches, and Sunni theologians. This distinction is clear to the informed and knowledgeable.
• The Akhbari Perspective on Six Key Points Regarding the Issue
• The Akhbari viewpoint encompasses six dimensions, each of which must be briefly and succinctly outlined, carefully examined, and its strengths and weaknesses identified, so as to dispel any confusion among the public.
• The Objective Obligation to Earn a Livelihood
• Although there exist numerous proofs and many narrations regarding the objective obligation to earn a livelihood that are accepted by all Islamic scholars, these narrations concerning earning a living are not more abundant or authoritative than those relating to the virtue and obligation of acquiring knowledge of religious law and Islamic rulings. Indeed, the definite and legal evidences regarding teaching and learning are far more extensive, and the large number of narrations concerning knowledge is accepted even by the Akhbaris.
• Since both categories of evidence are authentic and conclusive, a conflict arises between these two types of proof, each with a strong chain of transmission and clear indication. The wording of the first evidence states that earning a livelihood is obligatory upon every accountable and rational individual, whereas the second asserts that knowledge of Islamic laws and rulings, insofar as it is necessary and mandatory (either as an individual or communal obligation), must be pursued to the extent required and with all possible effort.
• According to the established principle widely accepted among all scholars of Islamic jurisprudence and Hadith methodology, in reconciling contradictory narrations, the obligation to earn a livelihood is qualified by the obligation to acquire knowledge. In other words, earning a livelihood is obligatory only when the acquisition of religious knowledge is not a compulsory individual or communal duty upon a person. Otherwise, acquiring knowledge takes precedence over earning a livelihood, and the sustenance of the scholars falls upon the Islamic public treasury (Bayt al-Mal). This is because such knowledge serves the interests and reform of individuals and society, whether presently or in the future. Therefore, supporting the livelihood and living expenses of scholars is among the most commendable uses of the Islamic community’s public funds.
• Conflict Between Work and Study
• When an individual faces a situation where earning a livelihood and pursuing knowledge cannot be combined, the duty-bearer must examine their conscience and deliberate with clear awareness to determine which of the two will yield greater benefit for their own development and that of society: engaging in work and exertion or acquiring knowledge and adorning their soul with it.
• Such an individual, provided they possess the necessary intellectual capacity, academic aptitude, and physical health, may undertake the challenging path of religious knowledge with determination, reliance on God, and appropriate mentorship, dedicating themselves passionately to acquiring knowledge and enduring the hardships along the way to reach their goal. However, if their aptitude for work and effort in earning a livelihood is greater, they ought to follow that path, abandon self-indulgence, and suppress distracting desires for knowledge that serve as satanic whispers. Similarly, if one recognizes a deficiency in intellectual capability but finds themselves better suited for work and exertion, they should abandon the pursuit of knowledge, engage in earning a living with the intention of gaining closeness to God, and thus be favoured by the Divine. This effort will become a means of their spiritual perfection. Such a person achieves success in life and does not waste their time in futility, since they act in accordance with their God-given talents, seek divine approval, and contribute to societal progress by fulfilling their appropriate role without squandering communal resources.
• Prohibition of Receiving Remuneration
• When a religious duty is objectively or communally obligatory, in individual acts such as prayer or fasting, receiving remuneration from others is meaningless because the reward is spiritual and intrinsic in the act itself. In communal and ongoing roles, such as judging, receiving payment is not permissible, as the benefit does not revert to others to justify remuneration. However, the continual need for such work may prevent the specialist from seeking a livelihood elsewhere; in this case, the Islamic ruler should provide for their sustenance to prevent societal aversion and ensure the work continues without depriving the individual of earning a living.
• If the religious ruling is merely recommended (either individually or communally), receiving payment for it is not permitted, except in social contexts where the livelihood of the expert would otherwise be at risk, and thus their living should be secured from public funds.
• Permissibility and Prohibition of Agency
• Receiving payment for acting as an agent or representative in obligatory or recommended matters, provided there is legal permission, is not problematic whether the act is ritual (ibadi) or non-ritual (tawassuli). For obligatory or recommended non-ritual acts, payment is permissible, as these acts do not constitute worship, even if performed with the intention of closeness to God. Since ritual acts do not require individual assignment, receiving payment is permissible and carries no legal objection. Of course, in non-ritual acts, agency and payment are only allowed when the act holds rational purpose and social value to justify remuneration.
• Payment for agency in obligatory or recommended ritual acts is permissible provided there is rational intention and social value. A common objection is that the obligation of intending closeness to God in ritual acts conflicts with receiving payment for agency.
• In response, receiving payment can serve as motivation and incentive to perform the act sincerely and with pure intention. The jurisprudence acknowledges cases where motivation aligns with motivation, such as prayer for needs or rain, where the necessity for rain motivates sincere prayer.
• Therefore, receiving payment for performing obligatory acts, whether ritual or non-ritual, is not problematic. It follows that receiving payment for recommended acts is even more permissible. Thus, studying Islamic sciences and jurisprudence, in any form, is not incompatible with supporting scholars through communal provision. By abandoning earning a livelihood, scholars undertake a greater responsibility whose social benefit extends to all members of society. Hence, this constitutes one of the best uses of public funds.
• Independence of the Shia Clergy
• Monetary contributions customarily given by believers and Shia to scholars and students are not for obligatory duties, but rather for recommended efforts and usually take the form of gifts or charity without expectation. Most scholars fulfil their duties, and friends and followers express their affection and respect through such contributions.
• This spiritual and popular connection between scholars and people is unique to Shia Islam, unparalleled by any other group worldwide.
• Indeed, this relationship results from the guidance and methodology of the Shia Imams, who organised the practical life of the community so that religious leaders always maintain a special status, ensuring societal continuity and credibility. Scholars themselves avoid dependency except in rare cases of corruption or colonial political interference, which are beyond the scope of this discussion.
• Historical experience shows that leaders of other sects and even Sunni groups have succumbed to subjugation under oppressive rulers and colonial powers, whereas the Shia clergy has maintained its independence over more than a millennium, standing against oppression and exposing tyrannical forces.
• No Necessity for Studying Religious Sciences
• Another negative Akhbari view denies the necessity of studying Islamic sciences, even declaring it forbidden. As discussed earlier, Islamic sciences serve the Quran and Sunnah and are essential for the reconstruction of Muslim thought and deeper understanding of religion and its laws.
