Fundamental Rights, Volume 2

(New Rights), Volume 2, Chapter 9, by Ayatollah Mohammad-Reza Nekounam:

Freedom, Self-Determination, and Immunity

Freedom

The word “freedom” (Azadi) derives from the Persian root related to “birthing” or “giving birth.” Historically, a person was termed “free” if born into a noble family, possessing a free and aristocratic lineage. This title denoted social status and rank. In contrast, the term “subject” (ra‘iyyat) referred to the poor, weak, and lower-class individuals, who were obligated to serve the aristocracy and were considered their servants or slaves. Ancestors believed that God created subjects to serve the nobility.

From its root, freedom implies emergence and manifestation. In the first volume of this work, we explained that freedom is a relative concept, denoting the revelation or unfolding of something previously constrained or restricted; that is, freedom is meaningful only where there is potential for limitation. Freedom suggests a gradual opening or blossoming and, accordingly, must operate within defined boundaries. We define freedom as:

“The gradual and proportionate unveiling of a natural, inherent perfection, alongside the safeguarding of the current state of such perfection.”

We have previously distinguished freedom from mere release or liberation, explaining that liberation denotes a kind of detachment or escape from a centre — for example, the falling of a bowl from one’s hand is release, not freedom, as no positive attribute is added. Freedom, conversely, always carries a positive connotation; what is sometimes called “negative freedom” is in fact liberation mistakenly labelled as freedom.

The claim that “human beings are naturally free by creation, and should not be in bondage to anyone or anything, and that freedom is a primary right” requires clarification, especially from an Islamic perspective. This explanation will help elucidate why Islam, despite recognising freedom, did not categorically forbid slavery, which apparently contradicts this primary right.

Much has been said and theorised about freedom, often naively, resulting in the subject being somewhat neglected.

Freedom: A Secondary Reality

As noted, freedom resembles unfolding and applies only to that which can be restricted or enclosed. Hence, the assertion that humans are naturally free at inception is mistaken, because freedom implies prior restriction. Considering human creation, the individual initially exists as a zygote confined to the womb, bound by familial, societal, and natural constraints — a network of dependencies and limitations. Freedom is not primordial or absolute but secondary and acquired. No natural phenomenon exists without multiple layers of containment. All phenomena strive to shed their shells and restrictions; freedom is the gradual unveiling of one’s inherent capacities. This principle is philosophical and ontological: all beings originate in a state of containment and progressively liberate themselves in alignment with their nature.

Limitations on Freedom

Every phenomenon faces various limitations on its freedom. One intrinsic limitation is the governing natural laws, which determine the pace and degree of unfolding — for instance, the gradual nature of growth. Another extrinsic limitation arises from interaction and conflict with other phenomena, which impose external constraints. To avoid harm, freedom must be regulated, controlled, and exercised proportionately. Therefore, freedom faces both internal and external limitations.

The concept of freedom, although clear and transparent, has been overlooked, leading to its misinterpretation as a primary, absolute right. What remains debatable is the identification of true freedom as applied to humans.

The Necessity of Discernment in the Path of Freedom

Humans possess free will and choice but also a self (nafs) inclined to self-interest without limits, which can lead to disobedience. Thus, an individual may, in the pursuit of self-expression and unfolding, ignore the boundaries of freedom and mistakenly believe they are acting freely, while in reality increasing their bondage to wrongful desires. Such an individual does not seek freedom but rather liberation — specifically, a guided liberation aimed at returning to their natural centre. This liberation involves struggle, conflict, and resistance, unlike natural freedom which unfolds gradually and harmoniously. Misguided freedom results in bondage to egotism and injustice, necessitating controlled liberation.

Freedom as Natural Self-Realisation

The essence of human freedom is to act in accordance with one’s natural disposition. A free person is one who reveals their inherent nature and potential. Freedom does not mean accumulating energy or force but liberating one’s existing capacities and displaying one’s true self.

The starting point of freedom is life itself, which is the primary and fundamental attribute, as reflected in the Divine Names where “Al-Hayy” (The Living) precedes all others. Life represents the manifestation of existence and is intrinsically linked to divine agency. One who lives and is conscious becomes aware of their own potential and strives to actualise it. Movement and progress are outcomes of life and awareness, driving individuals to detach from constraints and pursue freedom.

The Cost of Freedom

Because all beings seek to manifest their potentials, conflicts and competition inevitably arise over shared resources or goals, leading to clashes. Freedom entails risk, damage, and sacrifice. The path to freedom demands perseverance and hardship, as some individuals act selfishly, depriving others of freedom through unlawful desires. Thus, freedom cannot be attained without struggle.

The Harmonious Dance of Freedom

Even at the atomic level, the desire for freedom is evident through movement and rotation, which create a dynamic balance and order. When freedom’s movement is orderly and proportionate, it becomes akin to a dance — a rhythmic, beautiful expression of natural harmony.

Freedom and Pairing

The Qur’an states:

“And it is He who spread the earth and placed therein firmly set mountains and rivers; and from all of the fruits He made therein two mates; He causes the night to cover the day. Indeed in that are signs for a people who give thought.” (Surah Ar-Ra’d 13:3)

The phrase “two mates, distinctly two” underscores that natural freedom unfolds within the framework of pairing. A person without a suitable counterpart is deprived of their freedom and remains captive to internal desires without liberation.

The Expansion of Freedom

One who attains freedom becomes simple and expansive, free from constraints, radiant, joyful, broad-hearted, and natural.

Perfection, Freedom, and Authenticity

We conclude the discussion on freedom and the psychological experiences it entails here, without pursuing the natural path of human freedom—already explored in other works such as The Knowledge of Life. Instead, we return to the core of human liberation and the initial point that prompts one to manifest their potentials. This focal point is of great significance. We follow the premise emphasised at the outset: that the freedom of every individual is a movement along a natural course inherent within themselves. Each person possesses an intrinsic perfection which they seek to express and reveal. Throughout all realms, everything progresses from less to more, from deficiency to perfection, and from lower to higher states. Humanity continuously advances towards manifesting its unique perfection, whatever it may be. Initially, one reveals their primary perfection and subsequently moves towards the manifestation of subsequent perfections. To display their perfection, every individual draws upon their past and moves forward, constructing the future according to the inner blueprint of their perfection; they then claim that future, elevate themselves to it, and ultimately stand fully upright—having clearly realised the next perfection and prepared for the display of an even higher one. This principle governs all levels and realms; the essence of freedom is the expression of one’s distinctive perfection. Those who fail to recognise their perfection or whose trajectories are weak or conflicting are excluded from this process.

The perfection of any phenomenon resides in what is unique to it, and the aggregate of its characteristics necessitates this. Such perfection stems from its specific existential attributes, absent in other phenomena, which define it and render it superior and foremost in that respect.

For instance, the sword excels in combat and the horse in racing and horsemanship, though an axe can also cut and a donkey can run; yet the sword and horse remain distinguished. These qualities belong to the sword and the horse, not to the axe or donkey. Consequently, once the sword loses its prowess and the horse its speed, the horse is saddled and treated like a donkey, and the sword is traded as broken iron or crushed steel.

Every phenomenon must pursue its unique virtues in a manner specific to itself, avoiding deviation or distortion.

Accordingly, it must be asserted that one moves rightly along the path of freedom when their movement arises from the core of their nature and follows the path dictated by their particular perfection. Such movement is natural, not forced. A seed placed in suitable conditions that grows upward and flowers exercises freedom by moving naturally along its own path.

Human freedom means that a person can proceed in the direction their inner and psychological nature demands—whether towards good or ill. Yet this individual and natural freedom must harmonise with the natural freedom of society and with the religious covenant one willingly accepts, so that it does not result in chaos or license.

The Integrity of Freedom

The outcome of freedom is that each person attains their unique perfection, and consequently acts truthfully and sincerely towards themselves and others. In the earthly realm, freedom—meaning honesty, integrity, and authenticity—is the path to salvation. Freedom signifies that everyone is themselves, not playing another’s role; that they are sincere in their baseness, wildness, mischief, or knowledge, without pretense or hypocrisy; they remain as they are and safeguard their purity and truthfulness. Even if a person is morally flawed, they are moving naturally and, with willpower, can overcome their nature. If they truly realise their authentic nature, proper education and discipline become possible. Conversely, one who feigns goodness, neglecting their natural path without transforming or mastering their nature, descends into corruption, degradation, and emptiness due to inherent hypocrisy. One who is not themselves is nothing; hypocrisy means not being authentic, showing a false appearance that does not reflect one’s true self. Freedom is to be oneself; if one is base, they manifest baseness, though they must not transgress or harm others in society. They must strive to transcend their baseness and humanise it. Freedom inherently involves education: those predisposed to evil require instruction just as those gifted with goodness require cultivation and control. Mixture and hypocrisy contaminate freedom and lead to its destruction. Freedom entails being oneself, not mixed or imitating others. It is grounded in purity; one who lacks purity lacks freedom. A person who loves one profession but adopts another harms their freedom, as they continually play the role of their preferred identity in an alien context, creating confusion and misrepresentation. Ultimately, only those who are sincere possess freedom.

If we define sin—as a deviation from freedom—in one phrase, it would be: sin means not being oneself and acting deceptively. Society is healthy only when it grants everyone the freedom to be themselves without violating others’ rights or causing disturbance, while also providing proper education for all. A few aggressive individuals with tendencies towards transgression must be constrained within defined limits, as discussed in the first volume concerning the philosophy of punishments. Such a society is healthy, free from hypocrisy, pretense, resentment, despair, and oppression; it rejects tyranny and despotism, as well as animosity and envy. Freedom demands that everyone be themselves, rejecting oppression and coercion, as well as aggression, chaos, and disgrace. Freedom means allowing each person to gradually become themselves proportionally; sin is the absence of such freedom.

Beasts never tire of lust, nor wild animals of tearing and anger, because lust and rage are their nature. Yet human potential exceeds mere baseness and savagery; humans grow weary of lustfulness, ferocity, and mischief, unable to endure them lifelong, for these run counter to human nature and bring physical ruin. Excessive lust, for example, disrupts bodily functions. The human disposition is destined for the divine, for the caliphate of the Lord, and for the breadth of knowledge innate in their essence. Humans tire not of knowledge—lacking material needs—but develop an insatiable appetite for it.

An animal possessing baseness or savagery enjoys freedom insofar as it expresses these sincerely. It consumes what it desires truthfully, succeeds honestly, and genuinely embodies its nature, free from hypocrisy and deceit; thus, it is free.

Angels are also truthful, as are the saints of God, whose truthfulness is identical to their knowledge. Devils, however, are deceitful and lack sincerity.

Ordinary humans may also lack sincerity, fail to be themselves, and perform roles other than their own. One who is not themselves, living contrary to their true will and identity, seeking to mimic others or please them, loses their truth and freedom, becoming hollow, meaningless, worthless, and enslaved. Such a person is no longer free. Freedom belongs to those who are sincere.

This applies to justice as well: a just person is primarily sincere—being exactly what they are, playing no false role. If one lacks the virtue to avoid sin yet pretends to justice by external displays of righteousness, hypocrisy, and superficiality, they are less sincere than one who openly admits their lack of justice. One who lacks sincerity is predisposed to sin. Sincerity is the root of obedience; without it, no act of worship can avoid hypocrisy and is rendered void. Sincerity brings knowledge and increases freedom.

Freedom as the Ground for Love

Sincerity and freedom are the roots of love. Love means purity and clarity; it means being oneself. Such a person is motivated and enthusiastic to undertake a task that aligns with their sincerity and nature. One tires of knowledge, wealth, and other possessions if these are not gained sincerely, for no one can endure or bear burdens that are not genuinely their own.

The Harmonisation of Islamic Freedom and Religious Duty

Here it should be noted that one who accepts Islam sincerely must commit to religious duties that may restrict their freedoms. They embrace Islam voluntarily, and sincerity demands they follow its path. A monotheistic society does not conflict with sincerity or freedom; a Muslim willingly undertakes to restrain their desires and uphold freedom for themselves and others. They commit to abandoning actions incompatible with freedom. Such a person resembles a traveller who boards an aeroplane by choice and must accept its conditions until reaching the destination; they cannot claim to be unfree on the plane.

In an Islamic society, non-Muslims must respect the citizenship rights and peaceful coexistence under Islamic law, without disturbing Muslims; likewise, Muslims must respect the privacy of non-Muslims. Such a society embodies sincerity: Muslims follow religious laws sincerely, and non-Muslims sincerely observe civil rights they accept. Neither imposes hypocrisy or oppression; rather, Muslims possess true sincerity, and non-Muslims genuine sincerity—provided Muslims do not merely feign religion and impose authoritarianism that prevents anyone from being themselves.

An Islamic society is one where Muslims have true sincerity and non-Muslims have genuine sincerity without interfering with each other. The core of a faithful society is the believer’s conviction, knowledge, and heartfelt satisfaction; those without true piety are not bound by religious duty: “God accepts only from the righteous.” The true society is based on authentic belief and truth, not falsehood, while the civil society is based on social belief, not necessarily heartfelt knowledge, which may be false; here, obligation arises socially rather than religiously.

The Distinction Between the Reality and the Truth of Freedom

Freedom and sincerity exist in two dimensions: the realm of establishment and reality, and the realm of permanence and truth.

True sincerity manifests as fairness and justice, while genuine truth appears as love and guardianship (wilayah). Society must be governed either by justice or by guardianship. Justice-based societies are founded on true sincerity and fairness, requiring no faith or truth. Guardianship societies are based on true sincerity, love, and affection, termed “wilayah,” discussed in the next chapter. Therefore, a truly free society is either monotheistic and religious or secular and civil; any other form is decadent and unjust, founded on falsehood, where freedom and love are absent, replaced by lust, deceit, and hypocrisy. Such societies isolate divine saints and bring religion to decline.

In a guardianship society, hearts, love, and the prevailing sincerity hold value. Here, the individual is primary, not the society; society is merely an extension of the human heart, which transcends the society itself. The heart governs and unites, with hearts that foster monotheism coming together in unity—just as God possesses singular personal unity, so the heart is a single person, with all hearts gathered around one leader, the friend (wali) of God. The guardianship society has a genuine leader and an infallible organiser, governed by a doctrinal system promoting freedom, altruism, and love. It ensures worldly and eternal well-being, where no one feels weariness or despair, and all attain freedom, authenticity, and love, striving to remain faithful Muslims until death.

Conversely, the secular society is system-oriented and collectivist,

ruled by civil laws and collective belief. Its foundation is the principle of “freedom of opinion” and individual rights, which can be unjust and lead to chaos and fragmentation. This society prizes justice as fairness and sincerity, yet lacks the love and true knowledge present in guardianship.

In conclusion, freedom is a complex concept encompassing truth, sincerity, justice, love, and faith. To live fully free is to live in harmony with one’s nature, society, and divine law, grounded in authenticity and love. Freedom is not mere license but the true expression of one’s perfection and sincere being.

Critique of Perspectives

Here, we present a critique of certain statements. These theories, instead of advocating freedom in theorising, have fallen into a state of unrestrained liberty in theorisation and consequently lost the scientific framework of theorising. One author states:

“Imam Ali (peace be upon him) said: ‘Do not be a slave to others when Allah has created you free.’[4] Here, ‘Jal’ (جعل) means creation; that is, God created you free. According to this narration, freedom is inherent in human nature and disposition.”

The narration primarily negates servitude to anyone other than God and denies being a slave to one’s desires and whims, but it does not negate servitude to God nor the inherent bondage to Him. That is, every phenomenon—including humans—is created dependent on God, who has placed the natural path of freedom within human disposition so that through their own free will, they may reveal their unique perfection. Being a servant of God is intrinsic to human nature and disposition, and humans seek to actualise this innate disposition. The flourishing of this disposition is, in fact, their freedom.

Moreover, ‘Jal’ does not mean ‘creation’, as it pertains to attributes, and nothing can be ‘made’ (جعل) until it has been created. Linguistically, one cannot treat every word as synonymous with another; each word has a principal meaning. Jal requires an active will and here is used in the sense of ‘placing’ or ‘establishing’; that is, freedom is an attribute endowed to humans upon creation. Humans are inherently bound and captive by their nature but require liberation and freedom. God also desires His servant’s freedom; that is, God grants the servant the ability to flourish.

The bondage by virtue of servitude to God is an essential and ontological attribute of humans, whereas freedom is an active attribute that occurs gradually and progressively. Thus, Jal applies to the latter; otherwise, if freedom were an essential attribute, the initial injunction—‘Do not be a slave to others’—would be meaningless.

Freedom, which differs from licence or unrestrained liberty, demands at least non-harmfulness and abstention from sin. Natural and true freedom reveals the perfection of each individual.

It should be noted that referring to ‘abd (servant) as being bound to the Lord does not imply a knot or entanglement; rather, this bondage has the capacity for flourishing and actualisation, not for dissolution or liberation from its place. Servitude is an essential and created attribute that cannot be negated, whereas freedom comes upon this attribute and matures and enriches the servant in their servitude to God. This servitude is not slavery, because slavery is an artificial, secondary, and incidental condition resulting from an event.

One should not infer from this that freedom is not innate; although it is an active attribute following bondage and an actual attribute, it is nonetheless rooted in human nature. The fundamental principle is that the created human tends naturally towards freedom and seeks to manifest their selfhood and unique perfection. Hence, the principle of freedom stands, and no one may impose restrictions on another without specific justification. Humans are inherently servants of God, yet essentially free to manifest their bondage and unique perfection and display their servitude with increasing power and boundlessness, thus painting a tableau of pure and sincere love. Humanity displayed the pinnacle of freedom at Karbala, and none but Husayn (peace be upon him) can be the messenger of love, freedom, and liberation.

Humans are free with respect to non-God entities, but their freedom is limited progressively and in accordance with their unique perfection. They cannot exit the circle of God’s love and servitude, as it is said: (Indeed, to God we belong and to Him we shall return.)[5] This circle places humans in the realm of absolute servitude, except for those who disregard their freedom and become unrestrained. Even in relation to God, a servant cannot make an argument against Him, and the sending of prophets is by God’s grace, as it is said: (He is not questioned about what He does, but they will be questioned.)[6] Rather, God holds His servants accountable, as the verse states: (To God belongs the decisive proof.)[7] God has created everything rightly, justly, and in its place, and the servant must act with awareness and knowledge. No one can provide excuses to God, hence there is no place for questioning, as it says: (Look again: do you see any flaw?)[8] There is no fault in what God has created. The proof for servants is so clear that all recognise their shortcomings and fault, so that if someone attempts to speak, they are told: (Stay ashamed therein and do not speak to Me.)[9]

Martyr Motahhari, in his notes, describes freedom as follows:

“Freedom is not a natural phenomenon, nor is it an essential abstract philosophical attribute or a hypothetical mathematical attribute of things. Rather, it is a normative and practical concept that is attributed to the natural capacity of beings for perfection. In summary, freedom means that no obstacle should be placed in the way of the natural growth of the human capacity. Creating an obstacle to the natural growth of a plant—such as placing a flower in shade or in a confined space—is inappropriate and a violation of rights, but since the flower does not possess consciousness, it is not injustice; if it causes harm to animals, it is injustice; otherwise, no. Therefore, the question of whether freedom is among human attributes or not, the answer is that freedom is the necessity of non-obstruction. This necessity applies only to humans and not to plants, although plants also have rights. For animals, freedom means that no harm or injury should be inflicted; but this is not the same as conventional freedom. Hence, freedom is among human characteristics.

Contrary to the misconception of many Western philosophers, what underpins and grounds the right to freedom and respect is not individual desire, whim, or will, but the natural capacity granted by creation for progression and perfection.”[10]

Considering our discussion on freedom, freedom is a natural phenomenon for all phenomena, accompanied by gradual and proportionate emergence, and is not a phenomenon that does not strive to exhibit its unique perfection, whether human, animal, plant, or inanimate object. Every entity is in the process of realising its potential and flourishing. The Qur’an also regards the natural world as moving towards expansion and freedom: (And the heaven We constructed with strength, and indeed, We are [its] expander.)[11]

Freedom is the natural potential of every entity but is not absolute; it is limited by external proportionality and internal gradualness. Freedom in reality is one of the secondary intelligibles which exists inherently in every entity and develops accordingly, similar to knowledge, power, and beauty. It is not a conventional or purely conceptual term, but a real attribute inherent in the phenomenon, growing and manifesting with it.

However, Martyr Motahhari rightly states that “freedom is not a mathematical assumption of things.” Freedom, like geometric shapes, lacks form and is not a connected or disconnected quantity, nor is it an abstract concept. It is rather a secondary intelligible inherent in nature and is not a mere attribution. The author’s statement that “no obstacle should be placed in the way of the natural growth of human capacity” is a normative judgment and is unrelated to the concept of freedom.

We said that everyone perceives their freedom according to their capacity for awareness and understanding, and no phenomenon exists without natural consciousness; therefore, any deprivation of freedom is understood as injustice. Yet the statement that “if a phenomenon is unaware of its freedom, depriving it of freedom is not considered injustice” contradicts the rights of phenomena and is inconsistent. There is no phenomenon in the world devoid of consciousness, and any violation against it is injustice. For example, writing a telephone number in the margin of a book or placing a container upon it is an infringement and disorder, and tearing a part of the book’s page for mere need is a sign of an intrusive spirit—i.e., in the name of necessity and need, injustice is committed easily. The beginning of violation starts with self-violation, and one who violates themselves learns to violate others.

In animals, too, any obstruction—even without harm—is injustice. Someone who excessively burdens an animal without necessity, even if the animal suffers no injury, has wronged it.

Martyr Motahhari presents freedom negatively as ‘the necessity of non-obstruction,’ i.e., the absence of impediment, whereas we define freedom positively as the gradual and proportional actualisation of each phenomenon’s unique perfection—movement along its natural course. The absence of obstacles is a necessary condition but not the definition of freedom. This applies to all phenomena, whether human, plant, or animal, unconditionally. Thus, the Qur’an states: (And do not walk upon the earth arrogantly.)[12]—meaning one must respect the earth and not trample on it.

In volume two of Tafsir Huda, where we reveal the face of love, we stated that love has cyclical movement and continuous ascent and descent; that is, although the lover may ascend to the kingdom of the unseen, they do not lose their attachment to the visible world, nor does the celestial beloved take away the earthly beloved from their heart. Rather, the more one ascends to the unseen, the more they are attached to the earthly world with greater sincerity and fidelity—so much so that they carry even the stone beneath their feet with love, or like the companions of the Angels’ Cave, whose love burned in their hearts, they even take their dogs with them out of affection.

In any case, freedom is not exclusive to humans and exists in every corporeal phenomenon to varying degrees depending on their capacity.

However humans differ from other phenomena by virtue of their rational and conscious capacity, which allows for choice. Rational and conscious humans are in a higher rank of freedom, for their choices are not limited by instincts or basic needs, but by intellect and conscience. Thus, freedom is a function of rational capacity.

Hence, freedom means a rational being’s ability to actualise their inherent natural capacities and strive towards their unique perfection through conscious, deliberate choice.

Freedom and Its Limits

Freedom is not solely dependent on human will; as stated, it inherently exists in nature, and non-volitional beings also possess a form of freedom. The limitations on freedom are intrinsic to their nature and are not matters of choice. Moreover, these limitations constitute the essence of freedom itself, and attempting to escape them leads to liberation and detachment rather than true freedom. Therefore, it is mistaken to consider the limitations of freedom as solely arising from social necessity. Even a person living in complete isolation experiences limitations on their freedom; it is never absolute to the point of leading to liberation. Likewise, within society, there are different limitations, as freedom is a relative concept and its constraints vary according to circumstances. This leads to the conclusion that freedom does not require altruism or sacrifice. Maintaining natural limitations of one’s freedom does not imply self-sacrifice or indebtedness to society. Sacrifice and forbearance only have meaning in the context of coercive limitations, whereas the limitations inherent in freedom are natural and necessary.

Freedom from the Perspective of Islam

The approach of Islamic law towards freedom is a vast topic. Briefly, Islam is a religion that promotes facilitation and freedom rather than restriction and bondage. Islam never imposes undue hardship on people; it is a religion of ease and leniency. However, it must be emphasised that facilitation in religion does not mean lawlessness; rather, it occurs within the framework of law. It is part of Islamic law that the religion is fundamentally facilitative and centred on freedom. The religion posits that everything is permissible except a limited number of prohibitions. The legal system of Islamic law resembles traffic regulations, compliance with which facilitates movement and prevents accidents and fatalities. Such rulings are like the anchor of the human ship—without them, humanity would be tossed about in turmoil. Religious rulings are descriptive, not coercive; they function like the engineering plans that precisely indicate the position of everything. Such a religion does not instil fear or dread among people.

What has been described thus far pertains to the static nature of religion, as stated in the Qur’an: “Allah intends for you ease and does not intend for you hardship” (Qur’an 2:185). Our analysis in the seven-volume work Fiqh of Music and Singing elaborates on this. Unfortunately, some religious scholars have not adopted this approach in practice. Some have expected the entire populace to live a prophetic life, assuming that holiness, piety, purity, and self-discipline are obligatory for all. When the Qur’an states, “And I did not create the jinn and mankind except to worship Me” (Qur’an 51:56), it must be understood that worship is hierarchical and that this is a supreme goal. If the statement refers to natural worship, it is inherently fulfilled; if it refers to legislative worship, then worship is a path rather than a final aim, with individuals at various stages according to their personal capacities. Each person should expend effort proportionate to their own station; the same applies to piety and faith, which cannot be uniformly expected from all. A universal call to the highest form of servitude without considering different gradations and imposing practices such as nightly prayers uniformly affects other rulings and social norms. However, if society remains open and even disbelievers conduct their affairs ordinarily while the sanctity of religion is preserved as intended, the society will be healthy, and such widespread disorder will not occur.

We conclude this discussion with two illuminating narrations that emphasise both awareness and freedom, piety and liberality, and the simplicity and leniency of Islamic law. They imply that if people only observe what God has prescribed and respect the legal boundaries, their lives will be easy and free from anxiety. Deviating from Sharia renders life difficult, disordered, and unpleasant:

a) Sulayman al-Ja’fari asked Imam Musa ibn Ja’far about a man buying a fur coat in the market without knowing if the animal was slaughtered in accordance with Islamic ritual slaughter (dhabiha). The Imam replied: “Yes, there is no objection.” Imam al-Baqir said repeatedly: “The Kharijites made things difficult for themselves due to their ignorance; religion is broader than that.”

b) “Everything in this world is more splendid when heard about than when seen, and everything in the hereafter is more magnificent when seen than when heard. So suffice yourselves with hearing about the unseen, and know that what is lost from this world but gained in the hereafter is better than what is lost from the hereafter but gained in this world. How many losses have been gains, and how many gains have been losses? What you are commanded is more extensive than what you are forbidden, and what has been made lawful to you exceeds what is made unlawful. So abandon the lesser to attain the greater, and abandon what constricts to attain what expands. Provision has been guaranteed to you, and you are commanded to act; thus, seeking guaranteed provision should not take precedence over performing your obligations.”

