Jurisprudential Rules

Jurisprudential Rules

Introduction

Praise be to Allah, the Lord of the Worlds, and peace and blessings be upon the best of His creation, Muhammad, and his pure family, and perpetual curse upon all their enemies.

This treatise before the esteemed reader explores the most important fundamental jurisprudential rules that jurists adhere to. These rules serve as references for rulings in numerous jurisprudential branches related to legal deduction, and reviewing them is essential for anyone deeply versed in Islamic jurisprudence.

Jurisprudential rules are general rulings that encompass a set of similar legal issues under each rule, spanning various chapters which jurists and scholars of principles (usul) have elaborated upon extensively in jurisprudential and usul texts. Among the foremost works in this field are Al-Qawa’id wal Fawa’id by the First Martyr and Nadhd al-Qawa’id by Al-Miqdad Al-Sayyuri, who refined Al-Qawa’id wal Fawa’id.

This treatise represents the first part of a series, with subsequent parts to follow, God willing. It investigates the legislative basis of each jurisprudential rule, explains its meaning, its scope of application, and resolves its complex issues.

Our final prayer: all praise is due to Allah, Lord of the Worlds.

1. The Rule of “Ownership”

“Whoever owns something owns the right to acknowledge it.” This rule differs from “The acknowledgment of rational persons about themselves is permissible” as it is broader. Although some assert its evidence is an implicit consensus, the truth is that its proof is reason, just as with the rule of acknowledgment.

Its application is limited to what is certain in doubtful matters, and there is consensus among jurists regarding this limited scope.

2. The Rule of “Possibility”

“Whatever can possibly be menstrual blood is considered menstrual blood.” The evidence for this rule is found in the traditions, and the ‘possibility’ here is actual possibility.

It applies in cases where there is no objection to something being menstrual blood before or after three days. Following the resolution of differences, rulings are based on clarity in both the legal ruling and the subject matter.

3. The Rule of “Islam Abolishes What Came Before”

“Islam abrogates what came before it.” The evidence consists of various general and specific traditions revealing that this is a ruling ordained by the Lawgiver. The meaning is the forgiveness of prior acts upon a non-Muslim who embraces Islam, in belief and action or necessary abandonment, as a favour from the Lawgiver.

The rule pertains only to that which would otherwise be questioned of them, not to what was actually good or abandoned. This rule is applied absolutely except in cases of specific exceptions if any exist.

4. The Rule of “Casting Lots”

There is no doubt that casting lots (al-qur‘ah) is a legal principle, supported by evidence from the Noble Qur’an and other sources. Traditions related to this matter, both general and specific, are numerous.

The terms used in the evidence include unknown, doubtful, problematic, confusing, detailed, and others.

It is certain from all cases that the doubts are objective, not normative, accompanied by general knowledge and absence of any original evidence or indicators, which are speculative signs. The Lawgiver established this method to resolve doubtful matters when all other legal means such as signs or principles are unavailable.

5. The Rule of “No Repetition”

Imam Abu Ja‘far (peace be upon him) said: “Prayer is not repeated except for five things: purification, time, Qibla, bowing, and prostration.”

There is no doubt in the basis of this rule. Its main implication, briefly noted here, is that it does not include intentional violation of other obligations besides these five, according to evidence concerning parts and conditions.

Similarly, it does not include intentional violation of obligations due to ignorance of the ruling — whether due to neglect, forgetfulness, or initial ignorance — because the hadith’s scope is restricted to negating repetition in cases where without this ruling repetition would be obligatory.

Hence, intentional violations fall outside the hadith’s scope even with ignorance or forgetfulness. The hadith governs evidence about parts and conditions.

Exceptions include forgetfulness, ignorance of the ruling or subject, necessity, and the like.

From the essence of the hadith, it is understood that defects occurring outside these five specified causes do not necessitate repetition — even if excess occurs — thus the hadith includes excess as well as deficiency with no difference.

The meaning of the hadith “Prayer is not repeated except for five” is absolute with regard to all parts, conditions, and impediments, requiring no qualification other than the violation being related to the part concerned.

The generality of “no repetition” is not rational, nor can it be qualified, nor is the enumeration of these five comprehensive by rational negation. If evidence demands repetition due to violation of other parts or conditions beyond these five — such as intention, opening takbir, or the standing position itself — it applies.