• A third negative notion claims that dedicating one’s entire life to Islamic sciences is impermissible. However, it has been demonstrated that Islamic sciences are no less extensive than other disciplines and require dedicated, qualified individuals to pursue them full-time. Those who avoid this path lack the patience or intellectual capacity and seek excuses to avoid this vital undertaking.
• Among the Akhbari beliefs is the non-obligation of paying Khums (a religious tax) during the Occultation of the Imam and its permissibility for Shia, citing narrations which will be examined in detail later.
• Another point of Akhbari thought is the prohibition of using Islamic revenues such as Khums, Bayt al-Mal, and Zakat. However, it is permissible to support the livelihood of Islamic experts from Bayt al-Mal when necessary, and in fact, this is among the best uses of Islamic revenue, provided that such spending is regulated to prevent extravagance.
• After presenting these six Akhbari points, it is clear that there is no obstacle to acquiring knowledge for capable and motivated individuals; on the contrary, in some cases, it is necessary and obligatory. This is not in conflict with earning a livelihood, as reasonable provision for scholars is a religious duty, demonstrating the universality of Islam and the comprehensive governance philosophy of the Shia Imams, who have explicitly detailed all social expenditures and revenues.
• Another Akhbari deviation is their denial of the obligation of Khums for Shia. They assert that especially during the Occultation, paying Khums is permissible rather than obligatory, relying on certain narrations to justify this.
• Although Khums is a financial obligation with a firm religious foundation, especially during the Occultation when the Shia face many difficulties and oppression, the Imams have, out of kindness, relieved this obligation.
• In contrast, the Usuli scholars reject these claims, accusing the Akhbaris of superficiality and insufficient examination of the narrations, and maintaining that the strong, numerous scriptural evidences are decisive.
• The doctrine of Khums will be further analyzed by examining the evidences, narrations, and reasons why Shia scholars have not acted upon the Akhbari claims.
• The obligation of Khums is a fundamental tenet of Islam accepted by all sects, including Akhbaris, with firm scriptural and consensus support, including clear Quranic injunctions.
• Before any Muslim addresses the issue of khums (the obligation to pay one-fifth of the surplus of lawful income), it is essential to understand that this payment is not a favour or a gift to anyone. By paying khums, one merely returns one-fifth of their wealth to its rightful owner. The remaining four-fifths are permitted by the infallible Imam, who bestows this concession. Meanwhile, the believer who fulfils the obligation of khums will be rewarded on the Day of Judgment, receiving a multiplied recompense both in this world and the hereafter—a great act of divine kindness.
• After stating this firm belief in the Shi’a doctrine, it is necessary—so as to dispel any confusion or doubt—to present evidence from the Qur’an and traditions as examples, thereby providing a clear and concise understanding of the sources underpinning this conviction. Moreover, the very words of the infallible Imam carry a unique authority and effect.
• Evidence for the Obligation of Khums
• a) The Holy Qur’an
• (The Prophet is more entitled to the believers than themselves) [71]. The Noble Prophet (peace be upon him) has precedence over the believers, even over themselves.
• This precedence, mentioned in the verse, is absolute and applies equally to all individuals, regardless of their status.
• To clarify, “anfus” (selves) in this verse is the plural of “nafs” and refers to the believers themselves. The Qur’an explicitly declares that the Prophet (peace be upon him) has a rightful precedence over the believers in every aspect.
• The meaning of precedence here is that in any situation of balance or opposition, one party is given preference and priority over the other. Should two inclinations or wills arise, the one with precedence takes precedence by virtue of this status. Here, the Prophet (peace be upon him) is placed opposite the believers, with his will prevailing both materially and spiritually, as the wording of the verse applies universally to both the ontological and legislative spheres.
• Love and Desire of Every Particle
• According to divine guidance embedded in the natural order (the system of the best creation), two internal and creative forces—love and desire—are instilled in every particle. Each particle originates from love and pursues eternity with passion, striving continuously to complete itself, seeking the eternal and, upon reaching it, to behold the divine presence.
• Hence, in the nature of all things and beings, including faithful humans, love and desire exist. Every person, like every other creature, cherishes their own existence and loves their possessions and offspring. Consequently, every being and believer naturally avoids harm and seeks to preserve their existence.
• Love for Eternity
• Now, with an explanation of the longitudinal ownership and its three levels, as well as the divine guidance in love and desire, it becomes clear why the Qur’an gives absolute precedence to the Prophet (peace be upon him) over the believers in every respect. The existence of the believers ultimately originates from the infallible Imams, who hold legislative ownership, just as the ultimate true owner of existence is God Almighty. Thus, the true and absolute love and return to the Truth (God) and the prioritisation of the Prophet are understood as genuine and absolute.
• The Nature of Precedence
• It was noted that every believer must regard the will and desire of the Prophet (peace be upon him) as superior to their own and place their entire existence within his domain. Every believer must also consider any deficiency or hardship as beginning with themselves, acting as a shield to protect the Prophet and the infallibles, considering the infallible as their very soul. The absolute meaning of the aforementioned verse confirms that the Prophet has precedence over the believers in every respect, and the very existence of every believer originates from him.
• Therefore, a believer must first apply their affection towards the Prophet and then themselves. The Prophet and the infallible Imams are the true and legislative owners, while the believer holds merely a contingent ownership of their existence. This precedence is neither coercive nor a matter of favour but is the natural and real order of existence, which the believer acknowledges without reluctance.
• The mention of believers in this verse regarding precedence does not restrict this ownership and precedence exclusively to the believers but rather emphasises the importance and necessity of observing this matter, as non-believers cannot grasp this practical belief easily, especially not in action but rather only in words or writing. The significance of this matter becomes evident when the infallible requests one’s existence, particularly when what is possessed and needed is demanded.
• Only the believer can fulfil this; a disbeliever or weak believer develops animosity towards the infallible because they regard their existence as their own and recognise no ownership or share for the infallible. They see the infallible as intruding upon their being. Similarly, if God Almighty demands from a disbeliever or weak believer what He has given, they respond with hostility to the divine essence, regarding God as an oppressor who forcibly took their existence.
• Divine Providence
• This explanation elucidates why some traditions report that certain individuals die in disbelief, meeting God in hostility. They perceive God as an oppressor who forcibly takes their life and wealth, which they consider their own. They think God unjustly separates their wealth and offspring.
• This issue is of such importance that every person must never neglect God’s mercy in any state or situation, seeking refuge in Him and turning to the infallible Imams to safely pass this test—especially at the moment of death. Without divine favour and the intercession of the infallibles, salvation is unattainable, a fact evident from the description of this extraordinary moment.

