Wilayah and Government: Authority and Governance

Wilayah and Government

Authority and Governance

Identification
Author: Mohammad-Reza Nikoonam (b. 1327 AH)
Title: Al-Wilayah wal-Hukoomah / Mohammad-Reza Nikoonam
Publication Information: Tehran: Sobh Farda Publications, 1393 AH (2014)
Physical Description: 96 pages; 9.5 x 19 cm
ISBN: 978-600-91763-8-0
Cataloging Status: FIPA
Language: Arabic
Note: Previous edition published in Qom: Zohur-e Shafaq, 1386 AH (2007).
Subjects: Leadership – Religious Aspects – Islam; Guardianship of the Jurist; Leadership; Authority
Congress Classification: BP223.8 / N76W8 1393 AH
Dewey Decimal Classification: 297.45
National Bibliography Number: 3684678

Introduction

Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the worlds, and peace and blessings upon Muhammad and his pure family, and perpetual curse upon all their enemies.

Wilayah (authority, guardianship) is one of the well-known concepts, and it has numerous categories in terms of meaning, application, and its various rulings and consequences.

This treatise briefly explores, in terms of both its applications and rulings, the different forms of wilayah as discussed in religious discourse and law.

Divine Wilayah in relation to Allah (SWT) is a universally accepted, intrinsic, real, and eternal truth, with no doubt in it except for those who deny or reject the truth outwardly. The authority of the Lord over the created is self-evident, whether it is in terms of creation or legislation. Indeed, the created being is nothing in comparison to the Lord, and the relationship between the Lord and His creation is one of affirmation and negation. Any conceptualization of multiplicity in this regard requires careful reflection and intellectual analysis.

Wilayah (with a fatha) means love, particularly in relation to the Ahl al-Bayt (the family of the Prophet, peace be upon them), and is a fundamental aspect of religion. When used with a kasra, it signifies governance and sovereignty, particularly concerning the infallible Imams (peace be upon them). The absence of their governance during their lifetimes was due to opposition from adversaries and the lack of necessary conditions to implement their authority until the occultation of the last Imam, which led to the challenges we face today.

The Authority of Individuals Over Themselves

The authority of individuals over their own affairs, including their wealth and all that pertains to them, is a self-evident principle, without needing formal legislation from the shari’ah. This authority is grounded in rational and social norms, recognized universally among various peoples and communities, and even extends to the animal kingdom in some form.

Shari’ah teachings in this area confirm this principle and offer guidance on it. However, this authority is constrained by two conditions:

1. It should not cause harm or deprivation to others, and the authority of others must not be infringed upon.
2. It must not be used in ways that are unreasonable or cause harm.

No One Has Authority Over Others Except By Clear Evidence
The authority of one person over another, or of one person over a group, is contrary to the original principle of personal autonomy and requires conclusive evidence. It is not sufficient to base the establishment of any form of authority on subjective judgments or speculative ideas. Therefore, a jurist must rigorously investigate and verify any claim to authority before accepting it, as the fundamental principle is the negation of such authority unless clearly proven.

Thus, all forms of authority—including those of prophecy, imamate, paternity, marriage, slavery, and governance—are disputed and contrary to the original assumption. Each form must be substantiated by clear and compelling evidence, or the original assumption of negation holds. Freedom and independence are the core principles here. The important task at hand is to explore the evidence for each of these claims and critically examine them in the following sections, God willing.

Chapter One: The Authority of the Ahl al-Bayt (Peace Be Upon Them)

Among those whose authority is universally acknowledged over the believers and over all realms is the noble Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) and the infallible Imams (peace be upon them), as well as Fatimah al-Zahra (peace be upon her), who is described as the ornament of the banner of truth. This authority does not negate people’s independence in their personal affairs because they are the guardians of divine blessings, and their infallibility preserves them from any injustice or harm to others.

Their authority over people means their precedence over others regarding their own affairs. It signifies their exclusive right to govern all that pertains to people, and it includes legislative authority, whereby they explain and establish laws on behalf of Allah, without distinction between the words of Allah and those of the infallible Imams (peace be upon them).

The lawgiver is the one who enacts laws, whether it is Allah or the infallible Imams (peace be upon them). Their divine knowledge of the benefits and harms of all matters ensures their protection from error. What the infallible Imams say is the command of Allah, regardless of whether they say it in the name of Allah or in their own name.

