The Simple Body and Its Divisions
The Simple Body and Its Divisions
Bibliographic Information
Author: Mohammad Reza Nekounam (b. 1948)
Title: The Simple Body and Its Divisions / Author: Mohammad Reza Nekounam
Publication Details: Eslamshahr: Sobhe Farda Publications, 2014
Physical Description: 48 pages; 14.5 × 21.5 cm
ISBN: 978-600-91763-4-2
Cataloguing Status: FIPA
Notes: Previous edition: Qom: Zohur Shafaq, 2007
Edition: Second edition
Subject: Simple and Composite (Philosophy)
Library of Congress Classification: B105/B5 N8 2014
Dewey Decimal Classification: 101
National Bibliography Number: 3675766
Preface
The question of what constitutes a body has long occupied philosophers and scholars of rational sciences, inspiring extensive theorisation.
This work adopts a rationalist approach to critically evaluate the perspectives of philosophical, theological, and empirical scholars and explores the relationship of these discussions with findings in physics.
The theories of Al-Nazzam, Al-Shahristani, Democritus, Avicenna, Mulla Sadra, the late Allameh Qomshei, and the late Sha’rani, alongside the empirical viewpoints of Auguste Comte and William James, are analysed and critiqued. It is argued that infinite atoms and compounds, through the principle of perpetual motion (Shawqi), give rise to myriad phenomena, all ultimately culminating in the existential motion originating from the Divine.
And our final invocation is: Praise be to Allah, Lord of the Worlds.
The Simple Body and Its Divisions
The simple body is divisible according to all theories and perspectives, which fall into three categories:
- All divisions exist actually (in reality).
- All divisions exist potentially.
- Some divisions exist actually, others potentially.
Actual divisions may be finite, as asserted by the Mutakallimun (theological philosophers), or infinite, as maintained by Al-Nazzam.
Potential divisions may likewise be finite, according to Al-Shahristani, or infinite, according to the Peripatetics (falsafah philosophers).
The third position—some divisions actual, some potential—either holds that all parts are bodies (as Democritus argues) or denies that all parts are bodies (a view held by the Mutakallimun across various schools regarding non-corporeality in certain assumptions).
Assumptions Concerning Non-Corporeality
Assuming non-corporeality of body parts, these parts might be essential lines, continuous surfaces, something different from both, or a mixture thereof, or combined with indivisible parts. All such assumptions are deemed superfluous.
Positions on the Separation of the Body
The main proponents of views on the body’s separation are the Mutakallimun, Al-Nazzam, and Democritus.
a) The Mutakallimun assert that the body is a finite composite of discrete entities, with all divisions actual.
b) Al-Nazzam claims that all parts exist actually, but divisions are infinite.
c) Democritus holds that bodies are composed of indivisible solid parts that are not separable externally, though mentally divisible into hypothetical divisions.
The difference between Democritus and the Mutakallimun lies in that the latter do not consider parts of the body to be bodies themselves, whereas Socrates (in the text) considers the small parts as solid bodies.
On Body Divisions in Connection
The connected body is also seen as divisible finitely, as per Al-Shahristani, or infinitely, as per the Peripatetics, either in a non-continuous manner (as in Al-Muhakamat) or continuously in the sense of analytic and synthetic compositions.
Philosophers differ on whether the body is simple or composite of matter and form. The Peripatetics advocate composition, while the notion of simplicity traces back to Plato.
Discussion on Infinity in the Body
Al-Muhakamat’s author interprets infinity as non-cessation—divisions that never end but always surpass any given part—rather than the actualisation of infinite divisions from potentiality, as per the Mutakallimun.
Critical Commentary by Al-Muhaqqiq al-Dawani
Al-Dawani critiques the previous views, arguing that infinite divisions into ever smaller parts present no contradiction as infinite divisions imply no increase beyond the original essence.
The balanced view favours Al-Dawani’s stance and considers Al-Muhakamat’s position mistaken.
Summary of Scholars’ Positions on the Body
Al-Shahristani views the body as a connected unity with finitely potential parts, returning to the indivisible part of the Mutakallimun, though he believes the body is mentally divisible.