Irrespective of the abundant and definitive evidence mandating Khums, which invalidates the narrations permitting its exemption, the practical principles also necessitate the obligation of Khums; for certain engagement requires certain absolution. In other words, the fundamental principle of the duty of Khums and its endorsement are established, and the individual’s responsibility to pay Khums is activated. Now, to attain acquittal or waive this obligation, there exist only two means: one is the payment of Khums, and the other is a reason that removes the obligation to pay. Since no such reason exists — due to the narrations permitting Khums being weak in chain and indication — the obligation to pay Khums remains firmly in force. Neglecting it is considered counter-evidence and a violation of the duty’s obligation, amounting to misappropriation of others’ property without legitimate permission.

Narrations on the Necessity of Paying Khums

After demonstrating the weakness in chain and indication of the narrations permitting Khums and detailing the reasons for its obligation and confirmation based on verbal evidence from the Book and Sunnah, practical principles, jurisprudential philosophy, and the rationale behind the establishment of Khums, it is necessary to conclude by citing several sample narrations to confirm and establish the obligation of Khums from all perspectives, thereby clarifying the necessity of this historic and complex issue.

Khums: An Independent Support

In the report of Muhammad ibn Zayd al-Tabari, he relates:
“No wealth is lawful except from a source which God has made lawful. Khums is our support for our religion, our dependents, and our allies.” And at the conclusion, he states: “A true Muslim is one who fulfils what God has entrusted to him; a person who verbally declares Islam but opposes it in their heart is not a Muslim.” [84]

In this report, after his statement, the presence declares that no wealth becomes lawful except by the means God has permitted. Khums is our support for our faith and livelihood and aid for our friends and children. Then, at the end, he affirms: “A genuine Muslim is one who fulfils the obligations God has placed upon him; one who professes Islam with the tongue but contradicts in the heart is not a Muslim.”

This noble tradition asserts:

• The legitimacy of any ownership is recognised by God, and any unlawful effort is devoid of value and respect.
• The existential philosophy of instituting and perpetuating Khums is the continuation of the Ahl al-Bayt’s path, which opposes all forms of colonialism and oppression. In this struggle, no aid from tyrants or wealthy oppressors will be forthcoming; hence an independent and continuous support is undoubtedly necessary. God Almighty has therefore instituted Khums to ensure the intellectual perseverance and continuity of the political survival and social conduct of the Ahl al-Bayt and their followers.
• The essence of Islam is belief in and adherence to divine laws, and mere words or claims do not suffice to constitute a true Muslim.
• From this narration, the direct relationship between divine law, the legitimacy of ownership, the institution of Khums, and true Muslim identity is evident. If these factors coalesce harmoniously in society, that society will progress toward growth and health.

Khums and the Violation of Rights

In another narration, when asked about the permissibility of Khums, the Imam replied firmly:
“We do not permit any of you to consider Khums lawful.” [85]

This narration, aside from negating permissibility and reaffirming the obligation of Khums, establishes the rule’s statutory nature; for the Imam explicitly and exclusively states: “We do not allow any of you to consider Khums lawful.” Hence, the Imam emphasises the mandatory nature of payment, addressing all Shia collectively to show that this ruling applies universally. Given that the Imam uses plural verbs — “we do not allow” — he speaks on behalf of all the Imams, confirming that this is a fixed and general rule.