Overall, there are nine parts.

The negation of repetition is not limited to time or outside it, thus no obligation to repeat exists in either case, which is the main rationale behind exceptions.

The exceptions are summarized here:

• Purification means ritual purity, not impurity, due to the importance of exceptions related to it.
• Time means prayer times.
• Missing bowing or prostrations refers to after entering the late pillar.
• Missing two prostrations is the same.
• The meaning of Qibla is clear.

This completes the explanation of the hadith’s essence and the rule’s meaning. Many subsidiary issues exist in their proper places.

6. The Rule of “The Hand”

“The Hand” is a jurisprudential rule applicable to its instances. It denotes external control or possession of a thing or matter in its customary sense, according to the linguistic convention whereby words are set to convey meanings.

Its basis, along with narrations, is the ruling of reason. Narrations clarify the extent of reason’s certainty.

This rule constitutes a valid presumption based on reason’s ruling, with transmission serving as guidance thereto. It is evidence and authoritative over principles absolutely, including presumption (istishab), but its authority depends on no contradiction from reason — even by rational indication or widespread knowledge — and intention precedes it.

The hand over a thing extends to all benefits, rights, lineage, and properties, due to the universality of rational construction in all areas, even in establishing rights of the hand’s owner amidst doubt.

The hand of a Muslim also indicates innocence and purity. Statements by the hand-owner concerning purity and impurity are accepted.

Also accepted is their statement and acknowledgment concerning a disputed matter, based on their admission that the property belongs to a particular person without dispute or contradiction.

Acknowledgment by the hand-owner regarding a thing in separate or multiple sessions is fully valid and obliges the other parties if present.

The hand is also a sign of ownership, causes testimony and oath for its commands, and one cause of liability if the hand controls another’s property without permission.

The chain of the hand’s evidence is sound, its indication clear, and it is a cause of acquiring ownership and exclusive right in permissible things.

7. The Rule of “Denial of a Non-Muslim’s Authority Over a Muslim”

The rule denying a non-Muslim’s authority over a Muslim is among the definitive rulings of Sharia, based on the Qur’an and Sunnah.

It means legislative ruling forbidding any means or status giving a non-Muslim superiority or authority over a Muslim.

This rule overrides all primary evidences, such as “No harm and no reciprocating harm,” but based on definitive certainty, not conjecture.

The hadith “Islam is superior and nothing is superior to it” also explains this.

Although this rule is a legal presumption, its basis is definitive, as understood from the Lawgiver’s intent. Sharia does not accept presumptive reasoning to establish definitive proofs inferred from apparent texts.

There are numerous applications of this rule evident in Sharia jurisprudence. For instance, a non-Muslim cannot own a Muslim’s property by any means, nor inherit from a Muslim, and other similar matters. All depend on the absence of authority; where authority is absent, sale, lease, loan, pledge, etc., are valid.

8. The Rule of “No Harm and No Reciprocating Harm in Islam”

The source of this rule is traditions of both parties, with no doubt about its evidence. Its main implication is as noted here.

This is a general rule applying to many branches on a single basis.

The harm mentioned refers to detriment to a person’s affairs, property, or similar, in any aspect. It is a negative matter contrasted with benefit. The harm is personal, pertaining to actual individuals, varying by place and person.

Although the rule is general, the basis of its application to individuals is personal.

Harm is considered reciprocal based on the rule, meaning repeated harm, equivalence, and retribution. Harm upon another means that excessive harm upon the oppressor by the oppressed is invalid in the context of equivalence.

The negation of harm here means prohibition, not obligation.

Also, the presence of similar phrases in the language, especially in the Qur’an — like “no obscenity, no sin, no disputing in Hajj” — are not conclusive proofs against it but subject to further analysis.

The rule implies negating the ruling by negating its subject, like “no doubt” negates “doubt,” and “no forgetfulness” negates “forgetfulness” for the Imam, preserving the follower, without specific indication here.

The negation appears to apply to the subject matter itself, not the ruling, so it does not require further proof.

Hence, the rule’s implication is the real negation of any ruling that causes harm to the servants. If any primary ruling causes harm or leads to harm, it is effectively abrogated.

