A Leaf from the Pathology of the Islamic Revolution
A Leaf from the Pathology of the Islamic Revolution
Identification
Author: Nikoonam, Mohammad Reza (b. 1327)
Title: A Leaf from the Pathology of the Islamic Revolution / Nikoonam
Publisher: Islamshahr: Sobhe Farda Publications, 1393 (2014).
Physical description: 48 pages
ISBN: 978-600-7347-61-4
Cataloguing status: FIPA
Note: Previous edition: Zohour-e Shafaq, 1386 (2007).
Note: Second edition.
Subject: Sistan and Baluchestan – Social Conditions
Congress Classification: DSR2029/Y842N8 1393
Dewey Classification: 955.74
National Bibliography Number: 3680633
Table of Contents
Preface … 7
Who is the Known Cleric and Jihad? A Better Understanding of Life … 9
A Report from Sistan and Baluchestan
Zahedan … 23
Zabolis … 23
Birjandis … 25
Baluchis and Sunnis … 26
Sikh Minority … 27
Provincial Offices … 28
Smuggling … 29
Adverse Conditions … 37
Inquiry from the Guardian Council
a) Belief Conditions … 44
b) Practical and Moral Conditions … 45
Preface
Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the worlds, and blessings and peace upon Muhammad and his pure family, and eternal curse upon all their enemies.
After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, led by Mr. Khomeini, the first threat to the revolution was the infiltration of foreign agents and hypocrites within the revolutionary institutions and its executive system, or the weak performance of appointed officials and managers.
At that time, given my responsibilities, I seriously confronted this threat, and this writing contains part of those activities.
The first note, which is in response to an article published in the Kayhan newspaper at that time, pertains to the period when I was responsible for the Friday prayer leader position in the city of Esfarayen and held authority over all matters of the city, during which I firmly confronted infiltrators in revolutionary institutions, such as the Jihad Sazandegi.
It should be noted that the conditions mentioned and the criticisms discussed in this article relate to the year 1358 (1979), but the faces of the cities and the present officials have generally changed over these years.
The second writing, which is a report on Sistan and Baluchestan, is the result of a study I conducted in this province, particularly in the city of Zahedan. The third piece is a response to an inquiry from the Guardian Council regarding the conditions for candidates for the Iranian Islamic Consultative Assembly (parliament).
And our final statement is: praise be to Allah, the Lord of the worlds.
Who is the Known Cleric and Jihad? A Better Understanding of Life
A Clear Warning to the Muslim and Revolutionary People of Iran!
The threat posed by certain hypocritical and inexperienced revolutionaries endangers the Islamic Revolution. The vigilant and revolutionary people of Iran must know that the martyrs of the revolution have established a great battle, and it is upon us to commemorate its Arbaeen (40th day after martyrdom), ensuring that we preserve the true Islam; otherwise, there will be no solid foundation for the realization and survival of Islam.
Today, as “global imperialism” and “bloodthirsty Zionism” have been brought to their knees, humiliated before the Muslim nation and the blood of the beloved martyrs of Karbala, they remain on alert against the Islamic Revolution. They are continuously scheming to undermine it, and the only path that can lead them to destroy the revolution and bring ruin to the Islamic community is the use of their internal and external agents of hypocrisy. If they can implant their subservient agents within, the revolution’s downfall will be inevitable. Their main goal is to remove the militant and courageous Shiite clergy from the battlefront.
The agents of hypocrisy or inexperienced revolutionaries—those who have little to no real revolutionary struggle or suffering—under the guise of revolution and concern for Islam and the nation, seek to use terror, conspiracies, slander, insults, and threats to drive the true sons of the revolution and the committed Shiite clergy out of the field. They aim to bring the long-suffering Muslim nation once again under the grip of the Shah’s executioners, or even worse. These agents know that the only group that has consistently stood firm against the enemy, without any signs of compromise, is the popular and committed Shiite clergy. The history of Iran and the Constitutional Revolution testifies to how the separation of the people from the clergy led to the waste of the martyrs’ blood during that period.