In a sound tradition, after expressing displeasure at spending Khums without permission, the Imam said:
“By God, they will be questioned rigorously about this on the Day of Resurrection.” [86]

From this narration, beyond the non-permissibility and the continued obligation of Khums, it becomes clear how concerned the Imam is about the false claim of Khums permissibility (due to the necessity of allowance in certain exigent cases) and directs all attention to the Hereafter, emphasising the grave importance of the matter.

In the narration of Abu Basir, he said:
“I asked Abu Ja’far: What is the easiest thing that causes a servant to enter Hell? He replied: Whoever consumes even a dirham of the property of an orphan unlawfully, and we are the orphans.” [87]

This narration highlights the significance of people’s rights, especially the Khums of the family of Muhammad (peace be upon them). The phrase “we are the orphans” reflects their innocence, uniqueness, and purity among all creatures — a profound station requiring independent understanding.

A Fire in the Heart

In a divine letter, the Imam (may God hasten his reappearance) stated:
“As for the man who uses what is in his possession of our wealth and acts in it as if it were his without our permission, he is cursed, and we are his enemies. The Prophet said: Whoever considers lawful what God has forbidden of my progeny is cursed by my tongue and the tongue of every prophet who has responded. Whoever wrongs us is among those who wrong us, and God’s curse is upon him as He said: ‘God’s curse be on the wrongdoers.’ And the Imam also said: Whoever consumes any of our wealth without our permission is indeed consuming fire in his belly and will burn in the Hellfire.” [88]

In this divine letter, the Imam expresses his utmost and severe detestation toward the opponents and enemies of the infallibles. The term “mustaḥill” here refers to those who oppose and deny the divine ruling on Khums, thus rejecting it. Careless or neglectful individuals who merely profess belief by tongue are not included. The Imam concludes that whoever consumes even a small part of their wealth without permission harbours a fire in their heart and awaits Hellfire.

Numerous narrations exist on the non-permissibility of Khums, which need not all be cited here. These narrations differ from those permitting Khums for the Sayyids (descendants of the Prophet) as opposed to Zakat, and also differ from narrations about collecting Khums by the deputies of Imam al-Mahdi (may God hasten his reappearance) over seventy years. Many narrations attest, in various forms, to the obligation, collection, and use of Khums and the non-permissibility of its abandonment.

Shia: The Only Independent Global Doctrine

The position of Islam can be understood well by brief comparison between Islam and other heavenly or human ideologies in every respect, as well as between the numerous sects of Islam and Shia. The worldview of Islam is manifest only through the Shia perspective; for Islam is a religion that interprets the world in relation to man, and this interpretation is only realised through the Shia path — specifically the path of Imam Ali (peace be upon him), which alone can claim governance and global administration of worldly affairs. This is because only the infallible method captures all social and governmental grounds in an open and expansive world reliant on God and people. Any need for other forces, which leads to dictatorship, is deemed anti-religious and against faith.

The diverse dimensions of society and even the unified world must be sought only in the lofty thoughts of the Shia and the Quran, including Islamic economics and the establishment of a unified system to meet society and people’s needs, which play a pivotal role in this claim.

Khums, itself a part of the economic laws of Islam and Shia, manifests its important role in this context and must be examined thoroughly in its own right.

Khums: Guarantee of Shia Survival

This brief mention suffices: the survival of the Shia and the clergy over more than a millennium of relentless internal and external hostile assaults — both religious and non-religious — without any reliance on colonial powers of wealth, force, or deceit was only made possible through this unique political and economic system of the Shia.

All the independence enjoyed by the Shia world and its awakened clergy today stems solely from the fundamental stability of the school and its dynamic and productive economic foundations.

To witness this, one may consider all schools and even Islamic sects to understand how all nations, leaders, and sects of Islam — willingly or unwillingly — have become enslaved by colonialist powers and dependent on exploiters’ largesse, dedicating themselves and their doctrines to serve these powers.

Truly, those who oppose Khums — this divine and economic law of the Shia — knowingly or unknowingly serve the tyrants and devote their actions to them; for all devils have concentrated their efforts on negating and annihilating the Shia and its sincere clergy. They have sought to weaken the Shia’s economic backing, unaware that reality cannot be destroyed by such fragile illusions.

On the Distortion of the Qur’an

Definition of Distortion:
Distortion can be understood in two distinct senses:

1. Addition: The incorporation of extra verses or words into the Qur’an beyond what was originally revealed.
2. Subtraction or Alteration: The removal, omission, or modification of parts of the Qur’an.

The Position of the Muslim Ummah:
No Islamic sect accepts distortion in the sense of addition — that is, adding verses or words to the Qur’an. Regarding distortion in the sense of subtraction or alteration, there is some divergence of opinion among scholars; however, the overwhelming consensus among the great scholars of Islam, including Shi’a authorities, affirms the integrity and preservation of the Qur’anic text.

Evidence Against Distortion:
There exists a multitude of theological, historical, and textual proofs demonstrating that the Qur’an has been protected from any form of corruption or change. The Qur’an itself, alongside the sayings of the Prophet and the Imams, emphasises the divine guarantee of its preservation. This consensus is fundamental to Islamic creed and jurisprudence.