This rule overrides all primary proofs as with other matters of governance, making harm negated by the ruling’s existence itself, whether legal or discretionary, not factual.

Some difficulties in applying this rule are noted here:

First, the case of Samura’s ruling, which may appear inconsistent with this rule as the Prophet’s ruling caused harm to the wrongdoer, necessitating removal of harm through legislation. The reply is that the ruling targeted removal of the harm itself and this cannot be entirely effected without it, also applicable in other cases like the prevention of obstruction and pre-emption.

Second, difficulty may arise regarding the universality of the rule requiring limitation, which Sheikh’s explanation here does not resolve definitively. The correct answer is that no limitation is necessary as applying limitation generally negates the universality of the rule. It is clear that in all cases harm is not actually harmful.

Indeed, in all these cases there is a perceived harm, but not an actual harm; thus, all the legal resources established in the Shariah that entail a perceived harm are actually free from harm. Therefore, the context is one of specification (takhsis), not limitation (takhṣīṣ), so the resources need not be greater or fewer.

Thirdly, an objection might arise that by lifting one harm, the establishment of another harm necessarily follows — meaning that negating one ruling entails affirming the other. For example, the well-known case of an animal’s head encroaching onto another’s property. The response divides the case into two categories: the first, where harm to the subject of fault is inevitable — this is not disputed. The second category concerns the case of conflicting harms without negligence. Here, by the principle of “no harm” (lā ḍarar), which is an act of generosity towards the community, the ruling is to choose the lesser of the two harms. This does not imply that lifting harm from one necessarily places harm upon the other, which would be a contradiction. Instead, it is said that harm is lifted to the extent of the excess between them, not when they are equal or opposite, thus avoiding contradiction. This principle is enacted with regard to the community’s circumstances.

However, the authority of this principle is conditional upon the absence of hardship on either side; otherwise, the principle of hardship (ḥaraj) takes precedence over lā ḍarar in such situations. Not by virtue of the commandments themselves, for they are equal from this perspective, but because hardship is preferred over harm in their conflict, since harm may be remedied, whereas hardship cannot always be so.

The application of the principle lā ḍarar is also subordinate to the principle that “people have authority over their own property.” The primary principle is sovereignty, whereas lā ḍarar oversees it as with other legal rules, both primary and secondary. This sovereignty is a conventional apparent authority over ownership and property, limited by the prohibition of harm to others. This sovereignty is negated in cases of harm to others, and also to the owner, except where hardship is concerned, as mentioned before. Following this, there is no distinction in the authority between intentional harm and unintentional harm, or between actual harm and mere loss of benefit. The criterion for authority and sovereignty is limited strictly to the absence of harm to anyone, unless there is actual hardship in between.

Principle of “No Difficulty or Hardship in Islam”

This principle is derived from unequivocal texts of the Qur’an and Sunnah, indicating that the religion of Islam and the tolerant, easy Hanafi jurisprudence do not impose burdensome rulings or strenuous duties on Muslims.

Consensus in this matter is founded upon these evidences alone and not others. This principle is distinct from what is derived by rational proof, which pertains to what is impossible or unbearable for people. That would be inappropriate for the lawgiver to impose. Nevertheless, duties that are difficult but bearable, even if arduous, do not render the law objectionable, as the interests and conditions governing these duties are well established and intended by the lawgiver. This corresponds with the historical reality of other nations as mentioned in the Glorious Qur’an.

The text further explains that all burdensome and strenuous duties were present in earlier nations but not in all rulings; rather, only some of them. Complete hardship equals the dissolution of religion, which is most objectionable to the lawgiver. However, hardship and difficulty regarding some duties, which can be borne by the people with various benefits, is necessary for the compassionate and subtle lawgiver. Such matters have no place in Islam due to the generosity and mercy granted to this community through the Prophet and the Imams.

It is emphasised that there is no doubt regarding the existence of difficult duties like jihad, fasting, and others in Islam; yet, they are not genuinely burdensome in the legislative sense. A distinction is made between generally burdensome rulings and vital rulings with great importance, which have minimal obstacles at times or to individuals. According to this principle, such burdensome rulings do not exist, and when they appear, they are lifted.