The Peripatetics describe the natural body as a unified continuous form with infinitely potential divisions.
Al-Nazzam posits a body composed of actual parts without end, which is deemed irrational and unintelligible.
Democritus sees the body as composed of solid, indivisible atoms, divisible only mentally, not externally.
The Mutakallimun maintain that the body is composite of indivisible parts, finite in number, and does not divide either actually or hypothetically.
Refutations of the Above Positions
Against the Mutakallimun: if body parts after many divisions had no volume, the body could not exist, as a body without volume is inconceivable. If parts have volume, infinite divisions would be possible in principle, even if practically difficult.
Against Al-Nazzam: if all infinite parts exist actually, the body’s volume would also be infinite, which contradicts reason and sense.
Against the Peripatetics: sensory evidence for continuous corporeal extension is unreliable as a definitive proof, and the Peripatetics rely on a form of empirical deception.
Al-Shahristani’s view is a combination of three beliefs: the body is a connected substance; it has potential and actual parts; and it is finitely divisible, ultimately reverting to the indivisible part concept of the Mutakallimun.
On the Inherence of the Body’s Continuity
There is no actual essential continuity of the body; rather, its existence comprises primary parts observable in physical matter. These parts may be given different names according to successive subdivisions based on modern or future scientific discoveries.
Thus, the body is essentially disconnected, as Democritus affirms, but its parts are solid and can be further divided externally despite practical limitations.
Analysis of Socrates’ Statement
Socrates’ assertion that the body is fundamentally composed of discrete, solid parts without continuous form is true; however, the alternative claim that the body has no connected form is incorrect.
On the Indivisibility of the Body and the Dispute on Its Parts
The body does not truly divide in external reality, nor is it accurate to claim that the body consists of finite parts in actuality.
The indivisibility of the body aligns with the truth, as Socrates and the Allamah (the great scholar) asserted. Historically, what was once considered a compound of solid parts is now seen as divisible into many parts, although there may be an impediment to division in actuality or the body may not exist in the intermediate state. This contradicts the assumption, since the assumption pertains to the existence of the body, not to its absence.
Categories of Natural Bodies
Natural bodies are divided into the simple, the compound, and the singular. The compound may be either real or conventional, which will be discussed hereafter.
A singular body is one that has no composition whatsoever. A simple body possesses composition but not diverse natures; it has a single nature and is acquired. Composition, on the other hand, entails different natures, whether the composition is real or conventional. The real composition includes both quantitative and qualitative aspects.
The Body as a Simple Substance
The body is not composed of matter and form, but is a simple substance that appears under various states with specific characteristics, such as the corporeal, generic, elemental, or ethereal forms. Elemental forms consist of many elements—traditionally the four elements and the three kinds of natural beings (minerals, plants, and animals). Natural bodies also include atmospheric entities, meteors, clouds, and various celestial and terrestrial bodies.
Scrutinising Natural Philosophy and the Concept of Elements
Contemporary natural philosophers have broadened the scope of these concepts and redefined many of these terms under new designations, vastly expanding on earlier frameworks. They consider there to be over one hundred elements and reject the classical views on celestial spheres as held by the ancients. Despite the correctness of many ancient principles, modern science demonstrates that numerous celestial motions originate from the Earth. All bodies, whether ethereal or elemental, are fundamentally one, differing only in composition and material.
Denial of Substance and Its Implications
Modern natural scientists deny the existence of actual substance but are compelled to accept the substantiality of accidents. This discussion, however, lies outside natural philosophy because proving the existence of substance externally transcends sensory experience and is strictly a philosophical matter.
Alternative Views on the Composition of the Body
A less common view attributed to Nazam posits that the body is composed of colour, taste, and smell, essentially denying substance’s existence in external reality. This is evidently untenable. Sabzawari suggests that these qualities are subtle substances whose aggregation constitutes the bodies we perceive. He equates this with denying accidents rather than substance, a position not accepted by its proponent.
This account by Nazam, though potentially valuable and precise, can be interpreted, with appropriate analysis, to refer to the reality of the natural body, since colour, taste, and smell are not mere accidents but independent substances that become perfections of bodies upon composition. This analysis dissociates the argument from any denial of substance or accidents, as previously discussed by Socrates.
