Jurisprudence of Music and Singing (Volume 5)

Jurisprudence of Music and Singing (Volume 5)
Analysis and Review of the Views of Independent Jurists and Their Followers from the Thirteenth Century to the Present

By: Ayatollah Mohammadreza Nekounam
(May his soul rest in peace)

Main Author: Nekounam, Mohammadreza (b. 1327)
Title: The Jurisprudence of Music and Singing: An Analysis and Review of the Views of Independent Jurists and Their Followers from the Thirteenth Century to the Present / Mohammadreza Nekounam
Publication Information: Islamshahr, Sobhe Farda Publishing, 1393 (2014)
Physical Description: 7 volumes, Volume 5, 192 pages
ISBN: 978-600-6435-19-0 (Set), 978-600-6435-30-5 (Volume 5)
Cataloging Status: FIPA
Notes: Volume 5, Series 7 (First Edition: 1393)
Alternative Title: Analysis and Review of the Views of Independent Jurists and Their Followers from the Thirteenth Century to the Present
Subjects: Music (Jurisprudence), Islam and Music, Music – Fatwas
Library of Congress Classification: 6/194/N8 F7 1391
Dewey Decimal Classification: 374/297
National Bibliography Number: 3992942
Publisher: Sobhe Farda, Printed in Naghsh Gostar
Edition: First Edition
Print Date: 1393 (2014)
Print Run: 3000 copies
Price for the Set: 330,000 Toman
Distribution Center: Qom, Amin Boulevard, 24th Alley, Left Side, No. 76
Distribution Center Phone: +9825-3290-7815
Website: www.nekounam.ir

Chapter Eight: Singing and Music from the Perspective of Jurists from the Thirteenth Century to the Present

By: Sayyid Mohammad-Javad Hosseini Ameli
(Also known as Muhaqqiq Javad, d. 1226 AH)

Muhaqqiq Javad, author of the invaluable work Miftah al-Karama fi Sharh Qawa’id al-‘Allama and a teacher of Jawaher (The Jewel), analyses and critiques the fatwas and views of other jurists in his commentary on Qawa’id al-‘Allama by al-Hilli.

Definition of Singing

Al-‘Allama al-Hilli holds the view that:
“Four things are explicitly prohibited by the law, such as the creation of images (idols), singing, teaching and listening to singing, and the payment for the singer.”

In his commentary, Muhaqqiq Javad explains:
“It is as if the definition of singing in the dictionary refers to a sound that is prolonged, beautiful, and resounding, which aligns with the common interpretation, as the resonation of sound is closely linked to causing emotional excitement and ecstasy…”

He goes on to say:
“Thus, when the terms ‘prolongation’, ‘resonance’, and ‘ecstasy’ are mentioned, there is no need for further explanation, as they inherently convey the notion of enhancement and emotional stirring. The famous meaning is a clear consensus, and the common understanding should not contradict it.”

He also mentions that when examining the meaning of these terms, he concurs with earlier scholars who, following the Majma‘ al-Burhan, only describe two meanings: the well-known definition and the referral to common usage.

Distinction Between “Tarab” and “Tatrib”

In Volume One, it was discussed that ecstasy and tatrib describe the quality of sound, not the state of the heart. Tarab refers to the listener’s emotional reaction and is related to an ecstatic or overwhelming feeling, whereas tatrib describes the formal characteristics of the sound itself. It cannot be considered a mere emotional state of the listener. As discussed in the analysis of derivatives, the core meaning of the root word should be reflected in all derivative terms. Therefore, the meaning of tarab is inherent in both ecstasy and tatrib, and it is impossible to derive a meaning that departs from this fundamental concept.

Muhaqqiq Javad maintains that tarab is distinct from both ecstasy and tatrib, arguing that singing is prohibited even if it does not induce emotional excitement. He proposes two possible definitions of singing: one being the famous interpretation of “prolonging the voice with melodic resonance,” and the second being the referral of its meaning to common societal conventions.

Critique of the View of Muhaqqiq Ardabili

Muhaqqiq Javad critiques the definition of singing provided by Muhaqqiq Ardabili, which states that singing involves a prolonged sound without ecstasy. He points out that if this definition were to be accepted, even the call to prayer (adhan), which includes prolonged sounds without emotional excitement, would have to be deemed forbidden. Muhaqqiq Javad suggests that Muhaqqiq Ardabili’s approach might have been influenced by a lack of reference to lexicographical sources, particularly when it comes to the nuanced distinctions between tarab and tatrib, as explained by linguists like the author of Qamus.

He further argues that Muhaqqiq Ardabili’s assertion that tarab is exclusively linked to joy is misguided, as it is a misunderstanding based on a popular misconception.

Music without Ecstasy (Permissible Singing)

Muhaqqiq Javad argues that permissible singing is that which lacks tatrib or resonance, where the voice is not manipulated to create emotional excitement. He suggests that resonance, as it is traditionally understood, includes various types of vocal manipulation, and such practices should be avoided for the voice to remain free of tarab.

Arguments for the Prohibition of Singing

“There is no disagreement, as noted in Majma‘ al-Burhan, regarding the prohibition of singing and the prohibition of its teaching, listening, or paying for it, whether in the context of the Qur’an, supplications, poetry, or otherwise. Even prominent scholars such as the late Mufid al-Kashani and al-Khorasani followed the path of al-Ghazali and others from the Sunni tradition, limiting the prohibition to cases where forbidden elements, such as musical instruments or improper topics, were involved.”

Muhaqqiq Javad rejects arguments in favour of the permissibility of singing and dismisses them as being influenced by the broader Sunni tradition, often attributing such views to taqiya (dissimulation). He critiques these views, noting that they conflict with both the Qur’anic teachings and the doctrines of Shia jurisprudence, and emphasizes that such opinions should be considered mere fabrications, divorced from the true understanding of Islamic law.

The Problem of “The Preference of Kufr!”

The scholars who believe that singing (ghina) is permissible, or even recommended, and that it is acceptable to recite the Qur’an and supplications with singing, face a conflict with the narrations that describe the payment for the singer’s services as harsh and consider such acts to be acts of disbelief (kufr). Can disbelief be recommended? The understanding of such scholars, who think these narrations imply the recommendation of singing, is mistaken. These narrations explicitly encourage reciting the Qur’an in a sorrowful or pleasant voice, both of which have no connection to singing.

Some narrations attributed to the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) state: “My community has been gifted with three things: beauty of the face, a good voice, and a strong memory.”

The term “ghina” refers to wealth, and these narrations that command reciting the Qur’an in a melodious or sorrowful manner refer to the self-sufficiency that comes with reading the Qur’an, not to singing it.

The view that singing is permissible is considered by some scholars to be erroneous and a superstition that originates from the Sufis. Of course, at that time, there was significant animosity towards the Sufis, much like how the Sufis, who held political power, had conflicts with others. The Sufis often accused the scholars of ignorance, while the scholars saw them as deviants. However, it is wise not to view others with disdain or enmity. Rather, one should treat all of God’s servants with compassion, love, and respect, refraining from issuing judgments as if one were in God’s position. Our affection and aversion should be divine in nature, and if it stems from personal or sectarian bias, it leads only to rancor and bitterness.

Ultimately, everyone is a Muslim to the extent of their understanding, and whether one is a dervish, a scholar, or a mystic, it should not create enmity among them. The sanctity of personal and intellectual boundaries must be respected, and we should never encroach upon each other’s sacred spaces. It is truly regrettable when a respected scholar like the late Muhaqqiq al-‘Amili, who was known for his piety and legal opinions, accuses a fellow Muslim of being irreligious merely because of a differing legal opinion.

Prominent figures like the late Fayḍ al-Kāshānī and al-Muqaddas al-Ardabīlī, who are major figures in Shiism and have devoted great attention to the authority of the Ahl al-Bayt, should not be dismissed as having followed the opinions of the general masses or as lacking in scholarly depth. Writing off such esteemed individuals as seeking after the views of the general public and disregarding their scholarly contributions is an unbecoming approach to academic discourse.

In modern-day sports competitions such as wrestling, boxing, and karate, participants often strike one another intensely, but they do not disrespect one another. After the match, the loser and winner embrace without resentment, and the loser does not blame the winner for their success. Even two non-believers may behave in this manner, demonstrating the courtesy that should be present in any contest. This is the etiquette of competition and the dignity of human nature.

Sadly, in academic discussions, accusations and defamatory remarks are sometimes exchanged, as if one were confronting a sworn enemy. One must counter arguments with evidence, just as a lock can only be opened with a key—not by striking it on the ground. In a debate, one must view the opponent in a manner that even if they present an incorrect argument, one might believe that God, on the Day of Judgment, could reward their incorrect position more than the correct position, as actions are judged by intent and the purity of the individual’s heart.

It is important to note that these esteemed scholars, driven by religious zeal, often sought to counter those whose opinions diverged from their beliefs. However, this is not the proper way of engaging in intellectual discourse. A person should never be afraid of their adversaries and should always strive to engage in respectful dialogue.