Accordingly, Islam contains no legislated rulings that are genuinely burdensome—whether obligatory or prohibited, primary or secondary—binding over all rulings, including the principle lā ḍarar as mentioned previously.

This principle applies to all legal chapters and issues, provided it is verified, as discussed in all legal texts in detail. Therefore, if a person acts under burden according to primary rulings despite the validity of this principle, such action is invalid and considered as if no action was done, similar to the situation when harm is confirmed. No distinction exists between the principles lā ḍarar and lā ḥaraj regarding lifting obligation with continuing consequence.

Principle of “Deception” (Gharar)

One of the known principles in the domain of liability is the principle of deception (gharar), which refers to causing harm to someone through the deception of another. The deceived party may claim compensation from the deceiver proportional to the harm suffered, even if the deceiver was unaware, as intention is not a necessary condition under the title.

The evidence supporting this principle includes the renowned prophetic tradition, consensus, rational proof, and the principle lā ḍarar, all strengthening the link between the cause and the direct actor, and the specific proofs in special cases indicating the deceived party’s recourse to the deceiver proportionally to harm suffered.

However, it must be said that consensus, though described as “disputed,” is evidence because its basis lies in one of the claimed matters, and suspicion that consensus does not derive from these matters is insignificant and disregarded. Also, since there is disagreement on this principle’s generality, it cannot be wholly established by consensus.

Further, its rational proof is not absolute, especially considering customary views; partial evidence is insufficient here. The famous prophetic tradition is also unreliable due to possible weakness or generality, and doubt about its source suffices for rejection.

Thus, even the rational and prophetic evidence do not fully establish the absolute principle covering the deceiver’s ignorance of harm caused.

However, the principle lā ḍarar is sufficient here, including in establishing the principle of deception. The specific proofs are from particular cases and rational deduction, combined with the absolute wording and consensus, which may be disregarded by us, but exist.

Principle of “Presumption of Validity in the Actions of Rational Agents”

Among the jurisprudential principles is the presumption of validity in the acts of rational agents, with several aspects:

1. Meaning: It refers to the correspondence of the act to reality as performed by rational agents after ascertaining the act and existence of the subject, whether the agent is rational or not, specific or general. Validity applies regardless of the actor or recipient, or whether the contract conditions are met or if there are defects, once the subject matter is confirmed and no contrary indication exists.
2. Recognition: The general conduct of rational agents across all sects leads to assigning the legal effects of reality to their acts, and the lawgiver’s non-prevention confirms this consideration, as numerous traditions indicate.
3. Specificity: This principle overrides presumption of invalidity and objective presumption in cases of doubt concerning the title or subject, once the subject is verified.
4. Indications: It serves as a rational indication affirmed by the lawgiver, with the onus on contrary evidence.

This principle applies universally to all acts of limbs and faculties, until a contrary indication appears.

Principles of “Passing Over” and “Completion”

These two well-known principles have multiple facets:

1. They are evidential presumptions rather than foundational principles, as the lawgiver intends to remove the possibility of conflict, with their scope and evidential base found in specific legal issues. Their general and comprehensive application emerges from the details.
2. Their scope extends beyond prayer and ablution, applying to all fields, as they are grounded in reason and law, though not always explicit.
3. Although similar, they are distinct principles both in nature and evidence: passing over concerns doubt between parts, while completion concerns doubt after the act’s completion.

Principle of “Prohibition of Assisting in Sin and Aggression”

This principle is founded on Qur’anic and Prophetic texts and rational reasoning. The verse: “Help one another in righteousness and piety, and do not help one another in sin and aggression” clearly indicates the obligation and prohibition.

Though absolute cooperation is not obligatory, the general prohibitive principle stands firm, as supported by numerous narrations and rational proof. This includes the principle lā ḍarar, sin against others, and self-inflicted sin.

Sin is defined as disobedience and neglecting an obligatory duty, and assistance refers to helping with intent or certainty of occurrence, or even intent without occurrence, but without intent to cause sin, no ruling applies.

The principle’s applications are extensive across all legal chapters and are clearly established.

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The Principle of “Non-Liability of the Trustee”

This is one of the well-known and widely applied legal principles, the essence of which is that the trustee (amin) is not liable provided there is no transgression or negligence.