Their legislative authority is grounded in their divine infallibility and their unique access to the knowledge of all that is beneficial or harmful, which sets them apart from everyone else, including caliphs, rulers, jurists, and scholars.

The Role of Guardianship

The role of guardianship in Islamic law, especially when attributed to a ruler or a jurist (faqih), is based on the concept of achieving the public good and maintaining social order. This function aims to prevent harm and promote welfare and benefits for the community. Therefore, the exercise of guardianship by these figures must inherently take into account these factors. It is not sufficient for a guardian to merely refrain from causing harm to negate the obligation of their guardianship. This is also the case for the guardianship of the father and grandfather, which is established to prevent harm and achieve the benefit of the child, even if the child de facto possesses authority over their own affairs. This matter, however, does not pertain to the current discussion.

In general, the presence of public benefit in the exercise of this guardianship is essential. The basic principle is that no one has the right to exercise authority over another without clear justification. In the case of the father and grandfather, guardianship is established due to the presence of a beneficial interest. In other situations, however, this requires evidence. The emotional bond between a child and their father does not, in and of itself, justify the guardianship if no benefit is discerned, and it would be inappropriate to rely solely on this sentiment, especially since it contradicts clear Quranic and Hadith-based injunctions. For instance, the Quranic verse: “And do not approach the wealth of an orphan except in the best manner” (Al-An’am 6:152) is explicit in this regard.

The Cessation of a Father’s Guardianship Over His Child: Maturity

The cessation of a father’s guardianship over his child occurs when the child reaches maturity, which includes physical growth and legal competency in the management of personal affairs. However, the issue becomes complex when considering the continuation of a father’s guardianship over matters such as marriage, particularly when the daughter is unmarried or has not been consummated in marriage, or when she remains a virgin. There are numerous opinions regarding this issue.

As for the basic premise of a mature, independent woman being able to marry without her father’s consent, many narrations address this point, including a Hadith from Imam Sadiq (a.s) stating, “A virgin girl who has a father cannot marry without his consent.” Furthermore, it is reported that the Prophet (PBUH) said, “If a virgin girl comes to you and says that her father has married her to someone, and she does not wish it, she is not bound to accept it.”

Contrary to this, other narrations argue for the permissibility of marriage without the father’s consent, particularly when the girl is independent and capable of making her own decisions. The general consensus is that while the father’s permission is strongly recommended, it is not absolutely necessary if the daughter is mature and capable of exercising her own will. This is further affirmed by several narrations, one of which states, “If a woman is free to manage her own property and financial matters, then she is also free to marry as she chooses without a guardian.”

The Husband’s Guardianship Over His Wife

The guardianship of a husband over his wife is a well-established concept both rationally and scripturally. The Quran explicitly mentions: “Men are the protectors and maintainers of women” (Quran, An-Nisa 4:34). This guardianship is based on two grounds:

1. “By what Allah has given some of them over others” — this refers to the natural differences between men and women, including intellectual, physical, and social capacities, which make men more suited to handle public and societal matters.
2. “By what they spend of their wealth” — men are responsible for providing financial support to their wives, which is a key aspect of the marital relationship.

This guardianship does not mean that the wife is a slave to her husband or that her autonomy is forfeited. A wife remains free in her personal matters and is not required to obey her husband in anything that does not relate to their mutual interests or shared responsibilities. She is also prohibited from obeying him in acts of disobedience to God.

While a husband may advise, admonish, or, in extreme cases, discipline his wife for serious wrongdoing, these actions must be within the bounds set by Islamic law. Any form of coercion beyond these limits would be unlawful and considered an overstep.

The Jurist’s Guardianship

The jurist (faqih) has three primary roles in Islamic society:

1. Issuing legal opinions (fatwas) for the people.
2. Adjudicating disputes and handling matters of governance — there is no dispute regarding the jurist’s authority in these two areas.
3. Exercising authority over the lives and property of others — this is the area of concern regarding the role of the jurist as a guardian.

This can be examined in two ways:

1. The jurist’s independent authority to act, such as in the case of arranging marriages or selling property on behalf of minors or others.
2. The jurist’s authority is contingent upon obtaining the necessary permission, such as for public welfare projects or religious duties like commanding good and forbidding evil.

However, the question remains whether the jurist’s role as a guardian is inherent or granted by divine permission. While it is generally accepted that no one has the right to impose authority on another without legal or divine justification, there is an argument to be made for the permissibility of assigning guardianship to a jurist, provided the conditions and legal requirements are met.