Sahib al-Wasa’il al-Shi’ah, after citing narrations in its 25th section, quotes a passage from Al-Saduq that vehemently condemns the addition of extra phrases in the call to prayer (adhān):

“This is the correct adhān; nothing should be added to it or removed from it. The Mufawwidhah — may God curse them — have fabricated reports and increased the adhān with the phrase ‘Muhammad and the family of Muhammad are the best of creation’ twice, and in some of their narrations, after the testimony ‘I bear witness that Muhammad is the Messenger of God,’ they add ‘I bear witness that Ali is the Wali of God’ twice. Some even narrate instead: ‘I bear witness that Ali is truly the Commander of the Faithful’ twice. There is no doubt that Ali is the Wali of God and the true Commander of the Faithful, and that Muhammad and his family—may God’s blessings be upon them—are the best of creation, but these phrases are not part of the original adhān. I mention this so that these additions are recognised as the fabrications of the accused Mufawwidhah, who have deceived themselves in their sect.” [112]

The “correct adhān” is thus that which was stated earlier; nothing should be added or omitted. However, the Mufawwidhah—a reference to a group described as rationalists and here condemned—have concocted narratives and inserted phrases such as “Muhammad and the family of Muhammad are the best of creation” twice, or added twice after “I bear witness that Muhammad is the Messenger of God” the phrase “I bear witness that Ali is the Wali of God.” Some replace this with “I bear witness that Ali is truly the Commander of the Faithful” twice. It is indisputable that Ali is the Wali of God and the rightful Commander of the Faithful, and that Muhammad and his family are the best of creation. Nevertheless, these phrases are not originally part of the adhān and should not be inserted into it. This statement aims to clarify that these additions come from those accused of ‘tafwīḍ’ (delegation or neglect) who falsely claim to be Shi’a but deceive themselves. The narration establishes that although these words reflect Shi’a beliefs and are pillars of faith, they do not belong to the components of the adhān or iqāmah. Sahib al-Wasa’il, after citing these statements, says: “This is the end of the words of Al-Saduq, the chief of the hadith scholars, may God be pleased with him,” recognising him as the chief muhaddithīn. [113]

From the statements of these two great scholars, several points may be deduced:

a) The Shaykh (Al-Saduq) discusses the correct and incorrect forms of adhān, attributing the addition of phrases in adhān and iqāmah to a group other than his own.

b) He identifies those mentioned as the Mufawwidhah, a term indicating deviation, both doctrinal and in the parts of the adhān, distancing them from Shi’a and asserting they deceive themselves by falsely calling themselves Shi’a.

c) The Shaykh curses them, and it is evident that a scholar like Al-Saduq—who was born by the prayer of the Mahdi (may God hasten his reappearance)—would not curse anyone except those he believed had deviated from faith.

d) Sahib al-Wasa’il’s confirmation of all these points and his praise of Al-Saduq as chief muhaddithīn, without criticism, indicates his agreement with him.

Proximity to the Truth

In interpreting the noble verse (“And We have raised your mention high”) [Qur’an 94:4], several narrations state: “Since God has promised to exalt the Prophet’s name, it is mentioned in the adhān and iqāmah immediately after God’s name and without interruption.”

Ali ibn Ibrahim, the author of the Qummi tafsir, comments under the verse (“You shall be mentioned as I am mentioned”) [Qur’an 17:55], reporting the divine statement: “And this is the phrase people say: ‘I bear witness there is no god but God and I bear witness that Muhammad is the Messenger of God.’” [115]

This narration indicates that the Prophet’s mention is closely linked with God’s mention, an honour granted by God Almighty. Notably, the name of Amir al-Mu’minin (Ali) is absent here. Thus, the testimony in the adhān and iqāmah is a distinctive feature of the Prophet Muhammad alone.

Given the nature of worship and the prohibition against adding anything to its components, as well as the principle of rejecting innovation (bid‘ah) and the strict adherence to the prescribed wording of adhān and iqāmah, which constitute obedience to divine commands, one cannot incorporate the testimony of Wilāyah (guardianship) into these invocations. While no Shi’a doubts Ali’s rightful Wilāyah and Imamate, or the Prophet’s and his family’s status as the best of creation, the key principle is not to introduce any phrase into adhān and iqāmah without legitimate proof or divine permission. Any addition constitutes innovation and causes division among Muslims, conflicting with the principle of taqiyyah (prudence). This may explain why the testimony concerning Ali’s status is not placed alongside the testimony to God and the Prophet in adhān and iqāmah.

Partial Inclusion or Entry?

Usuli scholars, lacking any proof or authorization for their practice, resort to an invented principle: if the phrase “I bear witness that Ali is the Wali of God” is said with the intent of partial inclusion or entry (meaning adding it officially), it is forbidden and an innovation; but if said without such intent—merely as an expression of blessing or remembrance—it is not objectionable.

They rest their argument on this and regard it as sufficient, unaware that both the intent to innovate or enter the phrase and the act of reciting the testimony itself are separate sins. For example, someone drinking wine without the intention to legitimise it is judged differently than one who drinks wine to insult God or to declare it lawful. Even the first, though not intending insult or legitimization, still faces punishment. Hence, lack of intent to innovate does not solve the problem nor justify the practice, but rather complicates matters, turning it into mere formalism and embellishment.