Its basis lies in the narrations specific to this subject, and there is no evidence to establish liability except in cases of transgression, negligence, or lack of permission by the legislator or owner regarding the manner of disposition. This latter point is separate and unrelated to the current discussion. Moreover, the basis for non-liability requires no additional evidence, especially consensus, as the rational judgment also aligns with the legal evidence. Nonetheless, the authoritative source for proof here is the religious texts and the narrations of this chapter.

The summary of the principle’s core meaning is that liability refers generally to responsibility for replacement in kind, value in valuables, and limits of liability. The trustee intended here is the one authorised to take and manage the property. No one can accuse the trustee without evidence.

If no evidence exists, the trustee is not liable even in cases of apparent transgression or negligence, unless the owner has clear evidence. Transgression and negligence mean exceeding the limits of permission—even if actual transgression does not occur. With transgression or destruction, liability arises by virtue of actual effect; with mere retention or diminution, liability is contingent on the strength of evidence. Exceeding permission determines the scope of liability.

Granting trust may benefit the trustee, such as in borrowing (aariyah), or benefit the owner, as in a deposit (wadi‘ah). Permission can come from the owner or the legislator, and their cases are numerous.

This principle is generally applied without exception. Any supposed contradiction is wholly refuted, mainly due to failure to properly ascertain the principle’s subject and limits.

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The Principle of “Destruction”

Among the important legal principles is that “Whoever destroys another’s property is liable.”

This issue requires no in-depth argument because clear evidence is found in the Noble Qur’an, both specific and general narrations, and the unanimous consensus of the scholars on this matter.

The statement in the heading encapsulates all the relevant evidence, even if it is not itself a narration.

In summary, destruction means loss or annihilation. Destroying property means its loss or annihilation, whether it concerns another’s property, its usufruct, or benefit. The term “property” is as commonly understood, unless otherwise invalidated by legal evidence.

Liability here means compensation: replacement in kind or monetary equivalent.

This principle means that whoever annihilates another’s property is accountable for replacement in kind or value.

There is no difference in liability between direct destruction and causing it indirectly. The cause means what necessitates the destruction. This ruling applies to causes as well, based on narrations, without distinction regarding the intention of the cause.

Though direct and indirect parties differ in rulings, the direct party is primarily liable in normal customary honesty. Sometimes the cause may share liability. However, the direct party’s liability is certain unless destruction occurs mechanically without intent; then the cause bears liability.

The classifications in this matter are numerous and best understood through rational reflection.

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The Principle of “Joint Responsibility”

Among the juristic principles is that the obligated persons share in the ruling across all ages until the Day of Judgment. This principle applies universally to all ranks and individuals, preserving specificities and the reality of circumstances.

Its proof lies in reason and the inherent nature of law regarding universality and generality in the domain of applicability.

The consensus among the scholars stems from this fact, combined with the flavour of the Glorious Qur’an and the narrations, both general and particular, affirming the eternality and universality of Islam and its law.

The scope of this principle is too vast and refined to require proof here; discussing it serves only as a reminder and emphasis.

Universality and generality do not contradict non-universality at the individual level. Universality is realised through the reality of each individual, which is evident and needs no further explanation.

Difficulties and misconceptions about this principle arise only from this aspect; otherwise, the principle is accepted as universally and generally established.

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The Principle of “Loss of Sold Goods Before Possession Belongs to the Seller”

One of the juristic principles is that “any sold item lost before possession belongs to the seller.” Its proof is the narrations of the chapter, both general and particular.

The principle means that loss before possession is a cause for contract annulment; consequently, the loss belongs to the owner, which is evident from the wording “belongs to the seller.”

This principle reflects customary understanding among people and experts in this area.

Although it apparently applies to the sold item and the price, its scope is general, including the price, because the ownership and understanding of experts and common sense treat these matters under the same rules. Moreover, the term “sold item” in its general form includes the price as an extension.

Thus, the principle undoubtedly includes the price as well.

If only part of the sold item is lost, the rules for partial loss and dealings with the remaining goods apply; however, the buyer retains the option regarding partial loss.