The Nature of the Simple Body and Its Divisions
A simple body, according to all scholars, is divisible. Some hold that all its divisions are actual, others that all are potential, and some maintain that some are actual while others are potential.
Actual divisions may be either finite (as held by the mutakallimun) or infinite (Nazam’s view). Potential divisions are either finite (Shahrestani’s perspective) or infinite (according to the hakiman).
Within the third view, either all parts of the body are bodies (Democritus’ view) or none of the parts qualify as bodies (the mutakallimun’s belief).
Conceptual Assumptions
Since the smaller parts of the body are not bodies themselves, they are either substantial lines, continuous surfaces, or a mixture of both, or indivisible parts.
Views of the Discontinuists
Discontinuists, such as certain mutakallimun, Nazam, and Democritus, assert the divisibility of the body into parts. Some mutakallimun argue that the body has finite, limited actual parts, Nazam claims it has an infinite number of actual parts, and Democritus conceives bodies as potentially divisible beginnings with no actual external division, though mental division is accepted.
The difference between the mutakallimun and Democritus lies in two main points:
- The mutakallimun consider the parts of the body to be bodies, whereas Democritus does not.
- The mutakallimun reject any form of division, but Democritus accepts mental division of the body.
Views of the Continuists
Among the continuists, Shahrestani advocates finite potential divisions, while the hakiman believe in infinite potential divisions.
Hakiman differ regarding whether the body is simple or composed of matter and form, and on the nature of infinite division. Various scholars hold differing opinions, with Muhaqqiq al-Hakim presenting what is considered the most accurate view.
Arguments on the Unity and Divisibility of the Body
A single continuous body has finite potential parts which in external reality correspond to indivisible parts, though mentally divisible (Shahrestani’s view).
A continuous body with infinite potential divisions is a substantial form united with matter (hakiman).
Nazam argues that the hakiman’s position on infinite actual divisions is false.
Democritus views the body as a collection of small solid parts with volume but no external division, though mental division is conceivable.
The mutakallimun assert the body is composed of indivisible parts that have finite quantity and accept no division.
Nazam holds the body is composed of an infinite number of actual parts.
Critique of the Above Views
Criticism of the mutakallimun position points out that if the parts have no volume, they cannot constitute the body, since the body necessarily has volume. If the parts have volume, then any division is theoretically possible, even if not practically achievable.
Regarding Nazam’s view, if the body consists of an infinite number of actual parts, then the body’s volume would also be infinite, which contradicts sensory and rational evidence.
Hakim’s argument that the simple body has a unified substantial continuity lacks convincing evidence beyond sensory observation and requires formal proof.
Shahrestani’s claim that the body consists of three categories—substantial unity, finite potential parts, and finite actual divisions—offers nothing novel.
Hakim’s stance faces criticism for relying solely on sensory observation without rational proof, conflating potential parts with actual parts, and mistakenly asserting limited divisibility which negates the premise of divisibility.
Therefore, philosophically, the body must be either composed of potential parts that are indivisible or of actual indivisible parts rather than a mixture.
Non-Continuity of the Body
Although the body appears to be externally continuous and divisible, the reality of the body lies in primary parts that possess extension. These parts, though not externally observable as divided or composed of matter and form, can be further subdivided conceptually into smaller parts (such as atoms, energy, genes, or other future terms).
Hence, the notion that the body has no substantial continuous form is accurate, although it may possess subtle, intricate, and apparent connections.
The body contains many potential and actual parts; actual parts are limited, potential parts infinite, and in all cases can be subdivided into smaller forms.
Critique of Democritus’ Belief
Democritus’ view that the body’s parts are connected is valid, but his claim that these parts are indivisible and finite is untenable.
The body’s volume is a collection of small, non-rigid parts, which cannot exist without volume, size, and weight, even if externally indivisible or currently indivisible.
Democritus’ position, which is also supported by Allamah (rahmatullahi alayh), is inadequate, since modern science demonstrates that these parts are divisible and decomposable unless prevented by some obstacle or cease to be bodies.