Why then do Usulis speak in such a manner when a scholar like Al-Saduq—renowned narrator of the Imams’ traditions, born by the prayer of the Mahdi—curses this group?

We hold that Ali ibn Abi Talib is the Commander of the Faithful and Wali of God, and that the family of Muhammad are the best of creation; yet this belief must not lead to innovations in the religion or additions in the formal prayers.

Conformity with Ahl al-Sunnah

The critique addressed to Usulis resembles that directed at Ahl al-Sunnah: that they have altered God’s religion by additions and omissions. Their leader, the second caliph, said: “The Book of God suffices for knowing the religion’s rulings.” [116] But since the Qur’anic verses indicate only general rulings, they resorted to innovations such as analogy (qiyās), juristic preference (istihsān), and public interest (maṣlaḥah mursalah), thereby distorting the divine law and straying from the Prophet’s teachings.

Ahl al-Sunnah have also innovated in the adhān and iqāmah by adding phrases like “As-salāh khayrun min an-nawm” (“Prayer is better than sleep”) instead of “Hayya ‘ala khayr al-‘amal” (“Come to the best of deeds”), causing further divergence from Shi’a.

If Usulis add phrases of testimony to the adhān and iqāmah, they face the same critique and join the innovations of Ahl al-Sunnah.

In other words, if Usulis do not consider “I bear witness that Ali is the Commander of the Faithful and Wali of God” an innovation or intend it as partial inclusion, Sunnis will respond similarly about “Prayer is better than sleep.” Thus, they have paved the way for Sunnis’ justifications.

Why does the Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, have no authority to alter even a dot in the religion, yet you do so? This act justifies the distortions found in the Torah and Gospel, for distortion is nothing other than tampering with religion by addition or omission—whether in Islam, Judaism, or Christianity.

Why then ignore Qur’anic verses and traditions that forbid any alteration, even minimal, and why disregard the hadiths prohibiting innovations? Is tampering with religion not distortion?

Leaders of Deviation

It will be explained that the principles of divine religions from Adam to the Seal of Prophets lost their authenticity only through distortion and deviation initially caused by scholars and intellectuals of those religions. That is, the first breach of the religion’s preservation came from learned individuals who broke the seal of divine decree, allowing others to follow.

The gravity of the issue lies in the fact that when a jurist modifies the religion to suit his own desire, it leads to further distortions by his followers.

If introducing this phrase in the adhān and iqāmah is permissible, then by the same logic one could add it to the beginning of prayer, recitation, bowing, testimony, and prostration, or insert testimony to the Wilāyah of other Imams or any newly invented phrases. Similarly, additions could be made in other acts of worship like fasting, zakāt, pilgrimage, and jihad, so long as the intent to innovate or enter is denied—rendering the objection meaningless.

Religious Audacity

Is it not audacious to claim: “The phrase ‘I bear witness that Ali is the Commander of the Faithful and Wali of God’ was neither prescribed by God, the Prophet, nor the Imams as part of adhān and iqāmah, but we have arbitrarily added it”? Or is the audacity greater in placing ourselves where the Prophet and Imams have not?

If Usulis defend themselves by saying: “The Prophet said: Wherever you mention my name, follow it immediately with Ali’s name,” we respond: this may be correct, but did the Prophet or Imams ever practise this in the adhān or iqāmah?

Why not add “I bear witness that Ali is the Commander of the Faithful and his executor” in the tashahhud during prayer? Why is this command forgotten in other instances?

If Usulis argue that there must be a difference between Shi’a and Sunnis in adhān and iqāmah, we reply: if the difference lies in truth and error, many differences already exist, clearly distinguishing the two groups. If these differences are of our own making, then scripture and tradition consistently pursue unity and emphasize it, to bind Muslim groups together.

Beyond religious teachings, natural laws also aim for unity and harmony among people.

The Holy Qur’an explicitly calls upon the People of the Book: “O People of the Scripture! Come to a word that is equitable between us and you: that we worship none but God…” [117]

Unity and the Testimony of Tawhid in the Book

The Book calls upon its followers to come together in a shared belief and to testify to the oneness of God (Tawhid). This is particularly significant given that the term itself, as used by Jews and Christians, had been tainted with polytheism. The wise Qur’an seeks unity of speech among the People of the Book and Muslims, aiming to resolve remaining disputes through this unity. This is especially pertinent today, as followers of revealed religions face overt attacks from polytheism and disbelief.

Islam, which advocates strongly for unity, cohesion, and solidarity, would not sanction a clear division between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims. The infallible Imams have emphasised taqiyya (prudential concealment) primarily to preserve the unity of speech. Consequently, they have consistently advised their followers to conceal divisive issues and refrain from exacerbating differences. While preserving the life, honour, and property of the Shi’a was also a factor, the primary aim of taqiyya was to prevent sectarian discord and thereby avoid the weakening of Muslims in the face of their enemies.

Islam and Sacrificing for Interests

Some Usuli scholars argue: if the testimony of allegiance (Wilayah) is an innovation (bid’ah), then countless people from past centuries who have uttered this truthful phrase in honour of Amir al-Mu’minin (peace be upon him) must be condemned to Hell. Indeed, if this testimony were an innovation, why has no one severely criticised it over the centuries?