This principle is not confined to sales, although the narrations are specifically from the sales chapter, because the rationale and reason of intellect are identical. The legal exposition covers only part of the rationale and does not exclude the principle’s application to other transactions, with certainty.

Further particularities of this principle are discussed in jurisprudence and are not repeated here.

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The Principle of “Liability for the Faulty is Also Liability for its Invalidity”

The principle that “liability for the valid entails liability for the invalid” involves several considerations, briefly summarised here.

Its foundation varies among scholars, but it is supported by principles such as respecting the property of the entrusted, the principle of the hand (responsibility), consensus, and the principle of respect.

Consensus here, despite its importance, is not decisive because it rests on premises similar to many others; the key proof lies in the principle itself, not consensus.

The principle of respect is not an established basis since respect alone does not guarantee liability.

If the basis of this principle were mere confidence (iqdam), it would be an application of customary reason; yet, confidence alone is not an absolute proof.

Crucially, the well-known prophetic tradition “The hand takes until it delivers” is central, whether the object is delivered or to be delivered, and whether the context is literal or figurative.

This tradition is accepted as reliable by both Sunni and Shi’a scholars, freeing it from doubt.

Its meaning is that one is liable for everything taken, until the liability is removed, whether the object exists or not, and regardless of the type of contract or transaction.

Liability here refers to actual liability for the object itself, with no difference among types of taking, due to the generality of the term.

By logical extension, the converse is also inferred universally: if one is not liable for the valid, then one is not liable for the invalid; because without liability there is no loss, thus outside the scope of liability.

Therefore, both principles are fundamentally sound and universally applicable in all contracts and transactions. Any apparent contradiction is unimportant and dismissed by experience and precision.

Lastly, the subject of liability here is the persons involved in contracts and transactions according to the primary matter, so that if a valid contract implies liability, the invalid one also entails liability, regardless of external distinctions or classification.

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The Principle of “Loss During the Option Period is the Seller’s Responsibility”

This principle is mainly based on the narrations of the chapter and pertains exclusively to animals. It applies from the buyer’s side without the need for conditions or stipulations within three days.

Hence, this principle is more specific than the broader principle: “Loss during the option period belongs to whoever does not have the option.”

No evidence exists for the generality of the broader principle, nor is consensus binding here due to the clarity of the basis as in other cases.

The phrase “belongs to the seller” indicates that liability for the seller is in effect because of annulment of the contract in case of loss during the option period, similar to loss before possession. This annulment benefits the buyer during the option period.

Similarly, loss caused by defects also entitles the buyer to the option, with no distinction.

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The Principle of “Following the Majority”

In the context of prayer, “doubt” means uncertainty due to forgetfulness. This is a legal principle without rational basis, linked to obligatory prayers; supererogatory prayers have specific rulings regarding doubt.

Doubt in areas not specified in the texts results in invalidity, unless it is clear that the doubt concerns the worshipper’s own action. For example, the requirement of two (rak‘ahs) applies to Friday prayer, shortened prayers, and invalid doubts where no remedy or proof of invalidity exists.

Following the majority is a legal remedy to prevent excess and to complete what was missed through other means.

Completing the two prostrations involves raising the head because the completeness of the second prostration is only certain upon rising; mentioning obligatory matters during it does not ensure its completion.

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The Principle of “The Validity of Presumption in Prayer”

This principle is based on the narrations of the chapter. The doubt refers to acts and units of prayer, not to the validity of the prayer itself or compliance with its command.

The term “doubt” or “presumption” in the narrations means legal presumption: if doubt arises in prayer acts, repetition is not obligatory; otherwise, it is.

These narrations indicate the validity of presumption in all such cases, without exception, in all prayers and all units.

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The Principle of “No Doubt Between Imam and Followers with Mutual Preservation”

This principle’s proof is narrations and consensus, which arose from these narrations as in many consensuses.

The ruling is based on the unity of prayer in congregation, a legislative means to eliminate doubt and validate prayer when possible.

The ruling applies regardless of the type of follower—just or sinner, provided the prayer behind them is valid.

Here, doubt means uncertainty as in other contexts. The term “preservation” means elimination of doubt, not leaving it unresolved.

The principle applies to all actions, words, and units where such ruling can be applied, not restricted to certain units, and does not require complete certainty in the final unit; it suffices to base the ruling on it with certainty.