Thus, it is not self-evident that a jurist automatically possesses such authority, and it requires clear, scriptural evidence to establish it. This is reflected in the practice of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the Imams, who appointed certain individuals as governors in various regions, effectively extending their authority over affairs in those areas.

However, the phrase “He who takes from it takes a generous portion” is not in contradiction to the matter at hand, as the taking may occur from both the infallible and others. Similarly, what is taken from them may also come from both sources. The term “taking” in this context refers not just to words and meanings, but also to truths and other aspects. Hence, it does not contradict their stature in any way.

1. Muhammad ibn al-Fattal al-Naysaburi, Rawdat al-Wa’izin, edited by Sayyid Muhammad Mahdi and Sayyid Hasan Khurasani, Qom, Razavi Publications, 1386 AH.

The important point here is that the entire narration, with all its details, seeks to highlight the position of knowledge and the scholar, no matter their rank. It is not intended to address any other matter, nor can anything other than this be inferred from it, rendering everything else irrelevant in this context. The primary understanding is that this narration emphasizes the position of knowledge and the scholars, as well as their inheritance of knowledge, the narration of religious rulings, and the refinement of their ethics through their teachings and sacred breaths. This is emphasized as an acquisition in proportion to one’s readiness and ability, distinct from other divine positions that were exclusively granted to the prophets, such as absolute sovereignty over wealth, lives, and the like. This matter is unrelated to the narration and is regarded as inconsequential in this context.

Among the other narrations is one from Abu al-Bakhtari, from Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq (peace be upon him):

“The scholars are the heirs of the prophets, for the prophets did not leave behind a dirham or a dinar. Rather, they left behind their sayings. Whoever takes something from them has indeed taken a generous portion. Therefore, be careful from whom you take your knowledge, for among us, the Ahl al-Bayt, there are upright ones in every generation who will remove distortions from it made by the extremists, the fabricators, and the ignorant” (1).

This narration, despite the weakness of Abu al-Bakhtari, does not imply general inheritance for the faqih (jurist) either. Rather, it specifically mentions that the inheritance is in the form of narrations from the prophets. The “narrations” here refer not only to words and superficial meanings, but also to truths and rulings in all their forms. This inheritance is not limited to the faqih alone but encompasses everything the scholars have received from God. Therefore, nothing in this narration suggests involvement in the governance of wealth and lives, and it entirely excludes such matters, as stated in the previous narration.

Further, in al-Kafi, it is narrated from Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq (peace be upon him):

“The scholars are the trustees, the pious are the fortresses, and the successors are the gates” (2).

The key term here is “trustees,” referring to those who are relied upon and trusted. It means that the scholars are trusted in the religious virtues and knowledge of the infallibles, and this trust extends to all matters that the Imam would address. This description is of a characteristic, not a mandate. The phrase does not establish the topic or create any official position. It is a validation of those who embody these attributes, especially in light of the two subsequent parts of the narration: that the pious are fortresses, and the successors are the gates. Just as the pious are described as fortresses, the scholars can also be viewed as fortresses of Islam, as evidenced in another narration: “The scholars are the fortresses of Islam.” Similarly, the successors (awsiya’) are closer to the concept of guardianship than to trust. Hence, the scholars may also be described as successors. This suggests that scholars, pious individuals, and successors all share certain responsibilities and roles, though this does not imply that these roles grant them the power of absolute governance or control over wealth and lives.

Another narration from al-Kafi, from Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq (peace be upon him), states:

“The jurists are the trustees of the messengers, as long as they do not enter into worldly affairs. Someone asked, ‘O Messenger of Allah, what is meant by entering into worldly affairs?’ He replied: ‘Following the rulers. When they do so, beware of them with regard to your religion'” (1).

Here, the “jurists” are described as a category of scholars, and the trust placed in them is related to their role in transmitting and explaining religious rulings. The narration clarifies that the jurists do not assume any role in worldly matters or governance. The comparison with the rulers highlights the distinction between jurists and political rulers, underscoring that the jurists’ role is not to govern but to guide in religious matters. The implication is that the jurist is not a political leader, and the jurists are not rulers in any sense of the word.

In a similar vein, al-Kafi also narrates:

“When a believer dies, the angels, the places where he used to worship, and the gates of heaven through which his deeds ascended, mourn for him. The Islam suffers a blow that cannot be repaired, for the pious jurists are the fortresses of Islam, just like the walls of a city” (1).