Conclusion
A singular body is one without any composition. A simple body has composition but of a single nature. A compound body has multiple different natures, either in real or conventional composition, and real composition may be quantitative or qualitative.
This discussion has been confined to the simple body, as it remains the subject of dispute among theologians, philosophers, and natural scientists. Compound bodies, being heterogeneous and jointed, are not the focus.
The body is a simple substance that acquires various titles through differing properties, such as corporeal, generic, elemental, ethereal, the four elements, the three natural kinds (mineral, plant, animal), and atmospheric and celestial entities.
Contemporary Natural Science and the Body
Today, many of the classical terms have changed, and the number of elements exceeds one hundred. The celestial spheres and motions as previously conceived are rejected; many celestial movements originate from Earth. Matter is resolved into molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles such as protons, neutrons, and electrons, and matter is convertible to energy and vice versa.
The theory that matter is condensed energy is still under debate; however, volume and substantial nature remain accepted, although the relation of accidents to quantity and quality is a separate discussion.
On the Denial of Substance and Accidents
This topic is distinct and has not been elaborated here, as it pertains to different philosophical debates.
Those who deny the existence of substance, such as contemporary physicists and natural scientists, must nonetheless accept substance. This is because substance cannot be disproven; rather, it is established through philosophical proof. Therefore, this discussion is not within the remit of physicists to reject or accept substance on the basis of natural or empirical arguments, since the matter is a philosophical issue, not an experimental one.
The less common view, espoused by Nazam, that the body is composed of colour, taste, and smell, essentially returns to the denial of substance. The justification offered by Haji Sabzawari—that by colour, taste, and smell he means subtle substances that condense to form composite bodies—is in fact a denial of accidents, and both views constitute inadequate theories.
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that Nazam’s argument carries considerable significance, since it is now clear that smell, colour, and taste are independent substances and represent perfections of other substances.
The claim by Auguste Comte and James that all entities are accidents, and that what we call substance are merely accidents with greater stability, is entirely incorrect. The recognition of substance pertains to philosophy, and substance is established through the rational recognition and analysis of the characteristics of effects. This process involves affirmation or negation, although errors may occur in analyzing external subjects; such errors are faults in analytical premises and do not diminish the validity of the analysis itself. Many philosophical errors regarding natural and astronomical subjects arise precisely from this issue—errors that relate to scientific knowledge rather than to philosophy.
Regarding the proof of substantial motion, it must be said that ‘huyula’ (quiddity) is a fundamental aspect of the existence of the body, and the Aristotelian composite (matter and form) lacks foundation.
According to the theory of motion in substance, the natural world is successive layering and becoming, not a process of coming into and passing away; all nature conceals its actualities within itself while manifesting its potentialities.
It is surprising that the esteemed Mulla Sadra, despite his profound understanding of the nature of substance, accepted the composition of matter, and even more so, that Haji Sabzawari upheld the notion of additive composition.
The late Mr. Shahrani, the Aristotle of our time, states: ‘Laypeople think that Democritus’s small and solid particles are indivisible parts, and even novice philosophers err. The truth is that these particles are not indivisible, since they have qualities. Examples of such small particles are the smell of camphor, air, musk, and other subtle materials.’
The analysis of his statement is that Democritus is not said to believe in indivisible parts per se, but that his doctrine implies the body is finitely divisible, with no infinite external division. Thus, the division of a natural body reaches a point beyond which it cannot be divided further; he does not say that division is impossible, but that it does not occur. This is what is meant by describing the particles as solid—they are not externally divisible. Therefore, if we could say they were divisible, it would mean we cannot divide the body, though it is divisible in principle. This is accurate, but this meaning is not explicitly found in his writings. Hence, Mr. Shahrani’s interpretation is not entirely correct.
Philosophers who critique Democritus argue that accumulated parts are not a body, for a body is a single connected entity, even though the connection itself lacks a clear rationale.
Ibn Sina argues: if the nature of the body, which is essentially connected and separable, consists of ‘huyula’ and a composite form, then a body that is prevented from separation by smallness or hardness is a composite. This is because, as the sages say, what applies to an individual applies to nature, and the law of analogy in what is possible and impossible is uniform. Therefore, a simple, singular body does not exist externally; every body is a composite of matter and form, regardless of what body it is.