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The Principle of “No Doubt in Supererogatory Prayer”

This principle is based on the narrations of the chapter. It means the legislative negation of doubt—doubt is disregarded.

Following the lesser or greater amount is at the discretion of the worshipper, with no obligation.

“Supererogatory” refers to all prayers that are not obligatory in two, three, or four units, and are not subject to obligation. Otherwise, they fall outside this ruling.

A prayer which becomes obligatory ceases to be supererogatory, and the principle of continuity (istishhab) cannot maintain doubt when obligation arises.

Hence, the principle refers to voluntary prayer, while obligation overrides it, even if the obligation is temporary.

Details are elaborated in extended works, with some debate on the acts and titles involved.

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The Principle of “No Doubt in Cases of Excessive Doubt”

Among the juristic principles is that “there is no doubt in excessive doubt.” Its basis is narrations. The core message is: “If forgetfulness or doubt overwhelms you…”

Here, “forgetfulness” means doubt. The condition is that the doubt is frequent, defined here as at least three occurrences.

The wisdom is mercy and repelling Satan from the faithful worshipper. The ruling is imperative, not discretionary.

Remedial action in such cases is permissible even without proof.

Item 25: Principle of the Validity of Evidence (Hujjat al-Bayyina)

One of the well-known principles concerning matters is the validity of evidence (bayyina). Although the term bayyina has a broader linguistic and customary meaning, in the context of Islamic jurisprudence it refers specifically to the testimony of two just witnesses.

The validity of evidence is contingent upon rational custom (‘sīra ‘aqliyyah’), which is why the Qur’anic verses and Prophetic traditions affirming this principle serve as definitive proofs that eliminate any possibility of dispute.

The fundamental basis for its evidentiary value after rational custom is established by the Qur’anic verses and narrations, such as the narration of Mas‘ada ibn Ṣadqa and others. There is no exclusivity regarding its validity across judicial matters or other legal categories, except concerning the required number of just witnesses in various contexts, or distinctions between men and women. All of this is articulated in specific legal texts.

The validity of evidence applies to tangible matters or those that have an apparent customary link to perception, such as proving justice, knowledge, diligence, marital status, ownership, and so forth.

Once established, evidence is legally effective within the parameters of its relevant subject matter and no further. The requirement of multiple witnesses is limited to issues beyond those explicitly detailed in the narrations, because the evidence of a single trustworthy report encompasses all those judicial matters without distinction.

Evidence holds precedence over legal maxims because the latter address matters of uncertainty, whereas evidence constitutes certain knowledge. It also precedes presumptions based on rational custom, except where stronger proofs exist, such as self-confession.

The scope of the rational custom is restricted to the presence of certainty; where certainty about dispute exists, evidence does not constitute valid proof.

Item 26: Principle of the Permissibility of Self-Admission by the Rational

The principle that “it is permissible for rational individuals to admit upon themselves” is well established among all religions and schools of thought.

Its foundation lies in the consensus of rational people and the sanction of the Lawgiver (Shari‘ah). Numerous narrations from the Infallibles (peace be upon them) support this principle, and there is consensus based on these reports. The Qur’an also indicates the permissibility of self-admission, which rational people accept as incontrovertible.

The rationale behind this form of admission for a rational person includes various beneficial factors, such as personal orientation, relief from inner burden, fear of divine punishment, and other possible motivations.

Admission must be voluntary and without coercion or compulsion. All forced admissions, such as those extorted by tyrannical rulers through beating, verbal abuse, or other forms of punishment, are not legally binding.

The extensive discussion in Prophetic traditions primarily serves to affirm the binding effect of voluntary self-admission.

By “rational people,” we mean the general populace excluding the insane or the severely intellectually disabled. The admission must be detrimental to the person admitting it, and the principle relates specifically to voluntary self-admission. It does not include admissions about others, nor does it entail an absolute necessary correlation between cause and effect in all matters, as these are legal and customary considerations.

No distinction exists regarding the strength or form of admission, whether verbal or implied, but it must be clear and explicit according to customary understanding.

Once admission is complete, denial is not permissible. If coercion or compulsion exists, denial is indicative of the incomplete nature of the admission.