If the religious culture is portrayed contrary to the facilitative nature of the Sharia, the ship of religion will founder. The culture of the Sharia is one of purity, comfort, vitality, joy, and a life free of sin, corruption, and negligence. Avoiding sin is obligatory, but portraying an easy religion harshly is neither prudent nor pious. Unfounded strictness leads to religious alienation, especially among youth.

The Qur’an states: “If you were harsh and hard of heart, they would have dispersed from around you” (Qur’an 3:159). The Prophet’s gentleness and compassion drew people to him. Our religion is characterised by softness, kindness, and mercy, a fundamental principle manifest also in the names of God. Divine mercy and compassion dominate until the servant errs gravely; then, God is also “Severe in Punishment.” The mercy and compassion of religion is a broad principle that encourages people towards faith and should govern religious leaders as well.

A legitimate ruler does not enslave people with personal whims or arrogance but merely executes divine commands. The ruler’s commands and prohibitions are God’s commands, not personal. Otherwise, the ruler becomes a tyrant.

Numerous Qur’anic verses affirm human freedom. Religious injunctions presuppose freedom, for commands without freedom, will, and choice are meaningless. The default position in Islam is permissibility, and duties are lifted from various groups. Unfortunately, sources that meticulously discuss freedom in Islam have not been sufficiently refined, interpreted, and explained. Consequently, freedom today is often attributed to Westerners, who are regarded as the pioneers of social freedoms because they have exported their ideologies and beliefs through academic and institutional means. Meanwhile, Islam fell prey to unjust rulers and tyranny, which overshadowed the Sharia.

Studying freedom in Islam comprehensively across its branches and comparing it with related and opposing terms could fill dozens of volumes. Moreover, freedom is contingent on geographic and temporal conditions and must be considered regionally. The land and soil where people live affect freedom in two respects: the essential nature of freedom in a region, and the extent to which rulers grant freedom to their people. Sometimes freedom is discussed at the national level; at others, a country must be divided into regions, with freedom adapted accordingly. Likewise, various forms of tyranny obstructing freedom must be identified, as tyranny often disguises itself regionally. For example, in Iran, freedom was once symbolised solely by “God, Shah, Homeland,” a slogan that excluded popular freedoms. In this model, God guaranteed legitimacy, but was only a symbolic figure for the Pahlavi dynasty; the Shah represented individual authority over society; and the homeland was the realm of his governance. The people had no freedom and were expected only to obey the Shah. Similarly, Ferdowsi composed the literary masterpiece Shahnameh but never wrote a “People’s Book.”

Freedom as a Slogan of the Islamic Republic

The Iranian Islamic Revolution was founded on the slogan: “Independence, Freedom, and Islamic Republic.” This inclusion of freedom is a major distinction. The term “Islamic Republic” itself embodies freedom, independence, popular sovereignty, and Islamic character, with the earlier terms emphasizing the importance of freedom and independence. However, stating these slogans in absolute terms leaves the type of freedom and independence ambiguous, unless it is understood that these rights belong to those who proclaim the slogans.

Foundations of Freedom

We consider freedom to rest on three pillars: Homeland, People, and Religion. It is preferable to propose the slogan “Homeland, People, and Religion” instead of the previously mentioned slogans, with deliberate order. These three dimensions form the infrastructure of freedom.

• Homeland
  The homeland is the foundation of life and therefore must precede people and religion, though this precedence does not imply superiority. Similar to purity being a prerequisite for prayer, the homeland varies according to geography and culture. Different homelands and countries can have local Islamic republic governance under a central authority, which is also an Islamic Republic. People who have lived on a land for generations own it and cannot be expelled on account of religious belief. For an ancient country like Iran, with a deep historical lineage, expatriate Iranians long to touch its pure soil with tears and longing. Such ownership is ancient and respected by all faiths.

Moreover, the concept of homeland suggests that an individual can have multiple homelands. For example, a Shi’a living in a European country might consider both their place of residence and Iran as homelands—one geographical and the other cultural and religious.

• People
  The second pillar is the people, encompassing each individual, in contrast to the concept of a republic, which primarily considers the collective. Therefore, the term “people” has precedence over “republic,” as it does not overlook any individual, regardless of beliefs
• or race.
• Religion
  The third pillar is religion. A nation or society can be secular or religious, but freedom is guaranteed only by a divine religion; otherwise, society will dissolve or lose its social fabric. For Iran, religion has been and remains its major social identity.

Dimensions of Freedom

Freedom has three interrelated dimensions:

• Freedom of Thought and Expression: The ability to think and express oneself freely.
• Freedom of Belief and Religion: The right to choose and practice one’s religion or belief.
• Freedom of Action and Behaviour: The liberty to act according to one’s will within the bounds of law.
• We have stated that slavery is objectionable; however, the objectionableness of slavery does not imply that being someone’s slave is inherently reprehensible. Rather, its reprehensibility is accidental.
  A slave, while being a slave, for instance, does not necessarily commit sin, nor is his servitude considered a crime. Slavery is more often a consequence of poverty and war, and the stigma of being a slave—which differs from the institution of slavery—derives from exploitative factors. Yet the objectionableness of slavery itself is also accidental. However, it must be noted that committing an objectionable act does not always amount to perpetrating an exploitative action. Sometimes performing an objectionable deed becomes obligatory for the sake of survival; for example, eating dog meat or carrion becomes necessary if survival demands it, and the individual must endure hardship to do so, for which they will receive recompense and reward. Accordingly, one should not assume that the objectionableness of something necessarily entails a prohibition; however, certainly, everything prohibited (haram) is objectionable.
• Relativity and contextual change apply to everything, and with a change of context, the specific ruling for that subject applies, which does not mean a change in divine law. In slavery, one who legally acquires slaves under contemporary laws and customs is not considered an aggressor. This is analogous to copyright law: if a society does not observe it, while non-compliance is objectionable, its widespread practice prevents it from being considered an infringement of others’ rights. Hence, if international bodies were one day to legalise slavery, the ruling that Islam has on this matter would once again be applicable, and the Islamic laws regarding slaves would be relevant; that is, a subject which had ceased to exist returns with the reappearance of its cause. If the day comes when the non-Islamic world enslaves Muslims, Islam does not forbid Muslims from enslaving non-Muslims in return, to avoid harm to the Muslim community and to preserve bargaining power in diplomatic and political negotiations, as well as in the exchange of captives and slaves, so that Muslims are not placed in a position of weakness and forced to surrender slaves unilaterally. For this reason, Islam has not categorically prohibited this abhorrent institution but has made it conditional on prevailing circumstances. Islam also has a principle of obligation, which is accepted by rational laws, stating: if an individual or a nation is bound by their own laws to a ruling, another party who does not recognise that ruling may still engage with them on that basis and to their own advantage.
• Islam also engaged with slavery economically, which was essentially a form of unpaid labour, and accepted the emancipation of slaves in exchange for payment, to boost economic prosperity. If slaves and their unpaid labour were removed from Islamic society’s economy, wealth would need to be injected for investment and job creation in compensation.
• Islam does not condone violence and oppression even on the battlefield; however, if the preservation of the Sharia necessitates harshness towards non-believers, it is recommended, as stated in the Qur’an: “Severe against the disbelievers” [Qur’an 48:29]. This is an instructive recommendation reflecting social realities, indicating that one should not show weakness before the enemy. Thus, preserving the Sharia—even if it entails, as a defensive necessity, the killing of some believers—is deemed permissible; much less so when it involves enslaving non-believers.
• In any case, Islam must secure its own survival and, for the vitality of the broader community of believers, even permits the martyrdom or killing of some believers as a defensive measure, where the ends justify the means. Yet this justification must be reasoned and evidenced, not based on personal whims or partisan interests. If preserving Islam endangers the majority’s interests, since Islam cannot exist without its people and religion’s vitality depends on their life, the majority’s interests take precedence. Thus, it is impermissible to impose intolerable hardship on the vast majority of Muslims in the name of preserving Islam. This matter requires careful jurisprudential scrutiny and comprehensive understanding of Sharia, its subjects, and criteria for rulings.
• The philosophical basis for denying absolute and inherent objectionableness lies in the discourse of ‘good and evil’ in philosophy, which is foundational. Philosophy posits the existence of absolute good but denies the existence of absolute evil. Evil is not a substantive entity but a secondary, accidental existence. Beauty possesses essence, and God embodies all beauty and perfection. Reprehensibility lacks essence and thus cannot be inherent. Good and evil, beauty and ugliness are not exact opposites because evil is a creation of good, and ugliness a creation of beauty. This does not imply one can justify anything or refute truth. The examples provided by the Infallible Imams in this context are neither dismissible nor scientifically defensible since they are acts whose truths remain unknown to us, known only to the Imams unless one can claim complete scientific investigation and exhaustive inquiry of each case based on sacred intuition mediating between divine truth and humans. Differences in understanding among ordinary humans inevitably remain, and no one can claim to hold the ultimate interpretation except the naïve or superficial.
• Without the station of infallibility and devoted, insightful supporters close in spiritual clarity who fully accept the infallibility of the Imams and follow them, scientific disagreement persists and cannot be eliminated among ordinary individuals, who inherently understand relativism.
• In conclusion, several points should be borne in mind:
  First, only someone well-versed in the nature of Islamic rulings and the Shi’a system of jurisprudence—familiar with the relationship between custom, reason, and Islamic legislative and advisory rulings—can meaningfully engage in this discussion. A slightest lapse in this understanding leads to flawed recognition.
• Second, Islam emerged in a primitive Arabian society where slavery was a core economic pillar; today, this institution no longer exists in practice, rendering its ruling obsolete. Nonetheless, Islam is a timeless law; its emergence in a primitive society does not confine its rulings to that context nor exclude modern, civilised societies from its framework. Its rulings and programmes are eternal and applicable to all times.
• Finally, Islam’s policy towards abolition was not violent or prohibitive but achieved through centuries of cultural work that entirely removed the basis of slavery from Islamic society. This was done with utmost patience and prudence, especially given that most power-holders were fond of their slaves and used them extensively for leisure and carnal purposes, gifting them freely and reluctant to relinquish them.
• Foundations of Freedom
• Most Western theorists regard social freedom as rooted in dignity and human ‘honour,’ such that deprivation of freedom amounts to assaulting human dignity. Loss of human dignity implies destruction and distortion of human essence, degradation, and fall from the status of humanity to something inferior. They argue that humans are created with dignity and that human nature demands freedom. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is based on this idea, stating in Article One:
• “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”
• The term ‘dignity’ here corresponds to human honour. The latter part of this article is accurate; however, the premise is problematic since freedom is not an innate attribute of humans—dependency and bondage precede it. No one is born free. The foetus enters the world through pain and confinement, and is released from the womb, not into freedom. Freedom manifests only post-liberation when the individual strives to express their unique perfection.
• Many constraints and deficiencies derive from heredity and parental conditions, affecting the child’s genetic makeup. Humans are born into complex, problematic circumstances, ranging from poverty and illness to other inadequacies. No two infants have equal conditions and opportunities, thus their developmental trajectories differ from birth.
• Human rights should begin by addressing these inequalities and dependencies, instituting provisions preventing parental shortcomings from affecting the child and ensuring secondary equality of opportunity. Only then should freedom, the natural human faculty, be discussed and rights to freedom derived from it. Consequently, the freedom of a child with abundant opportunities differs from that of a child born into poverty; hence, equality of freedoms is an oversimplification.
• For example, during research in a juvenile detention centre, it was found that an imprisoned mother nursing her infant in such an environment is likely to produce a criminal bent on destroying goodness. Such a child’s fear is deeply ingrained, and their knowledge is limited to prison life, which shapes their future towards crime. Infants should never be detained in prison; it is their right not to be. Imprisoning children under two years old should be criminalised.
• Similarly, infants born in hospitals due to maternal illness are born ill; a child witnessing parental poverty becomes ill too. Governments wishing to eliminate these consequences must provide minimum necessary facilities to every newborn, along with identification documents. Children’s rights should resemble social security entitlements, ensuring healthy young citizens capable of contributing to society. This prevents transmission of parental deficits and safeguards societal well-being. As previously discussed in population control, generations afflicted by deficiencies require regulation, while healthy, intelligent, and gifted generations must be supported to proliferate. Average individuals form society’s median, warranting neither special support nor restrictions. Such measures prevent intellectual stagnation, ugliness, and disease from pervading society; thus, indiscriminate promotion of larger families is ill-advised.
• In sum, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has an incomplete beginning but is correct in affirming the equality of humans in essence and rights, mirroring Islam’s principle of equality of life, independent of knowledge, power, or wealth.
• One Western thinker stated:
• “If one relinquishes their right to freedom and choice, they have degraded from human to animal status, for the difference lies in will and choice, not intellect.”
• We assert freedom as a natural human faculty, the source—not the right itself. Natural freedom is not a right that can be waived but a natural state; ignoring it is

the source—not the right itself. Natural freedom is not a right that can be waived but a natural state; ignoring it is ignorance. Rights derive from natural faculties; relinquishing a right does not degrade one’s humanity, but ignorance of it does.

Freedom has three principal types:

1. Freedom of choice (to accept or reject),
2. Freedom of action, and
3. Freedom of speech.

Each depends on conditions and context, and society must safeguard them to avoid suppression of will and denial of action. One cannot choose to do the impossible, just as one cannot choose not to be dependent. Freedom of speech applies to permissible matters and is limited where harmful.

Freedom is not absolute; the law and social norms restrict it to prevent harm. Human rights derive from the balance of individual and collective interests.

In conclusion, freedom as a natural faculty exists, but its realisation is contingent on conditions. Freedom is not absolute or unconditioned, but limited by the law, custom, and morality to protect societal order and individual dignity.

In any case, it is nature itself that limits freedom and defines its boundaries, not justice—which itself arises from nature after freedom—and nature is what nurtures these two siblings, one elder and the other younger. However, the complete revelation of this lies exclusively within divine revelation (Wahy).

One thematic critique of the previous theoretical discussion states:

“The determinant of freedom cannot be justice, human rights, democracy, or similar concepts; because if the determinant itself does not possess defined rights, it can never delimit anything else. Justice, one of the noblest and most beloved human virtues, has various meanings and limits in different schools of thought. The only factor that can fully define the boundaries of freedom is divine law (Sharia), which specifies the rights of the rightful owner, mandates redress for transgression, forbids destruction and annihilation, and prescribes defence. Therefore, the only thing that can truly limit, and indeed define, freedom is divine law.”

A flaw in this argument regarding justice is that justice is not precisely determined or fixed. The same criticism applies to non-infallible Sharia derived through ijtihad (independent reasoning). A Sharia inferred by a jurist is not infallible and may be subject to embellishments and errors. Although the Sharia known to the Infallible—i.e., divine revelation—is, as we have stated, the best source to define freedom, even Sharia cannot limit freedom per se; because divine and infallible Sharia is a discovery of natural freedom and articulates the true boundaries inherent within it, serving as the scientific source and awareness of freedom.

Freedom of Belief

That everyone is free to hold any belief is a natural (ontological) fact. Everyone is free in thought and theory selection. However, freedom of belief, meaning the right to express rational thought that does not contradict the fundamental principles of the governing system, is among the earliest social freedoms. This means no one is permitted to express ideas opposing the accepted principles of the country’s law under whose jurisdiction they live and must at least practice taqiyya (discretion and concealment) within that country—unless they possess sufficient power to defend their existence and beliefs. The preceding is a rational perspective on freedom of expression of belief.

Difference Between Thought and Expression of Belief

That anyone can think whatever they like is a natural fact related to the creative structure of the human mind and its understanding faculties. Everyone’s mind is capable of reasoning and rational reflection. Beyond the mind, one can possess knowledge in the heart, as discussed in detail in the book Sirr-e Sorkh (The Red Secret). However, expressing and propagating ideas is subject to each country’s laws; the Islamic system does not permit the dissemination of every idea and restricts it to prevent harm to vulnerable minds and their destruction and to safeguard the intellectual environment of its followers. Islam considers the psychological safety and security of its adherents its duty. The issue of apostasy (riddah) is an example of Islam’s prohibition on expression of certain beliefs.

Expression of Belief: A Social Right

Freedom to express belief is not an individual right but a social one, and if a belief is unhealthy or incorrect, expressing it is considered an infringement on others’ rights. Expression entails aggression and interference in others’ lives. Displaying a belief opposing the ruling system’s ideology creates disturbance, miseducation, and challenges in society—except in a system claiming Islamic legitimacy that does not commit manifest wrongs leading to the destruction of the religion’s foundations and the dignity of guardianship (wilaya). In such an environment, taqiyya is forbidden, and true religious scholars consider uprising and even sacrificing their blood to protect the healthy life of religion their divine duty.

Prohibition of Thought Inspection

Inspection of beliefs—distinct from freedom to express belief—is forbidden. Article 23 of the Iranian Constitution prohibits inspection of beliefs and does not restrict freedom of expression:

“Inspection of beliefs is prohibited, and no one can be persecuted or accused solely for having a belief.”

Difference Between Inspection of Action and Inspection of Belief

“Inspection of action” is distinct from “inspection of belief.” Some inspections of actions are permitted; for example, inspection to detect adultery when there is reasonable suspicion is not forbidden, though not obligatory, as proof may lead to societal corruption. However, mere belief and conviction cause no harm as long as they do not manifest in acts of expression or propagation; for those, detection through inspection, investigation, or coerced confession is possible.

Freedom of Belief and Human Rights

Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:

“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”

Foundations of Freedom of Belief in Secularism

Secular societies consider the basis of freedom of belief to be its personal nature and its non-impact on society, since—unlike religious or authoritarian regimes—they lack a fixed ideological framework and only seek to preserve secular foundations. They regard absolute freedom of belief and feelings across theoretical, scientific, practical, moral, or divine domains as necessary. They differentiate freedom of belief from freedom of expression, placing limits on the latter. Some secular countries allocate specific places where all political groups may freely express opinions about the country’s status and its officials; expression outside these places is prohibited.

Expression of Belief and Social Order

Expression of belief should not cause social disorder, stress, anxiety, public disturbance, or conflict with national security. Nevertheless, people in Western countries enjoy greater freedom of expression than in Eastern ones—whether religious or communist. Expression requires suitable context, and these contextual boundaries limit expression, especially to avoid harming others’ freedom or public order.

Governance, Religion, and Freedom

In secular democracies, sovereignty is paramount; the individual holds no inherent status to claim freedom of belief as a purely personal matter because social rules accepted by the majority supersede individual preferences. Conversely, in religious societies, freedoms are defined through religious teachings and sanctities; expressing beliefs contradicting sacred matters is regarded as audacity and crime, sometimes even disrespect like failing to greet appropriately. Thus, the freedoms extolled by Western societies have no place in such systems, nor do we advocate for them.

It should be noted that under despotic governments, society’s individuals become as despotic as the state, expressing beliefs through violence, demonstrations, and destruction of public property. Contrarily, Western societies accept the relativity of beliefs, so no intellectual despotism exists; people do not consider their ideas infallible. As stated in On Liberty:

“In the West, there is a close connection between freedom of beliefs and their relativity; because we do not know whether the belief we try to suppress is truly false and baseless. Humanity is not immune to error and mistake, and this implies we cannot regard our own understanding as the absolute judge—especially given that many things people believed for centuries are now deemed false. Moreover, a belief lacking absolute certainty has no right to oppress or seek elimination of others’ beliefs.”

Relationship Between Relativity and Freedom of Belief

Relativity in ordinary human knowledge and thought is natural. Ordinary humans have no privilege over others warranting different treatment. Societies with a religious worldview cannot accept relativity, as predetermined dogma prevents them from hearing alternative views. Secular societies, lacking a fixed model, do not require adherence to any pattern, only preserving secular foundations and maximal freedom for all—up to the point it does not cause chaos or public disorder.

Religious societies cannot grant the freedoms Westerners demand. Freedom of pen, speech, and expression of belief existing in the West have no place there, and rightly so. It is therefore absurd to claim, for instance, that in a religious or authoritarian country no one is imprisoned for expressing beliefs because the opportunity to publish opposing views is denied by governmental filters. Freedom in such countries is only for those conforming to rulers’ defined models, a fact that necessarily limits any freedom.

The Value of Belief

The sanctity that religions and schools of thought have attributed to their own beliefs has caused many people throughout history to be killed because of their beliefs. Some thinkers even considered belief more sacred than human beings themselves. This contrasts with the contemporary Western intellectual stance, which holds that human beings possess intrinsic dignity that surpasses any belief. According to this view, belief has no bearing on a person’s humanity, and a clear distinction is made between religiosity and humanity. Furthermore, Western societies refrain from involving belief in social matters, maintaining that individuals have the freedom to hold any belief they choose within the privacy of their minds and homes.

We oppose these two views. In our philosophical teachings — particularly in discussions concerning the unity of the knower and the known — we have asserted that a person’s humanity is intrinsically tied to the beliefs they hold. Should someone possess incorrect beliefs, they are regarded as inferior even to beasts. The Qur’an states:
“Indeed, We have created many of the jinn and mankind for Hell. They have hearts with which they do not understand, eyes with which they do not see, and ears with which they do not hear. Those are like livestock — rather, they are more astray.” [29]

Human life is essentially founded upon belief and the defence thereof. Even animals possess a form of natural belief. A distinction exists between speech, thought, and belief. The Western world has granted freedom only to human speech and thought in society, while eradicating belief from the public sphere.

A human without belief, even if they engage in thought alone, resembles someone who merely eats and drinks. In this regard, there is no fundamental difference between subsisting on food, sleep, and desire and thinking without faith or belief.

Speech and thought are preliminary to belief. Thought does not form part of the essence of humans or animals. Animals have a natural capacity for limited thought, just as humans naturally share this with animals, but humans also possess artificial and symbolic capacities unique to them.

Belief arises from thought and constitutes the core of human identity. However, the Western system today does not define humanity by belief; instead, it regards the human body as human, granting it dignity, while disparaging spiritual matters and even promoting disrespect towards them. It must be said plainly that the secular nature and identity of democracy entail the neglect of belief and spirituality. The clearest evidence is the public display of various sexual acts in explicit detail on mass media. The West, by marginalising belief, has been able to replace divine revelation and law with collective rationality. Philosophical analysis, however, attributes human dignity and worth to belief, as discussed in the profound and scholarly topic of “the unity of intellect, knower, and known.” Today’s Western world regards humans as merely thinking bipeds and forbids the intervention of belief — religious or otherwise — in social affairs, thus demoting humans from their true human station.

Islam grants no validity to those who do not hold Islamic belief and regards non-believers as akin to filth, such as urine, excrement, semen, dogs, and pigs. Moreover, unlike Western societies, Muslims accord honour even to their deceased; burial is treated with reverence rather than relegated to municipal authorities.

The elimination of belief and the turn towards anthropocentrism and humanist rationalism have led to the decline of sentiment and the rise of lust, desire, and violence in place of chastity and love. Industry has become their deity, resulting in widespread nervous disorders and mental illnesses. In contrast, Muslims, valuing belief as fundamental, even respect their dead. Islam prioritises belief to such an extent that hypocrisy and ostentation are considered among the gravest sins and nullifiers of worship. Yet, one who appears outwardly respectful of Muslim belief and observes religious rites is accepted.

This pure and unadulterated Sharia is valuable; however, when its followers do not adhere to its principles and distort it according to their whims, it is another matter. For example, the European Renaissance and Scientific Revival arose in response to the oppression of the Church’s clerical authorities and the persecution of scientists such as Galileo and freedom seekers. Likewise, in Shi’ism, martyrs were killed in the name of belief, and similar atrocities occurred under Sunni authorities, such that humanity was compelled to adopt secularism and democracy, abandoning belief to respond to religious extremism by excluding belief from the social arena. Consequently, humanity has fled from religion and religiosity and will not return to its true form soon, until tyranny fills the world and the awaited liberator is sought.

The secular and humanist Western world has reduced humans to the level of jungle animals and turned the world into a modern jungle. Their social system seeks only to equip humans with knowledge to hold jobs, earn bread, and live freely without harming others. This approach aspires to peaceful coexistence without conflict, which differs little from a civilised jungle; animals also maintain such order. But animals do not live for belief. Secular humans do not allow belief to influence society; it remains a private matter, even combated through cultural programmes aiming at cultural homogenisation.

Secular societies respect religions and do not permit insults even towards sacred idols or groups like the Baha’is, but they lack any social structure for belief and only respect it within the confines of the home. They prohibit any religious belief from guiding the political governance of society, due to the historical record of crimes committed in the name of corrupted religions. This historical experience has made humanity not just wary but hostile towards religion.

The Supremacy of Belief Over Thought

Philosophically, no human is without belief. Even secularism constitutes a belief guiding social organisation, not merely thought.

Belief should be regarded as the defining feature of humanity, superior to science and thought. While correct thought and science cannot instil self-restraint, altruism, or love, a correct belief does. For a person to reach their ideal perfection, they must hold the best belief to advance. Naturally, perfection belongs to the latter, though this claim requires rational proof. Islam, as the final divine religion, may represent the best and highest belief, much as humanity attains the most advanced scientific and technological achievements.

Knowledge as the Criterion of Belief

Superior belief is acquired and must be attained through evidence and reasoning because belief is susceptible to distortion and adulteration. Belief elevates a human, bestowing value and dignity. A person without belief lacks true reality. But not every belief suffices; rather, it must be one whose truthfulness and sincere conviction are justified. Such a belief transforms a person into a true human, and changing it alters the essence of the individual, akin to narcotics stripping a person of their identity and reducing a noble person to beggary. A strong conviction serves as a powerful deterrent against wrongdoing and leads to happiness and well-being, unlike science and thought, which offer only relative health.

To understand that belief shapes human reality, one must study the luminous and earthy facets of humanity — a complex and profound subject with numerous narrations but seldom addressed due to its philosophical and mystical depth. The earthy aspect governs worldly management and health but does not oversee happiness. The true human aspect is the luminous one, nourished by correct beliefs and knowledge, not mere thought or science.

Western society ignores the luminous aspect of humanity and lacks a truly human life. Like the care they provide for their dogs — including the best living conditions and hygiene — they treat humans similarly, no more.

Knowledge is the lost treasure of the Western world for forming coherent belief. Westerners do not recognise it to prioritise it, having regressed to the level of animals unable to acknowledge their humanity. They treat humans as they do dogs, providing food, medicine, and companionship, with friendliness and affection as one might expect between animals.

However, the true human is neither merely physical desires nor social affection, though maintaining such matters rightly is vital. Westerners have advanced relatively in securing worldly well-being and fostering peaceful coexistence — partly by fleeing clerical oppression and choosing the warm embrace of a loyal dog that does not harm them. Yet, despite their progress, Western humans have not risen beyond the level of animals, though humans possess a luminous and spiritual essence inaccessible to animals.

No Western political leader speaks of belief, the afterlife, or eternal happiness as electoral promises or duties. Religious leaders, however, consider securing the eternal happiness of their followers a primary responsibility, offering them the hope of Paradise and closeness to God to mobilise the masses.

Belief pertains to the luminous aspect of humans, whereas thought relates to the earthly and carnal aspect. Both believers and non-believers have thought, which does not affect their purity or impurity nor determine their fate in Paradise or Hell. What differentiates them is belief, which sanctifies some and deems others impure, deserving either heavenly reward or eternal punishment.