This narration underscores the importance of the believer, especially the scholarly believer, in preserving the integrity of Islam. The loss of a jurist signifies a blow to the religion and its rulings that cannot be easily remedied. However, the narration does not imply that the jurist has a position of political governance. Instead, their role is that of safeguarding religious truth and guidance, especially in the context of teaching and upholding religious law.

This hadith also clarifies the virtue of scholars, stating that their merit is less than that of the Prophets and Messengers, yet still greater than others in some aspects. This contrasts with the previously mentioned hadiths in terms of the meaning of the superiority of scholars, where they are compared to the Prophets of the Children of Israel or to other previous Prophets. In all of these, aside from highlighting the status of scholars in this Ummah, it shows their equality with other Prophets or the Prophets of the Children of Israel or the Prophets before them, or the best of the earlier Prophets. These interpretations of the virtue of scholars vary in their expressions, as seen in the hadith of death, which implies that the scholars’ virtue is lesser than that of the Prophets and Messengers but greater than others. In contrast, the earlier hadiths suggest that scholars are equal to the Prophets of the Children of Israel or other previous Prophets.

1. Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 2, p. 25.

If it were said that all these hadiths could be reconciled by suggesting that the equality of scholars is with the Prophets of the Children of Israel—who are the best of all Prophets and Messengers, all of whom are superior to scholars—it can be answered that the hadiths do not distinguish between the Messengers and others, as the Prophet (PBUH) said, “like other Prophets before me,” which encompasses all Prophets. If it were claimed that the context implies the Prophets of the Children of Israel, this also would not fit the situation, because all Prophets are superior to scholars by virtue of their infallibility, and in this regard, there is no equality between them. Therefore, the intended meaning of “Prophets” in the hadith would be all Prophets, and all are superior to scholars. Thus, the wording of the hadith of death aligns with the reality if the scholars in question are not infallible Imams. If they are infallible Imams, their superiority is certain and undisputed in various ranks.

In any case, this hadith does not relate to the assertion of divine absolute authority for scholars.

Moreover, there is another narration: “The most severe orphanhood is the one who is cut off from his Imam,” and another narration from the Commander of the Faithful (AS): “Whoever among our Shia is knowledgeable in our teachings and guides the ignorant in our Shari’ah, when cut off from our presence, will be with us in the highest companion.” These and other narrations emphasize the significance of knowledge and scholars in the context of the guidance provided by the infallible Imams (AS), as well as their role in guiding the faithful through the teachings of the divine revelation, which does not directly relate to the subject of absolute governance, nor does it establish any authority for the scholars in this regard.

There are also narrations that claim: “Scholars are the guardians of the orphans of the family of Muhammad (PBUH).” However, these do not substantiate the claim of absolute governance because the guardianship here refers to guiding the orphans in knowledge, not a political or administrative authority over the community.

Additionally, there are narrations such as: “Every good deed is a form of charity” and “Assisting the weak is among the best forms of charity,” which emphasize helping others. However, these do not provide a foundation for the questionable matter, nor do they prove any specific subject. They simply offer general guidance or ethical principles.

Finally, there is a narration attributed to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) regarding the eighth share of the spoils of war for the scholars. However, this too, according to sources like Al-Kafi, does not support the idea of absolute authority for the scholar. The term “Sultan” in the narration is understood to mean a righteous, knowledgeable scholar (faqih) rather than an arbitrary ruler.

Thus, upon careful examination, it can be concluded that all the narrations discussed do not provide evidence for the general authority of scholars over the Ummah in an absolute sense. They do not establish for the scholar a comprehensive, divine, and absolute authority over people’s lives and properties. What they do confirm is the role of the scholar in guiding, teaching, and resolving disputes according to the principles of the Shari’ah.

Conclusion of the research:

In conclusion, all the narrations reviewed fail to substantiate the notion of absolute governance or divine authority for the scholar, and they do not establish for the scholar the right to rule over people’s lives and properties as the Prophets and Imams possess. Instead, they confirm the scholar’s role in guiding people based on knowledge of the divine law and helping resolve conflicts in society.

Yes, there is no prohibition in Islamic or rational law for a righteous scholar, jurist, or expert to engage in public affairs, such as governance or the protection of the community, within the framework of Shari’ah and established laws. However, such involvement requires certain qualifications and conditions, and the scholar must ensure that their actions remain in line with the divine law.