The Issue of the Sinfulness of Singing

“In the fifth issue: there is no disagreement that singing (ghina) is considered sinful, according to the author and the prominent jurist in the work al-Irshād and al-Tahrīr: ‘Extending the voice, including the echoing or melodic parts of the song.’ The person who sings and listens to it is sinful, with consensus from both sides on this matter. Imam al-Sādiq (peace be upon him) says in a narration by Anbasa: ‘Listening to music and singing causes hypocrisy to grow within a person, just as water makes plants grow.’ In a narration by Abū al-Ṣabāḥ and Muhammad ibn Muslim, regarding the verse ( وَالَّذِينَ لاَ يَشْهَدُونَ الزُّورَ ), the term ‘singing’ is used as the equivalent of ‘false speech’ (zūr), and it is forbidden to use singing in the recitation of poetry, the Qur’an, supplications, or even eulogies, including those dedicated to Imam Husayn (peace be upon him). Many narrations equate singing with frivolous talk (lahw al-ḥadīth). Imam al-Sādiq (peace be upon him) further states that ‘singing is one-tenth of hypocrisy,’ and in another narration, he says: ‘A house of music is not safe from calamity, its prayers are not answered, and angels do not enter it.’ Imam al-Bāqir (peace be upon him) says in a narration by Muhammad ibn Muslim: ‘Singing is something promised with punishment from God.'”

As for the narration that says, “He is not one of us who does not sing the Qur’an,” this should be understood as referring to the richness or self-sufficiency derived from reciting the Qur’an, not to singing in the musical sense.

The Principle of Permissibility of Chanting

The late author of Jawāhir (The Jewels of Jurisprudence), in a rare development in this matter, makes an exception for chanting (ḥadāʾ). He refers to it as a permissible form and bases it on the initial principle of permissibility. This is a new stance.

Certainly, the most certain case for the prohibition of singing is that which is associated with the corruption and vice of sinful people. For cases of doubt, where there is no certainty about the permissibility or prohibition of singing, we must apply the principle of innocence (barā’a) in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

The narrations about chanting (ḥadāʾ) must be studied in their own context, yet the narrations referred to by Jawāhir are weak in their transmission. It’s remarkable how some jurists rely on such narrations or principles, while disregarding the vast body of narrations that permit it.

The late jurist in Jawāhir (may God bless him) claims that chanting is an alternative form of singing and that it does not reach the level of actual singing, but no evidence is presented for this claim.

The Prohibition of Musical Instruments

In the sixth issue, the jurist addresses the ruling on musical instruments and declares that there is consensus that the use of instruments like the lute (ʿūd), cymbals (ṣanj), and others of similar nature are prohibited, meaning that those who play or listen to them are sinful. He supports his claim with both consensus (ijmāʿ) and numerous narrations. According to Imam al-Sādiq (peace be upon him), after the death of Adam (peace be upon him), Satan and Qābīl (the son of Adam) rejoiced and established musical instruments as a form of mockery. Every instrument in existence today is a result of that mockery, and the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) forbade musical instruments, including drums and other similar instruments.

The late Jawāhir scholar accepts this prohibition of musical instruments and considers both the performer and listener to be sinful. However, one must question whether such an absolute stance against all musical instruments is valid in the light of Islamic jurisprudence.

Sheikh Ansari:

(Sheikh Murtadha bin Mohammad bin Amin Ansari, 1214–1282 AH)

The Prohibition of Hedonistic Music

Sheikh Ansari initially states that no conclusive evidence has been found regarding the inherent prohibition of music simply because it is music. In conclusion, however, he deems the sound and words associated with hedonistic music as forbidden. According to this view, if music is equivalent to hedonism, then music is prohibited. If music is more specific than hedonism, then only hedonistic music is prohibited, while non-hedonistic music remains permissible. If, however, music is broader than hedonism, then hedonistic music is forbidden, but non-hedonistic music is permissible. However, the topic of discussion here is not the general concept of music but whether music, in and of itself, is permissible or prohibited. The notion that hedonism is inherently prohibited, and that music is forbidden because it is associated with hedonism, lies outside the scope of this discussion.

Sheikh Ansari’s Scholarly Approach to the Discussion of Music

The late Sheikh Ansari, a brilliant scholar and one of the founding figures in modern jurisprudence and principles of Islamic law, approaches the topic of music differently from other scholars.

He does not take the prohibition of music as an established religious necessity. Instead, he first addresses the historical context of music and briefly discusses some of its sources, before delving into the topic without any preconceived assumptions. He follows the discussion in a logical and methodical manner. For him, the outcome of his research is of little importance; what matters is the process of inquiry itself. He does not exhibit any form of bias and values intellectual openness. It would be most commendable for religious scholars to adopt such an approach in their legal research. Unfortunately, although many modern scholars and jurists benefit from his intellectual legacy, few adopt this unbiased approach in their jurisprudential studies. This is why his Makasib remains a central text in the Islamic seminary, surpassing works like Jawahir al-Kalam due to its analytical rigor and systematic approach, making it a model for the training of jurists.

The Prohibition of Music in the Qur’an

Sheikh Ansari begins his discussion on music as follows:

“The thirteenth issue: Music. There is no dispute regarding its prohibition in general, and the narrations supporting this view are abundant. It is claimed in al-Iyadh that these narrations are widespread.”

He cites a number of narrations that interpret terms like “qawlu zur” and “lahw al-hadith” as referring to music. For example, in the Sahih al-Shahham, Mursal Ibn Abi Umair, Muhtawil al-Basir, and Hassan al-Hisham, these terms are interpreted as referring to music.

There is no disagreement among jurists that, in general, music is prohibited. The narrations supporting the prohibition of music claim widespread authenticity.

The Scholars’ Divergence Regarding the Nature of Music

However, Sheikh Ansari acknowledges that before offering a legal ruling, a clear understanding of what music entails is necessary. Defining the term and understanding its specific characteristics must precede the issuance of a legal verdict, as the definition of the subject is crucial before applying the law to it. As such, he explores the issue in depth, considering both the substance and the context of music.

The Distinction Between False Speech and Musical Sound

Many jurists define music as “a prolonged voice with melodious modulation.” They limit music to the quality of sound, without addressing the words or lyrics associated with it. However, the narrations which reference lahw al-hadith, qawlu zur, and other related terms do not distinguish between sound and words, but rather focus on the context of entertainment or falsehood inherent in the speech. Therefore, the terms lahw al-hadith and qawlu zur may refer not only to false words but also to sounds or activities associated with them.

Sheikh Ansari, too, treats music as a form of sound but distinguishes it from speech, noting that a voice, even if melodious, must be considered in the context of its content. In his analysis, music is an issue of sound, which may be deemed prohibited if it is associated with false or hedonistic speech.

The Prohibition of Hedonistic Music and False Speech

Despite his nuanced understanding of music, Sheikh Ansari concludes that music accompanied by false or hedonistic speech is forbidden. His distinction rests on the combination of sound and false or indulgent speech, rather than the sound or music in isolation.

The key distinction here is that Sheikh Ansari does not see music itself as inherently prohibited unless it is part of a larger context of falsehood or hedonism. He acknowledges that not every form of indulgence or falsity is necessarily prohibited by default, but when combined with music, it becomes problematic.

The Evidence for the Prohibition of Hedonistic Music

The primary evidence Sheikh Ansari cites for the prohibition of music is that when music is associated with frivolous or false activities, it detracts from spiritual and moral pursuits. He draws upon narrations such as the one where Imam al-Sadiq (AS) responds to a question about music by explaining that the prohibition comes not from the music itself, but from the way it is used to distract from moral duties and responsibilities.

Sheikh Ansari concludes that music associated with hedonism, excess, or falsehood is prohibited, not because of its intrinsic nature, but because it aligns with indulgent and frivolous behavior.

On the Prohibition of Music and Singing in Specific Contexts:

He is uncertain about the subject of forbidden music or does not wish to issue a clear ruling, opting instead to passively address it. As a result, he cites the words of certain jurists and linguists to highlight the differences of opinion among scholars. He then interprets these identifiers in their customary sense and asserts that the form of singing they describe is by no means forbidden. This implies that they neither understood the concept of ghina (singing) nor were the rulings they provided regarding it correct. He selects the definition from Sahih al-Lugha as the best description. The essential definition is the one widely accepted among scholars. Notably, the Sheikh suggests that the interpretation of ghina by the common folk, which relates to the entertainments of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, is the true form of ghina, and that the hadiths concerning its prohibition specifically refer to this kind of singing. In other words, the reality and common understanding of ghina during that time, even though it may not reach today’s understanding, were clearly known to people.

The late Sheikh draws attention to an important point here, stating that none of the definitions of ghina provided are correct; rather, ghina should be understood as what was well-known in the specific cultural context of his time. The shaan (context) of the hadiths likewise refers to this understanding—specifically to the singers who performed semi-naked and engaged in various immoral acts. According to this perspective, what is problematic is not the voice or sound itself, whether normal or musical, but rather when the voice is associated with vice, immorality, or corruption, it becomes forbidden. The prohibition in the hadiths of ghina and music pertains specifically to this kind of ghina and music, excluding its legitimate use by pious and Muslim performers promoting Islamic teachings. However, if similar circumstances arise in the present day and ghina and music are used to support a corrupt state, their prohibition would still stand. For example, foreign singers working in the service of imperialist powers are viewed as agents of the world’s oppressive systems, and their actions are seen as among the gravest of sins.

In these remarks, Sheikh classifies ghina that is associated with amusement as forbidden, not the inherent nature of ghina itself, without considering any conditions or qualifications. It appears that Sheikh, aware of the divergence between his view and that of most scholars, may not want to publicly oppose the majority, and thus he adopts a nuanced approach, treating only the ghina associated with amusement as forbidden. This ghina, however, is specifically that associated with the people of vice. According to this viewpoint, if a state-run media channel in an Islamic society broadcasts musical ghina, there is no issue, since the performers are not associated with vice, and their singing would not be considered sinful. However, if the same ghina is broadcasted by foreign media controlled by enemies of the faith, then its performance, broadcast, and viewing would be forbidden, as this form of ghina is considered to belong to the people of vice.