The Claim of Absolute Truth

The secular world, from an empirical perspective, asserts the relativity of truth, claiming that true belief cannot be distinguished from false and that all beliefs contain some degree of truth. However, philosophical reflection affirms a single true belief and denies relativism. Secularism cannot accept the existence of a superior belief in practice; otherwise, no rational person would refuse to adopt the best belief. Yet, secularism, in reality, persecutes conversion — especially to Islam — and systematically monitors and restricts religious affiliation.

The Necessity of Recognising Truth

John Stuart Mill outlined a vision of liberty that reveals the nature of freedom in secular societies. He argued against the suppression of any belief by individuals or governments, stating that such suppression is inherently harmful and unjust, regardless of who enforces it. He warned that silencing a single person’s opinion is as wrongful as silencing the whole population, as it deprives humanity of the opportunity to confront truth and error. Whether the suppressed belief is true or false, the suppression harms society by preventing this dialectic.

While Mills defence of liberty supports tolerance, it does not prove the validity of secular relativism. Rather, it upholds the importance of free inquiry. Yet, the secular worldview maintains belief as a personal, private matter, excluding it from the public and political realm. However, Islam respects only the true belief; for only truth is deserving of respect, and anything else, whatever it may be, is false and unworthy of respect. Islam views phenomena longitudinally, placing the nearest and infallible saints who have attained proximity to the Divine Essence and the Bearer of Revelation as the highest of humans and the noblest of beings.

In an Islamic government, even the very principle of governance is structured and substantiated on belief, which confers legitimacy and authenticity upon the government; in other words, belief plays the most fundamental role in society. In contrast, the Western world has removed belief from its agenda, focusing solely and horizontally on social rights. The West advocates freedom of belief only because it regards belief as a private, individual matter, unrelated to society, law, or government; thus, beliefs carry no practical social role. Disputes arising from differing beliefs must be resolved in courts, where a third party cannot interfere, as belief is not permitted to play any social role nor does it recommend caring for one’s fellow believer in social affairs.

Conversely, belief in Islam intervenes in the minutest and most mundane aspects of life, including the manner in which a Muslim uses the lavatory or sits, and even considers a person impure if they deny God in their own home. This is due to Islam’s longitudinal view of humans and phenomena; thus, a change in belief can transfer a person from the pinnacle to the depths. For example, a disbeliever is considered ritually impure—a reality, not a political or conventional status.

Freedom of belief in Islam has a longitudinal dimension. Islam venerates only the supreme belief and regards all else as false, with the degree of falsity increasing the further one moves away. Rights in Islam are similarly considered longitudinally, except where, due to the limits of human knowledge, they are treated horizontally, such as in the case of qisas (retributive justice). Moreover, even these are legislated by Islam itself, which does not permit humans the liberty to unilaterally create rights or validate contracts as they please.

In any case, the aforementioned author fails to appreciate that the Islamic societal system differs fundamentally from secular governance, and what applies in those societies cannot simply be transposed here. Although it is common for Islamic rulers who are not infallible to lapse into despotism and injustice due to ignorance of Sharia rulings or succumbing to base desires and lacking spiritual purity, thereby harming society, such regimes are often worse than secular and non-religious governments. These discussions are pertinent in societies where despotism rules under the guise of religion, such as among certain Arab sheikhs; however, it must be clarified that such critiques are made against those governments specifically. The concept of freedom in a divine government must also be explained, so that the minds of Muslim communities are not confused by doubts and suspicions concerning Islamic rulings and their comprehensiveness, nor should despotism be attributed to the infallible religion, lest believers begin to abandon their faith. Indeed, over fifty Muslim-majority countries are no longer identified as Islamic governments but are rather recognised as despotic regimes merely bearing the name of Islam. The movements in these societies aim to free themselves from the yoke of tyrannical rulers and establish democratic governance.

We have analysed the nature of Islamic governance during the Occultation (Ghaybah) and the peaceful coexistence of all ethnicities and religions, along with the hierarchical implementation of Islamic rulings, in an independent volume. This book outlines the boundaries of freedom for followers of various religions and ethnic groups within one country and safeguards freedom of belief, which, if given a platform for open intellectual discourse, could be presented to the scholarly community.

Critique of the Principle of Morality

The principle of morality forms one of the foundational claims for freedom of belief in the West. It asserts: “Treat others as you would wish to be treated yourself.” This principle advocates equal treatment of others’ beliefs and rejects double standards and discrimination. Known as the “Golden Rule,” a succinct summary by a proponent who was a political figure early in the revolution states:

“Because one’s own belief is true, one must not confront opponents; one cannot consider an act criminal for others while committing it oneself. Just as we expect others to allow us freedom of expression and speech, we must grant the same to others.”

The claim that “what you desire for yourself, desire for others” is not absolute but applies only to good and beneficial matters. We have embraced the true and correct Islamic belief for ourselves and advise others accordingly, warning them against holding false beliefs because falsehood deprives one of human identity. However, this claim assumes belief in its absolute form, which is neither universally good nor beneficial to all. No one accepts any and all beliefs unconditionally; rather, beliefs are chosen based on reason, personal inclinations, or fallacies unbeknownst to the believer. The principle of morality is valid and accepted in both secular and religious societies but is not absolute because it pertains only to goodness and welfare, in which discrimination must not be practised, and legal equality must prevail among rulers and subjects alike. Yet, in practice, even religious societies often grant freedoms primarily to elite classes with political or economic power, while ordinary and righteous individuals are deprived of many freedoms due to their subordinate status.

In Islamic countries, Islamic governance should be designed diversely, reflecting environmental and societal differences. For example, in Sunni communities, the Islamic republic should be founded on monotheism and God-worship, whereas in Shia communities, in addition to monotheism, the guardianship of the infallible lineage should be integrated. A united Islamic public could be formed under a central Islamic republican government, though this requires long-term political effort. Each republic should be based on the ethnic and sectarian character of the majority population to realise a universal Islamic community and establish popular sovereignty, especially in the central republic. Islamic rulings should be prioritised and graded according to the local populace’s spirit and acceptance rates, which must be researched. For example, in Albania—where seventy percent of the population are Muslims—the Islamic dress code may not be strictly observed, with some parts of the body left uncovered while others are fully covered.

Contradiction Resolves

It is necessary for an Islamic ruler to uphold the status of religious scholars, provided that they do not engage in subversive activities. However, the ruler may invest in the scientific critique of their theories and safeguard an environment conducive to scholarly critique for the advancement of knowledge in this field. The Islamic system must be vigilant and not neglect that the preservation of religion during the occultation period is unattainable without the institution of jurisprudence and ijtihad in its broadest sense, and without the theoretical contributions of jurists and religious experts. The religious vitality of society is realised only through adherence to this dynamic. The plurality and multiplicity of virtuous jurists and the diversity of religious scholars bring prosperity to the Islamic community and do not create any grounds for conflict or intrusion upon each other’s domains.

Accordingly, the Islamic system must also acknowledge that a jurist possessing the necessary qualifications, given their sphere of acceptance, enjoys social influence and the actual realisation of their jurisprudent authority. Conversely, if a jurist lacks the requisite religious qualifications, popular acceptance does not confer legitimacy or legality. Thus, the establishment of multiple jurisdictions and regional, provincial, or national authorities is permissible if it strengthens religion; however, any jurist intruding upon another jurist’s popular domain, under any title or name, is prohibited and lacks religious justification, resulting in the forfeiture of the jurist’s qualifications. The sanctity, authority, and obedience owed to a jurist are not absolute but contingent upon their soundness and the presence of conditions; otherwise, the obligation of religious obedience is lifted.

On the other hand, no deviation or deficiency should cause turmoil within the religious community’s environment, nor should it sully the domain and dignity of a deserving jurist under any pretext or title, as this constitutes one of the gravest sins and deviations. All faithful individuals must counsel themselves and others to avoid such ailments.

Apostasy and Freedom of Belief

Humans are free in their beliefs but not free in their expression. Related to this is the issue of apostasy, which is a necessary and accepted concept in Islam, setting boundaries and red lines for expressing belief.

A Muslim must be confident in the principles and essentials of religion. Against certainty lies doubt and denial. Any manifestation of doubt or denial renders one an apostate or disbeliever. A disbeliever is one who denies God Almighty or harbours doubt regarding the Divine Truth—such as atheists, materialists, and idolaters—or believes in dualism, as attributed to the followers of the good and evil deities, or believes in trinitarianism, such as adherents to the doctrine of the Trinity (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), or doubts or denies the prophethood and finality of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), or believes in something that entails attributing falsehood to him, such as denying the obligation of prayer and fasting. This belief inevitably leads to attributing falsehood to God and His Messenger, whether knowingly or unknowingly, whether one acknowledges the obligation or not, whether concerning the essentials or branches of religion, or regarding the origin and afterlife, ethics or jurisprudence, and whether the person considers themselves a Muslim and behaves accordingly or not. In any case, when any of these characteristics are openly expressed with full understanding, it suffices for declaring the individual a disbeliever.

A disbeliever is impure (najis), and their impurity, like other juridical impurities, is a factual reality encompassing all parts and secretions of their body—including hair, nails, saliva, tears, nose secretions, and sweat—with no distinction between People of the Book and others.

The impurity of disbelievers and People of the Book is not a political or conventional matter, nor a superficial or imagined filthiness to merely keep Muslims away from associating with them, but a ontological and real impurity intrinsically linked to their disbelief, placing them in a lowly rank comparable to dogs and pigs in the cosmic order.

As previously stated, apostasy is not confined to denying the essentials of religion but also includes denying any ruling that entails denying the Messenger of God, as it constitutes disrespect and desecration towards him. The ruling of apostasy is a form of religious defence and a fortification to preserve the faith. The apostasy ruling is a necessity for safeguarding Shariah and is not a political issue subject to change or temporary conditions; it should not be conflated with corruption or sedition nor used as a pretext for expulsion and punishment without due inquiry into the intellectual capacity or comprehension of the accused. It should be applied within its correct legal context and not restricted solely to the government’s authority. Issuing apostasy rulings, akin to the protection of honour, may warrant the execution of a transgressor but must be proven in a court of law.

Freedom of Expression

The discussion of freedom of expression is contingent upon freedom of belief. Freedom of expression means the liberty to articulate one’s beliefs or ideas (theorisation), subject to the same boundaries as freedom of belief; the two are inseparable. However, a fundamental difference exists in legal terms: unlike other rights, the proof of this right precedes its establishment, meaning that one must consider the current societal conditions and speak accordingly, rather than proposing an idealistic framework detached from reality. Therefore, abstract or philosophical definitions of freedom of expression are irrelevant here; rather, the perspectives of regulators, societal filters, and the speaker’s role and compatibility with their statements must be considered when defining freedom of expression and the dissemination of ideas through media and communication platforms.

In religious societies, freedom of expression is defined in accordance with Shariah. In secular societies, individuals coexist without any inherent sanctity or superiority; everyone has equal respect and may criticise others with wide latitude. This pertains to freedom of thought and scientific theorisation rather than freedom of belief, which is not the focus in secular frameworks.

Nevertheless, freedom of expression is subject to the ruling authority’s stance and the influence and power of the speaker within that authority. Speech must be framed within the limits set by the government. If these boundaries are unclear, scholarly advancement in the humanities will stagnate, rendering the field underdeveloped, as no thinker would feel free to theorise, and their works would always be derivative and subordinate.

No further elaboration is possible here as utopia is the realm of dreamers, whereas our discourse is grounded in social realities. Hence, instead of theorising, we examine provisions from the country’s constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Freedom of expression must be pursued pragmatically. As Marx said:
“First, the external world must be rectified; then the mental world will follow.”

This statement has been misinterpreted; our point is that freedom of expression must be realistic rather than idealistic or imaginary.

Social Freedoms

As previously discussed, secularism and democratic governments have removed religion from their agendas, replacing it with freedom of thought, and regulating other freedoms accordingly. One such freedom is social freedom, which is articulated in Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as follows:

“Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.”

Furthermore, paragraph 4 of Article 23 of the same declaration states:

“Everyone has the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of their interests.”

This declaration refers to political, social, group, party, professional, union, and syndicate freedoms, rather than individual freedoms detached from ideology; it does not recognise an absolute freedom of assembly—especially if such assembly opposes certain ideologies.

Religious governments, having constructed their governance on ideology, cannot grant their populations the freedom to form gatherings opposing their ideological foundations, even if such gatherings are peaceful and non-violent.

The Western world does not grant society a social role for religion, recognising it solely as an individual right. For example, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights declares:

“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.”

This article acknowledges religion as a right for the individual but makes no mention of the freedom of religious parties or groups, and some countries even prohibit Islamic dress, considering it an expression of ideology, in public spheres. Religion and ideology have no role in the social structure of secular countries; indeed, they should not interfere.

By contrast, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, founded upon ideology, defines social freedoms as follows:

“Article 26: Parties, societies, political and professional associations, and Islamic or recognised religious minority associations are free, provided they do not violate the principles of independence, freedom, national unity, Islamic norms, and the fundamentals of the Islamic Republic. No one may be prohibited from participating in them, nor compelled to join any one of them.”

This article links parties and groups to ideology, since religious governments cannot remove ideology from their agenda and individualise it. Consequently, they establish red lines; the freedom stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights—absolute and without any red lines—is neither absolutely nor relatively accepted in such countries, but is accompanied by red lines. These red lines derive from a longitudinal worldview that ascribes sanctity and superior dignity to certain matters, particularly the prevailing Sharia law.

Religious Minorities

In principle, Islam asserts exclusive truth for itself as the final and perfect religion, tolerating no foreign or other faiths, and does not recognise any minority—official or unofficial—within its domain, since acceptance of the ‘other’ undermines the truth and superiority of Islam. However, practically, due to incapacity to confront the large populations of previous heavenly religions, Islam acknowledges only three religions—Christianity, Judaism, and Zoroastrianism—as legitimate. Other religions are viewed as claims, human inventions, deviations, and political or colonial tools, devoid of legitimacy and thus denied freedom of propagation, expression, or social presence. They are to be combated for being misleading, notwithstanding the Constitution’s silence on unofficial minorities, except for stating in Article 13:

“Zoroastrian, Christian and Jewish Iranians are the only recognised religious minorities, free within the bounds of the law to perform their religious ceremonies and observe their personal status and teachings according to their faith.”

When considering religious minorities, one must ask whether Islam recognises them, whether it has the capacity to deal with them, and, if it does, they must be eliminated. If not, their population percentages are counted; if small, they are denied official minority rights, but if significant, they are granted such rights while regarded as second-class citizens, except under conditions discussed elsewhere where they might be treated as ordinary citizens.

Peaceful coexistence with these minorities is due to incapacity and the fact that their opposition is limited to jurisprudential details and does not clash with the fundamentals of Islam. Thus, they enjoy social freedom to exist within Islamic society despite disagreements with some Islamic aspects. Article 14 of the Constitution states:

“Pursuant to the noble verse: ‘Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for religion and drive you not out of your homes, from being kind and just to them. Surely Allah loves those who are just,’ the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Muslims are obliged to treat non-Muslims with kindness, justice and fairness and to respect their human rights, provided they do not conspire against Islam or the Islamic Republic.”

This article recommends peaceful coexistence with non-Muslims but does not accord them all the civil rights of Muslims, such as government employment, as doing so would violate justice and the principle that “Islam is exalted and nothing is exalted above it” and would oppress Muslims.

Accordingly, unofficial religious minorities, even with significant populations, are considered second-class citizens. The Constitution intentionally leaves this ambiguous, allowing flexible responses depending on circumstances. Whether a minority is ‘noble’—non-political and non-subversive—is debatable. Those with power who oppose the Islamic system are deemed conspirators and misled, justifying government action against them, including eradication. Opposition from a few is regarded as ideological, implicating all followers of that ideology, who may be suppressed until the threat dissipates. Conversely, non-confrontational minorities with marginal and hidden beliefs play no social role and are limited to second-class citizen status, gradually marginalised.

The Islamic government must keep such ideological groups weak and controlled to prevent ideological contamination spreading to others. Thus, it is natural they are not allowed public religious assemblies or ceremonies.

The example of Imam Ali (a.s.) advising Malik al-Ashtar to allow non-Muslims to practise their religion and grant them rights owed to Muslims was based on the particular political power these groups held in chaotic Egypt. The majority, including Muslims, favoured Muawiya and opposed Imam Ali’s rule. The advice aimed to avoid provoking more enemies and maintain control. Proper context analysis is needed to understand such rulings; the exercise of ijtihad enables recognition of such subtleties, where the nature of the minority and the political power it holds matters. For example, a mosque like Dirar must be destroyed, while removing even a brick from a true mosque is sinful, reflecting differing contexts.

Contemporary Conflicts

Modern conflicts are not merely military but have political, economic, and cultural dimensions. Some sects engage in cyber attacks, espionage, provide scientific or military secrets to foreign powers, direct organised corruption, or recruit specialists and talents for highly complex operations designed to destabilise particular systems, effectively ‘locking’ or destroying national systems.

Some religious minorities, despite economic power and market control, cause no harm and behave lawfully like Muslims but remain second-class citizens. Islam’s perspective is longitudinal, not the Western lateral view of humanity. Hence, these minorities must observe Islamic dress codes, while Western countries cannot force Muslim women to remove their veils, as they recognise Muslims only as lateral citizens and otherwise would revoke their citizenship or deny residency.

UN Human Rights Commission’s Questions

The UN Human Rights Commission has posed four questions to Iran’s representative regarding minority freedoms, which can be answered based on the above:

1. What is the status of followers of other religions and sects not mentioned in the Constitution?
2. Why are only these three sects recognised as religious minorities?
3. Does a state have the authority to declare a religion official or unofficial?
4. What are your commitments regarding human rights documents, especially Article 18 of the Covenant, which states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of religion and belief without interference”?

The response is that over 90% of Iran’s population is Muslim and has voted for Islamic governance; Islam recognises only ‘People of the Book’ as legitimate minorities with the ‘dhimma’ rule. Thus, the recognition of these minorities is religiously derived, not governmental, answering questions two and three. Consequently, other minorities are deemed deviant sects without immunity, addressing question one.

By contrast, a secular country like Spain, predominantly Christian, cannot refuse to recognise Islam because it separates religion from politics and regards all humans equally, with no authority to judge religion’s truth or falsehood. The Islamic Republic, representing Muslim people, can recognise or not recognise religions.

The questioner, assuming a secular Western framework, mistakenly applies these questions to the Islamic system, which is longitudinal and incompatible. Religion explicitly addresses these issues, leaving no room even for rational or customary jurisprudence. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights cannot be equated with current customary rationality because it conflicts with divine revelation.

International Obligations

Iran’s commitments to international treaties are contingent upon no conflict with Islamic law, an implicit condition in all treaties Iran signs as an Islamic Republic. Moreover, Iran can apply reservations, provided they do not contradict Islam or the Constitution. Most treaties are symbolic, political, social, and non-binding on religious matters.

Where human rights and religious sovereignty conflict, sovereignty belongs to religion, accepted by the people, especially in matters not religiously mandated, where popular opinion governs, such as accession to nuclear conventions.

Treaties differ from commitments; treaties are legal and can be suspended or withdrawn from, unlike commitments, which must be upheld.

Human rights have often been used as pretexts for exploiting weaker countries. International relations are based on power and interest; a powerful country dominates others. For instance, the US has plotted against Iran, even downing a civilian plane with 400 innocent passengers. Iran regards the US embassy as a spy centre, seized by students

in 1979 after decades of interference, nuclear assassination attempts, and political interference. Iran sees itself as a victim of double standards.

If you want me to polish or expand any part, just say! Would

Such worship and servitude are never lost. This form of servitude is always constant and enduring, free from interruption, disconnection, or weariness; neither does the servant’s consciousness fade, nor the Lord’s capacity diminish. It is true that God is always beloved, but the lover may lose their love, and love may turn into hatred and hostility; however, such matters do not exist in the consciousness of spiritual knowledge and existential worship. The existential worshipper reaches a state where they say: “O God, my servitude is not by my own doing; my worship is the effect of Your worthiness. Your merit and dignity compel me to worship You.” Self-interest, greed, desire, and affection fall away from such a servant, leaving only divine merit and worthiness. Worship and servitude, in this context, are an act of compulsion; infallibility and freedom from error are permanent and stable for them. They do not err in discerning the expediency and good of any phenomenon or servant, and place everything in its proper position out of love. Thus, the path of guardianship (wilayah) is far sweeter and more delightful than the path of justice when severed from guardianship.

However, speaking of justice alone entails difficulty and harshness. One who holds guardianship can easily pursue even the subtlest nuances of life with the purity that resides within them and through persistent love, whereas justice is the path of reasoning, austerity, evidence, and measure. Even in justice-centred societies, the evasion of those who avoid justice cannot be prevented. The difference between guardianship and justice is like that between seeing and being in water or fire; therefore, one must move from justice to love and affection. Love, in turn, must be directed towards the Absolute Truth and all of God’s creation, which is His handiwork and manifestation.

The love and affection of the Divine saints—those pure and unified in God—are both truthful and correct in relation to people, and never diminish. Not only do events not separate the possessors of guardianship from their people, but difficulties and incidents refine and bring them closer together, intensifying their mutual love and affection. This is in stark contrast to worldly governments, where in times of crisis, rulers and society do not remain united, enjoying prosperity together but fleeing from one another in adversity.

If the path of love and affection is opened before an individual or society, the promotion of justice does not appear dry and stern to people, nor is there a need to resort to coercion and force; rather, only altruism prevails: those who go, go willingly. But for those who see justice as stern and flee from it, they must be softened with the catalyst of love, which is only possible in a society founded upon guardianship and love.

The Difference Between Social Justice and Shi‘a Guardianship

There is a difference between the discourse on justice—particularly social justice—and the Shi‘a concept of guardianship, and comparing the two clearly highlights the distinctive advantages of Shi‘a universal guardianship.

Social justice operates within the framework of law and dominance, whereas universal guardianship gives primacy to individuals and the community, manifesting itself through love for them and assistance in fulfilling their spiritual and material needs. Social justice is applicable to secular, non-religious, and laic individuals, but universal guardianship is explicitly religious—particularly Shi‘a—and requires heartfelt belief and a bond of love.

Social justice regards altruism, forgiveness, and sincerity as secondary; universal guardianship instils these elevated human virtues suddenly within the individual, empowering them with a spirit of sacrifice and forgiveness.

In social justice, corrupt or superfluous individuals and organs are subjects for legal accountability, whereas universal guardianship, while dealing appropriately with such individuals, stands firmly to remove any relative exemption from obligation. Social justice does not possess a positive distinction absent from universal guardianship; on the contrary, universal guardianship possesses a structure that, aside from differing from social justice, does not lack its positive aspects and merits. Social justice’s sovereignty rests with the majority, rooting all powers in multiplicity, but multiplicity cannot be the fundamental root of anything; philosophically, multiplicity is an effect of unity. Universal guardianship, however, has a root of unity and ultimately leads to the rightful guardians and the Absolute Truth.

The goal of social justice is the order of affairs and the establishment of a suitable society, with its end found within its present existence. Universal guardianship’s end transcends society itself and is connected to eternity and the hereafter, bringing forth natural foundations of life and eternal sprouts. Indeed, social justice has no specific eternal end, and its existence is temporary, whereas universal guardianship even in its natural and transient form bears eternal fruits and pursues a continuous process without transience.

Given the aforementioned differences and other fundamental gaps between the two concepts, it becomes clear that the Shi‘a belief regarding social structure is the “universal guardianship” model, not “social justice.” This is because social justice places life within society, which itself depends on individuals; universal guardianship replaces societal life with the essential primacy of humanity and regards the true life as that of the universal guardianship of society’s members. The right of self-determination in this model is bound to love, knowledge, divine assistance, and truth, as the possessor of guardianship is annihilated in the Absolute Truth, possessing no personal will, and wholly sacrifices themselves for their people.

Shi‘a sources for Islamic governance present a universal and all-encompassing guardianship that Shi‘a jurists must not neglect or marginalise. It is necessary for Shi‘a legal scholars to take upon themselves the responsibility not to leave Shi‘a ideals unpractised and unfamiliar in foundational legal texts so that even Shi‘a specialists are unaware of them. At the very least, they should mention them in their books and teach them to their students.

Certainly, social justice—today’s ideal for democratic governance and touted as the remedy for all ailments, even pursued in Shi‘a Iran—has many positive aspects in theory, but it is not close to the Shi‘a model of universal guardianship. The differences between the two are so vast and distant that one cannot be Shi‘a and confine oneself to social justice alone. Modern societies, in practice, are far from even their own proclaimed ideals, let alone being able to speak of the fundamental Shi‘a belief.

Advocating justice as a sacred slogan is a complete discourse within the realm of base human desires, but in practice, there are few worthy adherents of this claim. Those who can deeply understand justice are rarely among its self-proclaimed advocates, while the knowledgeable are ostracised by the claimants of justice and cruelly sidelined with their slogans. Many speak of justice but are themselves unjust and lack the comprehension of just thought. They shout justice without knowing it and only recognise their own interests.

Understanding justice-based thought and the comprehension and enactment of such a sacred and complete belief is never suited for the false claimants of justice, whose understanding is confined to worldly pleasures and the pursuit of power and politics. They are neither capable of correctly understanding such a belief, nor able or willing to practice it. In fact, those who have made such claims since the beginning of time have committed more oppression than other groups, inflicting massacres, bloodshed, and atrocities on the oppressed. Each of these groups, which divide into numerous factions, has wrought destruction in the name of truth and justice, burying others alive and inflicting grave injustices on ordinary people.

History bears witness to such brutal, savage, and tyrannical ignoramuses who have mixed blood, malice, war, and strife with bread, sugar, prayer mats, and ritual prayers. Some people have believed them and could not see their deception behind thousands of veils of hypocrisy, while many considered their presence expedient, linking their right to self-determination to the interests of rulers.

The right to self-determination is a God-given right, and God wills for society, with awareness and by its own will and choice, to realise the universal guardianship of the Infallibles. God has established popular acceptance as a basis for the implementation of universal guardianship. Any conflict between members of society and the possessor of infallibility arises from either ignorance or the enmity and worldliness of some. Whoever determines their destiny for ultimate success consents to the guardianship and rule of the possessor of infallibility, especially when they find the infallible guardian to be a source of love and care, seeking their good and guiding them on the path of worldly safety and eternal happiness. Although the Saqifah coup deprived people of this right of self-determination until the advent and caused deviation, imposing tyranny in Islam’s name, some Sunni jurists even consider a ruler imposed by force as legitimate and obedience to them obligatory.