In contrast, Akhbari scholars respond that those who deliberately promote this innovation will face divine wrath. The common believers who follow these scholars without deep knowledge are not to be equated with the innovators themselves. The fault of ordinary people lies solely in imitation, and as long as they remain unaware, their actions may even be rewarded. The Imams have stated in narrations that anyone who performs an act believing it to be obligatory or forbidden by the Divine Lawgiver will be rewarded accordingly, even if the act is not truly mandated.

However, Usuli scholars contend that great jurists like Sheikh Saduq, nearly a millennium ago, explicitly declared the testimony of Wilayah in the call to prayer (adhan) and iqamah as bid’ah and forbidden. If the Usuli scholars admit this, their scholarly credibility would be undermined, which explains their reluctance to admit the error. Thus, they are faced with a dilemma: uphold their reputation or maintain Shi’a and Islamic teachings, and some choose to prioritise their interests.

Akhbari scholars advise the faithful to focus on preserving their piety, religious devotion, intellectual clarity, and correct beliefs, and to love and honour the Imams, particularly Amir al-Mu’minin, distinguishing between the pillars of faith and the optional additions in the call to prayer and iqamah. This, they argue, would enhance religious understanding and knowledge of faith.

Usuli Rebuttals: Three Foundational Points

Usuli scholars address Akhbari criticisms by clarifying three key points:

1. The phrases constituting the adhan and iqamah;
2. The fatwas of Shi’a scholars regarding the testimony of Wilayah in the adhan and iqamah;
3. The meaning of bid’ah in religion.

The Phrases of Adhan and Iqamah

Numerous narrations enumerate thirty-five phrases in total: eighteen in the adhan and seventeen in the iqamah, with no significant disagreement among scholars on this matter.

No jurist regards the testimony of Wilayah to Amir al-Mu’minin as an integral part of the adhan or iqamah, although neither the entire adhan nor the iqamah are obligatory parts of prayer. The testimony is a desirable phrase, added after the testimony to the prophethood of the Messenger of God, akin to the salutations upon the Prophet and his family within the tashahhud during prayer.

Scholarly Opinions

Shi’a scholars consider this testimony to be a recommended (mustahabb) phrase rather than a compulsory one within the prayer rituals. They do not deem it forbidden unless it is introduced as a mandatory part of religious law, which would then constitute an innovation.

Definition of Bid’ah

Bid’ah in religion is the attribution of any act to religion that was neither prescribed nor sanctioned by God or the Prophet. Introducing a practice as a religious duty, or abolishing an established practice without divine sanction, constitutes innovation and is forbidden, potentially leading to disbelief.

The Nature of Recommended Phrases

Based on these clarifications, it is evident that no one can assert the testimony of Wilayah in the adhan or iqamah as obligatory prayer ritual; such a claim contradicts the consensus of Shi’a jurists. However, this testimony is not an innovation, as it is not presented as a legislative act but as a recommended mention following the testimony to the Prophet.

Comparison with Sunni Additions

A common misconception is that if the testimony of Wilayah in the adhan and iqamah is permissible, then the Sunni phrase “as-salatu khayrun min an-nawm” (“Prayer is better than sleep”) should also be allowed. Shi’a scholars reject this, considering it a meaningless phrase introduced as a compulsory addition, which is not based on any authentic tradition and lacks theological significance.

The testimony to Wilayah is a vital and authentic phrase, central to faith, as supported by Qur’anic verses and narrations, unlike the Sunni addition which lacks meaningful content.

Friday Prayer and Its Status

Akhbari scholars maintain that Friday prayer remains obligatory even during the occultation, and neglecting it is sinful and contrary to the Qur’an. They argue that after the Prophet’s demise, religious laws became fixed, as the verse “This day I have perfected for you your religion” indicates. The Imams never abrogated the Friday prayer, encouraging its performance even with small gatherings.

Debate on Suspension of Friday Prayer

Some Usuli scholars claim that Friday prayer is linked to religious governance (caliphate), which does not currently exist, thus justifying its suspension. Akhbari scholars reject this, asserting it constitutes unauthorised interpretation that conflicts with clear narrations permitting Friday prayers with as few as five or seven individuals.

Friday Prayer as the Embodiment of Religion

Friday prayer symbolises the entirety of religious obligations, emphasising order, unity, and collective worship. It serves as a central pillar for social cohesion and displays the strength and organisation of the Muslim community, thereby instilling fear in enemies.

The suspension of Friday prayer undermines this symbolic and practical role, while other obligatory dues, such as Khums, continue to be observed even amid political adversity.

In another example, if the man of the house is absent, and the mother, faced with poverty, hardship, and the task of raising her husband’s young children alone, then after the husband returns, he might rightfully ask: “Why is this child like this and that child like that?” Or, he should acknowledge the efforts made and reward the woman for her toil.

Similarly, during the occultation (ghayba) when people are suffering greatly from confusion and affliction, the Shiite clergy took the role of the shield of faith. They fought valiantly against the enemies of religion and the opponents of the Imams, safeguarding the faith, belief, and the sanctity of the Shia community. They will continue to do so until the return of the Imam.

Is it justifiable for an ignorant person to direct their attack towards what remains in the house, replacing gratitude with animosity and still consider themselves to be pious and religious?