Thus, in Sheikh’s perspective, it is not disbelief or faith that influences the prohibition or permissibility of ghina, but rather the aspect of it being lahw (amusement or idle distraction). Whether something is considered ghina in itself is irrelevant. The prohibition of the voice of a sinful person arises because it leads to negligence and misguidance, diminishes religious awareness, promotes falsehood, and causes corruption and deviation. However, the voices of the Prophet David, the beautiful voice of Imam Hasan, the recitation of the Qur’an, and the voices of the believers are not problematic, and can even be heard in such a way that the voices of the sinful are overshadowed.

The Absence of Taqiya in the Present Era

Following the trend of the Sheikh’s argument, it is clear that he avoids issuing a definitive fatwa and speaks in a manner that leaves room for ambiguity. Reaching his final fatwa is akin to understanding the philosophical propositions of Mīr Dāmād, which few can truly grasp. Of course, Mulla Sadra also expressed similar thoughts in his writings, but as he spoke openly, he faced political pressure at the time, while Mīr Dāmād was consistently respected. At times, taqiya may necessitate that scholars express their views with complexity and ambiguity, or use phrases that allow for multiple interpretations. However, in the current situation, where public understanding has greatly increased, concealing a fatwa is inappropriate unless the government pressures dynamic and enlightened scholars and seeks to isolate them. In the present day, taqiya, especially for diplomats and pilgrims to the House of God, is not permissible, as foreign nationals are aware of the practices of Iranian Shiite groups and perceive any act of taqiya as hypocritical behaviour.

Respecting certain matters due to international law, to which the Islamic Republic of Iran has committed itself, is necessary. For instance, refraining from marking the prayer in Saudi Arabia due to its contradiction with that country’s laws is an act of respect for the host and must be observed. However, it is not necessary to pray with one’s hands placed over each other as the Saudis do; this would be prohibited, as the pilgrims’ identity documents are in the hands of the authorities, who would perceive this as falsehood, interpreting it as a sign of hypocrisy.

The Joyful and Amusement-Inducing Nature of Music

“Then, the meaning of ‘al-Mut’rib’ is something that is pleasurable in general, whether for the singer or the listener, or something that has the potential to induce such pleasure if not prevented by some hindrance like the unpleasantness of the sound. However, if pleasure is considered an act—especially with regard to individuals, and particularly in the sense of lightness due to intense joy or sorrow—then it becomes problematic as most things deemed ghina in common usage are free of this element. This might explain why the second martyr added to the definition in al-Rawda and al-Masalik—after the common definition—by saying, ‘or what is known in common usage as ghina,’ a view that was also followed in Majma‘ al-Fayda and others. It is possible this also prompted the author of Miftah al-Karama to claim that ‘the pleasurable nature of sound in the definition of ghina differs from tarab,’ the latter being defined in al-Sahih as lightness due to intense joy or sorrow, even though some scholars, like those in Majma‘ al-Bahrayn, mistakenly equated the two terms. They supported this interpretation by citing the definitions in al-Sahih which define tarab as extending and enhancing sound, and in al-Misbah, as prolonging and echoing the sound. In al-Qamus, it is stated that ghina refers to that sound by which one is made to feel joyous, and tarab refers to that state of joy. What is clear from this analysis is that the term tarab used in the definition of ghina by the majority of scholars refers to lightness (pleasure), which occurs either through joy or sorrow, and not merely through the extension, enhancement, or echoing of sound, which alone does not necessarily lead to the prohibition.”

The Sheikh goes on to explain that the voice itself is not inherently forbidden, even when extended or echoed. However, he considers the pleasure-inducing quality of the sound to fall under the category of amusement (lahw), thereby categorising it as impermissible. Even though there is no clear religious prohibition on joy or pleasure, it is the frivolous or amusement-driven nature of certain forms of sound or music that renders them impermissible.

In his research, the Sheikh identifies a critical distinction between the inherent nature of sound, such as the pleasantness of its quality, and its association with amusement. Any sound that is categorised as playful or associated with the sinful lifestyle of certain individuals is prohibited, even if it is not classified as ghina. By focusing on these elements, the Sheikh offers a more nuanced approach to ghina, connecting it to both its cultural and moral connotations.

The Sheikh’s Opinion on the Prohibition of Music and Singing:

The late Sheikh did not find himself convinced that melody, merely due to its melodic nature, should be prohibited, and instead he included the melodies of the people of corruption and sin in the discussion, deeming them forbidden. One must acknowledge that the Sheikh never follows an argument without a proper basis. Another distinctive characteristic of the Sheikh is that he rarely resorts to general principles but rather meticulously considers every aspect and dimension of the issue at hand, thereby safeguarding himself from falling into the trap of superficial reasoning. He is exceptionally detailed in his legal opinions and demonstrates great intellectual subtlety, avoiding simplistic views.

For example, if someone pushes another into a well, they are considered a murderer, and the act is classified as premeditated murder. However, if someone swerves their car to the left, accidentally causing another person to be killed, the death would not be considered premeditated, although in reality, it is an example of premeditated murder.

Singing in Sacred Matters:

The Sheikh proceeds to quote some views that indicate that singing and music are not merely legal matters but also intertwined with politics and personal preferences. He reports that some people believe that frivolous and false activities are prohibited, but if these activities are directed towards spiritual or divine purposes—such as promoting the guardianship of the infallible Imams, reciting the Holy Qur’an, or performing lamentations and mourning—they are not problematic. However, the Sheikh states that such activities are not only sinful but that using them for sacred purposes involves a compounded sin. The name of Imam Hussein (a.s.) does not justify the permissibility of singing, even if it were forbidden.

If the voice of those engaged in sinful pleasure is used to recite the Qur’an, supplications, or elegies, there is no doubt about its prohibition, and its punishment would be multiplied because, at its core, it represents a trivialization of such sacred matters, ultimately diminishing the religion.

The Sheikh views the teaching of musical modes such as Shushtari, Afshari, Mahur, and Bayat Turk to be a form of Satanic deception for mourners and preachers. He considers it a trick of the Devil for someone to sing or murmur in melodies or poems under the guise of religion to relieve boredom or derive pleasure. Such activities, he claims, are far removed from the sanctity of religion.

At times, individuals, having lost a loved one or fallen into debt, or facing other troubles, become upset and, upon hearing even the slightest sorrowful sound, such as a song in the Shushtari mode, they may weep, associating their grief with the loss of Imam Hussein (a.s.). Although, outwardly, their sorrow may appear to be for Imam Hussein, in reality, they are merely relieving their own heavy grief by listening to a sorrowful melody. They are essentially venting their sadness and may mistakenly believe that such grief brings them closer to higher spiritual states.

Critique of the View of Shaykh al-Sabzawari:

“In more recent times, doubts have been raised on three fronts regarding the prohibition of singing: first, regarding the fundamental ruling itself; second, regarding its subject matter; and third, the application of the ruling to some cases of singing but not others.

Regarding the first point, it is reported from the late Shaykh Kashani that he restricted the prohibition of singing to instances where it involved something extraneous—such as playing musical instruments, the presence of men, or the use of false speech—while, in itself, he considered singing not to be prohibited. According to his report in al-Wafi, after narrating conflicting reports on the permissibility and prohibition of singing in the Qur’an, he says: ‘The apparent conclusion from all the narrations is that the prohibition of singing and related matters—such as its performance, teaching, listening to it, selling and buying it—only applies to the types that were common during the caliphate, which involved women performing for men, speaking falsehoods, and playing with musical instruments like flutes and reed pipes, unlike other types of singing.’ He then cites the hadith: ‘It is not the type where men enter upon them,’ and concludes: ‘On this basis, there is no harm in singing poetry that mentions Paradise and Hell, invokes the rewards of the Almighty, mentions acts of worship, and encourages virtue and asceticism, as these all involve the remembrance of Allah.’ He further suggests that, ‘this kind of singing, which focuses on the remembrance of Allah, causes the skins of those who fear their Lord to shiver, and their hearts soften towards His remembrance.’

In short, it is clear to the intelligent among us, after hearing these reports, that the truth of singing should be distinguished from its falsehood. Most of what Sufis sing in their gatherings falls under the category of the false.'”

I assert that, had the late Shaykh not referenced the report that ‘it is not the type where men enter upon them,’ it would have been reasonable to apply his view to what was stated earlier—that the prohibited singing is the type associated with playful activities such as musical instruments, false speech, and men entering into the women’s gathering for the purpose of temptation, without considering the voice itself as inherently prohibited. However, his reference to the narration, ‘it is not the type where men enter upon them,’ clearly indicates that he distinguishes between different types of singing—not because of the act itself, but due to the social context and related immoralities such as sinful entertainment and false speech.

The Sheikh’s Response to Shaykh al-Sabzawari’s View:

The Sheikh critiques the view of Shaykh al-Sabzawari, stating that singing, as an act of frivolous amusement, is forbidden on its own, and it is not necessary for it to be accompanied by other sins or immoralities to be prohibited. He acknowledges that if one were to consider ghina as simply a beautiful voice or pleasant sound, this would be a reasonable interpretation, as no one has ever prohibited the mere existence of beautiful voices. Shaykh al-Sabzawari had gathered narrations praising beautiful voices and emphasized that these voices are associated with the Qur’an and supplications, noting that these beautiful sounds are integral to these spiritual acts. However, the Sheikh insists that beautiful sounds, when utilized for purposes of amusement and worldly pleasure, especially if they are associated with sinful contexts, are forbidden.