Those who cannot independently and openly enter the field have disguised themselves as “the other half of the revolution” and infiltrated revolutionary bodies such as the committees, the Revolutionary Guards, the Republican Party, and Jihad, claiming to fight under the banners of “Imam” and “the nation.” Using hollow slogans, they have found refuge in these organizations, from where they attack both Islam and the true revolutionaries. At times, they appear openly, as in Kurdistan and Gonbad, while at other times, they operate covertly, using leaflets, newspapers, and creating uproar to betray Islam and its revolutionary sons.
For example, I refer to Esfarayen, one of the underdeveloped cities in Khorasan province. The Khans (local feudal lords) ruled this city for several hundred years, and though they have since been ousted, their agents have taken control and are now trying to incite chaos among the people, hoping to regain power. However, they are mistaken, for such an opportunity no longer exists due to the vigilance of the people and the exposure of their hypocrisy.
The people of this plague-ridden city are simple and indifferent, primarily due to their weakness and the overwhelming power of the Khans, with many still loyal to them. After the revolution, the agents of hypocrisy and opportunists, who were absent from the struggle, took advantage of the situation and infiltrated into the party, Jihad, and other organizations, or took control independently. They have implemented their own version of the “revolutionary chaos,” often based on colonialist practices such as the “desert trials,” as they call it, and have brought this culture to rural areas.
A Report on Sistan and Baluchestan
The following text is the result of efforts and research conducted during one of the months of Ramadan in the early days of the Revolution, as part of propaganda work in the region. Although I spent only a month in this province, I claim that I have identified all the issues and topics pertaining to this deprived region, which is home to a variety of social tastes. Through my interactions with all different sectors of the people, I have not hidden any matter and will summarise it all here.
(21)
Firstly, it must be stated that the claim by the authorities that “Sistan and Baluchestan is one of the deprived regions of Iran” is a statement that should not be uttered. This region is one of the richest in Iran in terms of raw mineral, oil, agricultural, commercial, and fisheries resources. With proper utilisation of these resources, many of the country’s problems could be resolved.
This region can be divided into several areas: Zahedan, Khash, Saravan, Chahbahar, and Iranshahr.
In a general but unequal division, the province of Sistan and Baluchestan can be categorized as follows: Zahedan is the provincial capital, and Iranshahr is highly sensitive, while Chahbahar, Khash, and Saravan each represent an important part of this province.
In terms of social status, the region can be divided into several sections: the authorities and officials, the army and the Revolutionary Guard, the Islamic Revolution Committee, the clergy, the Shia people, the Sunni people, and other sects and groups within the region. Each of these will be briefly and succinctly outlined to offer guidance for resolving the region’s issues.
(22)
Zahedan
Let us start with Zahedan, the provincial capital. Although Zahedan has gained significant importance and expanded over the past fifty years, it has never truly had the vitality of a city. There is a large amount of class disparity among the people. The main groups in Zahedan include the Zabolis, followed by the Birjandis, with the Sunni Baluchis, the Shia Baluchis, a few hidden Dervishes, and a number of Sikhs forming unique sections of the population. Moreover, smuggling of goods and materials is also a key issue.
Zabolis
The Zabolis, due to the lack of resources in Zabol, the absence of a healthy living environment, and the lack of job opportunities and suitable economic conditions, have significantly migrated to Zahedan, to the extent that they make up the majority of the city’s population.
The Zabolis have only two clear beliefs and characteristics, which define their entire identity: their ethnicity and their Shia faith. They are deeply proud of these two aspects and are passionate about them—both as Shia and as Zabolis.