Critique of Views

We said that God created His servants out of love and is concerned with their destiny out of love, wishing for their ultimate well-being. Therefore, God does not appoint one over them who is ignorant or ruled by base desires and who might oppress His servants out of ignorance or selfish passion. God entrusts governance only to His infallible saints, and their rule is by guardianship, not agency. Hence, if an infallible conveys God’s revealed message and is the conclusive proof to creation, they may kill opposing enemies, as God states: “So kill the polytheists wherever you find them, and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush” (Qur’an 9:5). The role of the people is solely acceptance and approval. Therefore, the author of the following text is so uninformed about the Shari‘ah to write:

“A government which I present in criticism of democracy, and which I consider true democracy—meaning a government based on agency—is, in this sense

, a government which has its basis in the Shari‘ah and is in harmony with the faith and thoughts of the people.”

This is clearly an error because such a government does not exist in the Shari‘ah. The government mentioned is based on agency, the people’s vote, and popular will, whereas in the Shari‘ah, no agency or vote exists to create a government, but only a divine right belonging to the infallible guardian who is the absolute ruler. If a government is not founded upon this principle, it is unlawful according to the Shari‘ah and therefore can be overthrown.

On the Reality of Governments and the Concept of Immunity

From the standpoint of external reality and the demonstrable nature of governments, it is evident that if a regime possesses an authoritarian character, it will interfere in all aspects of people’s lives without providing them with immunity. Such regimes—even those that may appear democratic—sometimes disregard the fundamental right of immunity for citizens and perpetrate various forms of insecurity and violations. This occurs because the populace is regarded as subjects rather than citizens, and the ruler considers themselves superior to the people. Such a ruler may become a shepherd who merely tends their flock. These regimes tend to interfere more in private matters and, rather than guaranteeing immunity, inflict greater violations on people’s rights.

In religious systems, if the ruler is not infallible and assumes a form of ‘divine charisma’ while lacking true spiritual authority (wilayah batiniyyah), the threat to people’s rights is amplified. A historical example of this is the church-affiliated states of the medieval period, which committed some of the gravest crimes against humanity. Many Third World countries governed by various forms of despotism suffer from pervasive insecurity and provide minimal protection to individuals and families. Conversely, countries with a longer history of democracy tend to interfere less in people’s affairs and provide greater security through institutional frameworks. They establish systems that govern societal affairs, allowing individuals freedom in the utilisation of these systems—that is, individual actions are left to personal discretion—while the systems themselves organise all aspects of communal life.

For instance, governments provide public transportation such as buses and urban trains to ensure that every individual receives their rightful seat, preventing standing passengers, yet they do not impose gender segregation. Similarly, it is not customary to station traffic officers or security personnel at every intersection; rather, closed-circuit cameras monitor traffic and public spaces, thereby maintaining a psychological calm and avoiding the impression of a police state. Nonetheless, excessive covert surveillance may lead to psychological insecurity.

Experience shows that the less a government claims rights and consequently the lower its authority, the greater the immunity it affords its citizens and the less it infringes on their rights, thereby maximising justice. In religious systems, this holds particularly true if the ruler is infallible. For example, when the Qur’anic verse “The Prophet is more entitled to the believers than themselves” was revealed, some Jews, despite not accepting Islam, trusted in the Prophet’s justice and protection due to their recognition of his integrity, thereby placing themselves under his protection without embracing the religion. Such a government is unique to the presence of an infallible leader; our discussion here pertains to the era of occultation, wherein governance is administered by non-infallible individuals.

During the occultation, the less a government intervenes in private matters and the more it delegates governance to the people—meaning that the state focuses on designing systems for societal management and minimises physical intervention—the more people’s immunity is secured and justice implemented effectively.

Apostasy is one of the crimes that is not explicitly mentioned in the law. However, it can be argued that Article Four of the Constitution—which states that “all laws and regulations must conform to Islamic criteria”—governs the application and scope of all constitutional provisions.

Apostasy refers to the rejection following separation and severance from a particular doctrine or ideology and an unlawful departure from the boundaries of religion. It is akin to resigning without permission from an organisation, illegal capital flight, or the brain drain from a country. All religions and doctrines consider the defection of their followers as weakening the morale of the believers and the position of the community, and they oppose it. Indeed, this concept is present even in important organisations, such as intelligence agencies, which deal harshly with those who defect, sometimes even killing them. Therefore, the very act of an individual severing ties with a doctrine in which they are rooted constitutes a crime; however, the conditions that establish this crime remain subject to debate, and not every kind of severance results in apostasy.

Islamic laws govern all legal principles. Any ruling deemed Islamic must be adhered to both in belief and practice by those enforcing the law, and apostasy is considered a crime under this governance.

Nevertheless, many offences—even lying or shaving the beard, which are forbidden in Islam—have been neglected due to the lack of practical enforcement. Crimes are recognised only when there is consensus among all jurists, leaving no room for dispute. Islam contains all laws and explains them in detail, delegating their discovery to the jurisprudents; thus, it cannot be said that rulings do not apply retroactively, since the content of the laws was predetermined, and the law gives them form and enforceability.

It should be noted that the Islamic Penal Code requires serious review; a dedicated and appropriate effort has not been made to clarify crimes and their proportional punishments. Laws that are bound by time and place or tainted with extraneous additions have not been properly identified or revised.

Court rulings must be reasoned and grounded in legal provisions. Islam is the supreme law, from which crimes and appropriate punishments must be derived. Judgments that are refined, unanimous, and endorsed by the majority of jurists, or declared by the ruling authority—such as the fatwas of Imam Khomeini, which judges and officials consult—are authoritative. Otherwise, the law risks being subject to personal whims, which then become enacted as statutory law, undermining the integrity of the legislation.

Islamic punishments are matters of divine obedience. The philosophy behind imposing penalties is understood as the discipline and deterrence of the offender to ensure mandatory compliance with social laws, or as retribution and emotional satisfaction, as well as for security purposes, either separately or collectively. Generally, all these factors are considered simultaneously; rarely is a law enacted solely for vengeance, and even then, such laws are seldom enforced. Instead, diverse motivations collectively influence the legislation.

The key element in punishment—as the term implies—is proportionality between the penalty and the crime. The integrity of those responsible for executing penal laws is also vital; as the saying goes: “One who bears a punishment cannot administer it,” lest the educational and deterrent effects of the penalties be lost. The principle of punishment is rational, and society cannot be secure without it; however, due attention to proportionality in lawmaking and having competent enforcers lends credibility to punishments. This is especially important in punishments where reason plays a significant role and religion has not provided direct guidance. In such cases, expertise and integrity, which are central to ensuring security and protection, are paramount.

Although some Islamic penal rulings are affirmations rather than innovations and were practiced before Islam, their recognition as legitimate rulings is significant, and they must be adhered to unless a specific temporal factor influenced their acceptance and current circumstances necessitate a change, in which case the appropriate ruling must be extracted from religious texts.

Among the factors affecting the modification of a ruling is the ease or hardship of the ruling’s application. Any ruling that becomes excessively burdensome is not enforceable and must be adjusted accordingly to the new circumstance.

The proportionality of punishments must be drawn from religion, and one cannot arbitrarily forbid punishments such as execution, stoning, or torture by branding them as violent acts. Although the legislation of punishments is divinely ordained, their practical implementation requires suitable conditions, as discussed previously, and these two spheres should not be confused. Just as education without discipline is a lax approach and a discipline-only system is an excessive one, religious rulings with valid execution conditions cannot be suspended on the pretext of global societal excesses or deficiencies. If a punishment is proportional to the crime, it cannot be labelled violent but should be considered proper discipline and, rightly, punishment for the crime.

The enforcement of Islamic punishments has psychological effects on society and cannot be implemented divorced from social realities, effective educational and deterrent outcomes, or without consideration of the root causes of crime—which may stem from social realities or the psychological character of the offender. In brief, rational weighing is influential, and the enforcement of rulings in affluent versus impoverished or healthy versus corrupt societies differs. This discussion pertains to the understanding of the subject, and such attention is crucial for comprehensive knowledge. However, regarding the ruling, no better or immutable ruling exists than Islam’s, whose divine infallibility guarantees it. While subjects may change, rulings do not.

Furthermore, punishments are means, not ends. Therefore, a judge may assess the educational and deterrent outcomes of enforcement or pardon, and if pardon better serves the individual’s reform, it may be preferred. Nevertheless, this judgment is derived from religious texts, not the data of developed global societies. Consequently, if those societies oppose an Islamic ruling without justifiable reasons grounded in the subject’s understanding, their opposition should not be accepted. Similarly, if a jurist fails to observe proportionality in understanding the subject, their ruling is invalid. Article 38 of the Constitution states:

“Any form of torture to obtain confession or information is prohibited. Forcing a person to testify, confess, or take an oath is not permitted, and such testimonies, confessions, and oaths lack validity. Violators of this principle shall be punished by law.”

Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Islamic punishments are based on human dignity and aim to preserve human honour and prevent deviation from humanity, controlling base desires. Islam honours human free will and freedom. Humans are free beings whose choice is a defining feature; any coercion distorts their autonomy and humanity. A person may freely appear in court and confess their crime, but Islam does not endorse nor favour such confessions, as divine wisdom requires sins to remain concealed to prevent escalation. Islam does not accept forced confessions, which lack religious, rational, and legal validity. Any official relying on such a confession compromises their legitimacy and integrity.

Islam has defined crimes and assigned punishments but disapproves of officials seeking to uncover crimes coercively. Islam has set stringent evidentiary standards to ensure crimes and punishments retain a taboo status, thus securing societal safety. Accordingly, any coercive attempt to discover crime is invalid, and those who act thus lose their justice and office through self-removal.

No sin is greater than distorting humanity and disregarding human dignity. Forcing confessions ranks alongside sins such as lying and backbiting, which destroy humanity; while lying’s immorality is conditional, coercion’s immorality is intrinsic, and Islamic as well as human rights laws allow no exceptions. A society should not tolerate a spirit of intrusion but respect the individual and preserve communal dignity, continuously purifying it; otherwise, undue scrutiny and insistence on proof will corrode society.

Democratic Government

When humanity reached the Age of Enlightenment, democracy was legitimised; because prior to that, people had suffered greatly under autocratic, theocratic, and nationalist regimes. The oppression and atrocities had deeply wounded the human spirit, such that people would no longer tolerate such forms of government. They sought a new system that respected the will of each individual as a part of the whole, so that people would feel that it was their own will that governed them. Consequently, the system of elections and democracy was devised.

On the other hand, human beings are fallible and lack access to absolute wisdom to prevent errors in understanding; therefore, to restrain mistakes and the potential exploitation by others, a controlling and inhibiting mechanism is necessary. This mechanism is the utilisation of collective intelligence, whereby the broader the scope of collective reasoning, the less likely it is to err, and the probability of error diminishes.

The Refuge of Democracy

Autocratic, monarchic, and tribal governments have consistently been associated with tyranny and domination. Historical review demonstrates that regimes which claimed religious authority—particularly those led by followers, clerics, and priests rather than the original prophets and saints—have been marred by violence. These regimes often committed atrocities in the name of religion. Therefore, humanity recognised that the concentration of power in either of these two forms would not yield peaceful living conditions. Consequently, it sought to design a government model that afforded greater freedoms to its people, in which the majority of society could participate in its determination and oversight. Thus, democracy, integration, collectivism, and majority rule became the refuge, addressing the twin problems of human fallibility—detached from divine revelation—and human selfishness—distant from infallibility. Democracy was regarded as the best system of ‘people ruling over people’, consulting all members of society whose collective wisdom was esteemed, and meritocracy was valued. Meritocracy, alongside respect for expertise and adherence to law, helped control potential errors of reason and capriciousness of desire, partially compensating for humanity’s detachment from divine guidance.

The Establishment and Challenges of Democracy

Consulting the people, in the absence of an infallible individual, is justified provided it is free from the manipulations of economic cartels, social power brokers, and influential figures. However, in practice, political, colonial, and economic interests often manipulate and control the choice of individuals, thereby undermining genuine free elections. The very plague of autocratic regimes has infiltrated democratic ones in reality.

Today, democracies, under the guise of law and human rights, commit severe injustices against the oppressed. The domination and arrogance once exhibited openly by force are now executed legally, sanctioned by developed nations. Contemporary society is little more than a modern civil jungle; whilst noble ideas are espoused in public forums, the reality is individual tyranny in practice. Independent thinkers and free intellectuals who refuse to submit to power are increasingly marginalised, despite their invaluable contributions being overlooked in the supposedly open information age. It appears powers have near-monopoly over communication technologies. Exploitation today can easily displace regions and nations, dragging humanity into servitude, destitution, corruption, and collective immorality. The deep-rooted arrogance and folly of humans frequently render governments incompetent, imposing a dark culture over economy, wealth, politics, and even statesmen. Consequently, elected representatives often end up as mere puppets of global powers rather than expressions of collective human reason.

Humans, whether individually or collectively, remain in loss, as the Qur’an states:
“Indeed, mankind is in loss, except for those who have believed and done righteous deeds and advised each other to truth and advised each other to patience.” (Qur’an 103:2-3)

Collective reasoning can become an instrument wielded by mafias and selfish powers.

Nonetheless, freedom under democratic governance in the modern era, with all its constraints, remains preferable to previous religious governments (meaning the followers, not the original religion). People no longer perceive themselves as subjects or servants of former masters; their mindset has broadened, though the ideal has yet to be achieved.

At least in principle, humanity seeks governance in service to itself. Yet in reality, a new form of collective enslavement has emerged, and until the awaited Mahdi (may God hasten his reappearance), the ideal will not be realised—unless the modern democratic model is abandoned in favour of the ‘Islamic Republic’ in its Shi’a form, a government of just and expert rulers, where meritocracy can be implemented optimally.

Therefore, considering Western democracy as the best possible form of government, to the exclusion of alternatives, is a form of self-defeat. In principle, the theocratic government of a just jurisprudent represents the best model conceivable during the occultation of the infallible Imam. Practically, some may shift from a religious government, corrupted by tyranny and oppression, to democracy or return to the Islamic Republic due to the lack of roots and spirituality in democracy. However, they would not tolerate the autocratic and religious regimes of priests and clergy, such as the historical Church, which are definitively over.

Summary

Democracy cannot be considered humanity’s ideal, nor is it inevitable that all nations must sooner or later adopt it, since a stronger rival exists in principle—the Islamic Republic. It is not a historical determinism nor a social compulsion that dictates the end of religious governments in every form or the rise of democracy. Both forms have considerable strengths in principle, though neither has fully realised these strengths in practice.

In reality, democracy suffers from economic cartels dominating states, rendering it superficial and contentless. Similarly, religious governments suffer when seized by authoritarian groups that distort and suppress the spirit of religion under a religious facade, causing them to lose public support.

The persistence of both is not rationally or philosophically necessary; it remains to be seen which will prevail practically.

Nevertheless, humanity is caught in a social and historical necessity, its understanding growing but not necessarily aligned with truth. Rapid expansion of knowledge may lead to deviation, reducing reliance on truth and increasing the multiplicity of desires, potentially causing explosion rather than enlightenment. Human understanding is ever-growing but may not incline towards truth.

To date, humans have not mastered controlling their selfishness and arrogance, hindering disciplined progress.

In purportedly democratic countries, yearning for religion grows as a mere desire, but the populace cannot find a religion that truly responds to their needs, especially in today’s era of information overload and religious plurality. Faith or human belief systems have always been sources of human upheaval, swaying them through periods of hope and despair.

Democracy, in principle, demands universal participation and political pluralism, allowing various ideologies and groups to flourish. It promotes political relativism and wise distribution of power via separation of powers. It also nurtures social ethics and political education, resulting in civic morality—akin to the collective religious gatherings in mosques, exemplifying orderly, voluntary, and respectful community presence.

Despite these theoretical advantages, democracy today is often a controlled system, manipulated by powers pursuing their own interests, producing merely a facade. If governments truly served the people, why are peaceful protests met with brutal repression? Why has information technology eroded domestic security? Developed democratic countries are increasingly governed by security and police apparatuses, even as polished media personalities speak of freedom.

Thus, democracy today resembles a modern, civil jungle, yet even traditional jungle law might yield better outcomes.

We neither glorify democracy nor resent it; however, in principle, the Shi’a Islamic Republic—provided it avoids tyranny, violence, ignorance, and injustice—remains the healthiest model capable of harmonising piety and civilisation. Should these conditions fail, democracy might be preferable, given its relative consultation of collective reason and lesser oppression of the weak.

The Islamic Republic is superior also because it is founded on an infallible model and divine legitimacy. It situates sovereignty where God wills, unlike democracy which lacks divine legitimacy and struggles to combine civilisation with piety, causing inherent tension between Islam and democracy. Islam rejects democracy except where implementing Islamic governance is impossible, in which case democracy is tolerated as a lesser alternative—since governance is necessary. Among worldly governments, the ‘rule of the majority’ is least harmful to the people.

Critique of Democratic Structures

Karl Popper, in The Open Society and Its Enemies, critiques political philosophy by stating:

“It is a philosophical error to ask ‘Who has the right to govern?’ rather than ‘How should one govern?’”

However, the older philosophical question is valid because governance depends fundamentally on the ‘who’ before the ‘how’. The ‘doer’ precedes the ‘deed’. Who holds the right to govern shapes the system itself. Philosophically, the agent (who) is primary over the action (how). Thus, effective political engineering must consider the nature of the ruler, provided the analysis is rigorous and inclusive.

Sadly, most Western philosophers are not rigorous thinkers but rather romantics or empiricists, akin to a singer with no knowledge of music theory or a poet ignorant of metre and rhyme. Their philosophy lacks scientific rigour.

Popper also writes that what society needs is not a religion of totalitarianism but gradual social engineering based on rational principles—an approach linked to enlightened political demands for freedom and its regulation through reason.

While history shows that human progress is incremental and experimental, governance differs. Divine prophets present governance not based on trial and error but on absolute correctness grounded in infallibility. When divine guidance is absent, trial and error becomes the fallback. Yet political reality reveals governance as often seized by cruel tyrants rather than just rulers.

Capitalism and Economic Cartels

Capitalism and the capitalist system serve as the prime conduit for theft and plunder by economic cartels; yet, Western society prides itself on this system and, following the collapse of communism, holds uncontested dominance over the governance of global society.

The contemporary world is a jungle of bloodshed, where trial and error cannot be afforded in governance. Modern governments centralise social engineering and political control in the hands of rulers who design, execute, oversee, and fund all affairs. In such regimes, nothing escapes the authority of the power holders. Indeed, the meat is in the cat’s grasp. Under these conditions, there is no room for trial and error; only one option remains: the cat devours all the meat without leaving the slightest grease around its mouth, and no one witnesses its gluttony. This is the scenario if the cat is ‘noble’; otherwise, it is a wolf in a devilish guise, adorned with a bow tie merely to wound and a necktie simply to tear, as narrated in the book The Skirt of Time:

“The world came into the grasp of the hundred-headed demon,
Two hundred giants of error emerged at its gate.
I have no discourse with you,
For your ears are deafened by your own negligence.”

Humanity is condemned to this jungle-like nature and lacks the power to change it, except by seeking refuge in the sanctity of the Immaculate Station. It may take hundreds of years before humanity attains such awareness, and this model is also ineffective during the era of occultation.

We live in a world where the trade of human organs has become commonplace in the streets, with specialised vehicles for organ surgery and trafficking abducting victims and harvesting their organs on the spot. A world where ignorance is a step nobler than knowledge and the blade rests in the hand of drunken gangsters. Torture devices have become fully electronic and intelligent, and all manner of drugs, including psychotropics, serve the system. Humanity has always advanced along the path of carnal desire, aggression, and greed. It is in such a world that philosophers and legal thinkers must speak, craft programmes for the present, and avoid utopian rhetoric—utterances that only provoke the laughter and ridicule of economic cartels and wealth conglomerates. Playing with words, without awareness of social realities, is mere naivety and foolishness.

Divine Governance

Humans are naturally created free, and no one holds legitimate authority or sovereignty over another; only God possesses sovereignty over His servants, as previously discussed. Therefore, the right of sovereignty is legitimate only if it is granted by the Lord. Moreover, God’s special representatives, entrusted with the guardianship and leadership of servants, possess both divine revelation and, to prevent injustice, are endowed with infallibility and a restraining power against error, having also attained the station of divine love.

Consequently, divine governance—whose rulers are both possessors of revelation and infallibility—is the most sacred and pure form of government. Its legitimacy is proven by miracles that the prophet or guardian bears, and this miracle, as evidence of the prophet’s truth, is accepted by all rational minds.

A divine ruler never governs by their own will but acts as a messenger; thus, there is no despotism. The ruler conveys God’s teachings, not personal desires. The people are not subjects to the ruler but rather follow him in order to worship God and pursue spiritual perfection freely and voluntarily. The divine ruler never governs by force or oppression but bases their legitimacy on rational evidence—namely, the miracle that demonstrates human incapacity to replicate it.

The ruler, as a messenger, has no independence; their superiority lies in the miracle, not power or wealth. Furthermore, the ruler is infallible and never errs in decisions concerning governance. Such governance enjoys universal acceptance from the wise and collective reason and is beloved by the public. Opposition to such a person stems from ignorance or malice.

Establishing Divine Governance

In principle, such government embodies all virtues and represents the highest, most ideal form of rule. However, in practice, societies have often rejected God or doubted the prophet’s miracles and infallibility or opposed them to protect vested interests. Hence, infallible divine government has only appeared sporadically—such as the theocratic rule of the Israelite divinely appointed rulers, the ten-year governance of the Holy Prophet in Medina, or the four-year rule of Imam Ali. Historically, humanity has not yet developed a continuous taste for enduring divine governance. Thus, speaking of such government remains symbolic and utopian, especially during occultation when the infallible leader is inaccessible. As the Qur’an states:

“No prophet ever came to them without them mocking him.” (Qur’an 36:30)

Religious Authorities and Corruption

Among the followers of religions, priests, saints, and religious scholars who lacked infallibility sometimes attained power, but often the religion they propagated became corrupted with distortions, such that the original revealed text no longer applied. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam under unjust caliphs fell into this fate, losing their legitimacy and descending into falsehood. Consequently, priests ruled by deifying themselves, imposing whims as religious traditions to exploit the masses. Their dominance relied heavily on force and wealth, equating governance with power and riches.

The Legitimacy of Divine Governance

Divine governance is legitimate only if it possesses both legitimacy and acceptability. By legitimacy, we mean the authority granted by God; by acceptability, the miracle-backed proof possessed by the prophet or divine guardian, which compels people to accept governance rationally.

Historically, divine prophets’ governments enjoyed the highest popular support, with people willing to sacrifice their lives and wealth, a phenomenon unparalleled in other regimes. Governance by jurists is legitimate only if their religious affiliation is genuine and they meet the necessary conditions of competence, justice, and qualification, alongside popular endorsement.

Qualifications of the Jurist Ruler

The jurist ruler must be knowledgeable not only in jurisprudence but also possess managerial expertise, including sociology, psychology, and economics. They need not master all fields but must competently oversee specialists. The administration must adhere to religious sources, as the people accept religious governance. For instance, the majority of Iranians desire an Islamic government of the Shi’a type; this popular acceptance constitutes the best evidence for its necessity.

Conclusion

In sum, divine governance is the highest and purest form of political authority, rooted in divine legitimacy and rational acceptance, embodied most perfectly in infallible leadership but also practicable through just and qualified jurists under conditions of popular endorsement. Rejection of such governance, without due cause, constitutes disobedience and warrants accountability.

The Islamic Republic

A republic is a system of governance in which, unlike democratic systems, there is no sovereign ruler. In such a system, the people elect a president to enforce the law. Republics come in various forms; however, one particular model exhibits a systematic design and bears resemblance and proximity to the governance of an infallible divine authority, and that is the Islamic Republic. Contrary to the ordinary republic, the Islamic Republic has a ruler — the Leader — who holds sovereignty. This Leader must be a jurist (mujtahid), a thinker, an expert, endowed with managerial capability, and just to the degree required by a sacred disposition. Since the Leader derives rulings from religion, and justice is a condition for sovereignty, if personal desires influence their rulings, the Leader does not need to be formally dismissed; rather, they automatically lose the legitimacy of their authority and are thereby removed.

Because the jurist issues rulings from religion, they lack independence in the conventional sense. The Leader considers themselves a servant of the people, who are regarded as their benefactors. Their independence is thus limited: their authority is divine, and they attain leadership through popular acceptance, holding the people’s consent. Should the Leader lose popular legitimacy, since the welfare of religion during the occultation of the Infallible Imam is system-oriented rather than ruler-oriented, they must cede their position to another qualified jurist. The Leader must not resort to force against the people to preserve their position but must cultivate legitimacy through just and proper means, establishing their scientific, spiritual, and ethical superiority in the public eye.

In such a system, it is necessary to establish a reasonable mechanism every few years to reaffirm the Leader’s popular legitimacy—especially among new generations who have the right to choose. Popular legitimacy is vital to prevent authoritarianism and religious alienation among the masses and to present a benevolent and beloved face of religion. If the Leader fails to maintain these conditions, the system practically transforms from an Islamic Republic into an aristocratic or individual dictatorship or merely a Muslim government. The ruler then governs not by the prescribed criteria but by the dominance of force and wealth, ruling tyrannically until death. Such rulers, typical in many non-Iranian Muslim states, govern on the basis of tribal, ethnic, or financial power, constituting a ‘throne-to-coffin’ rule. The only Islamic Republic currently embodying a comprehensive framework designed for the best governance in the era of occultation, as enshrined in its constitution, is Iran’s Islamic Republic. Its governance resembles that of the divine messengers. However, in practice, all the aforementioned conditions must be met; otherwise, without widespread legitimacy, the Leader gains independence, becoming a despotic ruler, unjust if lacking justice, and ignorant if lacking jurisprudence.

From the above, divine governance can be categorized into two types: governance by a Prophet or an infallible authority, and governance by a just, qualified jurist, the latter being the Shi’a belief.

Should access to governance by the infallible Imam or a qualified jurist be unattainable and hope lost in both, popular governance remains the best form. Although such governments lack divine legitimacy, they possess rational legitimacy. Just as every society accepts marriage (nikah) recognised by Islam, every society possesses an identity and governance that can be legitimately recognised and respected.

Imam Khomeini warned that:

“If dear Islam and the nascent Islamic Republic are deviated, struck, and ultimately fail—God forbid—Islam will be consigned to oblivion for centuries, and instead, a monarchical and kingly Islam will replace it.” [44]

He emphasised the importance of this issue: if people’s needs are not met by the Islamic Republic and they become disillusioned, they turn to secular and laic governments and forms of democracy, rejecting religious involvement in governance. They observe that the claimed religion of the rulers has failed to serve them effectively. Religious governments, when inefficient, tend to become authoritarian and corrupt, mixing the system with oppression, tyranny, and ignorance—what Imam Khomeini warned against as the emergence of a “monarchical Islam.” He identified this as the most dangerous deviation and affliction of the Islamic Republic because Muslims will only accept a ruler who governs in the name of religion and Islam.