Late Allahi argues that this proof is incomplete, for one can say that small bodies differ in kind and species from other bodies. Thus, the fact that a composite sensible body has certain properties does not prove that a simple, singular body shares those properties, as simplicity is a different category from composition.
If ‘huyula’ is established, then the composition of body from ‘huyula’ and form is implicitly confirmed, and the proof of ‘huyula’ depends on disproving indivisible parts and denying the existence of small solid bodies. If such denials are not proven, nothing remains of Ibn Sina’s denial or opposition to this issue, and the body remains sensible and self-evident, though its formal connection requires proof which sages have not provided.
Late Allahi finds Ibn Sina’s argument on separation and connection incomplete, stating: separation in a connected body does not annihilate the substantial connection of the body; rather, the conventional connection is reduced by a slight quantitative accident. Thus, the body can be said to be a substantially connected entity capable of separation and union, which themselves exist within the connected substance. The occurrence of separation and union does not abolish the body, but only removes the conventional, quantitative connection. Therefore, the connected body remains connected in all cases, and separation is a quantitative attribute.
In other words, if water is poured from one vessel into another or vice versa, the substantial, essential connection of water remains, and only the minor, quantitative connection is lost and replaced by another such connection.
Thus, ‘huyula’ is inseparable, and the substance of the body is the ‘huyula’ of the natural world.
Late Allahi considers the argument of potentiality and actuality incomplete, stating: that which is capable of becoming another is precisely the absolute substance of the body, and this substance remains with all its actualities and forms, since there is no real coming-into-being or passing away; everything is layering upon layering and successive clothing, and the removal of one layer does not occur in reality. What is annihilated with the arrival of another actuality is the formal accidents of the substance.
The substance of the natural and sensible body of the world is potentiality, and there is no need to posit an abstract potential substance or the ordinary quiddity of the Peripatetics. Even if generic forms such as water and fire are substances, and essential change in the body results from the arrival of forms, the substance of the body itself is the ‘huyula’ of the world, possessing an endless potentiality for successive forms.
With the negation of ‘huyula,’ the composition of body and the concomitance of ‘huyula’ and form are also invalidated, rendering the formal and additive union of Haji Sabzawari baseless.
According to the law of causality, the number of material causes is finite, since the power of matter is limited. Were it infinite, the power to produce existence beyond existence would be necessary, in addition to requiring contiguity. The situation is reversed for immaterial beings, who do not require these two conditions.
The Four Types of Infinity and Final Remarks
Infinity can be categorised into four types:
a) Infinite beings that exist in union, arranged in causal and temporal sequence, such as beings ordered causally and temporally and with infinite spatial extent—if this is valid.
b) Infinite beings arranged without causal or temporal order, such as celestial and elemental bodies or immaterial souls.
c) Infinite beings that exist successively but not in union, such as the hidden parts of infinite corporeal beings.
d) Unbounded existences, such as the infinite series of numbers.
The mutakallimun and philosophers affirm the first type (causally and temporally ordered), which is impossible.
The second type (unordered but unified) is possible according to philosophers but impossible according to mutakallimun.
The third type (not actually unified) is possible for philosophers and impossible for mutakallimun.
The fourth type (unbounded) is possible according to both philosophers and mutakallimun.
Hence, the first type is impossible, while the unbounded, unordered, and non-actually unified types may be possible.
The primary origin of bodies consists of imperceptible corporeal particles differing in kind, shape, and form. The ‘huyula’ of the world is composed of these distinct particles. All corporeal forms and their accidents arise from infinite movements and combinations of these particles.
Infinite particles or compounds, through passionate movement, produce infinite types of phenomena. All these creations are effects of infinite names and attributes and their manifestations, and all parts and forms are brought into existence by finite compositions through names and attributes, leading to the existential and creative movement of the Truth.
Existence as a whole is encompassed by a vast reality; imperceptible particles give rise to generic corporeal forms, and various celestial and elemental natures derive from the four elements and the three genera of natural beings.
The doctrine of the immobility of the Truth, as previously stated by Allahi Quds Sirrah, is incorrect.