No one claims that there are no issues within the Shiite clergy; that all the scholars are infallible and that they surpass the likes of Abū Dharr and Salman in their excellence. However, one must acknowledge that the enduring life of the religion and the symbolic and actual embodiments of truth are these very scholars. The warriors of the Awaited Imam (may Allah hasten His return) are the clergy. This is a fundamental point, and the presence of the unworthy among them is a different issue entirely.

Should one apply a balm to the wounds of those who have been wounded in their struggle against falsehood, or should one pour salt into their wounds? A friend applies a balm, while an enemy pours salt.

Thus, accusations of moral corruption against the scholars, the possessors of knowledge, and the guardians of the Shia faith are not so simple, and anyone who makes such accusations will find themselves deprived of truth. Such an interpretation of religious scholars must be regarded as stemming from ignorance, lack of piety, and a disregard for Islamic decorum.

At this point, it is necessary to address, one by one, all the claims and criticisms made by the Akhbaris, discussing openly the truth and falsehood of each, so that the ignorance of the accusers is exposed.

Each of these accusations and slanders is investigated through several points to ensure a fair and balanced perspective:

1. Malice and False Claims: One of the most obvious things in the statements of the Akhbaris is the amount of malice, hatred, rancour, and slander that is spoken without evidence, far removed from any truth. The use of terms such as “evil behaviour”, “corrupt interactions”, “distance from purity”, “alignment with the world’s people”, and “earning from illicit sources” is highly dangerous and leads to obvious misguidance. It seems that they have identified all the evils in the world in the Shiite clergy, and to such friends, one might say: “Congratulations to the enemy.”
2. The Prophets Did Not Receive Payment: The Akhbaris cite verses from the Qur’an claiming that the prophets never received compensation from the people. Therefore, since these scholars are the heirs of the prophets, they should not accept any money from the people.

In response, it should be noted that the addressees of the prophets were their enemies, who claimed: “We ask nothing from you in return for presenting the truth; our reward is with God.” We see that, although the prophets were infallible and had no need for training or teaching, God Himself designated certain rights for them. This is even clearer in the case of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as God has allocated a share for him, and the Prophet holds both His share and his own, which is for the Imams, along with many other rights that have been discussed in jurisprudence. Therefore, given that scholars should be fully dedicated to research and learning, and considering that the Akhbaris have justified not paying khums (a form of religious tax), how should scholars sustain themselves? Should this not be similar to the case of the confiscation of Fadak from Imam Ali (peace be upon him) and Fatimah (peace be upon her)? There is no problem if a scholar has financial relations with the people, just as the Prophet and the Imams took charge of the financial affairs of religion and provided for their own needs with dignity and moderation.

The narration cited by the Akhbaris regarding the one who earns from their knowledge should be understood in its true context. It refers to the scholar who, without proper understanding of religious truths, issues rulings for worldly gain, thus leading to the corruption of rights and misguiding people. Such a person is not the true scholar.

1. The Role of Scholars in Worship: The positions of leading prayers, calling people to worship, and guiding the people are related to the Prophets and Imams. During the occultation, it is the responsibility of the righteous scholars to take up this task. However, two things must be considered: deceit and the lack of knowledge or qualification. Such individuals are not worthy of leading prayers or being placed in positions of authority within the community.
2. The Responsibility of the Clergy: The pulpits, like the places of prayer, are sacred positions belonging to the Prophets and Imams. For over a millennium, the scholars have introduced the people to their religion from these positions. If unqualified individuals rise to these positions, it is the duty of the people to remove them. The misdeeds of the unqualified do not tarnish the reputation of the religious scholars, but it is the responsibility of the people to avoid those who are unqualified and to safeguard the sanctity of religion.
3. The Dangers of Flattery: Flattery, hypocrisy, and the appeasement of the worldly elite have no place in the lives of the true religious scholars. If some individuals engage in these practices, it does not harm the integrity of the true scholars and jurists.
4. Pride and Humility: Pride and self-promotion are the characteristics of the misguided, but dignity, greatness, and authority are not incompatible with knowledge, piety, and religious commitment. All the Prophets and Imams had such dignity that anyone who looked at their noble faces would be compelled to believe. While physical traits like a staff or sandals are blessings from God, it is the spiritual dignity of the scholars that commands respect, not physical stature.
5. Avoiding Conflict: Envy, slander, and cursing are diseases of the soul that keep people away from the blessings of God. True religious scholars are free from such vices. If people become ensnared in such traits, it should not be attributed to the scholars, who are clear of such faults.
6. The Shia Seminary: The Shia seminaries have always accepted individuals from various backgrounds and ideas, producing scholars who can be compared to the Prophets in their piety and knowledge. Even without the support of a formal system, the seminaries have produced such figures that, at times, they are more remarkable than some of the Prophets. Therefore, the key is not to look from a distance and attack the seminary, but to focus on finding those who will guide others with knowledge, rather than those who defame it.

In conclusion, there are three points that should not be overlooked:

• The Role of the Clergy: The Shiite clergy have, with all their might, supported the religion of God and have followed the path of truth despite facing all enemies and having minimal support from friends.
• Challenges: There are numerous problems, including deep-rooted disorganization and shortages in personal qualities, caused primarily by the tyranny of oppressors. Efforts must be made to address these issues.
• Inaccurate Criticisms: Many of the unwarranted criticisms directed towards the scholars have no basis in truth and should not be leveled against them. They do not reflect the reality of the religious scholars, who uphold the integrity of Islam.

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