If religious governments fail to uphold the stipulated conditions for their rulers, the future will belong to secular, laic democracies or false spiritual movements. The narrations about “those who fill the earth with oppression and injustice” illustrate that the world will be saturated with tyranny beyond its capacity, leaving little room for effective religious governance. Thus, we must wait and say: “Wait; indeed, we are waiting.” [45]

In analysing democracy, we distinguished between its theoretical foundation and practical implementation, asserting that the Islamic Republic is a formidable rival to democracy and that defeatism should not lead to accepting democracy as the inevitable future of governance. We also discussed secularism, which excludes religion from the public sphere, resulting in a temporary and exhausting direction for humanity. Those who find no spiritual meaning therein will seek alternative spiritual and religious ideologies, gradually paving the way for the reappearance of the Promised Mahdi (may God hasten his reappearance). Yet, until that green dawn, centuries of patience are required, during which the Islamic Republic must be strengthened through rigorous and sound theoretical development.

We Affirm the Reality of Life

A religious government is not one in which governance is merely involved in religion as an external addition, nor where government and religion are two distinct entities such that religion is layered upon government or vice versa. Similarly, sovereignty, understood as governance, is not a detachable covering for the jurist (faqih). Rather, jurisprudence in its broadest sense inherently possesses both ontological sovereignty (based on a sacred disposition) and legislative authority. The noble verse, “Obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you” (Qur’an 4:59), expresses the necessity of obedience to a qualified ruler and highlights the inseparability of governance and the ruler’s personal authority as an essential and intrinsic attribute, not merely an incidental characteristic.

A review of the two primary sources, the Qur’an and Sunnah, clearly demonstrates that Islam inherently contains the concept of governance and that the origin of Islamic government is Islam itself. The obligations to enforce hudud (legal penalties), qisas (retributive justice), diyat (blood money), the collection of khums, zakat, and other dues, as well as matters of hisbah (public accountability), inherently necessitate an Islamic government. These matters fall within the purview of governance. When properly understood, the Islamic government is thus logically established and is not a novel concept or a creative theoretical construct.

Governance Based on Power

The nature of government is founded on power. If Sharia attains authority, it will, like any other group or party, establish governance based on its power. Particularly, Islamic Sharia, due to its liberating teachings—calling to righteousness and well-being and steering away from the excesses of Judaic materialism and the one-sided spirituality of Christianity—governs hearts. Its source of authority is its popular base, and this natural process of governance does not require recourse to textual evidence, though such evidence is plentiful. For instance, no prophet has ever been without authority; authority signifies executive power, as some prophets explicitly requested from God: “My Lord, grant me authority and join me with the righteous” (Qur’an 26:83), and God said to David: “O David! We have made you a vicegerent on earth; so judge between the people with truth” (Qur’an 38:26).

Furthermore, the authority granted to qualified jurists to issue fatwas is a form of governance, since a fatwa is not merely an academic opinion but a Sharia directive to be implemented by the jurist’s authority, who may also enforce accountability in accordance with the principle of commanding good and forbidding evil. Similarly, the authority a man holds over his wife renders him the manager and ruler of the household, as stated: “Men are protectors and maintainers of women because Allah has given some of them an advantage over others and because they spend out of their wealth” (Qur’an 4:34).

Power and authority constitute the structure of governance. Even if hundreds of texts mandate the establishment of government, without power, Sharia cannot manifest its social role in guiding people towards well-being and salvation. Power is the foundational material of every government. The infallible Imams, due to the absence of devoted, loyal supporters, were unable to establish Islamic governance in practice. Many qualified Shia jurists and believers doubted that a country could be governed without confrontation with internal obstacles and foreign interferences. They believed any attempt to establish Islamic government would harm the people and their followers. Consequently, initially, governance was left to kings; during the Constitutional era it was divided between kings and scholars; and ultimately it passed to jurists as the Muslim people embraced government as their own and supported it. There have been kings who sought scholars’ permission for their rule and scholars who served as judges under royal decree.

It must be noted that the claim for the necessity of Islamic governance during occultation differs from the doctrine of the Guardianship of the Jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih). Some arguments for Wilayat al-Faqih lack sufficient evidence. We have critiqued some of these reasons in our Arabic book Al-Wilayah wal Hukumat. Examining the proofs for Islamic government is beyond the scope of this work, though we have reviewed dozens of textual evidences in advanced jurisprudence classes and published them in a separate book. The necessity of Islamic government is demonstrable from the Holy Qur’an, whose verses in this regard outnumber the narrations. These verses are discussed in external jurisprudential debates as well as in Tafsir Huda.

Attention to the Era of Occultation and Taqiyya

The most profound psychological factor that prevented Shia jurists from even considering the establishment of a Shia government was the severe trauma caused by the tragic event of Karbala. The martyrdom of the infallible Imam of the Shias, with the horrific atrocities committed by the Umayyads, deterred armed uprising for a hundred years following the event. Subsequently, the era of occultation began, and Shia difficulties and weaknesses deepened daily. Brave jurists were martyred or isolated in secrecy and loneliness. Until about fifty years ago, when Sheikh Abbas Qummi, author of Mafatih al-Jinan, experienced misfortune such as a flat tire, he was viewed with suspicion and left in the desert. When the clergy is so weakened, the idea of state and governance becomes a visionary dream for jurists, and this weakness even permeates jurisprudential reasoning. They deem initial combat in the occultation period forbidden, despite the continuing relevance of the noble verse: “So fight against the leaders of disbelief” (Qur’an 47:4). If a jurist attains power to spread Islam through initial warfare and free people from imperialist and colonial rule, they would undertake it.

If discussions on Islamic government and its structure were previously absent, it was because jurists lacked power and authority. Naturally, the discourse of a powerless individual about authority found in Sharia appears fanciful and is met with indifference. Yet when jurists gain even limited power, they apply their guardianship and governance, as history records.

It should be emphasized that power differs from tyranny. Islamic government is based on guardianship and love, founded on popular support rather than a despotic military regime, which would lead to oppression and religious alienation. As previously stated, guardianship is born of love; no one can possess the sacred disposition or guardianship bestowed by God without love for His servants in their heart.

Just as hisbah is obligatory upon believers, government is a social necessity, and its establishment by believers is obligatory when they possess the power. The extent of governance is determined by believers’ capacity and strength. For example, Grand Ayatollah Borujerdi exercised authority over the seminaries in Qom, and Imam Khomeini gained the power to lead Iran with the support of a guardianship-based popular base.

The necessity of government is part of Islamic rulings, yet Islam does not require absolute governance. It stipulates conditions for the Islamic ruler, such as knowledge, expertise, consultation, sound decision-making, insight, management skills, and the possession of a sacred disposition. Power is primarily about managerial ability and coordinating affairs rather than merely possessing physical tools or military machinery. Thus, Islam has a government during occultation, but this government is conditional. It does not accept any ruler but requires jurisprudential expertise, justice, popular legitimacy, and social acceptance as fundamental conditions.

Popular Acceptance: The Manifestation of Islamic Governmental Power

We stated that the foundation of any government, including Islamic government, is power. Here, it is important to emphasize that the power of Islamic government lies in popular acceptance and its embrace by the people. Islam’s acceptance by the people is twofold: the people must accept Islam, and the ruler must accept the people, love them, be alongside them, and work for their benefit. Given that most individuals in society are self-interested, such companionship requires great tolerance and patience.

Critique of the Theory of “Islamic Democratic Republic”

The Islamic Republic government incorporates popular power within its structure. Therefore, the term “democratic” cannot be appended to the Islamic Republic, as it does not convey any new meaning. Islam already provides democracy within the framework of the Islamic Republic. The biggest issue with this author and others like him is their lack of accurate understanding of Islam; they cannot provide even one example for their theories and resort to generalities, fallacies, and rhetorical sophistry.

Critique of the Theory Separating Fixed from Variable Rulings

In the works of some followers of Westernised currents, the question—borrowed from Western discussions—“How can fixed and eternal Sharia be compatible with social changes?” is answered as follows:

“Fixed Sharia pertains to the unchanging aspects of human life—i.e., content and determination of duties—while the variable aspects of life are left to individuals and governments. Among Shia thinkers, Allama Tabatabai, Motahhari, and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr have explicitly stated this in their writings. According to these thinkers, human life has two aspects: fixed and variable. The eternal rulings of Sharia relate to the fixed aspects of life because only in these cases is the formulation of eternal rulings possible; in other cases, eternal rulings do not exist because such formulation is impossible.”

This statement implies that the variable aspects fall outside the domain of divine injunctions and cannot have rulings made for them.

It is true that social changes have altered the appearance of mundane phenomena, but these phenomena remain the same subjects. There is no subject in Islam—claiming comprehensiveness and finality—that lacks a ruling. Hence, humans must derive their duties for any novel subject from Islam.

This author fails to provide even one example supporting his claim. For example, warfare by sword,

spear, and arrow has changed into warfare by gun, missile, and atomic bomb, yet Islam’s rulings on war and peace remain the same in essence, while their appearance and means differ. The means and circumstances change, but the ruling, which is concerned with the substance, does not change.

The rulings of Islam remain constant both in terms of content and form; only the subjects to which these rulings apply may change, not the rulings themselves. For example, running water in the past flowed naturally over the land, whereas today it is accessible to the faithful via plumbing systems. Similarly, constructing statues in a region steeped in idolatry is forbidden, but permissible in a monotheistic region free from polytheism. Likewise, raising a grave differs between these two contexts—meaning the subject of the ruling varies, not the ruling itself. The ruling encompasses both the content and the manner of its application, and no one is authorised to alter or modify either the content or the form of the ruling’s implementation. However, one may intervene in the subjects, for instance, transforming an impure substance into a pure one; for example, converting wine, which is impure, into pure vinegar by boiling off two-thirds of it, or placing a dog, which is impure, in a salt marsh, from which the resulting salt is pure.

Finally, it must be emphasised that it is erroneous to claim that ijtihad is suspended in acts of worship. Worship constitutes a major category of ijtihad, and a mujtahid must employ their interpretive faculty in matters of worship rather than relying on imitation. The existence of divergent legal opinions concerning acts of worship further attests to the exercise of ijtihad in this field. That said, a critique is due regarding the example of tayammum (dry ablution) used to argue against its being subject to ijtihad, as it inadvertently diminishes the sanctity and dignity of jurisprudence, which is a highly advanced discipline. Beyond acquired skills, jurisprudence demands a sacred aptitude to enter the spiritual domain of deriving religious rulings—a faculty discussed in our work, Sociology of Religious Scholars.

All Islamic rulings, both in content and form, must be derived from Islam itself. Islam, claiming comprehensiveness and finality, excludes the need for any external inputs, regardless of their civilisation of origin. Any perceived change is either a change in the subject or a contamination introduced by self-proclaimed jurisprudential experts. Ijtihad, moreover, places great emphasis on recognising subjects, one of its three fundamental pillars.

Islamic rulings are immutable, though they may be suspended or temporarily dormant; such suspension does not equate to change in the ruling. As stated, Islamic rulings must be categorised according to their applicability in each era, and only those capable of being enforced become active. No ruling attains actuality without the power to execute it. For example, the ruling mandating the execution of a woman who murders a man, and the obligation to pay half the blood-money, may be deferred if international pressure causes disillusionment with religion, rendering enforcement impossible. Nonetheless, the ruling remains valid until the end of time and must be enforced should the Islamic system regain the capacity to resist external pressures.

Secondary rulings exist, wherein the emergence of a new external subject may cause the primary ruling to be set aside, without altering the primary ruling itself. For instance, the obligation of Friday prayer is contingent on the presence of the infallible Imam; performing the noon prayer on Friday in his absence implies a form of disrespect. Yet, under an unjust or tyrannical ruler, Friday prayer is no longer obligatory and the noon prayer becomes obligatory instead. With the presence of a just ruler fulfilling conditions, the obligation becomes discretionary. Thus, these temporal and spatial conditions modify the subject of the ruling, not the ruling itself; in this case, we have three distinct subjects: Friday prayer with the infallible Imam, Friday prayer under a tyrannical ruler, and Friday prayer under a just ruler fulfilling the requisite conditions.

Dividing religious rulings into fixed and variable, content and form, or essence and shell creates confusion and reduces a sophisticated discipline to superstition. Such categorisation opens the door to various alterations, distortions, and innovations. For example, women might claim that since covering is for the sake of shielding the body from non-mahram men, they may stand naked in prayer within a household free of non-mahrams. Or that the obligation of audible recitation in the dawn, sunset, and night prayers was due to darkness and fear of strangers, which no longer applies with electric lighting, permitting silent recitation.

Islamic rulings are based on a causative factor, namely revelation. This causative factor remains valid until superseded by another, and since Islam claims finality and closure, no subsequent revelation will abrogate these rulings. Consequently, all Islamic rulings are eternal and everlasting.

Furthermore, rulings cannot be fabricated solely by citing wisdoms. Although referencing wisdoms or the criteria for rulings may broaden a mujtahid’s understanding of the causes, it does not grant legislative authority. The mujtahid’s comprehension of these criteria is necessarily incomplete and limited, and thus cannot be a basis for formulating new rulings. Rather, striving to understand these criteria enhances one’s grasp of the reason behind divine rulings. For this reason, criteria recognition is not well-known in jurisprudence, where scholars focus primarily on authentic traditions. Nonetheless, we consider understanding the criteria a key element of jurisprudence, as it enables partial recognition of the cause of rulings, preventing superficial jurisprudence based on blind imitation of sources and facilitating the scientific investigation of ruling criteria. However, this does not lead to legislative change except where the reason has been explicitly stated by the Lawgiver, and in such cases, rulings may be transferred from one subject to another through refined application of the criteria.

Those who issue rulings based solely on reference to texts without understanding the criteria lack interpretive power; they merely apply rulings to cases, which is not the same as deriving rulings. Understanding the criteria opens the path to presenting rulings in a scientific manner compatible with modernity but does not justify altering rulings. Our limited knowledge of these criteria does not suffice to transfer or alter rulings based on human reasoning, whether the criteria relate to rational matters or fully religious issues, such as purity, impurity, or tayammum.

The aforementioned thinker’s fundamental error lies in his ideological premises, whereby he regards prophecy as arising from changing human needs, considering the differences between prophets to be differences in the form of practice rather than in the essence of religion. He writes:

“Prophethood arises from human necessity for divine communication. Since the fundamental intellectual and practical principles that prophets called towards were one and all directed people to a single goal, differences in the laws and systems are not essential but rather akin to different programmes periodically enacted within a country, all deriving from the same divine constitution. The Quran insists on the unity of religion and views differences in laws as individual variations.”

However, prophethood is never a product of human need, nor do prophets adapt their revelations according to the needs of their communities. Rather, communities manifest their prophets. Prophets have consistently introduced a higher level of thought and served as the cause of their community’s development. Prophethood determines the intellectual level of communities, which vary according to the stature of their prophet in monotheism. A community with numerous problems indicates that its prophet’s monotheism was comparatively lower in rank than that of the resolute prophets and the Fourteen Infallibles. This relative diminution, whose magnitude is fixed only for the Fourteen Infallibles, results in deficiencies within the prophet’s community. This does not contradict the fact that all prophets are infallible in principle.

Philosophically, from an external reality perspective, communities are the effect and manifestation of their prophets. Prophets hold the role of teachers and educators, where the teacher is the cause and the pupil the effect, establishing a causal relationship. The varying ranks of prophets in monotheism mean each divine law corresponds to the prophet and his community. This correspondence is that of agent and recipient: communities serve as recipients, not agents; thus, they cannot hold a causal role. Prophets serve as causes to meet human needs in accordance with their rank. The Seal of the Prophets, Muhammad (peace be upon him), possessing universality and finality, terminates prophethood and the line of divine guides until the Day of Resurrection. His community acts solely as recipient of knowledge and revelation and cannot be the cause of revelation; rather, they have a receptive capacity for the active agent, which is revelation.

Another error in the cited text is the failure to distinguish between monotheism and worship of God. The essence of religion shared by all prophets is monotheism, but monotheism itself encompasses various particularities. Monotheism with its various nuances is the core of all divine religions, distinct from unity and personal identity of religion understood as worship.

Each prophet’s monotheism had a distinct content and character: Moses focused more on worldly affairs, Jesus more on spiritual and esoteric matters, and Abraham emphasised foundational principles common among all prophets and foundational to Islam. Unlike the teachings of Moses or Jesus, which are not recognised as the roots of Islam, the Prophet Muhammad’s (peace be upon him) religion is collective and final. The community of each prophet changes according to the specific character of their monotheism, which encompasses various aspects—worldly, spiritual, fundamental, and collective—each unique yet unified in personal identity. The difference is thus not merely in minor matters of form and structure but in content and fundamental principles. Unlike other religions, Islam has both a community and finality; though revealed in a particular region, its origin is distinct from its ongoing transmission, which is universal and timeless.

Each divine law was individual and unique; previous laws were nullified and lost their legitimacy upon the arrival of a new law. Every religion has a personal unity; otherwise, belief in the previous religion would imply partial adherence to the new one, which is not the case. Those who reject the last divine religion gain no benefit from previous religions, and their deeds, even

if good, will be rendered void.

The notion that the prophet’s role was to address human needs at the time is contrary to the principle of prophethood and revelation. Rather, the prophet is the cause of human development and perfection; his teachings guide his community to transcend mere needs, raising them to higher levels of intellect and spirituality.

On the Erroneous Division of Islamic Rulings into Fixed and Variable

The division of Islamic rulings into fixed and variable categories is fundamentally mistaken. Islam possesses no mutable ruling in essence. For instance, the ruling on amputation of a thief’s hand is eternally fixed and does not change. Amputation, as we see it, is permissible and is not contingent upon the notion of “cutting off the hand” per se. Housing, clothing, and other human necessities are not rulings themselves but rather instances or applications. While human intervention in nature, in terms of invention or discovery, is within mankind’s authority, each subject inherently carries a ruling prescribed by the Sharīʿah, and if no specific obligation (taklīf) is found in the Sharīʿah for a newly emerged subject, it indicates that the matter is permissible and without a specific ruling. Novelty of a subject does not imply its permissibility outright; rather, it must be verified that the Sharīʿah does not oppose it. Change and transformation occur solely in the realm of subjects, while rulings maintain necessary permanence and do not admit such division.

A respected theologian traces the roots of the discourse on fixed and variable rulings in the West to an introduction written for an archaeological text. He states:

“Christianity has no social rulings because social rulings are variable, and one cannot legislate eternal rulings for ever-changing human life. Therefore, the Sharīʿah contains no rulings on variable social matters.”

He further concedes:

“Rulings, following human nature and constitution, are of two types: fixed and variable. For example, some ethical matters, social affairs, civil and penal laws, rooted in innate human principles, are uniform across societies and fixed within Islam; yet rulings concerning Islamic governance—such as diplomatic relations or trade with other nations—are contingent on changing circumstances and thus possess variable rulings. For instance, the prohibition of tobacco was due to special conditions arising over time, which led to a secondary ruling.”

Despite citing the clear example of tobacco prohibition, the author fails to recognise that it is the subject, combined with temporal and spatial contingencies, that changed, resulting in a secondary ruling. The original ruling regarding tobacco untouched by colonial influence remains eternally valid. This resembles the case of land redistribution during the Pahlavi tyranny, which Imam Khomeini initially forbade but was implemented after the Islamic Revolution. In such cases, temporal and spatial conditions attach to the original subject, transforming it into a secondary subject, similar in kind but altered by these conditions. This parallels the example of steam rising from impure urine: while the urine remains impure, the steam is a different subject altogether, having undergone transformation. Secondary rulings follow the transformation of the subject, such as the permissibility of prostration upon a grape leaf in regions where it is not consumed, contrasting with regions where such use renders it impermissible. Likewise, rulings on music and singing changed during the times of the Imams when oppressive caliphs manipulated these arts to serve evil agendas—a topic discussed in detail in the book Fiqh of Singing and Music.

Allama Tabataba’i is regarded as the originator of the discourse on the duality of rulings, and his followers, especially those privileged to study under him, adopted this division to reconcile human scientific civilisation’s mutable phenomena with the immutable Sharīʿah. In his esteemed Al-Mizan commentary, he expounds his view at length:

“Human knowledge and beliefs are of two kinds: one that admits transformation and progression, such as industrial sciences used to advance material life and tame nature’s resistance to man… and another that does not admit transformation but admits a different kind of progression, namely divine sciences and general knowledge… The human society requires transformation and progression in the utilisation of nature’s benefits, which can only be achieved through continual industrial research and application. Islam does not prohibit this. However, particular rulings related to current events that occur at specific times and rapidly change—such as financial rulings, organisational matters concerning defence, transport, and municipal regulations—are delegated to the discretion of the ruler. These are particular decisions liable to change with changing interests and circumstances, unlike divine rulings found in the Qur’an and Sunnah which are immutable and unalterable.”

Allama’s discourse, although lengthy, emphasises that knowledge divides into sciences subject to transformation (e.g., technology, industry, mathematics) upon which human progress depends, and sciences that do not admit change but admit a different form of perfection (e.g., knowledge concerning the origin and the hereafter). Islam’s social order is built upon such general knowledge, where differences over time relate only to superficial, formal matters and do not affect the fundamental principles or core affairs. Change occurs only in particular instances, not in general concepts. For example, human needs such as clothing and food remain constant across eras; only the forms, means, and tools differ.

Islamic beliefs and laws aligned with innate human nature and aimed at felicity do not lose their validity despite evolving novelties. However, particular rulings—those concerning transient events such as financial or administrative matters related to defence, rights, and civic affairs—depend on the ruler’s discretion. The ruler, akin to a father in a household, may modify particular rulings due to changing causes and interests but cannot alter the immutable general rulings.

All rulings, whether general or particular, must derive from the Sharīʿah. Humans cannot arbitrarily change or legislate new rulings; they may intervene only in subjects, and such intervention must adhere to the Sharīʿah’s framework. The ruler has no role in legislating but acts solely as an executor of the law. Both the ruler and the head of household must obey the religion; for instance, a husband cannot forbid his wife from praying, as such authority is not granted by the religion, though he may restrict her leaving the house within certain conditions prescribed by Sharīʿah to prevent oppression.

In sum, nature inherently changes but this change pertains to subjects, each carrying a pre-established ruling discoverable through the systematic science of ijtihād. Such rulings are unalterable, although they may be suspended if enforcement is not feasible. If humans seek to benefit from a matter, they must alter the subject sufficiently to fall within a legally permissible category and achieve the desired benefit. For example, although wine is forbidden, its subject may be transformed into a permissible, intoxicant-free beverage, a “pure drink” as described in the Qur’an, revealing that heavenly blessings are also discoverable in this world through knowledge and technology.

The theory dividing religion into essential (dhāti) and accidental (ʿarḍī) propositions is mistaken. Some assert that legal rights between men and women or slaves and free persons are accidental, not essential to religion. They argue that the prophets did not seek to change social standards but rather brought new meanings and orientations to life. However, such views erroneously separate legal matters from religion, which we contend includes no accidental rulings. The essential versus accidental division stems from misunderstanding changes in subjects, initiating a significant deviation.

One commentator suggests that social rulings are largely approvals of existing customs rather than original legislation. We must note two key points in response:

Firstly, reason, both in independent rational principles and innate rights, reveals divine law. The Sharīʿah does not contradict reason as reason apprehends objective reality and Sharīʿah issues rulings in accordance with truth. Religion, understood as a method or way of life, must accord with reality and reason.

Secondly, Sharīʿah issues advisory rulings concerning “custom” (ʿurf), which in Islamic terminology differs from the legal notion of custom. True custom is always validated by the Lawgiver and has no original rulings. What is called “custom” in law often confuses habits, traditions, or societal norms which Sharīʿah may reject (such as usury or alcohol consumption). Custom itself holds inherent validity as a known good practice universally recognised, and Sharīʿah does not alter or reject it.

Thus, rulings associated with customary subjects are not accidental; rather, they belong intrinsically to the Sharīʿah’s essence and are not imposed from outside. The division of rulings into essential and accidental is therefore flawed and leads to major religious deviation.

Furthermore, some rulings revealed progressively, such as prohibiting wine or endorsing slavery, reflect strategies to combat entrenched traditions gradually to avoid societal backlash. For instance, the prohibition of wine was gradual to prevent negative reactions against Islam’s core.

Moreover, he fails to recognise that the term “Islamic religion” refers specifically to the religion brought by the Noble Prophet (peace be upon him), and that “Islam” is a technical term applied to the Shariah of that Prophet. This is precisely what the noble verse (إِنَّ الدِّينَ عِنْدَ اللَّهِ الْإِسْلَامُ) [Indeed, the religion in the sight of Allah is Islam] speaks of. The Shariah is individual and distinctive, admitting no repetition or substitute. As a comprehensive and final religion, it neither allows suspension, abrogation, multiplicity, nor alteration.

However, the term “Islam” applied to other divine prophets refers in its linguistic sense to submission or surrender; as stated in the verse (مَا كَانَ إِبْرَاهِيمُ يَهُودِيًّا وَلَا نَصْرَانِيًّا وَلَكِنْ كَانَ حَنِيفًا مُسْلِمًا وَمَا كَانَ مِنَ الْمُشْرِكِينَ) [Abraham was neither a Jew nor a Christian, but he was a monotheist, a Muslim, and he was not among the polytheists].

The technical term “Islam” is used with reference to a particular rank and instance, whereas the general meaning of Islam denotes submission to monotheism without this specification. Thus, if a ruling is deemed Islamic in the general sense, it does not imply its validity within the Shariah of the Noble Prophet (peace be upon him). The unity of monotheism—which is, admittedly, a superficial view as each prophet has a particular level and character of monotheism—does not equate to unity of Shariah or religion.

“Islam,” “Shariah,” and “Din” (religion) are three distinct concepts. Even a disbeliever may have a religion in the sense of worship and a natural life programme, while every prophet has Islam in the sense of monotheism. The unity of Islam is more specific than the unity of religion, encompassing worship and monotheism, but Shariah is not shared. Shariah has an individual, specific existence; two Shariahs cannot be identical. Shariah is not a generalisable concept; otherwise, all Shariahs would be unified and considered one, whereas different Shariahs have distinct and unrelated instances, akin to the concept of numbers.

Each Shariah has its own identity and individuality. This is similar to the word “graduate,” which, when specified by level, distinguishes a university student from a primary school pupil, neither interchangeable. Without specification, the term applies to both, but this does not mean one can replace the other. The Islamic Shariah has a unique existence and, therefore, does not permit suspension or hypothetical scenarios of being revealed elsewhere with different spatial or temporal conditions.

The Arabic language is also the form and framework of Islam, shaped by its identity and reality; this form cannot be separated from its content. Islam itself has shaped and identified this form, being a unified whole rather than dispersed or diffused. Therefore, any alteration in the language of Islam would cause the religion to lose its essence and become something else. Islam without the revealed linguistic form is meaningless and null; no alteration or multiplicity is possible due to its individuality. This point has been previously explained, and it suffices here to note the philosophical meaning of the term “identity.”

When Islam is an individual and specific religion, its unity is intrinsic, meaning that not even a single ruling can be extracted or rejected; disbelief in even one Islamic ruling amounts to disbelief in the entire religion, whether that ruling pertains to values or methods. Islamic Shariah articulates both values and methods. However, humans can alter methods by changing their subjects and can intervene to the extent of creating subjects and methods that the religion approves—for example, discovering and designing pure (tahur) wine.