Although in terms of belief, they prioritise their Shia faith, in practice, they are first and foremost Zabolis and then Shia. There are no exceptions to this. From the most virtuous to the most corrupt, all share this trait. They are known for their bravery but lack intellectual development. There is significant intellectual stagnation among them, and with minimal provocation, they can be mobilised in either good or bad directions, as long as the trigger is related to their identity as Zabolis or Shia. While their honesty is evident, their practical corruption must not be overlooked. They view Zahedan as their second home and never forget it, even if they were to enter paradise from Zahedan.
Due to cultural deficiencies, they have not experienced significant social growth and have no cultural influence in the region. Their administrative influence remains intact, but they rarely receive major roles or responsibilities. This frustration has been a major issue for them since the Revolution.
Birjandis
The Birjandis, though few in number—comparable to the Zabolis—have significant social presence. They believe themselves to be an integral part of the community, despite their lack of public position.
They have greater management experience and, even after the Revolution, have gained significant influence in various organisations, occupying key positions. However, they have fallen out of favour with the Zabolis, who do not openly express this.
The Birjandis possess a somewhat mysterious character, which the Zabolis lack, and they often compensate for their small numbers by employing this trait. This has been particularly evident in the urban society of Zahedan after the Revolution.
(25)
Baluchis and Sunnis
The Baluchis, especially the prominent ones, are an important minority with strong traditional unity, much pride, and devotion. They are always vigilant towards the Shia, especially the Zabolis.
At present, when this report is being written, the cultural deficiency among the Baluchis is significant. They are among the most underdeveloped sectors of the population in the region, but their commitment to the Revolution remains firm, allowing them to maintain their social cohesion and ideological fervour.
Their social awareness and religious knowledge are limited, and they have little accurate understanding of Shia beliefs. Their perception of Shia beliefs is mainly shaped by negative propaganda and their own corrupted understanding of their own faith.
Some of the tribal leaders (Khans) and religious leaders (Mullahs) have relative influence over them. However, the Mullahs are not respected by the people as they once were, though outwardly they are treated with respect.
(26)
The Khans and Baluchi smugglers hold significant power, and many of them have effectively enslaved certain people. Their influence is concentrated in the desert.
The Mullahs of the region are intellectually weak, though they appear outwardly respectable. They have aligned themselves with the Revolution, but they do not possess any real authority. They are simply power brokers, and in times of danger, none of them remain.
The region has numerous mosques and well-attended gatherings. Without speaking a word, the people communicate with one another, and they consider themselves loyal to the Revolution. However, with the right programme, there is a possibility of progress for them, which will be addressed later.
(27)
Sikh Minority
A small number of Sikhs live in the city, offering their beliefs and practices, which they source from India or their temple. They live in harmony with the local people, and the locals seem satisfied with them, as they, too, are content with the community. They are not involved in local political issues and live in a modern fashion.
Their rituals are discreet, and their beliefs are influenced by those of the Shia. Particularly after the Revolution, they have become more respectful towards the local population, and there is no threat from them to the government. However, their Dervishes are not as prominent as in other parts of Iran, and they only have a ceremonial retreat without any public outreach. They do not involve themselves in local affairs and pose no threat to the Revolution.
(28)
Government Agencies in the Province
After the Revolution, there has been little done to reform the government agencies, with much of the time being wasted on superficial improvements. Even the distribution of resources remains disproportionately imbalanced, and the poor remain even poorer. The revolutionary institutions are the only active forces in the region, though they face many challenges and remain ineffective in addressing the fundamental issues.
Smuggling
The most significant issue causing the province’s decline is smuggling, which worsens day by day, leaving a constant and unstable situation. Smugglers, operating from dirt roads and within the city, supply most of the materials distributed across the country. They are in contact with foreign agents, and their domestic operatives are powerful, each with their own defensive and distribution networks.
Addiction levels among both men and women are alarmingly high, with few effective solutions. While the Revolutionary Guard, the Committee, and the Gendarmerie take actions, they cannot control the distribution of illicit substances and often adopt a conciliatory approach.