While the scholar or jurist has an important role in maintaining the faith and guiding the community, the concept of Wilayat al-Faqih (guardianship of the jurist) does not imply the absolute divine authority that was held by the Prophets and Imams. Furthermore, the establishment of justice and the protection of the community does not necessarily require the absolute authority of a jurist but may be achieved through a collective effort, guided by Islamic principles and laws.

Thus, the idea of establishing a perfect government led by a jurist in the absence of the Imams (AS) does not necessarily entail an absolute and divine form of governance. Instead, it remains a matter of collective responsibility and accountability, in which scholars and jurists play a crucial, though not absolute, role.

The Truth Regarding the Position of Non-Infallible Authorities

In non-infallible contexts, statements and rulings are often issued for the purpose of public announcement and resolving disagreement and confusion. These rulings may be based on the testimony of two just witnesses, or derived from knowledge accessible to them and other means of information, as in the case of the narration from Muhammad ibn Qays about Imam al-Baqir (A.S.), who said: “If two witnesses testify before the Imam that they have seen the crescent, regardless of where they have seen it, the Imam shall command the fasting of that day” (1). This command is, in reality, a way of confirming the ruling through a legitimate means, even though the infallible Imam is capable of such decisions through direct knowledge without requiring a legal proof.

Similarly, in the context of applying punishments and deterrent measures (hudud and ta’zirat), the question arises whether these can only be carried out by the infallible Imam or someone appointed by him, or if they can be executed by others, such as jurists in the absence of the Imam. Many scholars have asserted that these measures can be carried out by qualified, just jurists based on their legal authority (wilayat) as granted by Islamic law, especially in the time of occultation.

However, it is important to understand that the implementation of hudud and ta’zirat is not necessarily restricted to a specific person, such as the infallible Imam or a designated appointee. These measures are part of the broader body of Islamic law, which serves to maintain public order and prevent immoral actions. The suspension of such legal measures would lead to the commission of forbidden actions, the proliferation of corruption, and the loss of both individual and societal moral integrity, all of which are unequivocally condemned in Islamic law. Therefore, the application of these measures is a communal responsibility (kifayah) and must be carried out by those qualified, such as just jurists or any qualified believer in their absence.

Moreover, the conduct of jihad in the defense of Islam, under the appropriate conditions, does not necessarily require the infallible Imam or his appointed representative. However, the conditions and the presence of the necessary religious and social benefits for such actions must align with Islamic guidelines.

The Role of the Jurist and Conditions for Their Actions

Following this, it is clear that the jurist, like other individuals, may appoint agents or representatives for matters where the requisite qualifications are present, as long as the conditions for agency and authority are met. A jurist does not have the right to assign someone authority over matters beyond their legitimate purview. Similarly, neither the jurist nor their agents have the right to overstep the boundaries of their appointed tasks.

Thus, the legitimacy of the jurist’s authority is determined by their knowledge of Islamic law and their adherence to its principles. They do not have the power to legislate or establish new laws but must act within the framework of established Islamic law. As such, their authority is contingent upon the conditions required for it, and their position can be revoked if the necessary conditions, such as the death of the appointing authority, are no longer met.

Public and Legal Affairs in Islam

Matters of public interest and the preservation of social order, such as the enforcement of laws and regulations, do not require the explicit permission of the jurist or anyone else. These responsibilities can be taken up by any capable believer, as long as they adhere to the principles of justice and legality. This reflects the general teaching in Islamic jurisprudence, where such duties are viewed as essential for the proper functioning of society and the protection of public welfare.

Furthermore, it is important that those responsible for public affairs and the execution of laws must possess certain qualifications, including trustworthiness. If a qualified person is unavailable, the responsibility may fall to others, even if they are not fully faithful, as long as they are capable of fulfilling the task. This reflects the Islamic understanding that maintaining public order and justice takes precedence over individual limitations.

Criticism of the Theory of the Jurist’s Authority

Finally, in relation to the concept of the jurist’s authority, the view expressed by Imam Khomeini in his book Wilayat al-Faqih (The Governance of the Jurist) is subject to certain criticisms. Imam Khomeini suggests that the concept of the jurist’s authority is a matter of belief rather than a conclusion that requires irrefutable proof. However, it should be noted that the existence of Islamic laws and principles does not necessarily depend on the authority of the jurist. The Islamic system can function with or without the establishment of a specific authority for the jurist, and the absence of this authority does not imply the suspension of Islamic law during the occultation of the Imam.