Humans can design different systems and characteristics, and by altering subjects, achieve growth, development, and progress that do not conflict with Islam. However, they cannot separate content from form and arbitrarily change methods and forms according to whims. Due to its unity and individuality, Islam cannot be conceived without its form and framework. If Islam mandates modest dress, this form of dress—covering the entire body except the hands up to the wrist and the face’s outline for women, avoiding flamboyance and transparency—is intrinsic to its essence and intended for all humanity across all eras.

Of course, Islamic rulings must be categorised, and it should not be that someone adopts only the dress ruling from Islam while emulating other religions or schools in the remainder. Only one who practically adheres to most Islamic rulings and whose Islam is evident can be considered to observe Islamic dress.

Those who deny this unity of religion fail to distinguish between unity of religion and multiplicity of subjects, which are influenced by time, place, and varied nature. Shariah is not subject to diversity or change, and Islam today is the same Islam revealed over a thousand years ago, not limited by that era but transcending time and making all multiplicity subject to its pre-designed methods and forms, rather than newly emerging variations.

Because of its unity and individuality, Islam makes every individual, wherever and whenever they are, subject to itself, inviting all to conform to its form. It cannot be adapted to arbitrary personal forms. Islam requires all followers, regardless of their spoken language, to perform prayer in Arabic and directs them to a single Qiblah for animal slaughter. Faith in the Oneness of God, the Prophethood of the Noble Prophet (peace be upon him), and the authority of Amir al-Mu’minin (peace be upon him) are conditions imposed on all, making them subject to its unified structure.

The unity of Shariah provides only one form, shape, and method, which all must follow. Though each subject has its method, and subject change leads to method change, the ruling for both must be sought from Islam; it is not left to human discretion. Even if Islam were to reach Switzerland, it would assimilate the Swiss, compelling them to learn Arabic to pray properly. Similarly, Amir al-Mu’minin (peace be upon him) possesses a unique personality that would not adopt Western dress such as bow ties or neckties but instead maintain his turban, emblematic of Shariah’s personal unity and immutable nature.

Furthermore, Islam has a specific economic system and method which, regrettably, has not yet been fully developed through ijtihad and remains pristine within religious teachings. Fortunately, we have been able to research and deduce Islamic economic rulings using an approved methodology, designing a system consistent with that which the early leaders of Islam employed.

Regarding the author’s citation of the Arabic marriage formula (ṣīgha), we have previously clarified that Islamic law permits marriage through consent (mu‘āṭah) without uttering a formula, and Arabic language is not a prerequisite for the marriage contract. The Shariah mandates Arabic in prayer and treats it as a legal requirement but does not require the marriage formula to be Arabic. Indeed, marriage can be effected without a formula, by an act signifying matrimonial agreement.

That religion possesses fixed and immutable rulings does not imply arrogance or incompatibility. The fixity is based on a systematic, natural order founded on realities inherent in nature. This is analogous to the stomach’s rejection of harmful substances; consumption of incompatible or toxic materials leads to illness or death, but this does not imply the stomach is arrogant or inflexible—it is simply functioning according to its natural system. Those who ingest poisons are themselves responsible.

Islam is a system producing rulings internally and accepts no external rulings. It has a ruling for every subject, as the verse states: (وَلَا رَطْبٍ وَلَا يَابِسٍ إِلَّا فِي كِتَابٍ مُبِينٍ) [No moist or dry [thing] but is [written] in a clear Book].

In our book Ayah Ayah-e Roshani (“Verse by Verse Illumination”), we have stated: “The Holy Quran is the book of all sciences. It encompasses spiritual and esoteric knowledge as well as empirical knowledge, crafts, and arts. It is the finest psychology textbook and the only heavenly book containing remedies for all psychological ailments. The Quran contains medical knowledge, the most advanced political management systems, and foreknowledge of scientific achievements that future scholars will discover, as was revealed fourteen centuries ago. The nutritional engineering in the Quran is so advanced that modern humanity lacks the tools and technology to prepare its prescribed foods. Many formulas therein remain undiscovered. The ‘science of life,’ obsolete among contemporary scholars, is found within this book.”

In our comprehensive exegesis, Tafsir Huda, we elaborate on this assertion that the Quran encompasses all sciences, and interested readers may consult it.

The individuality and unity of Islam, grounded in truth and natural order, do not conflict with reason, science, or collective intellect—provided these maintain their infallibility and genuine validity, presenting sincere knowledge and beliefs aligned with reality, free from ignorance or distortion. Therefore, Islam has no incompatibility with science, reason, or custom. Conversely, reason, science, and custom have traditionally acknowledged their subordination to religion and revelation. Any apparent contradiction arises either from fallibility in reason and science or from misunderstanding and erroneous interpretation of religion.

In summary, the claim that governance should derive only values and ideals from religion while remaining silent on methods due to their mutability is incorrect—even a glance at the Tawḍīḥ al-Masā’il demonstrates this. The noble verse (لَقَدْ كَانَ لَكُمْ فِي رَسُولِ اللَّهِ أُسْوَةٌ حَسَنَةٌ) [Indeed in the Messenger of Allah you have an excellent example] and narrations such as “Pray as you have seen me pray” and “Say La ilaha illallah and you will succeed” establish the necessity of following prescribed methods.

Reviewing chapters of Tawḍīḥ al-Masā’il—from imitation, purity, and impurity to transactions, jihad, inheritance, retribution, and penalties, as well as rulings concerning the deceased—confirms this. Likewise, Shariah does not accept mere monotheistic content as proof of Islam; verbal testimony, a form of faith, is required, as the narration “Say La ilaha illallah and you will succeed” indicates. Islam is defined by both form and content, with the form prescribed by the Shariah itself. Numerous etiquettes and recommended acts outside acts of worship bear testimony to this, as intention is essential for acts of worship but not for incidental matters such as purification. For instance, if a polluted garment is submerged in water such that water entirely covers it, it is purified without need for intention, as established by the Shariah; we cannot arbitrarily introduce methods contrary to these rulings.

All Shariahs have provided their own forms and contents, each possessing individuality, unity, and specificity in both form and content. However, the unity and individuality of Islam confer eternity and perpetuity upon its form and content—if its authority governs the subject’s power, it becomes actual and effective, requiring no external sources such as science or experience.

Given all the above, how misguided is the claim that “a religious government should derive its values and ideals from religion but obtain its methods of administration from science”?

The Holy Qur’an is the source of all knowledge, and the Shariah encompasses rulings on every subject. However, if someone is not a Mujtahid and lacks the capacity for legal reasoning (Ijtihad), instead of blaming their own understanding, they accuse the religion of being incomplete and believe that its governance system must rely on human sciences. If the Shariah is truly the divine law of God and free from corruption, it is fixed, firm, accurate, perfect, and comprehensive, requiring no other source; although other disciplines may, in harmony with religion, offer analyses to raise awareness and help the faithful avoid mere imitation.

The writings available from some intellectuals or even certain scholars within the seminaries on this matter tend to be vague and lack concrete examples. The writings of intellectuals influenced by Western thought often engage more in rhetoric and verbosity than in the presentation of coherent ideas and reasoning.

In any case, our position is that the content, form, and nature of governance are fundamentally grounded in the Shariah and must be derived from it. It is not permissible for Muslim societies to interfere in the design of the governmental structure; rather, the shape of governance must be obtained through the scientific methodology of Ijtihad, as we have previously outlined the four pillars of the Islamic government.

Regrettably, the principles, rules, and laws of Islamic governance have yet to be refined. We have presented some of these in the comprehensive book on Wilayat al-Faqih. For instance, we stated therein that the ruler in the Islamic system must be a singular and bound entity, and the three branches of power function as advisory bodies under his supervision, with law constituting the essence of governance. Therefore, governance cannot be conducted in a council form. Moreover, governance, like worship, is inherent in the nature, essence, and reality of the Shariah, and it is impossible to attribute an independent meaning to governance apart from the Shariah.

One member of the Kayan committee also put forward the theory of separating religious values from methods as follows:

“It seems as if the Qur’an does not regard determining methods and systems of governance as the domain of religion and revelation, but rather that it concerns the values related to governance. Some argue that Islam only provides values, and that forms and methods vary according to material and spiritual conditions; thus, some forms mentioned in religious texts pertain only to the customs of the people of that time, such as matters related to governance and judiciary. Those who advocate the separation between values and methods consider divine legislation in political matters as analogous to contemporary legislation, where the embodiment of religious values is realized in specific practical contexts.”

We maintain that the Shariah contains all primary, fixed, and enduring rulings on every subject. The Shariah not only declares values but also stipulates methods. How can it be argued that the Shariah only addresses values when it explicitly outlines detailed procedures for purification, cleanliness, including all their varieties, and the methods from going to the restroom to engaging in jihad and governance? Its jurisprudence is entirely about prescribing methods. This argument is as absurd as riding a camel bent double in broad daylight.

Critique of the Theory of Governmental Revelation from the Dignity of Imamate

A historical and biographical examination of the Shia Imams from Imam Husayn onwards demonstrates that these figures did not strive to establish governments during their lifetimes; that is, they did not endorse existing governments nor collaborate with rulers. Instead, they engaged in scientific and cultural activities quietly, as they were aware, by virtue of their Imamate knowledge, that with their limited power and the few faithful followers willing to sacrifice, any attempt at governance would fail and result in a deadlock, severely harming the Shia community and possibly leading to the extinction of the Imamate. Hence, they refrained from such claims and devoted themselves solely to cultural and scholarly jihad, resorting only to covert and underground activities when they gained even minimal influence. The preservation of the Imamate was a current obligation, while the absence of power rendered government formation impossible. This does not imply that governance was beyond the dignity of the divine guardians; as one official of the Islamic Republic once stated:

“The delivery of messages and corrective work and completing the world among the people is not beneath the dignity of God, humans, or the world, and reducing the rank of the prophets to the levels of Marx, Pasteur, Gandhi, or ancient kings like Jamshid, Kaveh, and Hammurabi is disrespectful to God. From the Qur’an, we see that the assumption of power or kingship by the Prophet Muhammad and some Jewish prophets was not universal to all prophets. Given the many prophets who were not rulers, this is considered an exception. Indeed, ‘prophethood’ and ‘government’ are two distinct roles or professions with different origins and foundations that cannot be combined, and the prohibition of prophets consulting people and seeking worldly power is strongly condemned. The prophets preferred establishing a community of faith over merely teaching and training individuals. The verses of jihad and defence are solely for defence and the establishment of security and freedom, not for aggression or conquest.”

The speaker appears unaware of God’s immense love for His servants and His wisdom and care in all His dealings with them. If God did not wish to be present among His creation, He would not have created the material world (Nasut) nor paid attention to it or mixed Himself with it. The conveyance of the divine message, whatever the subject, is a matter of God’s dignity. He does not even shy away from using the example of a mosquito, as the Qur’an states: “Indeed, Allah is not ashamed to present an example — that of a mosquito or what is above it…” [Qur’an 2:26].

God is directly involved in all affairs and attributes guidance and direction of His servants to Himself, saying: “You do not guide whom you love, but Allah guides whom He wills, and He knows best those who are guided.” [Qur’an 28:56]. Even the Prophet is cautioned against interference, reserving this dignity for God alone. Elsewhere, it is said: “It was not you who threw when you threw, but Allah…” [Qur’an 8:17].

We assert that God’s presence permeates all of material existence (Nasut). He is in all inanimate objects, hearts, minds, thoughts, limbs, in the fire of Nimrod, in Ibrahim’s garden, in chilli peppers’ fire, in firewood’s blaze, and in the cold of snow — in short, everywhere. Whatever we conceive of, God is within it. Even oxygen is God’s outpouring and descent, and every descent is God. Just as human ejaculation is a concentrated form of self, containing all the traits of the father and mother in the sperm—what then is God’s descent, the concentrated and diminished form of God, that embodies all divine attributes? The Holy Qur’an is the greatest manifestation of divine descent, and the Fourteen Infallibles are higher than the Qur’an, for they are the living, moving Qur’an, whose written form is the Holy Qur’an. Both the Qur’an and the Ahl al-Bayt are the Prophet’s trust, with the Ahl al-Bayt being the living Qur’an, therefore possessing greater importance and status. These all represent God’s descent.

Regarding injustices, oppressions, and cruelty — such as the mass killings of Bosnians, mass graves of Iraqis, or the abortion of a child by a mother who loved her only offspring for the sake of societal population control—such matters must be spoken of quietly and gently. God cannot tolerate such mercilessness. He cannot bear even the crushing of an autumn leaf underfoot, as it may shelter an insect that feeds its young or a worm that feeds on it. Humans must tread softly because God cares deeply about every step we take.

God is present in all of creation and shares in their sorrows, pains, sufferings, worries, and joys. He created the material world to accompany His beloved—humanity—in all its highs and lows, its light and darkness. However, the aforementioned speaker, devoid of any monotheistic insight or understanding of its implications, speaks frivolously and aimlessly. While it is true that the great prophets of God are not mere geniuses and that they surpass ancient rulers such as Hammurabi and Pasteur, as they are divinely chosen with bestowed knowledge, it is incorrect to claim that governance is not their domain. God Himself commanded them to establish governance, but they lacked the means and power. The Qur’an employs the word “rule” or “command” 208 times, and no prophet has been without an appropriate command for implementation. Governance means commanding one’s people, as God said to Moses: “And We wrote for him on the tablets [something] of all things — instruction and explanation for all things. So take them with determination and command your people to take the best of it…” [Qur’an 7:145].

Governance was a perfection for the prophets because through it, they established justice and fairness: “And if two factions of believers fight, then make peace between them. But if one of them oppresses the other, fight against the one that oppresses until it returns to the command of Allah. Then make peace between them with justice and act justly. Indeed, Allah loves those who act justly.” [Qur’an 49:9].

Prophets, having prophethood, general guidance, and authority over their people, intervened in all matters, guiding, safeguarding, and governing all aspects of life. The Qur’an says regarding the Prophet: “The Prophet is more worthy of the believers than themselves.” [Qur’an 33:6].

Governance is intrinsic to the Shariah and inseparable from the essence of prophethood

and Imamate. To suggest otherwise is a misinterpretation of divine wisdom and the historical roles of these exalted figures.

The Holy Qur’an is the identity document of all phenomena of existence, and the history of every event and the account of all occurrences concerning every individual and every entity can be derived from its verses: (“There is no moist or dry [thing] but that it is in a clear record”) [Qur’an 6:59]. Tafsir (exegesis) is the interpretation of the Holy Qur’an, which reaches such subtle insights.

Thus, the Holy Qur’an is the record of every person’s deeds and can be regarded as a mirror reflecting one’s own existence: (“Read your record; sufficient is yourself against you this Day as accountant”) [Qur’an 17:14]. In this way, this very book suffices for the present day and there is no need for anything else: (“Sufficient is yourself today”).

The Holy Qur’an is the identity card not only of all phenomena of existence but also of existence itself. The Divine, Blessed and Exalted, has an identity in the Holy Qur’an; for example, the Surah of Tawhid is the identity card of God Almighty, and nothing except God is present therein — just as Surah Al-Kawthar is the identity card of Lady Fatimah. In fact, each verse serves as a code, an identifier, and a statement of the truth of a particular reality.

The noble verse (“There is no moist or dry [thing] but that it is in a clear record”) [Qur’an 6:59] illustrates the variety of the verses and confirms that, given the Holy Qur’an, no other book is necessary, and all knowledge is encompassed within this very book.

The Holy Qur’an is the identity card of the essence of existence and all its phenomena; to the extent that if the Qur’an is opened and studied as it ought to be, it becomes clear that no particle of existence lacks a Qur’anic identity. This is the meaning of (“There is no moist or dry [thing] but that it is in a clear record”).

The reference to the “clear book” is indeed this Qur’an in our possession, which contains the story of every wet and dry thing, the destiny of every tangible and scientific phenomenon. The vocabulary of this written Qur’an narrates all truths, and its oral verses carry interpretations and esoteric meanings. Interpretation and esotericism are not descriptions of the inner reality of the Qur’an itself, which is outwardly manifest and requires no interpretation; it is an original entity that returns to no other.

The truths of all phenomena and the Divine Being of existence must be sought in this very book, which expresses both content and form, values and methodologies. It contains rulings for worship as well as for governance. It comprises both the Shariah and the state. A glance at the book Ayah Ayah Roshan (“Verse by Verse Enlightenment”), which we have authored in the course of research on certain Qur’anic verses, is the best evidence of this claim. Of course, discovery, invention, and research in subjects lie in human hands, not in foundational principles and rulings. It is not the case that Shariah and revelation are disconnected from empirical sciences; for example, the book Tawhid of Mufazzal delineates some foundational aspects of these sciences due to necessity and to the level of human understanding at the time, proportionate to society and not according to the knowledge and spiritual insight of Imam Sadiq (peace be upon him). Moreover, Shariah does not merely address empirical or human sciences, or governance and management, as some writers suggest, but it also aims at spiritual guidance and the ultimate felicity of the hereafter.

Religion primarily serves to guide individuals and societies; however, this guidance is not limited solely to acts of worship, spirituality, and the afterlife, but has a much broader meaning. Revelation and Shariah can pioneer human scientific and empirical knowledge. Nonetheless, knowledge itself is not inherently responsible for guidance but rather provides the grounds for societal development and technological advancement. Knowledge may bring spiritual and divine guidance or lead to misguidance or neutrality. Divine guidance can direct science and foster its growth. Sound knowledge does not conflict with pure Shariah but differs from it. Shariah can assist and guide science, and science can enhance understanding of Shariah, creating new topics without conflicting with Shariah and fulfilling legitimate human needs. Guidance is a superior level of awareness, while knowledge is of a lower rank. Humans possess three levels: the carnal (nafs), the rational (‘aql), and the spiritual (ruh). Revelation, miracles, and unseen matters relate to the inner self and spiritual level, which the divinely guided attain.

If knowledge or reason contradicts Shariah, one of the two is flawed: either reason and knowledge are not infallible, or an erroneous addition has disguised itself as Shariah. In the presence of an infallible Imam, if the Imam states something directly, then it is knowledge and reason that are mistaken; however, in the occultation period, there is potential for both erroneous juristic reasoning and corrupted knowledge. Religious adulterations or intellectual errors often stem from carnal desires that deliberately create fallacies, since true knowledge and sound reason cannot contradict pure Shariah, as both rest on genuine truths and real standards. Yet, human desires are rebellious and constantly at odds with Shariah or reason and knowledge.

If Shariah remains pure and free from carnal adulterations, it retains its divine infallibility, with revelation always superior to reason and knowledge, guiding and leading them. But if Shariah becomes adulterated, it descends to a carnal level beneath reason and knowledge, which then dominate and prevail. Similarly, if reason and knowledge become corrupted by carnal desires, they lose their intermediary status and regress to mere base desires. When both Shariah and knowledge decline, a conflicting situation arises that requires thorough analysis to discern truth. We have explained the value of rational analyses in the first volume of this book and addressed the resolution of conflicts between reason and Shariah therein.

In any case, a person enslaved by carnal desires, regressive, dogmatic, bigoted, ignorant, or uneducated cannot rationally analyse and scientifically investigate these propositions or appreciate each element in its proper rank and place. Such a person is ensnared by adulterations or false claims and falls because an untrained soul is incompatible with reason and revelation, although reason is the disciple of revelation and revelation its master.

Shariah should be considered in two layers: one, the divine Shariah, which is pure and infallible; and the other, the juristic Shariah, which may be contaminated by juristic error and adulterations. The juristic Shariah must be derived by a wise scholar — a jurist endowed with wisdom. A jurist without wisdom is like a sage without jurisprudence — who cannot rightly be called wise — and will fall into error and adulterate Shariah. Only a wise jurist can govern Shariah during occultation; a jurist without wisdom leads Shariah and society astray because he cannot hold both outward and inward realities. A wise jurist can detect self-deceptions of the ego and reach the truth, perceiving no conflict between reason and knowledge and Shariah and revelation. Science can renew and give fresh expression to revelation through discovery and invention since reason and knowledge can move vertically into the depths of revelation. The novelty of revelation means a new human insight, not a new divine revelation.

Revelation guides all sciences, whether physics, chemistry, commerce, sociology, psychology, economics, politics, or other empirical and human sciences. We claim the Holy Qur’an is the book of all knowledge, both known and unknown, and even on the Day of Resurrection, it retains its scientific dominance. Each segment of a verse should be given to a country and university to discover the scientific knowledge concealed therein. For example, in the five-volume book Knowledge of Istikhara, we have extracted a single field of Qur’anic knowledge and constructed the principles and rules of Istikhara (divinatory prayer) from the Qur’an, establishing for the first time in the Islamic world the logic of understanding Istikhara from the Qur’an.

Just as the Holy Qur’an advances knowledge, so too can knowledge support religion and Shariah. For instance, Shariah commands ritual ablution (ghusl), and science designs the most hygienic and advanced baths to fulfil this command, ensuring that water flowing over the body is properly drained. Shariah commands fasting, and nutritional science can advise fasting individuals on appropriate foods to avoid illness and maintain digestive health, and counsel the weak on how to regain their strength for fasting. In jihad, Islam’s primary aim is preaching and conveying the message; conflict should be managed to minimise harm, protecting children and women and reducing casualties. Science can help realise this aim by developing modern, electronic, or cyber warfare techniques, making religious goals practically achievable.

The Origin of Conflict Between Science, Reason, and Religion

It should not be overlooked that the origin of the conflict between science or reason and religion lies in the West and concerns Christianity, a religion that has been distorted in two ways: first, by carnal adulterations imposed by Christian scholars and Church authorities; second, by structured secular and anti-religious political and economic agendas. In contrast, Islam — though subject to distortions and innovations — possesses the Shia system of ijtihad (juristic reasoning) empowered by a sacred faculty, enabling jurists to distinguish truth from falsehood.

Our reference to Shariah is specifically to the ‘Alawi Shia Twelver Islam,’ not every religion or sect. Similarly, our reference to revelation is exclusively the Holy Qur’an, in which many verses are, we believe, definitive rather than speculative in both transmission and interpretation. The Holy Qur’an is

the source of absolute truth and certainty, and those who deny this are strangers to reason and religion.

Religious historical sources require investigation with a novel and scientific approach, necessitating thorough re-examination and reconsideration. Such inquiry demands analysis and interpretation aimed at uncovering the content and form of Sharia—free from personal motives and biases.

The foregoing provides a summary and outlook on the discussion of “maximalist and minimalist” approaches. Analysing this debate requires reviewing and critiquing certain existing views to illuminate the perspective considered preferable.

One individual who adopts a minimalist view regarding the rulings of Sharia has stated, with slight summarisation and alteration:

If laws are designed in such a way that they are not contrary to the scholarly opinions in jurisprudence, that suffices; for the Constitution requires that the law should not contradict “Islamic standards,” rather than conforming to the “well-known fatwas of jurists.” Similarly, the Constitution mentions the “non-contradiction” of subjects with Islamic rulings, where “non-contradiction” differs from “conformity.” “Contradiction” is a negative matter, whereas “conformity” is positive, and a negative matter is established by the absence of evidence to the contrary, whereas proving a positive matter requires affirmative evidence. For example, the fatwa permitting sacrifice outside of Mina, although contrary to the consensus of jurists, is not contrary to Islam.

In critiquing this viewpoint, it is necessary first to clarify certain terminology. The conformity of laws with Islam entails complete harmony between two positive entities—namely, the law and the Sharia—just as opposition entails two positive entities in conflict. However, the non-contradiction of law with Islam presupposes the absence of a positive ruling on that subject within Sharia, meaning it cannot be proven to be non-Islamic. Accordingly, non-conformity implies contradiction, whereas non-contradiction is a composite negative notion equivalent to conformity.

Therefore, if Islam has a ruling on a subject, there is no room for merely asserting non-contradiction (an abstraction secondary to conformity); rather, conformity must be established, which is affirmative. The author’s assertion that “contradiction differs from non-conformity” is mistaken, as these terms are analogous in meaning but differ in expression—one simple and the other composite.

Moreover, the use of a negative expression in the Constitution is another error, for as long as an affirmative term exists, one should not employ a derivative negative term, as negative terms carry a conceptual and scientific burden of positivity. Negative expressions are merely mental constructs and abstractions.

It should be noted that the terms “conflict” and “contradiction” differ: conflict implies intense opposition, whereas contradiction is a more general and less intense form of disagreement, allowing for coexistence, unlike conflict which implies mutual exclusivity.

Furthermore, contradiction in rulings applies only if permissibility is the default; otherwise, prohibition prevails, in which case only conflict is conceivable.

Given the semantic distinction between conflict and contradiction, one can say that general knowledge agreement is necessary, but opposition is not. However, it cannot be said that contradiction is impossible under general knowledge. The difference between contradiction and non-agreement is akin to the difference between prohibition and dislike, or obligation and recommendation, none of which entail conflict, as the intensity of divergence is less than that of conflict.

The author continues:

“We believe everything should be Islamic, but Islam has entrusted humanity with its affairs, except where God Himself has intervened. Legislation is mostly customary, and thus Islamic intervention is minimal.”

While it is true that we believe everything must be Islamic, it is incorrect to claim that Islam has left humanity to itself. God, as in creation, has not delegated authority—He says: “Lord, do not leave me to myself even for a blink of an eye” —and likewise has not entrusted legislation to anyone. Islam has a ruling for every matter, as previously discussed. The methodology of deduction, jurisprudential reasoning, and the research outlook in Islamic rulings have been outlined before, and a systematic framework has been noted, which does not need repetition here. Indeed, only certain matters are entrusted to humans within the bounds of divinely guided rulings. Many religious rulings are advisory, but this does not mean human interference is permissible, as these rulings correspond to natural laws and require discovery, not creation. Therefore, legislation in no area is customary, let alone mostly customary. The use of “mostly” to compare custom and law is mistaken, for the relation between them is general and specific in nature, and Islamic rulings rarely coincide with custom, which, in legal terminology, is not considered a source of Sharia unless meeting certain conditions.

In summary, Islamic Sharia governs all aspects of human life. The terms “minimalist” and “maximalist” are western constructs that pertain to other legal systems lacking the completeness and finality that Sharia claims.

Critique of the Jurisprudence of Duty Theory

Some Western-influenced circles argue that in democracy, the principle is the rights of the people, and law and government are rights-based; whereas in Islamic governance, derived from Sharia, people are regarded as duty-bound, and the government and jurisprudence are duty-based. If rights are recognised, it is because duties require them, so Islamic governance is duty-centred and incompatible with human rights and laws derived from them, as well as with justice. Some writers have described this as follows:

“The fundamental mindset of traditionalist Islamists is Sharia adherence and duty-orientation. They analyse political and social issues accordingly. However, Islamic modernist thinkers influenced by modernity see governance and legislation as rights-based rather than duty-based, and evaluate Islamic socio-political rulings from this standpoint. Today, it is preferable to speak of human rights, as humans seek to understand their rights more than their duties.”