(29)
The Current Situation in Zahedan
The administration is highly problematic, and the corrupt distribution of goods exacerbates the poverty of the city’s residents. Social stratification has become quite visible, and since the Revolution, no significant steps have been taken to address this issue.
The current governor is well-intentioned but lacks the experience and authority necessary for this important position. He operates more through charm than with deep thought or wisdom, and he views the people as beneath him. The city’s mayor has little real authority and is merely a figurehead with no role in key decisions.
While the Revolutionary Guard is highly capable, it suffers from a lack of intellectual development and is losing momentum. The Committee, on the other hand, has a very poor reputation among the people, despite having some well-intentioned members.
(30)
The clergy in the city can be divided into three categories. Although there are fewer than a hundred clergy members in total, many of them are merely reciters of religious texts with no actual influence. The second group consists of those with knowledge, but unfortunately, many are corrupt. The smallest group is composed of the righteous clergy, but they are rarely present among the people.
The cause of the recent events can be attributed to poor decision-making by the officials, leading to significant harm. The people have been disrespected, and there is little trust in the city’s leadership. The mosques are more often used as political hubs than for religious purposes, and both the governor and the Friday prayer leader lack popular support.
(31)
The people are eager to replace both the governor and the Friday prayer leader, as they are dissatisfied with their leadership. The Friday prayer leader’s aides are also not respected and are seen as unsuitable, exacerbating the people’s discontent.
The Republican Party has no influence in the city and is actually seen as a source of distrust. The head of the local Party is not a good individual, and the Organisation of Propaganda has done little to address the region’s issues. The cultural organisations are disjointed and often conflict with each other.
(32)
For a proper understanding of the current issues, I have contacted all groups and d the reality on the ground. By sincerely focusing on these gaps, the situation can be greatly improved.
Unfavourable Conditions
The life of the people in this region is dominated by several factors: fear, difficult living conditions, and drugs. All the conflicts in the region, from the beginning until now, can be attributed to the incompetence and mismanagement of the authorities. Otherwise, there is no danger to the Revolution from the people in this region. The only dangers in this area are drugs and smuggling. In times of hardship and crisis, the Baluch people may also cause harm, although this remains highly unlikely.
The judiciary in this city does not have a clear face and is not considered an important matter by the people. This directly influences the occurrence of crimes in the region.
The large number of Afghans, their disorganisation, the poor state of the market, and the lack of coordination between the perspectives of the city and its people contribute to the area’s problems. The people have a positive view of the core principles of the Revolution, but they are unclear about the nature of the authorities and are very distrustful of the local officials, especially the governor and the Friday prayer leader.
Of course, the minority of spies, wealthy elites, and Sunni leaders maintain a separate stance and must be examined elsewhere. The political groups are in a minority, isolated, and forgotten, but they do have a healthy structure, even though they lack significant influence. Wealthy individuals are powerful and troublemakers in the region. They maintain direct and indirect connections with all the factions in the area and have a covert relationship with the accommodating Sunni leaders. They should not be ignored.
Their domains are in decline, and there is little hope for improvement. A very fine religious school has been established in the centre of Zahedan, and efforts should be made to ensure its success in providing qualified academic staff, as this will be a crucial step forward for the region.
Problems and Criticisms
The Friday prayer leader of the region is a respected figure, but he has some negative attributes that prevent him from being an effective leader in the region. He is from Birjand, which causes constant friction with the majority Zabolis of the city. He has lost his connection with the people and is only focused on administrative matters. His actions and behaviour reflect this shift.
Some of his associates are seen as the most disliked and notorious individuals in the region, and the issues that initially revolved around these individuals have now shifted directly onto the Friday prayer leader. He should be asked, even under duress, to replace these individuals quickly.
If he resigns and is given an important task elsewhere, it would preserve the region’s morale and would be ideal if a competent local or non-local person were appointed in his place. If this is not possible, or if no suitable candidate exists, he must shift his approach to his responsibilities in order to ease the tensions caused by past and future events.