Critique of the Theory of Fayz Kashani

“Clearly, the majority of the statements by the distinguished scholar Kashani also reflect this view, as he denies the prohibition of pleasant sound that evokes the afterlife, causing forgetfulness of worldly desires. Indeed, some of his words seem to support a detailed view regarding the permissibility of entertainment sounds, which, upon closer inspection, appear not to be a detailed position but rather an unconditional claim of the permissibility of singing, asserting that there is no inherent prohibition, and that only what accompanies it from forbidden matters is impermissible. However, if this view is accurately attributed to him, it is extremely weak and lacks any substantial evidence. The numerous general narrations, claimed to have been widely transmitted, stand in contrast to it, except for a few specific hadiths that he mentioned:

Among them is the narration from al-Humayri — with a chain of transmission that could likely be included in the authentic collections — from Ali ibn Ja’far, who reports that he asked his brother (peace be upon him): “I asked him about singing during the festivals of Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, and weddings, and he replied: ‘There is no harm as long as it does not lead to disobedience.'” The apparent meaning here is that as long as the singing does not become a cause of sin or a precursor to associated sins, it is not prohibited. In another narration from Ali ibn Ja’far, his brother responded: “I asked him about singing in the context of Eid and wedding celebrations, and he said: ‘There is no harm as long as it does not involve playing wind instruments.'” The implication here seems to be that ‘not involving wind instruments’ means not using instruments like the flute or similar, or that the singing itself should not be accompanied by such instruments. Moreover, there is a narration from Abu Basir, who asked Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq (peace be upon him) about the earnings of female singers. He said: ‘The one who entertains men is forbidden, while the one who sings at weddings is permissible, for as Allah says: (And among the people are those who purchase idle talk to mislead others from the path of Allah)’ (Quran 31:6). In another narration from Abu Basir, Imam Ja’far al-Sadiq (peace be upon him) stated: “The wage of a female singer who conducts wedding ceremonies is not prohibited, as long as men do not enter the room.” The apparent meaning of the second narration and the explicit meaning of the first is that the prohibition of singing is contingent upon its purpose. If the goal is to set up a gathering of idle talk or sin, it is forbidden; otherwise, it is not. The reference to the Qur’anic verse in the narration indicates that both types of singing (that which entertains and that which does not) are forms of idle talk, but in one case, it is meant to lead people to sin and to divert them from the path of righteousness, while the other does not.”

— Further statements by Kashani on this matter seem more in line with this view. He negates the prohibition of pleasant sounds that serve as reminders of the afterlife and help one forget worldly pleasures and desires. However, some of the statements attributed to him regarding detailed distinctions in entertainment sounds may initially appear as support for unconditional permission for all forms of singing, provided no forbidden elements accompany them. This theory, if properly attributed to Kashani, is quite weak and lacks substantial evidence, with numerous general narrations serving as strong counter-evidence. As stated earlier, these specific narrations cannot contradict the more general ones, as the latter prevail.”

Critique of the Theory of Mukhaddis Ardebili

“Secondly — the error in defining the subject — some inexperienced students of our time have erroneously extended their understanding of the prohibition of singing to include mourning or elegiac singing, a claim which is baffling! If they intend to argue that singing must necessarily involve particular words, it would be a contradiction to both common usage and language. As for language, it has already been established, and regarding common usage, it is undeniable that anyone who hears a voice from a distance that includes an intoxicating sound capable of prompting dancing or the playing of musical instruments would immediately consider it singing, even without knowing the exact words being sung. If they are asserting that the style in which an elegy is recited cannot be classified as singing, this contradicts common sense.”

The late Mukhaddis Ardebili — whose name the Sheikh refers to as one of the students — believed that mourning songs in the context of the mourning of Imam Husayn (peace be upon him) are not only permissible but beneficial, as they increase sorrow. However, the Sheikh, critiquing this opinion, states:

Mourning for Husayn (peace be upon him) in the form of singing or lamentation is not only impermissible but carries a greater reprehensibility. The mention of Imam Husayn (peace be upon him) does not render any forbidden action permissible.

He continues this critique by pointing out that Mukhaddis Ardebili mistakenly argued that mourning songs are permissible because they evoke greater sorrow, yet the Sheikh emphasizes that regardless of whether they invoke more sorrow, such activities are still forbidden when they take the form of idle entertainment. The Sheikh’s critique is rooted in the principle that musical or entertaining sounds, even if done with good intentions (such as mourning), are still prohibited as they are classified under the category of “idle talk.”

Exceptions to the Prohibition of Singing

“Thirdly, the matter of restricting the prohibition to certain cases within the subject matter: In Jami’ al-Maqasid, an opinion is cited — though the author does not name the scholar — that singing during mourning rituals (such as at funerals) may be an exception, just as it is for weddings. Some later scholars have sought to justify this by referring to the general permissibility of mourning or the beneficial aspects of elegy recitation, as seen in previous references by the Sheikh and others. However, the Sheikh argues that general recommendations cannot override the clear prohibitions, especially those which are a precursor to further sins. This is exemplified in the hadith: ‘Do not bring joy to a believer by means of prohibitions, such as adultery, sodomy, or singing.’

As stated previously, the Sheikh’s critique hinges on the principle that actions intended to evoke joy or pleasure (even in a mourning context) should not be accomplished through prohibited means, such as singing. He further refines the argument that such actions should not be considered permissible just because they are part of a larger, praiseworthy act (like mourning). The Sheikh’s interpretation of the narrations further reaffirms his stance on the impermissibility of all forms of idle talk, regardless of their context.”

Women’s Singing at Weddings

“The second exception is the singing by female entertainers at weddings, provided there are no other prohibited elements such as the use of forbidden musical instruments, the utterance of false statements, or the entry of men into the women’s gathering. This exception is based on two narrations from Abu Basir regarding the wages of singers involved in weddings. Though the narrations rely on Abu Basir — whose reliability has been questioned by some — they are still deemed acceptable by the majority of scholars, though the Sheikh suggests caution in accepting them without further scrutiny. He notes that while these narrations permit the act of singing at weddings, they do not provide a blanket permission for all forms of singing.

The Sheikh’s analysis implies that while these narrations might justify the act of singing at weddings under specific conditions, the broader principle remains that singing for the sake of entertainment (even at weddings) remains forbidden in the majority of cases.”

The Prohibition of Musical Instruments

Dear Sheikh, the use of musical instruments is considered absolutely forbidden due to their association with frivolity and entertainment, with no exceptions being made. He states:

“The second type of earnings that are forbidden are those obtained through something that is prohibited due to the intention behind it, although the object itself might not be inherently forbidden. This category has various examples, including statues created for worship, such as crosses and idols, which are unanimously agreed upon to be forbidden.”[31]

The second category of forbidden earnings are those that are prohibited due to the intention behind their use, even though the object itself may not be inherently forbidden. These include objects such as idols and crosses made for religious purposes. He continues to give examples, including musical instruments:

“His statement: ‘God has forbidden all crafts that are entirely prohibited due to their inherent corruption, such as flutes, lutes, and all instruments of entertainment, as well as crosses and idols, which makes teaching and learning them, as well as earning a wage from them, forbidden.’”[32]

Some items, such as musical instruments like flutes and lutes, are intrinsically connected to forbidden uses. The use of such items for frivolity or entertainment is prohibited, and thus teaching, learning, and profiting from them is considered forbidden.

“The instruments of entertainment, in all their forms, are unanimously regarded as forbidden for all the reasons mentioned above. The discussion concerning the sale of the material is as previously discussed. It is clear that musical instruments are considered part of this category, with the essential forms being the types like flutes and singing instruments, as well as drums. Further elaboration on the definition of entertainment and its prohibition will follow.”[33]

In this statement, Sheikh unequivocally regards musical instruments as belonging to the class of entertainment and deems them forbidden. He discusses the essence of frivolity and its ruling elsewhere, and we will address his view and critique it in volume seven of this discussion.

Sheikh establishes the absolute prohibition of musical instruments because he does not see any legitimate use for them. Although Sheikh acknowledges that sounds of singing can be used in permissible contexts, in the current era, for all the examples that Sheikh considers forbidden, there are many permissible uses. Even items traditionally deemed impure, such as blood or semen, can have legitimate value and utility, and objects like sculptures or dolls can be made, bought, and sold legally, with these matters to be addressed in their appropriate context.

The Views of Mamuqani

(Shaykh Mohammad Hassan Mamuqani, d. 1323 AH)

Summary of the statements of Sheikh and other scholars:

“There is no disagreement regarding the general prohibition of musical instruments. The qualification of ‘in general’ indicates that there is some disagreement regarding the initial ruling, the subject matter, and the scope of the prohibition, particularly whether it applies to all types or only to specific cases. He addresses this in further detail, citing that the first view is attributed to the scholar al-Muhaddith al-Kashani, who believed that singing itself is not inherently forbidden. Instead, only the associated actions, such as dancing or other corruptions, are what make it forbidden.”

Mamuqani elaborates, stating that the evidence for the prohibition of musical instruments is based on both consensus (ijma’) in its two forms, obtained and transmitted, and in the Jawaher (a major legal text), where the prohibition of singing is considered a necessity of the madhhab. Furthermore, in the Mustanad, evidence for the prohibition is clearly provided by overwhelming consensus, even claiming it is a universally accepted religious duty, with numerous hadiths cited in support, over sixty of which are mentioned in Wasā’il al-Shī‘a.