Broadly speaking, human history can be divided into traditional and modern eras. Pre-modern humans can be described as “duty-bound,” whereas modern humans as “right-bearers.” The current jurisprudence is duty-based, not rights-based, hence it conflicts with the dominant discourse of the modern world, making understanding concepts such as Wilayat al-Faqih difficult for both opponents and proponents. Wilayat al-Faqih is governance based on duty, while modern political philosophy regards governance as rights-based—individuals who possess rights choose rulers and seek the fulfilment of those rights, and governance is obliged to ensure public welfare.

A Western scholar, taking democracy as foundational and comparing Islam thereto, writes in The Ethics of Power, The Ethics of Justice:

“Jurists’ duty thinking is quite clear. Law is the foundation of a just society and embodies public consent. Duty thinking means not disregarding rights but prioritising duties. The divine ruling is established by the certainty of one person; others have no participation. If a jurist reaches certainty, his ruling is undoubtedly divine. If you follow him, his certainty imposes obligation upon you. Although the jurist must be just, truthful, and equitable, once certainty is reached, that is final, and his ruling is divine. This concept, present in both Sunni and Shia jurisprudence, is strange and produces surprising results. It distances Islamic jurisprudence from modern law thinking where popular consent is required, and consequently from justice, which law best manifests when properly established.”

This author’s prioritisation of democracy seems to stem from personal grievances rather than objective analysis. Setting that aside, Islam is a comprehensive religion claiming finality and guidance in all fields, not confined to rulings and jurisprudence alone, which in any case is broad in meaning. The jurist should first be a sage—possessing intertwined sciences and a sacred faculty to discern truth—before entering jurisprudence, to avoid narrow-mindedness and personal biases.

Viewed holistically with its creedal and ethical propositions, Islam is not duty-based. Duties constitute only a minor part of Islam’s truth. Islamic governance is not designed solely by the traditional sense of jurisprudence but incorporates all knowledge, including jurisprudence. Islam holds a managerial view of governance rather than a narrowly defined jurisprudential one. Wilayat al-Faqih here means comprehensive guardianship encompassing all cognitive, ethical, jurisprudential, and emotional propositions, guiding phenomena towards their good by love and kindness, drawing upon the jurist’s sacred faculty and divine grace. We have elaborated this meaning in the works The Face of Love, Beloved of Love, and Beloved and Lovers.

Jurisprudence, defined as “the science of discerning the intended meaning of the sacred lawgiver through systematic study supported by the sacred faculty from the evidence of religion (Qur’an, Sunnah, and other valid sources), whether concerning creed, ethics, or rulings,” encompasses both ‘shoulds’ and ‘should nots’ and ‘is’ and ‘is not’. Early jurists primarily dealt with foundational principles before subsidiary matters, often focusing more on creed than legal rulings, confirming that when jurisprudence is understood broadly and combined with other sciences, especially wisdom, it avoids rigidity and the misconception that jurisprudence is duty-based. Though jurisprudence of traditionalists who limit themselves to strict legal principles is arduous, it cannot be called duty-based. Our jurisprudence is that of the Ahl al-Bayt and the Qur’an.

As narrated from the Prophet:

“Shall I inform you of the perfect jurist?” They replied, “Yes, O Messenger of God.” He said: The perfect jurist is one who neither despairs of God’s mercy, nor fears God’s deceit, nor loses hope in God’s providence, and does not abandon the Qur’an for anything else out of desire.”

Therefore, Islam cannot be called duty-based, nor should it be termed rights-based in the legalistic sense; rather, it is Sharia-based, with the Qur’an as the main source,

Therefore, Islam cannot be called duty-based, nor should it be termed rights-based in the legalistic sense; rather, it is Sharia-based, with the Qur’an as the main source, and the jurist possessing a sacred faculty to discern divine rulings that include both duties and rights. Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Abdullah narrated from Ibrahim ibn Ishaq al-Ahmar, from Muhammad ibn Sulayman al-Daylami, from his father, who said:
I asked Abu Abd Allah (Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq): “So-and-so, what of his worship, religion, and virtue?” He replied, “How is his intellect?” I said, “I do not know.” He said, “Reward is according to intellect. There was a man from the Children of Israel who worshipped God on an island in the sea, lush and verdant, full of trees, with abundant water. A king among the angels passed by him and said: ‘O Lord, show me the reward for this servant of Yours.’ God showed it to him, but the angel found it insignificant. God then revealed to the angel to accompany the man. The angel came to him in human form and said, ‘Who are you?’ He replied, ‘I am a devout man whose reputation and worship in this place have reached me; I have come to worship God with you.’ The angel stayed with him that day. When morning came, the angel said to him, ‘Your place is pure and suitable only for worship.’ The worshipper replied, ‘This place has a defect.’ The angel asked, ‘What is it?’ He said, ‘Our Lord has no beast of burden. If He had a donkey, we would graze it here because the grass is being lost.’ The angel asked, ‘Does your Lord have no donkey?’ He said, ‘If He had a donkey, such grass would not perish.’ God revealed to the angel: ‘I reward him according to his intellect.’” [95]

Sulaiman said: I once asked Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq about a certain person’s worship, religion, and virtue. The Imam replied: “How is his intellect?” I answered: “I do not know.” He said: “Reward and recompense are given according to the measure of intellect and reason, not according to fervour or passion. Indeed, there was a man from Bani Israel who worshipped God on a sea island lush and verdant, full of trees and water. An angel passing by saw him and asked God to show the reward of this servant. God revealed it, and the angel found it little. God commanded the angel to accompany him. The angel took human form and approached him, asking: ‘Who are you?’ He replied: ‘I am a devout man who heard of your status and worship in this place; I have come to worship God alongside you.’ The angel remained with him for the day. The next morning, the angel said: ‘Your abode is verdant and suitable only for worship.’ The worshipper said: ‘But this place has a fault.’ The angel asked: ‘What fault?’ He said: ‘Our Lord has no beast of burden; if He had a donkey, we would graze it here because the grass is being lost.’ The angel asked: ‘Does your Lord not have a donkey?’ He replied: ‘If He had one, the grass would not be wasted.’ God revealed to the angel: ‘Indeed, I reward according to the intellect.’”

Unfortunately, the problem of the Islamic society, as expressed by the aforementioned author, is that the measure and criterion for assessing the deeds, speech, and thoughts of others is not their intellect and knowledge, but the fervour and zeal arising from duty-bound action. When fervour based on duty is abundant and intellect scant, even a billion Muslims cannot sustain themselves financially. Of course, the intellect we mean is one that draws a person closer to God, with which God is praised and which ensures worldly well-being and eternal happiness. How can a Muslim, unable to support themselves, have worldly well-being? And how can one lacking worldly well-being achieve eternal happiness? A billion Muslims are captives of the West. The West does not have overwhelming power against Muslims; rather, Muslims themselves are weak and feeble. One without intellect is powerless not only against enemies but even among friends does not know what to do. One must have worldly well-being to achieve the hereafter, and these two are unattainable without analytical power and intellect.

Knowledge is a form of awareness, and truth or duty is a form of action. Knowledge, which relates to intention and the heart’s cognition, always precedes and supersedes action. It is knowledge that takes on the form of truth or duty and manifests as such; just as it also manifests in other forms like charity, altruism, forgiveness, love, and affection.

A society becomes Islamic when firstly Islamic knowledge and awareness are delineated and public knowledge is propagated at various levels with necessary classification. Islam is a law of knowledge; if a jurist lacks knowledge, jurisprudence becomes a dry shell. If Islam is presented with its comprehensive nature, human society will find it a modern prescription for a healthy worldly life. Science, with all its advancements, will affirm such a law, and rational thinkers and intellectuals will find it logical and in harmony with natural laws operating through natural channels. Therefore, pure Sharia, when correctly explained, faces little opposition. Instead of prioritising democracy and comparing Islam with it—which the author suffers from—Islam, as humanity’s foremost and most accurate source of knowledge, is prioritised, and the shortcomings of democracy become clear through such comparison. Islam is a religion of knowledge and must be introduced to various societies through its knowledge, not through brief legal treatises that lack foundational propositions and constitute the terminal rather than the initial stage of Islamic knowledge.

In any case, this temperament-driven reading is that of superficial interpreters and does not represent the true Sharia. In religious propagation, the Qur’an should be invested in because if personal preferences and temperaments intervene in its interpretation, the attentive and reflective audience will understand it for themselves. It is preferable to focus solely on the Qur’an, as the only authentic book of knowledge, and speak only from it.

The greatest flaw of the aforementioned author is that he has not himself researched authentic Islamic sources and could not achieve ijtihad in this field. Just as in Western philosophy he merely imitates Western philosophers and transmits their writings, in understanding Islam, he refers to secondary sources and jurists who are superficial. Had he confined himself to understanding Islam solely through the Qur’an, it is hoped he would have found the correct path and enlightened his knowledge of Islam through this book. But he lacks a competent teacher in Islamic knowledge and is superficial, failing to grasp the subtleties and refinements of pure Sharia. Though he sometimes reaches irritating superficialities, his shallow knowledge renders him unable to recognise their superficiality and instead of fighting these superficialities, he, by mistaking them for Sharia, attacks the entire Sharia and its rulings with anti-religious rhetoric.

If he had realised that Sharia rulings have different levels—one revealed to the Four Infallibles and another from jurists and non-infallible mujtahids, who may err even if their ijtihad is sincere—he would not depict Sharia based on the ruling of one jurist. Ignoring the clear and lucid knowledge the Qur’an provides, understandable to all rational beings, he would not consider a jurist’s fatwa as the whole religion and divine law. Much of what jurists say is not just their personal understanding but is corroborated by reason, custom, and collective intellect, with rational and philosophical precision being a part of it.

The esteemed author also claims that governance based on law, reflecting public consent, is closer to justice than governance based on one jurist’s opinion. This may hold for democratic governments, but in Islamic governance, justice is substantive and realised by experts, with the jurist as a specialist rendering rulings closer to justice, especially when the jurist is just and refrains from personal biases and temperament in his fatwa.

Islamic governance administers a God-centred society, regarding God’s satisfaction as justice. Mere public approval does not guarantee law’s correctness or proximity to justice, unless access to revelation and ijtihad is impossible. Constant change and transformation of laws indicate the error of many human laws, while Islamic rulings are fixed and eternal as they derive from revelation. God-centred governance does not mean anti-people governance, since God loves all His servants and considers them under His care. No government can be God-centred and yet reject its people, let alone oppress or abandon them.

The philosophy of governance in Islam is sincere and proper service to God’s creation, flowing in natural channels and structures of health and welfare. Islamic governance cannot enact policies without public approval. There may be governments that bear the name Islam but lack its essence and oppress citizens in its name. Such oppression stems from rulers ignorant of Islam or those who do not practise even their distorted knowledge of Islam and impose their personal whims on people. Mere reference to Islam by such tyrannical governments does not make their actions Islamic, as seen in the Saudi monarchy, whose clerics call themselves guardians of Muslims while violating Sharia laws globally and sanctioning the killing of Shia and fomenting discord through takfiri agents worldwide.

Oppression arising from the mere title of Sharia has caused some thinkers, tormented by hardship and insecurity, to adopt anti-religious views, claiming that governance based on public consent is closer to justice than divine governance. Indeed, if a religious government is oppressive, democracy is preferable because it grants more security and freedom and does not produce overt hostility to religion despite secular policies. Authoritarian theocratic regimes, like historical church governments, silenced all opposition brutally. Our discussion with the esteemed author concerns the ontological status of religion and its Islamic structuring, not the epistemology of religion or its practical implementation. Throughout history, every theocratic government crafted its own distorted religious narrative pleasing to rulers, leaving pure and principled Sharia in obscurity—just as the factual reality of Christianity has no relation to church institutions.

The author’s foremost and deepest error is his belief that the entire Sharia is comprised of religious laws and rules, all of which can be enacted in a single place and time in a pure and pristine form by one jurist or group of jurists without involving human errors and political temptations. Such ignorance of the nature of law and jurisprudence leads to his superficial and naive views. The only authentic religious rule of Islam is the Qur’an, which is accessible to all rational beings and possesses a unique scientific and intellectual value. Other rules are scientific, practical, social, and derived from the Qur’an and the Sunnah in their human forms, and are neither eternal nor immutable; they are subject to change according to different conditions and times, and even to error. Thus, many juristic opinions reflect human thought and conditions rather than divine law in its purest sense.

The author’s confusion and conflation between divine, permanent Sharia and human, mutable jurisprudence led him to reject the Sharia as a whole. If he had distinguished between the unalterable divine core and the human interpretation and implementation of the law, he would have had a more accurate understanding and greater appreciation for Islam.

In conclusion, the reader should note that Islam’s greatest strength lies in its intellect and knowledge, which precede action and passion, and that true Islamic society depends on widespread understanding of its knowledge, not merely fervour in action or political power. The Qur’an as the fundamental book of knowledge is the basis for such understanding, while jurisprudence is the human articulation of divine principles, which should be studied critically and contextually.

The divergence and rift between the jurists of the Constitutional Era were so profound that the late Nouri stipulated that his will be opened in a gathering where the late Akhund Khorasani and Sayyid Mohammad Tabatabai were present, since these two eminent and venerable jurists of that era could not sit together and engage in discourse. Ultimately, they sat back to back as the will was read. It is said that Sheikh Shahid wrote in that will: “Your disagreement gave others the courage to execute me.”

One of the greatest tactics of politicians is to hold meetings with their rivals, shake their hands, and smile at them, while simultaneously pursuing their agenda of surpassing them even in that very assembly. The ability to speak and engage in dialogue is a crucial political skill; those lacking such capability are vulnerable if drawn into the political arena.

The problem of some jurists’ inability to engage in discourse stems from their introverted disposition, which has always inclined them to avoid others and devote themselves to scholarly research in isolation. This introversion originated from the threats they perceived from oppressive literalists or ignorant opponents. Scholars have historically suffered oppression from their religious adversaries—such as Sunni rulers and some literalists. Shia scholars, since the consolidation of Muawiyah’s rule, have been afflicted with exile and, following the tragedy of Karbala, faced such shock that they saw no path to safety other than seclusion, withdrawal, and taqiyya (dissimulation). Naturally, an isolated individual loses part of their analytical power and cannot fully grasp all aspects of a subject, despite religious scholars being among the saints of their era. However, the wounds inflicted upon them as described have hindered their ability to engage in dialogue.

Moreover, some literalist scholars suffer from envy, jealousy, resentment, pride, arrogance, and similar vices, refusing to sit alongside others in assemblies. Such individuals regard their own opinion as absolute and equate any opposing view with apostasy and heresy, ever ready to brandish the cudgel of takfir or at least ostracism against their opponents, demanding that everyone be their follower rather than a rival or dissenter. They quickly quarrel, curse, or damn anyone who voices dissent.

In any case, the core issue underlying the disputes among religious scholars during and after the Constitutional Era relates more to these matters—especially the lack of dialogic ability—than to understanding of the Sharia. These spiritual and formalistic shortcomings have obliterated many of the privileges of Sharia within society. An author, possessing only superficial knowledge of Islam, has observed such problems and, mistakenly, instead of critiquing the scholars’ political weaknesses, has questioned the Sharia’s authority and its governance. In other words, they have attributed the properties of the attribute to the attributed; they have mistaken the child for the parent and confused the establishment of religion with its affirmation, attacking the religion itself rather than its adherents.

Religion, in its affirmation and as exemplified by Imam Ali (peace be upon him) and other infallible leaders, interacts with humanity so compassionately that even non-Muslims envy the purity enveloping it. For instance, Imam Ali was a scholarly authority even for his adversaries during the rule of the unjust caliphs, and the tyrannical rulers sought his counsel in governance.

What follows is the notable divergence among jurists. To address this issue urgently, the government might adopt the opinion of the most prominent jurist, or that of one with popular and public acceptance, or perhaps that of the eldest jurist, applying an age criterion. However, for a lasting solution, a working group of experts spanning all relevant disciplines must review divergent opinions, assess the reasoning of each, and select the best ruling based on societal suitability, likelihood of successful implementation, and efficacy. Jurisprudence, like other sciences, is subject to differing viewpoints. As other disciplines employ empirical judgment or commission-based evaluation, jurisprudence too can benefit from joint sessions among jurists to establish an adjudicatory system. Through such a system, the multiplicity of qualified jurists’ opinions would not hinder the practical enforcement of Islamic rulings, but rather be consolidated into a unified perspective, preventing opponents from exploiting juristic disagreement to promote suspension of Sharia’s application.

To realise this, robust information banks must be developed, collecting reasons for each religious proposition, their historical context, juristic views, as well as opinions from philosophers, mystics, exegetes, theologians, historians, sociologists, psychologists, religious scholars, jurists, literary figures, followers of other faiths, and all academic works in Islamic sciences. Jurists alone should not suffice for legal deduction; instead, a comprehensive analysis by researchers, theorists, and thinkers is needed. Through intellectual exchange and collaboration, the groundwork for unity in jurisprudence and other Islamic sciences can be laid, dissolving current fragmentation via the proposed structure. This undertaking, if accomplished in Islamic and human sciences, transcends mere adjudication and yields better results in scientific reform and substantiation of Sharia rulings, although it pertains to religious craftsmanship rather than religious science proper—which depends on the sacred faculty bestowed on select experts. The distinction between “religious science” and “religious craft” is elaborated in our book Sociology of Religious Scholars. After obtaining expert opinion from this working group, the implementation process should be trialled on a limited scale in society, and if successful and devoid of flaws, the ruling should be legislated as law.

This principle explicitly states that all laws must be Islamic and assigns the task of determining this to the Guardian Council; however, the current composition of the Guardian Council does not provide a basis for assessing the Islamic nature of laws. The term “Islamic criteria” is undefined, and it is unclear whether it is equivalent to jurisprudence (fiqh) or not, whereas the Guardian Council consists solely of jurists and legal scholars. First, it must be established whether only the prevailing jurisprudence constitutes the standard, criterion, and benchmark of Islamic sciences. Furthermore, the Guardian Council requires specialised legal working groups composed of jurists, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and scholars from other relevant disciplines, who, as a consultative council, have the authority to issue fatwas. The jurists of the Guardian Council should be guided by this fatwa council, and social legitimacy—which could be influenced by opportunistic actors—should not be the sole basis for the legitimacy of fatwas, so that the council’s decisions are scientifically coherent and organic.

We referred to this fatwa council as the intellectual authority of the system, a role currently absent from the constitution. It should be noted that institutional think tanks, due to a lack of intellectual cohesion and comprehensive theoretical frameworks, cannot possess the cognitive capacity independently produced by an autonomous authority that is both grounded in Islamic principles and informed by contemporary sciences; especially a thinking power that understands both government structure and operational, implementable matters as well as the social and communal analysis. The outputs of such an authority would be collective intellectual products of specialists and various working groups. If the system intends to be managed scientifically and on the basis of Islamic criteria, it requires the design of such an institution to produce scientific content and the necessary intellectual output. Without it, recourse must be made to individual jurists who have undertaken scientific efforts; however, such individual efforts cannot underpin the system’s work across the full breadth of society.

Moreover, the constitution neglects the position of religious seminaries (hawzas), which are the intellectual heart of the nation and bear the pulse of Islamic thought discovery. In Article 77, which discusses constitutional revision, three university professors are mentioned, yet this institution is entirely and fundamentally disregarded. The interaction of religious seminaries with the system should be governed within a legal framework through scientific working groups and based on recognised specialisations such as the power of composition and critique—not on approved specialisations or licenses—to prevent discord and disagreement.

Compliance with Islamic criteria does not imply full conformity; rather, it suffices that laws are not in contradiction with Islam, a matter previously addressed in this chapter. Article 94 also considers mere conformity sufficient:

“All enactments of the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be submitted to the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council is obliged to review them within a maximum of ten days from receipt in terms of conformity with Islamic criteria and the constitution, and if it finds them inconsistent, it shall return them to the Assembly for reconsideration. Otherwise, the enactment shall be enforceable.”

The Guardianship of the Jurist

The constitution, in its Article 5, identifies the most important institution of the Islamic Republic—the leadership and guardianship of the jurist (Wilayat al-Faqih)—and assigns to him the authority of governance and the leadership of the community:

“In the absence of the Imam of the Time (may God hasten his reappearance), in the Islamic Republic of Iran, the guardianship of the order and the leadership of the community belongs to the just, pious, time-aware, courageous, capable, and prudent jurist who undertakes this responsibility according to Article 107.”

Wilayat al-Faqih: Continuity of the Imamate

The term “guardianship of the order and leadership of the community” is precise and reflects the Shia doctrine of this movement. The Shia school is based on the concept of the Imamate. Shia identity is bound to the Imam, and in his occultation this doctrine must be manifested; otherwise, it would become void and suspended. The embodiment of the Imamate during occultation is the Wilayat al-Faqih.

Wilayah (guardianship) is an internal matter, while the leadership of the community concerns the outward, visible guidance of the people. Imamate and wilayah represent an intersection between God and the people: the wali relates to the inner divine realm, whereas the imam relates to the external social realm.

The Wilayat al-Faqih is a delegated imamate, and his powers correspond to the imam’s, but by virtue of his delegated status, are conditioned upon ijtihad (jurisprudential reasoning) and justice, since the imam possesses divine knowledge and infallibility, whereas the jurist’s authority is limited to jurisprudential competence and justice. The difference between divine knowledge and ijtihad, and between justice and infallibility, is the difference between the finite and the infinite.

The Wilayat al-Faqih during occultation does not differ from the period of the Imam’s presence, since even during the Imam’s time, society required jurists. In the major occultation, the infallible imam remains present with his scientific culture and sources that have been accessible for over two and a half centuries, alongside the Shia community. Just as guardianship during the Imam’s presence was delegated to selected deputies, so too is it for jurists meeting conditions in the occultation. They act as deputies alongside the scientific presence of the Imams, analogous to how Amir al-Mu’minin (peace be upon him) was present only in the central city and capital of the Islamic world, without physical presence in other cities, while his scientific works were transmitted to others. Hence, the relationship between the infallible imam and the Wilayat al-Faqih in both presence and occultation is consistent; the content of infallibility—the Imam’s scientific proofs—remains accessible. This is why initial religious emulation (taqlid) of a deceased jurist is permissible, as his written knowledge survives death.

The leadership of the Wilayat al-Faqih represents overarching management; therefore, the individual leader must be qualified and capable in jurisprudence, management, and justice—not a council. Oversight of the leader, however, is the responsibility of an independent intellectual body, operating under the leader’s authority. The current Assembly of Experts and Expediency Discernment Council lack the capacity for such oversight; this institution must be formed of skilled religious scholars and academic elites who operate independently.

In secular and popular regimes, the system governs, not the regulator. This is a characteristic of divine governance: the individual rules, not the system. The individual interprets the law and educates society; where this principle is violated, the government loses its Islamic identity and is effectively controlled by shadow powers and influential actors. The superiority of the regulator over the system in divine governance rests on his ijtihad, jurisprudence, and justice. These terms require precise definitions to distinguish them clearly from dictatorship and to demonstrate the freedom and vibrancy created by religion, as opposed to oppressive and tyrannical environments. We discuss this open, loving atmosphere in our book The Face of Love.

The conditions described in this article are undefined and lack precise criteria for each attribute, which constitutes negligence requiring proper definition, precise formulation, and justified referencing.

The constitution treats the leadership conditions in Article 5 superficially, as no clear standards have been set nor any scientific body assigned to delineate and declare eligibility criteria in an incontrovertible manner.

This is a flaw in the constitution, as none of the leader’s mentioned attributes have established standards. Article 107 states:

“The Experts of Leadership shall consult and review all jurists meeting the conditions in Articles 5 and 109. If one is found to be the most knowledgeable in jurisprudential rulings, political and social matters, or enjoys general public acceptance or has a particular distinction in any attribute of Article 109, he shall be selected as leader; otherwise, one among them shall be appointed as leader.”

The confusion surrounding this article stems from the disorder in religious seminaries in determining jurists qualified for religious authority and emulation, a process that lacks standards and testing. It remains unclear how to identify the most knowledgeable (a’lam) and who qualifies as such.

Article 109 enumerates leadership qualifications without elaboration:

“Qualifications and attributes of the leader:

1. Necessary scholarly competence to issue religious rulings in various jurisprudential fields;
2. Justice and piety required to lead the Islamic community;
3. Correct political and social insight, prudence, courage, management, and sufficient leadership ability.

In the event of multiple qualified candidates, the one with stronger jurisprudential and political insight takes precedence.”

One undefined term here is “jurist” (faqih). We have delineated this term in previous discussions and elaborated in our book Sociology of Religious Scholars. According to those discussions, a qualified jurist is a specialist capable of deriving religious rulings, a task far more complex than managing society. While management is an independent science, a jurist who can correctly and comprehensively deduce rulings possesses better insight into theoretical management and practical administration. Proposing juristic oversight over management would overly complicate matters. Islam contains management knowledge inherently, and a jurist fit for leadership is one who has acquired this knowledge from Islamic sources and the conduct of the Imams. There is a difference between the supreme ruler of an Islamic system who holds overarching societal management and administrators with limited managerial roles, which we shall clarify.

If jurisprudence is properly understood, it does not negate volition or exclude the field from management and planning; it is not an abstract law but conscious social presence. Jurisprudence holds a status no less than modern society. To understand its capacity, one must consider its scientific potential beyond its historical oppression and concealment, by returning to fiqh sources in the broad sense engaging with all Islamic sciences. Such knowledge is not opposed to science nor in conflict with it.

By jurisprudence we mean jurisprudential understanding and intellectual capacity for ijtihad, with logical consequences in the fields of management, administration, leadership, and social wisdom.

Justice is the second important attribute. Here the constitution does not distinguish between religious and legal justice, a confusion which must be clarified. Justice is a supreme moral quality that defines leadership, thus the leader must be just and fair in all areas, ruling society accordingly.

The final attributes include political and social insight, prudence, courage, management, and leadership ability; these are broad qualities that require further elaboration to determine their content and limits. Without such explanation, the constitution remains vague and open to interpretation.

The jurist (Faqih) possesses the right not only to supervise but also to intervene and assume authority. Accordingly, the statement of Martyr Motahhari, who limited the role of the supreme jurist (Wali al-Faqih) solely to supervisory functions without the right to interfere or exercise authority—thus reducing the supreme jurist to a mere informed arbiter without the power of approval—is rejected. He states:

“The guardianship of the jurist does not mean that the jurist himself should be at the head of the government and practically rule. The role of the jurist in an Islamic country—that is, a country where the people have accepted Islam as an ideology and are committed to it—is that of an ideologue, not a ruler. The ideologue’s duty is to oversee the correct implementation of the ideology.”[99]

“The guardianship of the jurist is an ideological guardianship. Fundamentally, the jurist is elected by the people, and this is democracy in essence.”[100]

These remarks were made in the early days of the revolution, possibly out of fear of being accused of despotism. However, the supreme jurist is indeed the ruler, and it is inconceivable that his subordinates hold the authority to rule while he does not. This theory is incompatible with the concept of “Guardianship of the Jurist.” In jurisprudence, the guardian of minors and the insane holds the right of beneficial intervention; how then could the jurist—who assumes this position under stringent conditions, and by virtue of his sacred capacity is genuinely superior to others, who are comparatively weaker in discerning good from evil—be denied the right to intervene and interfere? The Guardianship of the Jurist is a continuation and derivation of the guardianship exercised by the infallible Imams. The supreme jurist possesses all the powers of those infallible figures, subject to correct jurisprudential reasoning (ijtihad) and justice, conditions guaranteed by the intellectual power of the system. Guardianship is not merely supervisory; it is rulership and authority. Supervision is but one of the functions of a qualified jurist. Naturally, the jurist’s guardianship is valid only insofar as it remains within the bounds of Islamic law; he cannot act autonomously or make decisions based on whims or carnal desires. Moreover, since the jurist’s general conditions are ordained by God, his appointment is divine, and since it requires popular endorsement, he is chosen by the people among those meeting the necessary criteria. The people may limit or temporally restrict his term and may, if they wish, select among qualified jurists. However, since guardianship is a divine grant based on conditions set by God, they cannot restrict his authority in decisions made in accordance with Sharia. In cases where Sharia or the constitution permits referenda, the people have the right to intervene.