It is also important to differentiate between the notion of military service in the time of the Islamic government and that during oppressive regimes. While the military attire during a tyrannical regime is considered reprehensible, military service within an Islamic context, under the proper conditions, is entirely legitimate.

In summary, the legitimacy of the authority of the jurist, and the conditions for their actions, must be evaluated within the broader context of Islamic legal and social principles. The application of Islamic law and the maintenance of public order should not be confined to specific individuals but must be upheld by any capable believer under the guidance of Islamic teachings.

References:

1. Wasā’il al-Shī’ah, Vol. 10, p. 275.
2. The Holy Qur’an, 2:178; 5:38; 24:2.

On the Doctrine of Wilayah (Authority) and Its Application

1. Belief in Wilayah
   “We believe in the concept of wilayah, and we maintain that the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) must designate a successor, and indeed, he has done so. The successor is not meant to merely express rulings; he is not a lawmaker. What we require is a successor to implement the laws, a law enforcer. The belief in the necessity of establishing a government and creating an executive authority is part of the wilayah. Just as striving and struggling to establish it is part of our belief in wilayah, if the successor does not appoint one, he has not completed his mission; the completion of the mission is inseparable from appointing a successor. The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) was an enforcer of laws; for instance, he executed penal laws, cut off the hand of the thief, administered punishment, and stoned adulterers. A successor is needed for these matters.” (Previous source, pp. 17-18).

Critical Remarks on the Claim of Wilayah for the Jurist
There is a clear issue with the above claim. The assertion that belief in wilayah and the appointment of a successor by the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) necessitates the establishment of wilayah for the jurist during the period of occultation is flawed. The belief in wilayah of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the appointment of the infallible successors (the Imams) does not automatically imply the grant of legal authority (wilayah) to the jurist during the time of occultation.

The claim in some of these statements about the caliph being merely an executor of laws, not a legislator, shows the limitations of the caliph’s role, implying that the jurist’s role is similarly confined to law enforcement rather than lawmaking. The law needs an executor, but the appointment of this executor does not necessitate granting a specific wilayah (juridical authority) unless it is specifically mandated by Islamic law. The law can be executed by just jurists without granting them special authority, as long as the conditions of legal administration are met.

In the context of Islamic government and the necessity of establishing an Islamic state, the establishment of such governance does not necessarily hinge upon the appointment of a specific wilayah for the jurist. The act of executing laws and establishing a government can be undertaken by any capable individual without a formal grant of wilayah to the jurist, as long as the laws are followed properly. As such, the evidence supporting the granting of wilayah to the jurist in the period of occultation is insufficient, as detailed in previous discussions.

Separation of Religion and Politics
The claim that religion must be separate from politics and that Islamic scholars should refrain from intervening in social and political matters is a narrative propagated by colonial powers and non-believers. In the time of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), religion and politics were inseparable. It was not the case that some individuals were scholars of religion and others were politicians or rulers.

The debate on whether religion is identical to politics or distinct from it is complex. Religion encompasses the divine laws governing both the material and spiritual realms, providing guidelines for human thought and action. Politics, on the other hand, concerns the proper administration of worldly affairs, whether at the individual or collective level. While politics is a specific aspect of the broader concept of religion, it is not identical to it. Politics cannot be entirely separate from religion, as a complete religion must also include a political system that ensures justice and public welfare.

The relationship between knowledge, spirituality, and politics varies; it is not necessarily the case that scholars must embody both religious and political roles. However, the expectation of scholars is that they should ideally possess all these qualities in their work.

Islamic Government and Its Financial System
The financial system of Islam, as outlined in its teachings, is not merely for alleviating the poverty of the poor or the needs of religious leaders. Instead, it is intended to establish a government and provide for the necessary expenditures of a large Islamic state. For instance, khums (the Islamic tax on surplus income) is one of the key financial pillars for this purpose. The revenue generated from khums is meant to be used for the administration of the Islamic state, not just to support the scholars or the poor. In fact, if an Islamic government were to be established, the financial system could be more than sufficient to meet the needs of the state, as evidenced by the khums revenue from markets such as Baghdad, Tehran, Istanbul, and Cairo. It is important that this financial system is implemented correctly to support the Islamic state’s administration.