However, in volume three of his book, the scholar critiques these hadiths, explaining that none of them establish the inherent prohibition of singing itself. Claims of consensus or necessity of the madhhab lack sufficient support, as none of the narrations explicitly prohibit singing as such. Therefore, relying solely on consensus or a wide array of hadiths, without direct evidence from authentic narrations, is inadequate.

In his Ghāyat al-Āmāl, Mamuqani states:

“The phrase ‘in general’ suggests that there is some disagreement concerning the prohibition of singing, which arises from three factors: the initial ruling, the subject matter, and the scope of the ruling, with some scholars asserting that all forms of singing are forbidden, while others have restricted the prohibition to certain cases. Sheikh himself detailed these points and attributed the view that singing is not inherently forbidden to Shaykh al-Fiḍa al-Kāshānī. According to his interpretation and that of others like al-Kifāya, it is not the act of singing itself that is forbidden, but rather the corrupt actions that often accompany it, such as dancing or other forbidden activities.”

Critique of the Quranic and Hadith-based Evidence

Mamuqani continues to critique the reliance on Quranic verses and narrations to establish the prohibition of singing. He argues that these claims are based on a desire to extend the prohibition and that, in reality, no clear Quranic evidence exists to support the prohibition of singing itself. The prohibition is instead derived from specific hadiths, which have interpreted the relevant verses in a particular way.

Ayatollah Khomeini’s Perspective on Singing

(Khomeini, 1902–1989)

“Regarding the second issue of singing, there is a significant difference in interpretation and ruling. Some define it as merely listening to sound, others as the sound itself, with some interpretations suggesting it is specifically the musical sound that induces excitement or elation. Some scholars have even described it as singing accompanied by rhythmic modulation, or singing that is elevated and prolonged. According to the majority, it is specifically the sound extended with rhythmic modulation that is regarded as singing.”[37]

In his work, Ayatollah Khomeini introduces the various definitions of singing provided by different scholars. These diverse interpretations reveal the ambiguity surrounding the concept of singing and musical instruments. Khomeini’s goal in presenting these definitions is to highlight the confusion and lack of clarity regarding the precise meaning of singing, a matter which, according to many scholars, remains subject to various interpretations and lacks a definitive basis in legal texts.

Conclusion

The discussions of Sheikh, Mamuqani, and Khomeini reflect the deep complexity and diversity of opinions within Islamic jurisprudence regarding the prohibition of musical instruments. While consensus on their prohibition exists among many scholars, significant debate continues over the scope and justification of this prohibition, with interpretations varying widely based on differing readings of the Quran, hadiths, and the scholarly tradition.

The Term “Conventional” and the Definition of Singing

The term “conventional” refers to a person who is unusual, either leaning towards excess or deficiency, such that they are either unaffected by external influences, like inanimate objects, or overly susceptible to them. This type of individual is not considered the subject of ghina (singing or music).

The phrase “that which almost takes away reason” refers to a type of mild and light exhilaration, which is not considered part of ghina. For example, a light joy induced by certain beverages is not classified as ghina, provided it does not reach the point of impairing reason. The reason for the prohibition of ghina is the same as the reason for the prohibition of alcohol: its intoxicating and mind-altering nature. Similarly, ghina makes a person drunk and intoxicated.

From the perspective of the late Sheikh Isfahani, ghina refers to a voice or sound that is harmonious and proportionate, as taught by the science of music. The harmony and proportion present in ghina cause the intellect to weaken and become unstable, and anything that leads to the decay of intellect is considered unlawful. Thus, he not only defines the subject of ghina but also provides a definition for unlawful ghina.

Critique of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Views on Sheikh Isfahani’s Opinion

Ayatollah Khomeini, after quoting his teacher’s words, states:

“We have detailed his words to fulfill some of his rights and to highlight the analysis and benefits they contain. It must be said that what he has stated is one of the best theories on the matter, and is closest to the truth, although there are some areas where discussion is possible. For example, his assertion that ghina leads to the loss of reason and that the reason for its prohibition is the same as the reason for the prohibition of alcohol, while accurate in certain contexts, lacks support in common language and custom. Ghina is often understood to include various types of singing and its effects may vary significantly based on the context. For example, ghina might not always result in intoxication, as some instances of singing can be emotionally uplifting without diminishing reason. In fact, it seems there are numerous interpretations and categories of ghina and its effects, including musical voices and techniques, which could be very different from the effects of intoxicants like alcohol.”

He continues to critique the notion that the only cause for ghina is harmony and proportion in sound. The argument that any sound that is harmonious must be intoxicating or mind-altering is flawed. He asserts that the notion that all ghina causes atrab (exhilaration) and diminishes reason is unfounded, as the true effects of ghina can vary greatly based on the type of sound and the individual listener’s perception.

Ayatollah Khomeini points out that many of the events attributed to the effects of ghina among the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs were not purely due to ghina but rather a combination of several vices and behaviors, such as drinking alcohol and indulging in other forms of immorality. The idea that ghina itself leads to such excessive behaviors is oversimplified and does not align with the reality of what occurs in many of these historical examples.

The Absence of a Clear Definition of “Intoxication” in Ghina

Ayatollah Khomeini rejects the comparison between ghina and alcohol, which he sees as an invalid analogy. He points out that the claim that ghina leads to intoxication is not supported by evidence or experience. While both ghina and alcohol may result in a certain type of emotional or mental state, the effects of ghina do not rise to the level of true intoxication.

He further clarifies that ghina may cause a mild feeling of lightheadedness or euphoria, but it does not reach the level of causing a person to lose their faculties in the way that alcohol does. He compares the effects of consuming excessive amounts of certain foods, such as saffron or cucumbers, which can induce a mild sense of drowsiness or mental fatigue, but these effects are not prohibited unless there is a clear religious or legal basis to do so.

The Role of Jurisprudence and Philosophy in Legal Interpretation

Ayatollah Khomeini emphasizes that legal rulings should be derived from clear religious texts and established principles, not from philosophical speculation. While philosophy and wisdom may help explain or provide motivations for religious rulings, they cannot serve as the basis for establishing new laws. The true role of the jurist is to understand and interpret the law as established by religious texts, rather than attempting to legislate new rules based on personal interpretation of philosophical ideas.

The Debate Over the Beauty of Sound in Ghina

The concept of beauty in sound, as expressed by Sheikh Isfahani, is also critiqued. The argument that sound must be harmonious to be considered ghina is contested. There are cases where a sound may be harmonious but not induce the expected atrab (exhilaration). For example, an unpleasant or harsh voice, even if it follows some form of proportion, is not considered ghina by common standards, even if it might bring joy or amusement to some listeners.

Ayatollah Khomeini challenges the assumption that harmony is the only cause of beauty in sound, suggesting that not all harmonious sounds necessarily result in the desired emotional effect. He also disputes the idea that a particular voice, even when skillfully executed, can always be categorized as ghina if it does not meet the specific emotional or mental criteria for such an effect.

The claim that all definitions refer to what has been mentioned therein contains certain issues that are not difficult to notice. It could even be argued that what has been stated does not align with any of these definitions. It is apparent that the terms “hearing” or “sound” refer to their technical meanings, but they are not truly definitions, as is evident. The suggestion that these definitions can be reduced to his definition is problematic, as we shall explain further. Similarly, the interpretation attributed to Sheikh Ansari’s statement, “What is appropriate for certain instruments of amusement and dance,” appears to be incorrect, as it is evident that his intention was not to clarify the relationship between musical and rhythmic proportions.

The late Allama Isfahani believed that the only cause of ecstasy in music is its harmony, to which Ayatollah Khomeini (1) objects. He argues:

“The mere arrangement of notes in a proportional manner does not make the sound beautiful. If the sound lacks delicacy, richness, grace, and a general purity, its harmony and rhythm will not be appreciated. For example, a harsh and discordant sound is often ridiculed, just as the miserly nature of someone like Hatim al-Tai is mocked. There is no complete causal connection between harmony and beauty; hence, harmony does not necessarily imply beauty. On the other hand, there are instances where music conforms to musical principles but lacks beauty.”

However, this critique itself is problematic, as any sound with proper harmony is necessarily beautiful. But the reverse is not true: not every beautiful sound is harmonically correct. For instance, someone may sing beautifully but may not understand music theory, and a musician can recognize that their voice is pleasing but the notes are not arranged correctly. Therefore, a voice lacking harmony is outside the scope of our discussion. While harmony and beauty can indeed be considered equivalent, this does not imply that someone without formal musical knowledge cannot outperform a musician, as their voice may be so pleasing that it exceeds the harmony created by musical rules, even though the notes may not be correctly arranged.

The Definition of Ghina According to Ayatollah Khomeini (1):

“It is preferable to define ghina as the human voice that has inherent delicacy and beauty, even if only in a general sense, and has the potential to induce ecstasy when it corresponds with commonly known melodies. This excludes harsh or unpleasant sounds. We use the term ‘potential for ecstasy’ because the ecstasy produced by ghina is gradual—it may not occur with just one or two verses, but its essence, even with repetition, has the potential to induce ecstasy. This is similar to the rule regarding intoxicants: if large quantities cause intoxication, then small quantities are prohibited, as the essence of intoxication is the cause, even if it is not immediately apparent in smaller amounts.”

Thus, ghina is not identical with the lewd and vain sounds, nor with the melodies associated with vice and sin. In fact, many such melodies fall outside the realm of ghina. Each group of people involved in music, vice, or song in our time has its own specific occupation and its own terminology known only to those familiar with those arts.