The Difference Between Guardianship Over Minors and Insane and Guardianship Over the People

The necessity of leadership and obedience to a single individual who possesses the expertise to understand divine rulings and the ability to govern justly—even without sin—is a matter of collective rationality and the practice of sages who defer to specialists. Collective reason forbids non-specialists from holding such positions. The difference between guardianship over minors and the insane and guardianship over the people—which we previously mentioned briefly, pointing out their commonality in weakness without detailing their differences—lies here. Guardianship over minors and the insane is due to their incapacity, whereas guardianship over the people arises from the necessity of governance on one hand, and the unwillingness of non-specialists to assume this governance on the other. For the latter, governance is unwanted; collective reason mandates it, and they entrust and accept it from a qualified jurist. Meanwhile, minors and the insane have no will; they have no right to choose their guardianship, which is, as ordained by God, entrusted to a qualified relative such as a grandfather, father, or mother. However, in guardianship of the jurist, God has set general conditions but granted people the right to choose among multiple qualified candidates (which can number in the dozens). The people exercise collective will—not a specific faction—to elect, temporally limit, or revoke the jurist’s mandate. The implementation of this choice is rational rather than purely doctrinal (this distinction must be noted carefully to avoid confusion with the theological principle that the guardianship itself is divinely ordained). Hence, if a jurist superior to the incumbent exists, the people can withdraw their endorsement and grant governance to the superior jurist. This contrasts with guardianship over minors and the insane, who have no agency in this respect. Thus, these two types of guardianship differ fundamentally.

Acceptance of guardianship of the jurist entails collective rational and popular will. The jurist’s law is Islam, which he derives through ijtihad; however, to protect the jurist from error requires an intellectual force and an ideological support base, which constitutes the fourth pillar of the system—the intellectual power.

It is important to note that the constitution expresses Islamic rulings and no distinction should be made between Islamic law and the constitution. Leadership within the framework of Islamic law carries the authority inherent in Islam for every issue.

Although the comprehensive management of society is entrusted by the infallibles to the jurist, the conditions set by God and the popular acceptance establish a loyal and affectionate relationship between the jurist and the people. The jurist must embody “the chief of the people who serves them”—a great leader who serves and bears responsibility for the people. Introducing a person with such qualities is the role of the system’s intellectual power, which acts as the ideological organ, preparing the ground by presenting the scholarly and managerial capabilities of all qualified jurists and ensuring proper scientific and political promotion.

In the absence of the infallibles, the jurist functions as the teacher of divine revelation and rulings; these rulings require a capable educational authority to disseminate and institutionalise them, one who has the necessary expertise to manage the Shi‘a community within his popular influence. The jurist is not only a teacher and guide but also possesses the authority to command and lead; he is not limited to teaching society. Collective reason dictates that such grave responsibility and governance is unwanted by those lacking the qualifications, and they must accept the leadership of a qualified jurist with popular influence, binding it to their heartfelt and sincere religious sentiments.

The jurist is a divine figure nurtured by Sharia, having disciplined his ego and desires, holding no worldly ambitions or desires, and seeking nothing for himself. In the book “The Red Path” (Sīr-e Sorkh), we have outlined the spiritual training of the jurist, and the necessary scientific and jurisprudential qualifications are discussed in other works.

People’s Legitimisation

People’s legitimisation serves as the intermediary link between the theoretical establishment and the practical validation of the doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist). Popular election (acceptance by the people) elevates the theoretical establishment of the jurist’s guardianship to the level of practical validation, thereby granting it executive power and social authority.

It must be noted that Imamate and sovereignty for an infallible Imam are divine endowments granted directly by God. The notion of people’s legitimisation refers to the acceptance by the populace, which, if withheld, constitutes disobedience. The Imam’s social influence depends on the people, whereas the Imamate itself is a divine office beyond popular conferment or revocation. People’s legitimisation is never imposed coercively; the infallible Imams never forced themselves upon the people nor established their social role through despotism. However, rejecting the rightful Imam equates to rejecting God and merits divine punishment. Likewise, in the period of occultation, legitimising an individual lacking the necessary qualifications for guardianship entails deserving retribution. A community that chooses unsuitably and marginalises the rightful leader deprives itself of well-being and divine favour, inevitably incurring consequences such as unjust killings.

When people legitimise any qualified jurist, that jurist gains the authority to exercise guardianship within the bounds of that popular acceptance. Consequently, if two regions each legitimise different qualified jurists, each may govern independently, and interference by one in the other’s accepted domain would compromise their justice. Both must recognise each other’s legitimacy. People’s legitimisation must not be secured through misleading propaganda, sensationalism, exorbitant expenditure, or political manipulation, as these contradict the principle of justice. Rather, a neutral “fourth power” within the system should, based on scientific logic, facilitate the introduction of qualified jurists and amplify their voices to the public. Presently, some communities lack a credible scholarly framework and are factionalised, rendering this difficult.

The challenge in Velayat-e Faqih is not in its theoretical establishment but in recognising and validating the external qualified jurist. This necessitates a reflective authority and a scientific system to determine necessary standards.

For the era of occultation, general conditions that confer legitimacy upon the jurist have been articulated, while identifying the suitable candidate lies with a scientific working group to connect theoretical leadership to practical acceptance based on popular legitimisation. Each community may administer its affairs under the guardianship of a qualified jurist they accept. Hence, the formation of Islamic popular assemblies is an endorsed proposal.

The sphere of influence and authority of each jurist is defined by custom, society, and the jurist’s popular domain. This process is fundamentally rational and societal, grounded in customary acceptance, which establishes an independent jurisdiction for each jurist based on their popular legitimacy. Society and the people determine whether multiple jurists hold authority or a single jurist does.

Importantly, people’s legitimisation pertains solely to the social authority of jurists, who retain the right to choose but not to appoint. Members of society cannot alter the jurist’s stipulated qualifications nor add or remove conditions arbitrarily; otherwise, the governance of the jurist ceases to be Islamic and becomes merely Muslim governance devoid of Sharīʿa foundation.

The general conditions for jurists are a scholarly and technical matter, exceeding what most texts outline and intended for governing limited, closed societies. Mastery of psychology and sociology must be incorporated, and the jurist’s understanding must transcend conventional jurisprudence, encompassing a broad spectrum of Islamic and human sciences and insight into the subject matter and legal criteria. Similarly, the qualifications of a judge have evolved to include broader knowledge beyond traditional requirements.

God has designed an overarching system for Islamic governance, delegating its practical implementation to rational agents, prioritising divine laws while allowing flexibility in method.

In a Velayat-e Faqih-based system, after people elect and accept a qualified jurist, they do not lose their agency. The jurist may consult the people via referendum on major matters—such as war, peace, nuclear policy, or subsidy reform—once fully informing them. If responsibility lies directly with the people, consequences fall upon them. No generation can decide for the next; each bears responsibility for their era’s events. It is preferable the jurist avoid incurring direct accountability from the people in overarching social matters. Article 6 of the Iranian Constitution affirms that national affairs should be managed based on public vote through elections or referenda as prescribed.

Although the phrase “national affairs” is ambiguous, it encompasses major state matters. Article 110 designates referenda as one of the leadership’s three main responsibilities.

An infallible individual lacking in sanctity should not alone bear the burden of making critical decisions, but should delegate responsibility to the people through transparent referenda conducted under systematic supervision, free from provocative propaganda, framed scientifically and debated openly among experts and socially aware voices. Such referenda in an Islamic country do not contradict the leadership; on the contrary, they support and reinforce it, conducted with the leader’s permission or at their behest.

Determining whether a matter constitutes a major state issue—as foreseen by the Constitution—is the prerogative of two-thirds of the parliamentary representatives. While decision-making rests with the people, legitimisation and proclamation belong to the leadership (per Article 110), which may oppose public opinion but must assume full responsibility for such decisions and be accountable to the people for any failure. The leader may express expert views prior to referenda but must yield to the popular will, avoiding conflict with the people, as leadership’s raison d’être is sincere service. Loss of popular support equates to betrayal, since guardianship is not despotic but derives authority from the people. The jurist exercises guardianship through calling and enacting referenda, thereby reinforcing popular election and social power.

This framework eliminates despotism and arbitrary rule. Though referenda impose costs on the state budget, their benefits in major affairs justify the expenditure.

The country’s leadership structure rests with the Wali al-Faqih, who even in matters resolved by referendum, confirms and endorses outcomes. Leadership and Imamate—consolidated in the concept of ‘leadership’—reside with him but are always grounded in popular support. The leader cannot rely on military force against an unwilling populace because religion forbids coercion in guardianship matters. As in the case of Imam Ali (peace be upon him), who withdrew after the Saqifah coup without violence, whenever conflict arises between popular consensus and the principle of Islamic leadership, priority is given to the people unless the issue is purely perceptual and resolvable by scholarly arbitration. Islam’s strength is in its republican nature, not military power or despotism, even if the jurist is rightly qualified. In such cases, the jurist should step down peacefully.

This does not contradict the primacy of divine revelation, which guarantees Imamate’s permanence, distinct from the practical exercise of authority, which requires social legitimacy and popular acceptance.

Societal authority belongs to the people; revelation and guardianship pertain to leadership’s essence, not its power. Deliberate opposition by the people to a legitimate jurist is sinful; inadvertent opposition is excusable. In both cases, the jurist may not employ force because religion serves the people; forced removal leaves no community for religion to serve.

Divine Appointment and Popular Choice

The jurist’s divine appointment pertains to the reality of guardianship, while popular election and acceptance concern its practical exercise. These two levels are not contradictory but complementary: without popular legitimisation, the jurist lacks authority to govern.

Since the people must verify the jurist’s qualifications, they hold the right to supervise through experts and specialists—the system’s reflective authority—without needing the jurist’s permission. This right is God-given and ensures continued qualification; it does not derive legitimacy from the jurist but from divine law. Worship likewise is not contingent upon jurist permission.

Appointment and dismissal are parallel: appointment belongs to God, while dismissal does not rest with the people. A jurist losing qualifications is automatically disqualified without formal dismissal; the people can withdraw governance through protest and transfer authority to a qualified jurist.

People’s legitimisation is rational behaviour common to religious and secular regimes alike. The public role is affirmation (not discovery) of authority—similar to a teacher certifying a student’s success.

Divine appointment of Velayat-e Faqih involves actualisation through meeting conditions. The expert council identifies qualified candidates and announces them; the people’s role is to affirm.

People’s supervisory right stems from their social citizenship, not mere humanity, since social living entails mutual responsibility absent in individualistic existence.

Neglecting people’s legitimisation risks conflating Velayat-e Faqih—theocratic governance for the Imam’s occultation—with Muslim rule, akin to Pakistan’s model or constitutional monarchies, where popular roles are absent or delegated solely to monarchs or clerics.

Islamic governance originates from God and concludes with the people in a top-down model. Muslim governance is grassroots, permitting jurist or non-jurist leadership, akin to democracy despite Islamic titles. In Islamic governance, God is supreme, the jurist mediates between God and people, and people perform legitimisation, not ignored. Governance based solely on people makes them the ultimate arbiter of its Islamic character.

Islamic governance theoretically derives from the lineage of divine prophets and their methods, but practically, if it diverges, it becomes merely Muslim governance. Theoretical establishment of Velayat-e Faqih is undisputed; practical realisation brings forth the fragrance of sincere service and public legitimisation.

List of Publications Ready for Release

• The Enchanting Fire
• The Fire of Wrath
• The Fire of Devotion
• The Friday of Alast
• The Intellectual Freedom of Seminary Scholars and the Tyranny of Despots
• Freedom in Captivity
• The Tranquil Steward of Purity
• The Playful Tranquil
• Social Ailments
• The Nest of Purity
• The Water Basin
• The Creation of Man and Materialism
• Instruction in Iranian Musical Modes
• The Beautiful Voice
• The Sigh
• Verses of Ordinances and Jurisprudence of the Qur’an
• Verse by Verse Illumination
• The Rite of Rationality
• The Rite of Justice
• Clouds and Rain
• The Deceptive Satan
• Divine Jurisprudence
• Medical Rulings
• Gambling Laws
• Rules of Gaze towards Women
• Contemporary Rulings
• What Does the News Say?
• What Do the News Followers and Principles Say?
• The Star of the Heart
• Means of Revelation
• A Brief Divination Using Qur’anic Verses and Surahs
• Islam; The Ever-Living Identity
• Principles and Rules of Religious Propagation
• What Does the Principle Say?
• The Fallen Tress
• The Economics of Seminaries and the Stipend of Religious Students
• Healthy Economy, Sick Economy
• Jurisprudential Annotations
• Commentary on Forbidden Earnings
• Introduction to the Explanation of the Rules of Monotheism
• The Simple Body and Its Divisions
• The Nine Jurisprudential Treatises
• The Seven Creedal Treatises
• Singing and Dancing
• The Modern Index of Verses of Ordinances
• The Modern Index of Shia Jurisprudence
• Jurisprudential Principles
• Patterns of Religious Thought
• Studies in Usul al-Fiqh Methodologies
• The Musk (2 volumes)
• Guardianship and Government
• The True Imam; Fatimah 3, The Imam of Love; Hussein 9
• Man and the World of Life
• The Human Being, Hoorah
• The Islamic Revolution; Challenges and Proposals
• The Islamic Revolution and the Muslim Republic
• The Cultural Revolution
• The Coquettish Finger
• Inner Cognition
• The Necessary Conditions of Religious Study and the Semantics of Religion
• The Intuition of Divine Knowledge
• The Spring Branch
• A Leaf from the Pathology of the Islamic Revolution
• The Gathering of Glances
• The Good News of the Messenger 9
• Misfortune
• The Heights of Shia Jurisprudence (9 volumes)
• The Heights of Knowledge
• The Blind Monkey
• The Spring of Devotion
• The Paradise of Shamran
• The Heartless and the Mad
• A New Study on the Rules of Dancing
• Refuge in Annihilation
• Five Philosophical Essays
• Behavioural Advice
• The Patch on the Cloak
• The Prophet of Love; Hussein 7
• Religious Messaging
• Ornamentation Studies
• The True Leaders of Islam
• Analytical History of Music in Islam
• The Ever-Living History
• The Pulse of Faith and Disbelief
• Manifestation of Coquetry
• The Commentary of Liberation (3 volumes)
• The Inalterability and Authority of the Holy Qur’an
• Political Strategies
• The Interpreter of Guidance
• Obstinate Deception
• The Ninth Second
• Soft and Digital Interaction
• Dream Interpretation
• Commentary on Minor Surahs
• Commentary on Guidance (4 volumes)
• The Spectacle of Existence
• The Statue of Truth
• Yearning for Union
• The Only Essence (Poems)
• The Sword of Fate
• The Spell of Hypocrisy
• The Spell of the Whisperer
• Comprehensive Ordinances
• Sociology of Religious Scholars
• The Goblet of Intoxication
• Zoology
• The Captivating Gaze
• The Glory of the Devout
• The Beauty of Manifestation
• Mr Particle
• Demonology
• The War of Water
• War and Colour
• The Chivalrous Men
• The Wild Imagination
• The Troubled World
• Framework of Spiritual Perfection
• New Framework of Shia Jurisprudence
• The Why and How of the Islamic Revolution
• The Eye of Hope
• Outlook of Religious Scholars
• The Look of the Eye
• Fountain of Life
• The Springs of Kawthar
• The Spring of Kindness
• The Spring of Ruby
• How to Live, How to Die
• Face to Face
• The Face of Love
• The Mysterious Incident
• Annotation on Rules and Benefits
• Pilgrimage; Abrahamic or Organisational
• Spiritual Chambers
• The Heat of Hoor
• The Sacred Sanctuary
• The Battle Veteran
• Present and Absent Presence
• Presence of Lovers
• Presence of the Beloved
• New Legal Rights (2 volumes)
• The Truth of Sharia in the Jurisprudence of ‘Urwah (2 volumes)
• The Tale of Love
• The Wisdom Book of Philosophy
• Sweetness
• The Firewood Carrier
• The Hoor of Mount
• Seminary; Challenges and Proposals
• The Confusion of Essence
• Memory; A Role on the Face of the Mind
• Atheism and Principles of Atheism
• God-Worship and Innate Nature
• Theology
• The God I Worship
• The Madness of Chaos
• Qualities of Health and Happiness
• The Western Railway Line
• Eternal Hellfire and Torment
• The Arched Brow
• The Political Treatises of Khums
• The Five Virtuous Ones
• The Laughter of Newsha
• The Pointless Pig
• Sleep, Night and Awakening
• Heart’s Blood (Quatrains)
• White Blood
• The Tent of Permanence
• The Green Tent of the Reappearance
• A Story of Disorder in Religious Dress
• The Trap of Obstinacy
• The Hem of Time
• Knowledge of Divination (5 volumes)
• Cultivated Literature and Etymology
• Learning and Violence
• Sufficient Knowledge
• Knowledge of Interpretation, Knowledge of Exegesis
• Knowledge of Remembrance
• Knowledge of Spiritual Conduct
• Knowledge Seeking
• The Circle of Existence
• Introduction to Divination with the Holy Qur’an
• Introduction to Understanding the Holy Qur’an
• Introduction to Usul, Rijal and Diraayah
• Pain and Social Problems
• The Pain of Separation
• The Pretext of Tradition (Translation of Al-Muskah)
• The Drum of Death
• The Beloved Enamoured
• The Scatterer of Hearts
• The Devoted
• The Comforter
• The Breath of the Heart
• The World of Jinn and the Deceit of Humans
• The Colourful World
• The State of Solitude
• The Generous State
• The Saviour State
• Two Meeting Places of Love
• The Nameless Land
• The Land of the Compass
• The Final Sight
• The Madman’s Diwan (Doubts)
• The Diwan of Love and Knowledge (4 volumes)
• The Diwan of the Beloved
• The Diwan of Guardianship
• The Devil of Depravity
• The Devil-Born Dog-Wolf
• The Humiliated and Disgraced
• Secret and Affection (Masnavi Poems)
• Driving and Guidance
• The Grand Strategies of the Islamic System
• The Countenance
• The Markless Glow
• The Countenance of Existence
• Treatise of Clarification of Issues (2 volumes)
• The Dance of the Sky
• The Dance of Autumn
• The Dance of the Sword
• The Sweet Dance
• The Dance of Grace
• Psychology of Tyranny
• Psychology of Arrogance
• Psychology of Fear
• Psychology of Ambition
• Psychology of Anger
• Psychology of Women
• Psychology of Sadism
• Psychology of Polytheism
• Psychology of Nervous Disorders
• Psychology of the Lower Self
• Psychology of Greed
• Psychology of Oppression
• Psychology of Love
• Psychology of Reason
• Psychology of Knowledge
• Psychology of Willpower
• Psychology of Disbelief
• Psychology of Genius
• Psychology of Illusion
• Psychology of the Fiery Self
• Narrative of a Market Economy
• Spirituality and Leadership
• The Spirit of the World (Quatrains)
• Methods of Qur’anic Interpretation
• The Approach of the Holy Imams and Revolutionary Movements
• Enlightenment in Worldliness and Worldliness
• The Flourishing Era
• The Flourishing Flower
• Shia Leaders in the Era of Occultation
• Silent Vision
• Visionary Dreams
• Body Language
• The Song of the Skylark (2 volumes)
• The Song of the Instrument
• Pure Mysticism
• Dishevelled Hair
• Woman; The Paradise of Beauty and Upbringing
• Chain of Equality and Sequence of Oppression
• Life, Love or Law
• The Living Appearance
• Woman; The Eternal Oppressed of History (4 volumes)
• Woman and Religious Freedom
• Woman; The Goddess of Love
• Woman and Life
• The Visible Beauty
• Your Beauty
• Aesthetics
• The Art of Poetry Composition
• Simply in the Colour of God
• The Goblet of Hoor
• The Dragon’s Lightweight Brain
• The Star Without a Mark
• The Prostration of the Stature
• The Mirage of Mysticism or the Scattered Dust
• The Tall Cypress
• The Anthem of the Lovers
• Patriarchy: Men’s or Women’s Dominion?
• The Path of Mourning
• The Feast of Hoor
• Passion and Discord (Odes)
• The Travel of the Earth
• Thoughtful Wanderer
• The Red Path (3 volumes)
• The Journey of Love / Memoirs (3 volumes)
• The Appearance of Seeking
• The Devil’s Horn
• The Evening of Exile
• The Iranian Evening (3 volumes)
• The Witness of Solitude
• The Bewitched Witness
• Night, Solitude and the Thunderbolt of Silence
• The Poisons of Sorrow
• The Poisons of Deception
• The Emerging Jackal
• Wonders of Bodily Health
• The Candle of Gathering
• The Candle of Life
• The Playful Elst
• The Mad Passion
• The Rebellious Sweetness
• The Political Ritual
• The Madman of Existence
• The Method of Implementing Hudud
• The Householder
• The New Dawn
• The Book of Love
• The Seminary’s Manuscript
• The Purity of Youth
• The Purity of the Heart
• The Purity of the Intellect
• The Necessity of Understanding the Rank of Luminosity
• The Deceptive Tyrant
• The Drum of Uproar
• The Tamed Nature
• The Prey of Greed
• The Rebellion of Desire
• Seeking and Commitment to Work
• The Dawn of Tomorrow
• The Blessed Tuba
• The Vessel of Manifestation
• The Pure Manifestation
• The Study of Manifestation
• The Manifestation of Honour
• The Mystic and Perfection
• The Most Passionate Lover
• The Agile Lover
• Religious Scholars and Simplicity of Life
• The Beloved’s Mysticism and the Devotees’ Path
• Mysticism and Spiritual Stations
• The Bride of Spring
• The Bride of the Heart
• Pure Delight
• Love and the Trap
• Infallibility; A Divine Gift
• The Fragrance of Conclusion
• The Bewitching Demon
• The Science of Principles and its Five Scholars
• True Scholars; Followers of the Prophets
• The Science of Life
• The Phoenix of Affection
• The Worlds of Mina
• The Noble Warriors
• Drowned in You
• The Submerged
• The Stranger Unique
• The Drowning in Love
• The Best Gazelle
• The Drunken Gazelle
• Women’s Singing
• Coyness and Tenderness
• The Unseen, Night and Awakening
• The Sedition of Tyranny
• Angelology
• The Radiance of Joy
• The Culture of Sharia and the Nasut of Nature
• The Culture of Mysticism
• Jurisprudence of Wisdom
• Jurisprudence of Purity, Joy and Ecstasy
• Jurisprudence of Singing and Music (7 volumes)
• Modern Philosophy
• Philosophical Thought
• Philosophical Thought
• The Annihilation of the Face
• The Army of Fear
• The Eruption of Love
• The Catalogue of God’s Beauty and Majesty
• The List of Masculine and Feminine Terms in the Holy Qur’an
• The Sacred Light of Paradise
• The Height of Thought
• The Saint of Love
• The Holy Qur’an and Economic Contexts
• The Nearness of Exile
• Nearness and Calamity
• The Beloved’s Nearness (Couplets)
• The Story of the Hair
• The Gambling of Love
• Rules of Dream Interpretation
• The Seven Principles of Divine Conduct
• The Abode of Hope
• The Sweetness of Kawthar (Quatrains)
• A New Investigation into Miracles and Blessings
• The Book of God
• The Book of Friendship
• The Book of Nature
• The Book of Law (5 volumes)
• The Coquetry of Tenderness
• The Abandoned Hyena
• The Wandering Dog
• The Complete Divan of Neko (30 volumes)
• Kawthar; The Honour of the True God
• Kawthar; The Point of Existence
• Passages and Escapes of Society
• The Lowly Boar
• The Whirlpool of Illusion
• The Plundering Wolf
• Propositions of Anthropology
• Selected Explanations of Issues
• Social Dialogues
• Intimate Dialogues
• Qur’anic Discourse
• The Pomegranate Flower
• The Rose Face
• The Timeless Treasure
• The Essence of Servitude and the Core of Ownership
• Botany
• The Smile of the Beloved
• The Edge of Delight
• The Gentleness of Rain
• The Grace of Outcome
• The Tenderness of Presence
• The Flame of Poverty
• The Night’s Heart
• The Bewildered Zuleikha
• The Visible Moon
• The Beloved and the Lovers
• The Beloved of Love
• The Keeper of Secrets
• The Presence of Essence
• The Ideal City or Modern Forest
• The Levels of Guardianship
• Death and Life in Eternity
• The Glad Tidings of Purification
• The Nameless Drunk
• The Beloved Drunk
• The Intoxicated and the Sober
• The Tresses of Desire
• The Bodily Resurrection
• The Bodily Resurrection; A Religious and Philosophical Reality
• The Knowledge of the Beloved and the Path of the Devotee
• Spiritual Food
• The Stations of Mystics
• The Recompense of Love
• The Beggar Fly
• The Expressive Sayings
• The Treacherous Friend
• The Pilgrimage Rituals
• The Pilgrimage Rituals
• The Logic of Music
• I am the Sea
• The Covenant
• The Spiritual Mina
• The Coquetry of the Beloved
• The Drunken Narcissus
• The Mystical Prescription
• The Burnt Generation
• The Merciful Breeze
• The System of Domination
• Political Perspectives
• The Mystical Songs
• The Curse of Anger
• Psychology of the Soul
• The Call of Determination
• The Call of Love
• The Pure Criticism / Reception of the Divan of Khajeh Hafez Shirazi (4 volumes)
• The Role of the Father
• The Simple Beloved
• The Image of Existence
• The Beloved’s Gaze
• The Jewel of Existence
• The Face of Mission
• The Melody of the Devout
• Light and Joy
• Alcoholic Beverages
• The Drunken Unity
• The Arrival of Parisa
• The Study of Guardianship
• The Difficult Guardianship of Imam Ali (7)
• The Reckless Virus
• Religious Guidance
• The Coffin of the Thousand Hands
• The United Resolve
• Efficient Spouses and Managers
• The Air of the Beloved
• The Howl
• The Desire of Night
• The Uproar
• The Awe of Love
• The Pledge of Love
• The Wild Thorn
• The Memoir of Clergy
• The Loyal Friend
• The Everywhere Friend
• The Friend, Friend
• A Single Body
• Monotheism
• The Science of the One
• The One Who Sees
• The Champion