On the Concept of Wilayah for the Jurist
The idea of granting jurisdiction to the jurist is a rational consideration, akin to the legal guardianship over minors. If this authority were to be considered rational, it would only become legally binding upon the establishment of clear, legitimate proof from the Islamic legal framework. However, the concept of wilayah for the jurist cannot be assumed merely based on reason alone; it requires firm legal evidence and must be supported by the specific jurisprudential sources.

In conclusion, the governance of Islam is based on law, not tyranny. The head of the state must adhere to the legal principles of Islamic law, whether the individual in this position is a jurist or not. The government is based on the rule of law, and any leader, be it a jurist or not, must act within the constraints of this law.

References:

1. Letter from Imam Khomeini on the necessity of wilayah for the jurist.
2. Previous source, p. 56.
3. This statement, in its general form, is flawed and distant from the status of a jurist. Indeed, collecting wealth through unlawful means or by indebting oneself under non-legitimate titles is forbidden and undermines justice. However, the mere act of gathering wealth, even through lawful and permissible means, is not inherently problematic, although gathering wealth without expenditure also seems to be unbecoming of a just jurist; yet, this is a separate matter.
4. “Considering that jurists do not possess the status of prophethood, and there is no doubt that they are not among the wretched, it is necessary to state that they are among the heirs, and the concept of the heir to a prophet, being broader than just the heirs, also includes jurists” (2).
5. The title and subject of this hadith are limited to judicial matters, and have no connection with other subjects. The ruling of one subject does not necessarily extend to another without proper evidence. Therefore, the statement that the jurist is neither a prophet nor wretched implies that, by necessity, a prophet’s heir would be fundamentally flawed; since this division could apply to the righteous believers who are neither prophets nor wretched, implying that they, too, would be heirs of the prophet under this assumption. This is not the case. Thus, the truth lies with those who do not cite this hadith in this context to prove the jurist’s authority.
6. “The fear of the people from rulers stems from their un-Islamic and despotic governance. In a government such as that of Amir al-Mu’minin (A.S.), those who are fearful are the treacherous, the unjust, and the transgressors, while the general populace, both Muslims and non-Muslims, are under the protection of an Islamic government, living in security and prosperity” (1).
7. This statement refers to the Islamic government, the nation, and the religious state, and the general public is the central focus and criterion.
8. 1– “The reason people fear their rulers is that their government is not based on principles and laws but is despotic. However, in a government like that of Amir al-Mu’minin (A.S.), fear is for those who are treacherous, unjust, or transgressors, but for the general public, there should be no fear or anxiety. Under the Islamic government, both Muslims and non-Muslims live in safety and prosperity.”
9. The principle here applies comprehensively to determining the difference between an Islamic government and a non-Islamic one. If, however, the general public in a society is in fear, distress, or suffering from the government, it is no longer an Islamic government in the sense of that of Ali (A.S.), even if it outwardly claims to represent Islam. Certainly, attention is required when considering the fear of the wrongdoer and the corrupt; yet this fear on the part of the government is an indicator of safeguarding limits and standards in the community.
10. “The term ‘scholars’ refers to the scholars of the community. If we apply the narration ‘the scholars are the heirs of the prophets’ to common understanding, it implies that the jurist is the heir of the Prophet (PBUH) and is in the same position as Moses or Jesus. The Prophet, having authority and governance over the believers, also has the same authority and governance transferred to the scholars” (1).
11. The generalisation in the inheritance and authority is not unquestionable, as is the broadness of the analogy. At the very least, there is doubt.
12. 1– “By ‘scholars,’ we mean the scholars of the community. If we apply the narration ‘the scholars are the heirs of the prophets’ to common understanding, this implies that the jurist is the heir of the Prophet (PBUH), akin to Moses or Jesus, and the Prophet has authority and governance over the believers. The same authority and governance that the Prophet (PBUH) holds is also attributed to the scholars.”
13. Moreover, the chain of narration is weak and the credibility of the source in question is questionable, as is the authenticity of the book attributed to Imam al-Ridha (A.S.), as discussed in its relevant context.