Furthermore, according to the views of various scholars, ghina is a matter of the quality of the sound or the sound itself. The words spoken do not affect its definition, whether the words are false, true, wise, or even the Quranic recitations or lamentations for the martyrs. This distinction is clear and should not be overlooked. Thus, the best definition of ghina is the human voice that has inherent delicacy and beauty, even if only in a general sense, and has the potential to induce ecstasy when it corresponds with commonly known melodies.

Ayatollah Khomeini’s Preferred Definition of Ghina:

“Ghina is the human voice that inherently has delicacy and beauty, even if only in a general sense, and has the potential to be ecstasy-inducing for most people.”

This critique reveals a flaw in the common definition. The traditional view holds that ghina is the drawing out of a sound that contains echo and is ecstasy-inducing. However, ghina does not rely on the prolongation of sound or echoing. Many forms of ghina do not feature either of these qualities, which is especially true in the case of contemporary singers, whose voices neither prolong nor echo.

Ayatollah Khomeini adds the element of “delicacy of sound” to Allama Isfahani’s definition.

The essential point for this discussion is to obtain the essence of ghina, independent of what may be the subject of religious rulings and prohibitions. Therefore, the essence of ghina may be broader or narrower than the ghina that is subject to legal rulings in Islamic law. Consequently, ghina is not synonymous with lewd or vain sounds, nor with the melodies of those involved in vice and sin. Many such melodies fall outside the definition of ghina.

Ghina pertains to the quality or nature of the sound itself, and the content of the words—whether they are Quranic verses, wise speech, or lamentations—does not influence its definition.

Arguments for the Prohibition of Ghina

According to Ayatollah Khomeini (1), the sound of ghina is harmonious and delicate. The following reasons are presented for its prohibition:

“Regarding its prohibition, there are numerous narrations, some of which are quite well-known, regarding its impermissibility, and these fall into several categories:

One of these is based on the interpretation of the verse: (And avoid false speech), which has been understood to refer to ghina. For instance, in a narration from Hisham ibn al-Hakam, it is stated that: ‘False speech is ghina.’ This has been interpreted in narrations by Zayd al-Shahham, Abu Basir, and others. The commonly understood meaning of ‘false speech’ refers to speech that is false in its content, such as lying, bearing false witness, or slander, while ghina, as previously mentioned, pertains to the quality or nature of the sound itself, rather than speech. The verse has been interpreted in the context of someone praising a singer, saying ‘You did well,’ as narrated by Hammād ibn Usman from Abu Abdullah (7). Though the phrase ‘You did well’ is not in itself false, it is used here to refer to the act of complimenting a singer, which could be deemed inappropriate due to the association with ghina.”

Extensive, Rather than Transmitted Narrations

In discussing the ruling on music (ghina), Imam Khomeini writes:

There are numerous extensive and transmitted narrations concerning the prohibition of music, which can be grouped into several categories. One of these categories is the interpretative narrations.

However, one should not make such an interpretation of these narrations; because is the music that he identified the same as the type of music that these narrations refer to? Furthermore, can the claims of being extensive or transmitted be accurately applied to these narrations, considering that many of them have weak chains of transmission? And, as has been previously mentioned, some scholars believe that there is not even a single authentic narration that prohibits music?

Interpretation of “False Speech” as “False Statements”

Imam Khomeini considers “false speech” to mean “false statements,” which includes lies, false testimony, and slander.

We have said that “speech” refers to belief, and “false” refers to something incorrect. False belief can either be informative, such as a lie, or declarative, such as false testimony. These narrations aim to present a specific example of false belief so that future generations, aided by reason, can recognize similar examples.

Music in the narrations has been practically defined, and while Imam Khomeini considers “false speech” as referring to false speech, lies, false testimony, and slander, this interpretation is incorrect. The aforementioned acts do not embody the essence of “false speech.” For example, the identification of a person as a “rational animal” is distinct from saying “Zayd is a human,” because Zayd is an individual of the category “human” rather than a definition of the term itself.

“False speech” refers to false beliefs or lies that have a superficial truth, and not just any lie. Another example includes false testimony and praising someone who speaks falsely. In the narrations, one does not observe an emphasis on the sound of the voice or the pleasantness of the speech.

Imam Khomeini asserts:

Music is a particular type of sound or a sound with a specific quality. “Well done” is not inherently false; rather, its prohibition arises because it validates something false, much like the falsehood it endorses. Lies, false testimony, and praise for falsehood are considered “false speech.”

Our view differs from Imam Khomeini’s, in that we consider “false speech” to refer to false beliefs, which includes lies that appear true, false testimony, and praise for falsehood. The infallible figures practically defined the specific type of music, and it is certainly true that music associated with the Umayyads and Abbasids, combined with wine and various sins, served the false governments and their agendas. Imam Khomeini, however, takes a more circuitous route, examining different uses and the nature of the relationship between figurative and literal meanings. We argued that “false speech” has many examples, including false testimony, the creation of false speech, and praising someone who speaks falsehoods. These have multiple instances under one meaning and do not involve the use of a word in more than one meaning, nor a figurative expression or a literal claim. None of these matters are relevant to the current issue.

Literal Meaning of Claims

Imam Khomeini states:

The interpretation of multiple meanings derived from one word—whether it involves a figurative meaning or a word used in more than one sense—is part of the well-known practice of figurative speech. The literal meaning of a word can be applied figuratively, such as in cases of relevance between a subject and its corresponding application, or it can involve a literal claim, where the use of “false speech” to refer to music is a claim that music is false speech.

He continues by saying that the use of “false speech” in music relies on the claim that music is false speech or that the general use of “false speech” and the universal application of falsehood extend to music and its forbidden nature. He suggests that it is not the inherent essence of music that is prohibited, but rather the music that contains false words.

Imam Khomeini’s Perspective on Music and False Speech

Imam Khomeini’s understanding of “false speech” is based on the literal application of the term to music. He believes that music can be viewed as false speech in a figurative sense, yet ultimately, because of its association with falsehood and sin, music, by its nature, falls under the prohibition.

However, our view diverges. We maintain that music is inherently an expression of falsehood when connected with corrupt governments and sinful acts, specifically the kind used in the courts of the Umayyads and Abbasids. It serves as a form of false praise, not simply an inherent sound. Thus, the prohibition of music is not due to its form but to its content—its association with falsehood.

Analysis of Interpretative Narrations

Imam Khomeini raises an issue with the reliance on interpretative narrations to argue for the prohibition of music, which is a valid critique. He states:

What evidence is there to prove that false speech is forbidden and that avoidance of it is mandatory? Not everything that is false is necessarily prohibited. If false speech is understood as something without a rational purpose, unrelated to social or religious obligations, it might not be prohibited. In this case, while false speech is false, it is not inherently forbidden.

Thus, there is a debate about whether the prohibition of false speech applies universally to all forms of falsehood or is limited to specific types of prohibited actions.

Final Reflection on the Prohibition of Music

Imam Khomeini concludes by asserting that music, in a figurative sense, is indeed a form of false speech. However, the real issue lies in how music serves to distract from the path of truth and morality, especially in contexts where it supports sinful behavior. As such, the prohibition is not rooted in the sound itself but in the use of music to perpetuate sin and support falsehood.

In conclusion, while Imam Khomeini and we share some common ground, our interpretations differ significantly in terms of the nature of music, the broader implications of false speech, and the importance of context in understanding religious rulings.

As for the narrated reports explaining “idle talk,” they are also unrestricted without ambiguity. The claim that the specific type of music which is purchased to mislead from the path of Allah and made a mockery is the only category addressed has already been answered. The necessity of this interpretation can be found in the narrations that state that music is among those things to which Allah has threatened Hell, as He says: “And among the people is he who buys [idle] talk to mislead from the way of Allah…” [Quran 31:6]. There should be no doubt about its general application.

One of the numerous narrations attributed to Imam al-Ridha (A.S.) confirms this. Among them is a report narrated by al-Saduq, which is authentic, from al-Riyan ibn al-Salt, a trustworthy figure. He said: “I once asked Imam al-Ridha (A.S.) in Khurasan about music. I said: ‘The Abbasid ruler mentioned that you permit music.’ He replied: ‘The liar has fabricated this.’ I did not say this to him. He asked me about music, and I said: ‘A man came to Abu Ja’far (A.S.) and asked him about music. He said: ‘When Allah distinguishes between truth and falsehood, where would music be? The answer was: “With falsehood.”‘ He said: ‘You have passed judgment.'”

The clear indication here is that the rejection by Imam al-Ridha (A.S.) of permission implies that the statement of Imam Abu Ja’far (A.S.) indicates the prohibition of music. Otherwise, if his statement had suggested that music, although false, was permissible to some extent, the questioner would not have misrepresented the answer. The rejection is thus a clear proof that music is prohibited in the view of Imam al-Ridha (A.S.), and the contradiction regarding the misrepresentation by the questioner is evident in the narration.

Another narration from Abdul-Ala, which is also of good reliability, says: “I asked Imam al-Sadiq (A.S.) about music, and I said: ‘They claim that the Messenger of Allah (PBUH) permitted the words ‘We came to you, we came to you, we greet you, we greet you, we salute you.’ He said: ‘They are lying! Allah, the Mighty and Majestic, says: ‘And We did not create the heavens and the earth and what is between them in play. If We had intended to take a pastime, We would have taken it from Us, if We were to do so. Rather, We hurl the truth at falsehood, and it destroys it, and woe to you for what you describe.'” Then he added: ‘Woe to that man for what he describes.'”