The governor must undoubtedly be replaced, as there is no alternative. A qualified individual should be appointed to the region, and judges from foreign countries, whether Afghan, Pakistani, or from any other nation, should never be employed in the region, even if they are competent and honest.
The problem with the current national officials is that they are selected based on their social status. The environments of cities like Tehran and Isfahan differ significantly from those of Sistan and Baluchestan. In regions like Baluchestan and Sistan, the most experienced individuals should be chosen as officials because these areas are prone to crises. Creativity and capability should be considered, not just revolutionary zeal.
The Zabolis should be given some recognition, although ethnic considerations should be downplayed. They should be restricted, though the broader Sistani community should be disbanded. The best solution is to bring them under the banner of Shia Islam.
It is not advisable to put the Zabolis on trial in this region. Those detained for related matters should be released in a manner that does not serve as an example for others, as they were not the main culprits. The real blame lies with the inexperience of the authorities and the Friday prayer leader.
This region desperately needs more scholars and intellectuals. Rather than sending scholars to Yazd, Kashan, and Isfahan, they should be sent to these regions under special conditions. The propaganda organisation lacks substance and needs to be rebuilt, though it has contributed to some extent and is not inactive compared to other institutions.
Clarification from the Guardian Council
In the name of God,
- Belief in and practical commitment to Islam and the sacred Islamic Republic of Iran system.
- Expression of loyalty to the Constitution and the progressive principle of the absolute rule of the jurist.
- Having a good reputation in the electoral district.
- Publicly known for corruption or openly engaged in immoral behaviour.
Please provide the necessary explanation regarding the above principles.
Response to the Clarification
In the name of God,
The conditions mentioned above can be divided into two categories: doctrinal and ethical/practical conditions.
A) Doctrinal Conditions
The doctrinal conditions refer to belief and practical commitment to Islam and the sacred Islamic Republic of Iran. These express belief and practical commitment to the principle of Islam and the system of governance.
The first principle addresses the realisation and active embodiment of belief, while the second focuses on expressing loyalty to the Constitution and the principle of absolute rule of the jurist, indicating commitment to these ideals.
Islam is the general and universal principle, and the system is its specific form, which is referred to as Shia Islam. The Constitution defines the system’s identity, and the absolute rule of the jurist represents the system’s active embodiment in law and governance.
Belief is an internal matter, and the visible sign of it is practical commitment. Even if a person outwardly expresses belief, without sincere commitment, this is considered hypocrisy, and such a person is viewed as an infiltrator.
B) Practical and Ethical Conditions
The third and fourth principles describe practical conditions, from having a poor reputation in the electoral district to being openly engaged in immoral behaviour.
A poor reputation is generally restricted to the electoral district, but it may also extend beyond it if the matter is serious. In such cases, the consequences are the same. A poor reputation could be either a practical or doctrinal matter. However, such reputations should not be fabricated or influenced by particular groups or sources. Even if a reputation is true, it remains a barrier.
Concerning a reputation for corruption, the corruption does not need to be public but should be proven. A person known for corruption is not eligible for selection, as this reputation signifies actual wrongdoing, not just social gossip.
Being openly immoral is a clear sign of disqualification. Although public misconduct is the primary issue, doctrinal violations should also be considered, particularly if there are ideological affiliations or deviations.
In such cases, the candidate’s past must be examined at the time of election. It is not enough to consider past conditions; ongoing suitability is critical. If a person has previously had issues but has since corrected them, this should be recognised only if it has become widely accepted.
In some legal systems, the focus is on formal expressions of belief. However, in a religious context, a person’s sincere commitment to these principles must be evident. If a person only provides a superficial expression of their beliefs, they are not suitable for critical roles within the system.
May peace be upon those who follow guidance.
Date: 24/8/1379 (17th of Sha’ban, 1421)