14. “The concept of the jurist’s authority is not something newly created by us, but has been a subject of discussion since the early days. For instance, it was frequently discussed by al-Kashif al-Ghita and others. I assert that al-Naraqi confirmed all the duties that the Prophet (PBUH) held for the scholars, and similarly, al-Nayini affirmed that the concept of the jurist’s absolute authority can be derived from the famous hadith of ‘Umar ibn Hanzala. Therefore, the issue of the jurist’s authority is not new; we are simply re-examining the topic and expanding on its branches” (1).
15. 1– “The concept of the jurist’s authority is not a new idea introduced by us; rather, it has been an issue discussed from the very beginning, as frequently addressed by al-Kashif al-Ghita. I assert that al-Naraqi attributed all the responsibilities that the Prophet (PBUH) had to the jurists, and similarly, al-Nayini said that this idea (the complete authority of the jurist) can be inferred from the famous narration of ‘Umar ibn Hanzala. In any case, this is not a new discussion, and we are simply further analysing it and discussing its ramifications.”
16. The topic and its mention in the books and by the jurists do not, in and of themselves, guarantee acceptance or rejection. The important matter is the presentation of evidence, not the mere narration. While this issue is known among scholars and discussed in books, the real question lies in whether it is accepted or rejected. The majority do not pay it much attention or believe in it, particularly in its absolute form, let alone regarding the legislative and universal claim of divine authority for the jurist. This issue confuses mysticism with jurisprudence, as well as the general title with specific examples.
17. Those who support the absolute authority of the jurist are very few, even among contemporary scholars. This is evidenced by the absence of statements from respected figures like al-Naraqi, al-Kashif al-Ghita, and al-Nayini. In contrast, there are many who oppose this idea, either completely rejecting the concept of such authority or being cautious about it for various reasons. Among them, the most notable is Shaykh al-Azam, who raised objections in his writings, though the crucial matter is the evidence, not the narration. Here is Shaykh al-Azam’s stance on this issue:
18. “In conclusion, providing evidence for the obligation to obey the jurist, as if he were the Imam, is as difficult as drawing a line through the eye of a needle” (1).
19. 1– “Shaykh Ansari, Murtada, Al-Makasib al-Muharramah, First Edition, p. 154.”
20. “Familiarity with the concept does not negate its reliance on the Imam’s perspective, and it may be denied in the absence of such a figure, just as we are deprived of many blessings without it. May Allah hasten His reappearance.”
21. “It has become clear from what we have discussed that what these proofs suggest is the establishment of authority for the jurist in matters where their legitimacy is already presumed, to the extent that if there were no jurist, the people would be responsible for carrying out these matters. However, in cases where there is doubt about the legitimacy of an action, such as punishments without the Imam, the jurist cannot establish their legitimacy through these proofs alone, and must derive it from another source.”
22. “The ruling of Mirza Shirazi on the prohibition of tobacco was a governmental ruling that was obligatory to follow by other jurists, and the majority of scholars followed him, with few exceptions.”
23. “Mirza Muhammad-Taqi Shirazi’s ruling on jihad, although framed as defence, was followed by the scholars as it was a governmental decree” (3).
24. 1– “The ruling of Mirza Shirazi on the prohibition of tobacco was a governmental ruling, and it was obligatory for other jurists to follow. Most of the great scholars in Iran followed this ruling, with a few exceptions.”
25. “Mirza Muhammad-Taqi Shirazi’s ruling on jihad, although titled ‘defence,’ was followed by the scholars because it was a governmental ruling.”
26. It could be argued that these rulings from these two scholars regarding defence and the prohibition of tobacco were issued in the interest of protecting Muslims and the Islamic community, rather than in the context of governance. Even so, those who opposed the ruling, though few, either rejected the concept of government or were seen as transgressors. These two matters do not prove the validity of the ruling, especially in light of the overwhelming agreement among the majority, which intensified the issuance of the ruling.
27. These are some of the critiques of this book. I will not delve into all the critiques and analyses within it. The key point in this discussion is the absence of clear legal evidence supporting the jurist’s authority in areas where there is disagreement. It is important not to accuse scholars or Shaykh al-Azam of lacking understanding of Islamic principles regarding governance during the period of occultation, as there is no difference in this regard between Shaykh al-Azam and others, whether proponents or opponents of this concept. All agree that anything required by the shari’a must manifest in the real world, whether it is carried out by the jurist or other righteous individuals, and in their absence, those with the greatest capacity for moral virtues and the absence of corruption are responsible for ensuring its implementation.
28. In any case, there is no suspension in Islam concerning rulings and laws, but rather it is a matter of sufficiency and rationality, as elaborated by Shaykh al-Azam in his detailed discussions.