This narration is a clear statement regarding the prohibition of music. The Imam, by denying this claim and citing the Quranic verse, emphasizes that any form of music associated with falsehood and indulgence is forbidden.

Similarly, the report from Ali ibn Ja’far confirms the prohibition. He asked his brother (Imam Musa al-Kadhim) (A.S.) about a man who deliberately sings. The reply was: “No.” These many reports leave no room for doubt regarding the general prohibition of music.

Furthermore, the claim that the evidence pertains only to the music prevalent during the Umayyad and Abbasid periods, as some scholars like Kashani and Khurasani have argued, is contested. This is due to the fact that some narrations, like the one from Ali ibn Ja’far, clearly prohibit music without any reference to its associations with other sins, such as playing instruments or engaging in immoral acts. Thus, the interpretation that the prohibition of music is restricted to certain historical periods does not hold.

There is also a claim about the apparent relaxation in certain narrations, such as the one concerning the payment for a female singer at weddings. Some scholars have argued that the use of the word “and” in the narration implies a distinction between music itself and the associated acts, such as the presence of men or other immoral activities. However, even in these cases, there remains no explicit endorsement of music itself being permissible. Instead, the narration seems to suggest that music is only permissible in specific contexts where these associated immoralities are absent.

In conclusion, while some argue that the prohibition is context-dependent, the bulk of the narrations and scholarly opinions strongly indicate that music, as an inherent act, is forbidden, with only very specific exceptions made for certain contexts, such as wedding celebrations free of other immoral activities.

As for the reliance on narrations containing the terms “assembly” (majlis) or “house” (bayt), such as the narration of Hasan ibn Harun where he said: “I heard Abu Abdullah (peace be upon him) say: ‘The assembly of music is such that Allah does not look at its people'” (al-Kafi), and the authentic narration of Zayd al-Shiham where Abu Abdullah (peace be upon him) said: “The house of music is a place where calamities are not averted,” and the narration of Ibrahim ibn Muhammad from those who mentioned it from him (peace be upon him), in which it is stated: “Do not enter the houses of Allah that are turned away from their people,” after being asked about music, to support the view that the prohibition is specific to a particular type of music, there are weaknesses in this argument. This is due to the lack of clarity and specificity in these narrations, which fail to demonstrate that the prohibition is uniquely linked to music or that it is associated with other prohibited acts. Indeed, these narrations may imply such a link, but they do not conclusively establish it. Furthermore, the argument that the apparent meaning of the evidence suggests that music falls under the category of idle amusement or falsehood, which are not prohibited in an absolute sense, does not prove the prohibition of music.

Thus, from all the evidence presented, it can be concluded that music is inherently forbidden, and one must seek evidence for any exceptions to this rule.

The late Feyz Kashani, in his argument for the contingent prohibition of music, references the narration from Abu Basir, which has a sound chain of transmission. In the book Mir’at al-‘Uqul, this narration is cited with a “waaw” (conjunction), and Feyz argues that this passage not only implies causality but also indicates it. Accordingly, he claims that the narration renders a portion of music forbidden, specifically that which occurs in gatherings where men enter to see women.

However, in critiquing this claim, several interpretations can be proposed for the “waaw” used in the narration:

a) The phrase “and men do not enter upon women” could be read as describing a condition for the woman’s wages, meaning that the woman singer’s remuneration is lawful only if the men do not enter upon women.

b) This passage could express the reason for the prohibition, thus not indicating the inherent unlawfulness of music, but rather the prohibition arising from the entry of unrelated men and the accompanying acts like hearing the women’s voices or seeing their faces. In this interpretation, only a specific type of music associated with such gatherings would be prohibited.

If the narration is understood without the conjunction, a portion of music could be exempted from the prohibition, namely that which occurs in wedding celebrations, provided no unrelated men enter upon the women.

The second interpretation, in which the “waaw” is used to connect events in the present tense, contradicts the view of Feyz Kashani and his followers and aligns more closely with the apparent meaning of the narration. This interpretation holds that the prohibition is due to the presence of unrelated men, rather than being a specific rule concerning a type of music or specific gatherings.

In light of the above, the use of such narrations to justify the exceptionality of music is not convincing, particularly because their content contradicts other more general prohibitions. Even if the “waaw” were present, it would not change the inherent unlawfulness of music.

Concerning the exclusion of music in joyful occasions, such as Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, and other religious or national celebrations, it is suggested based on a narration from Ali ibn Ja’far. He asked his brother Musa (peace be upon him) about music in these occasions, and the reply was that there is no objection as long as it does not involve the playing of musical instruments like flutes. This narration has been understood to imply that music during festive days is permissible, provided it does not lead to sin or involve musical instruments.

This claim is also supported by Feyz Kashani’s followers, but its application is problematic, especially given the weakness of the narration’s chain of transmission. Furthermore, even if this narration were accepted, it cannot be used to limit the general prohibition of music, which remains effective on all other days.

As for the exclusion of music from elegies or mourning recitations, one might argue for its permissibility in such contexts, citing the general allowances for lamentations and recitation of the Qur’an. However, this argument is weak, as it conflicts with the broad prohibition of music. There are multiple theories on how to reconcile these types of acts, but the general principle of prohibiting music as a sinful act holds firm.

In conclusion, music remains inherently forbidden, and exceptions such as those for festive or mourning occasions need clear evidence and cannot be derived from ambiguous or weak narrations.

Women’s Mourning and Lamentation

“Baqiyat al-Kalam fi al-Akhbar al-Lati Tamassaka Biha”

As narrated by Hannan ibn Sadeer, it is said: “There was a woman in our district who had a female slave who was a mourner. She came to my father and said: ‘O uncle, you know that my livelihood comes from God, and this maidservant, too. I wish to ask Abu Abdullah (7) about this matter. If it is permissible, I will continue, but if not, I will sell her and eat from the proceeds until God grants relief.’ My father replied: ‘By God, I hold Abu Abdullah in such reverence that I cannot ask him about this issue.’ When we arrived before him, I informed him of the matter, and Abu Abdullah (7) said: ‘Do you enter into a contract?’. I replied: ‘By God, I do not know whether it is a contract or not.’ He said: ‘Tell her: Do not enter into a contract and accept what you are given.'”

Furthermore, in the narration of Abu Basir, it is reported that Abu Abdullah (7) said: “There is no harm in paying the fee to the mourner who laments over the deceased.” Some argue that mourning cannot take place without singing, or that the general implication of the hadith includes singing, but this interpretation should be resisted. Mourning, in essence, is distinct from singing. The true nature of these two concepts is different and, in fact, they are opposites. As the dictionary al-Munjid defines it, “a woman mourns over the deceased” means she weeps with cries and lamentation. Even if we assume it involves a specific sound rather than just crying, its nature remains distinct from singing, as supported by custom and tradition.

Additionally, the narration from Dawa’im al-Islam cites the Prophet Muhammad (9) as saying: “Two voices are cursed and hated by God: one during a calamity and one during a blessing,” referring to mourning and singing. Similarly, the narration of Abdullah ibn Sinan from Abu Abdullah (7) quotes the Prophet (9): “Recite the Qur’an in the melodies and voices of the Arabs, and beware of the melodies of the immoral and the wicked, for after me, there will be people who will recite the Qur’an with the melodies of singing, mourning, and monasticism. They will be unable to reach their throats, and their hearts will be corrupt, as will the hearts of those who admire them.”

Thus, it is apparent from the contrast between the melodies of singing and mourning that they are fundamentally different, as evidenced by both tradition and common understanding. These narrations do not support the permissibility of mourning with singing, and even if they were accepted in some context, it would not necessarily imply the permissibility of music.

The stronger view is that mourning ceremonies, even those commemorating Imam Hussein (7), as well as reciting eulogies, praises, prayers, and reading the Qur’an, are exempted from the prohibition on singing. The Arabic melodies prescribed for the recitation of the Qur’an are distinct from the melodies of the wicked and sinful, and they are not to be equated with the melodies of singing. Therefore, the hadiths that encourage the recitation of the Qur’an with beautiful voices should be understood in this context. The term “beautiful voice” here is meant to contrast with the musical instruments used in forbidden activities, and it refers to the natural, pleasing recitation of the Qur’an, not singing in the musical sense.

Regarding the Narrations that Permit Mourning and the Claim that Mourning Cannot Be Done Without Singing:

It must be noted that mourning can indeed occur without singing, and singing is a separate matter from mourning. The nature of these two acts is fundamentally different, even opposite, and both common practice and the narrations support this distinction.

Mourning and the Exception of “Hadha” (Lamentation)

It appears from al-Muhaqqiq in his Kitab al-Shahadat that “hadha” (the mourning chant) is considered an exception to the prohibition on singing. This is also mentioned by al-‘Allama in his al-Qawa’id and al-Shahid in al-Durus, and even by Khurasani, who claims that it is well known. However, there is some uncertainty about this claim, as al-Muhaqqiq himself did not explicitly accept it.

Furthermore, there is a narration in which the Prophet Muhammad (9) says to Abdullah ibn Rawahah: “Go ahead and chant to the camels,” and Abdullah ibn Rawahah was known to be an excellent chanter. This narration, though weak in chain, indicates that the Prophet (9) permitted the chanting associated with the camels, which is not the same as the musical, sensual type of singing. Therefore, “hadha” is not necessarily to be equated with singing, and this distinction is important in understanding the issue.

Another related narration is from al-Sukuni, who reports the Prophet Muhammad (9) saying: “The provision of the traveler is the chanting of the camels, and poetry, provided that it is not immoral.” The word “khana” here has been interpreted as referring to indecent or inappropriate music. However, there is debate about the exact meaning of “hadha,” and whether it refers exclusively to chanting for camels or whether it includes other forms of chanting that might involve music.

Despite these complexities, the overall conclusion is that the exemption of “hadha” from the prohibition on singing is not definitive. However, there is no doubt that the chanting used in wedding ceremonies (i.e., the zaf or bridal procession) is an exception. The hadith narrated by Abu Basir clearly states that there is no harm in paying a singer who chants for the wedding procession, provided she does not mingle with men, indicating that this form of chanting is distinct from prohibited singing.

“Then, it appears from the scholar in the Book of Testimonies that the practice of chanting (ḥadāʾ) is considered an exception from the prohibition on singing as a legal ruling. This view is also reported from Al-‘Allāmah in his Qawā‘id and from Al-Shahīd in his Durūs, as well as from Khorāsānī, who even claimed a general consensus regarding this. In the commentary on Al-Fiqh by Al-Majlisī the First, it is mentioned that the majority of scholars appear to have made an exception for chanting, and in Al-Riyāḍ it is stated that this exception is widely known. However, the author of Miftāḥ al-Karāmah has cast doubt on this purported consensus, and in Al-Jawāhir, he definitively states that no such consensus exists. It is possible that this confusion arises due to the general nature of the scholars’ statements, which did not explicitly make an exception for chanting, except for the aforementioned scholar and those who followed him. It is fair to say that no decisive consensus can be established on either side of the argument.

One might argue in support of this exception with a narration in which the Prophet (PBUH) said to Abdullah ibn Rawāḥah: “Encourage the camels to move, and he began chanting, as Abdullah was skilled in this practice. He was among the men, while Anjashah, another companion, was with the women. When the Prophet heard him, he said to Anjashah: ‘Slow down, be gentle with the vessels’—meaning the women.” (In this case, although the chain of transmission is weak, the apparent meaning suggests that Abdullah ibn Rawāḥah was chanting to urge the camels forward. The rhythm of his chant would have been distinct from the type of singing that induces light-headedness or euphoria associated with singing, as it is more akin to the stimulation experienced in wartime or similar contexts.)

It can be argued that this shows that chanting for camels is not permissible, as abandoning it and adopting the rhythm traditionally associated with driving animals suggests its prohibition. As for the statement that “Abdullah was skilled in chanting,” it is simply a report by the narrator and does not necessarily indicate that he was chanting in a manner resembling singing.”

As expressed in his statement: “There is no good in it,” and as evidenced by numerous hadiths explaining the verse, it pertains to gambling. One such narration is the hadith of Ziad ibn Isa al-Haddad, who said: “I asked Abu Abdullah (peace be upon him) about the words of Allah, the Exalted: ‘And do not consume your wealth among yourselves unjustly.’ He said: The Quraysh used to gamble with a man’s family or wealth, so Allah forbade them from that.” In another narration, he explicitly says, “By that, He meant gambling.” There are other similar narrations, but in general, these narrations do not indicate the prohibition of all forms of falsehood or amusement; they specifically refer either to the prohibition of consuming wealth unjustly, or to a particular type of activity.

Even if we assume there is evidence for the prohibition of falsehood, it is still questionable whether singing and other forms of amusement are considered part of it from a customary point of view. Falsehood refers to corruption that does not lead to any effect, has no legitimate purpose, and serves no practical end. None of these characteristics apply to singing, which has practical and rational purposes. Were it not for the legal prohibition, singing and similar activities would not be considered in the same category as falsehood, mockery, or frivolity. Therefore, using such arguments to establish the prohibition of singing or amusement based on the general prohibition of such categories is unfounded.

The prohibition of all forms of amusement is also argued by some based on a few narrations. One of these is a narration from Samaa’a, in which he says: Abu Abdullah (peace be upon him) stated: “When Adam (peace be upon him) passed away, Iblis and Qabil rejoiced, and they both gathered on earth, making use of musical instruments and amusements to mock Adam (peace be upon him). Therefore, anything on earth that is used for amusement or pleasure is derived from that.” It is clear that this statement refers to the specific forms of amusement related to musical instruments, but it does not indicate the prohibition of all types of amusement or singing.

Another narration from the book of Majalis by al-Hasan ibn Muhammad al-Tusi, which has a weak chain of transmission, quotes Ali (peace be upon him) saying: “Anything that distracts from the remembrance of Allah is akin to gambling.” This, however, does not necessarily imply that all types of amusement are prohibited in the same manner as gambling, as the legal interpretation of ‘distraction’ could be specific to acts that lead to heedlessness regarding sin or wrongdoing, as with gambling or the use of instruments.

Moreover, in a narration from al-A’mash about the Shari’a of religion, it is stated that amusements which divert one from the remembrance of Allah are disliked, such as singing and the use of stringed instruments. This statement that these amusements are “disliked” may also imply prohibition, but it is not necessarily conclusive.

The same theme is expressed in the narration of al-Fadl ibn Shadhan, which is found in a reliable collection of hadiths, where the categorization of major sins includes indulgence in amusement. This could be interpreted to mean musical instruments rather than all forms of amusement, which would be a more limited conclusion. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no definitive evidence to support the general prohibition of all forms of amusement or all types of musical sounds.

However, it is prudent to avoid certain types of musical sounds, such as those popular among the corrupt, as they may resemble singing and may be associated with falsehood. Even so, there is room for discussion regarding the interpretation of these prohibitions.

Al-Tahrir al-Waseelah (The Clarification of the Means)

In his Tahrir al-Waseelah, Imam Khomeini summarises the view of Sheikh Ansari, without introducing any new perspective. Therefore, all the criticisms we directed towards Sheikh Ansari’s opinion on the thirteenth issue of his Makasib (Book of Profits and Trades) are also applicable to Imam Khomeini’s Tahrir al-Waseelah. Imam Khomeini states:

“Music is haram to perform, to listen to, and to profit from. It is not merely the beautification of the voice, but involves modulation and a specific manner of echoing the voice that is pleasing and suitable for frivolous gatherings, places of enjoyment, and musical instruments. There is no difference between its use in legitimate contexts, such as reading the Qur’an, prayers, elegies, or any other type of poetry or prose. The punishment is even greater when it is used in matters that are meant to obey Allah (the Exalted).

Yes, singing by female singers at weddings may be an exception, which is not far-fetched, but caution should be exercised in restricting it to the event of the bride’s procession and the ceremony before and after the event, not in every gathering. It is more prudent to avoid it entirely.”

This clearly establishes that singing and listening to music for pleasure is considered haram, but there are specific nuances regarding exceptions in weddings.

Fatwas on Music

It is fitting to mention a few of Imam Khomeini’s fatwas on music to better understand his final position:

1. What is the ruling on music, and what types of music are considered forbidden? “Pleasure-inducing music is haram. Suspect sounds are not prohibited, and their classification is subject to local customs.”
2. What is the ruling on revolutionary songs broadcasted by state media? “Listening to or performing music that is intended for enjoyment is haram. There is no issue with suspect sounds, and the buying and selling of musical instruments for frivolous purposes is not allowed, though it is permissible to sell instruments for neutral uses.”
3. Is it permissible to sing Qur’anic verses in musical form? “If it is in the form of music that induces pleasure, it is not permissible.”
4. Can a wife sing for her husband in a manner that could be considered singing? “It is haram.”
5. What is the ruling on songs related to revolutionary events or military marches? “Not all sounds and tunes are haram, but the sound that is considered to be music or song by custom, suitable for frivolous gatherings, is forbidden.”

As we observe, Imam Khomeini’s fatwas emphasize that music, when associated with enjoyment and frivolity, is considered haram, but it is allowed when it does not induce pleasure, such as in certain formal or ritual contexts. These views align with traditional scholarly positions, and further exploration of this matter suggests that the prohibition of music is rooted in its potential to lead individuals away from serious pursuits, a point that Imam Khomeini articulates clearly in his statements.

Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Shihab al-Din Marashi Najafi

Ayatollah Marashi (who passed away in 1410 AH) responds to the following queries:

What is the ruling on earning money through gambling, singing, and similar activities?

“Earning money must be through lawful and legitimate means, and it is prohibited to earn through forbidden means such as theft, usury, singing, and gambling.”

Is it permissible to use radio and television?

“The use of radio and television is permissible as long as it is not for vain entertainment or amusement. For instance, listening to religious and scientific lectures, the Qur’an, and news is permissible. However, listening to music, singing, and corrupt programs is prohibited.”

What is the ruling on classical music or music played before or after the news or during movies?

“It is preferable to avoid listening to it.”

What is the ruling on singing, and how does it apply when accompanied by music?

“Singing is permissible if it involves admonition, guidance, or similar content, as long as it is not done in a manner of musical performance (singing in tune). However, music in any form is impermissible.”

Based on the fatwas of this ascetic scholar, any use of visual or auditory media by youth or the public, other than for admonition, guidance, or beneficial information, is not permissible. Particularly, they should refrain from the enchanting melodies from the “magic box” of television. At the same time, the proposals and fatwas presented from our side provide a sound and lawful approach to happiness and entertainment, without depriving youth of permissible religious joys.

Here, we refrain from quoting or discussing the opinions of other contemporary scholars to respect their dignity, and because what needs to be mentioned has already been covered in the review of past scholars’ views, with no need to repeat or elaborate on them further.