Rationality in Shia Mysticism / Volume Two

Ayatollah Nekounam's books

Rationality in Shia Mysticism / Volume Two
(*May his soul rest in peace)

His Eminence, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Reza Nekounam

Main Author: Nekounam, Muhammad Reza, b. 1327 AH (1909 AD)

Title and Author Information:
Rationality in Shia Mysticism / Volume Two / Muhammad Reza Nekounam.

Publication Details:
Islamshahr: Sobh Farda Publishing, First Edition, 1400 AH (2021).

Physical Description:
3 volumes.

ISBN:
978-964-2807-42-0

Cataloguing Status:
FIPA

Note:
This book is a commentary on “Qawa’id al-Tawhid” by Muhammad bin Habib Allah Torke Isfahani.

Note:
The bibliography is provided as footnotes.

Subject:
Torke Isfahani, Muhammad bin Habib Allah (d. 580 AH) — Qawa’id al-Tawhid — Criticism and Interpretation.

Subject:
Mysticism — Ancient Texts up to the 14th Century.

Subject:
Sufism — Ancient Texts up to the 14th Century.

Added Author:
Nekounam, Muhammad Reza, b. 1327 AH — Editor, Commentator, and Re-thinker.

Added Author:
Torke Isfahani, Muhammad bin Habib Allah (d. 580 AH) — Qawa’id al-Tawhid, Commentary.

Library of Congress Classification:
1400 Q 4 T / 3 / 283 BP

Dewey Decimal Classification:
212 / 90

National Bibliography Number:
37320-85 M

Rationality in Shia Mysticism (Volume Two)
Author: His Eminence, Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Reza Nekounam (may his soul rest in peace)
Publisher: Sobh Farda
Edition: First Edition, Publication Date: 1400 AH (2021)
Print Run: 3000 copies
Price: 2,500,000 Rial

Location:
Tehran – Islamshahr – Nasimshahr – Vajehabad
Address: 12 Meter Javadzadeh Street, No. 36
Postal Code: 3769138575
Distribution Center Phone: +98253279078
Website
ISBN: 978-964-2807-42-0

Copyright Reserved by the Author

Sixteenth Passage: The Incompatibility of the Four Forms with the Necessary Nature

He said:

“Then we say: The concept of this nature is not the concept of any of the determinations which are among the accidents that require the existence of subjects to which they relate in either actual or mental existence — whether they are existent or non-existent, by necessity.

If it is said: the determination of this nature, which is the same as this nature in its essence, may be considered as an inherent part of the absolute determination, and the concept of absolute determination could apply to it as well as to other remaining determinations, either as a matter of doubt, or as a matter of verbal, not conceptual, shared meaning, then it is possible that its determination may not be a rational concept and may not necessarily lead to the realization of a subject in existence in either of the two conceivable cases.

We say: We have explained in our philosophical works that the concept and meaning of determination are one, necessary, and do not differ except according to their relation to specific subjects. It is clear that the conceptual relation does not necessitate the understanding of the object in its full truth.”

Sixteenth Passage: The Incompatibility of the Four Images with the Necessary Nature

We then say: The concept of this nature is not the concept of any of the determinations which are among the accidents that require the realization of subjects in actual or mental existence — whether in existence or non-existence — by necessity. If it is said: the determination of this nature, which is the same as this nature in its essence, can be considered an inherent part of the absolute determination, and the concept of absolute determination can apply to it and to the other remaining determinations either as a matter of doubt or as a verbal rather than a conceptual shared meaning, then it is possible that the determination of this nature may not be rational and does not necessarily require the realization of a subject in existence under one of these two assumptions (doubt or shared meaning).

We say: We have clarified in our philosophical books that the concept and meaning of determination are one, necessary, and they do not differ except due to differences in how they are related to subjects. It is self-evident that the understanding of the relation does not necessitate the understanding of the object in its full truth.

Explanation and Analysis of the Issue:

Since it has been established by those who affirm the existence of the necessary nature that it cannot have mental or intellectual individuals, in order to qualify as the Necessary Being, as you have learned, and that the natures that are unable to have mental or external individuals are limited to the four images mentioned, hence the author began explaining the impossibility of these four images from the necessary nature, in order to establish the truth according to the teachings of reason and clarification, asserting that this nature does not qualify for necessity, assuming its existence. Moreover, the reason for discussing this, according to the principle of reasoning and dialectical research, follows from conceding certain premises of the opponent.

The explanation of this issue is: after accepting the realization and confirmation of this necessary nature, it is not suitable for being a necessary truth, as the Necessary Being must possess individual truths in mental and external existence, and the necessary nature is not one of these types of beings. If the necessary nature were to belong to the category of the Necessary Being, then it would necessarily belong to one of the four mentioned forms, but the conclusion is false.

Observations:

The philosophers asserted that the Necessary Being is the nature contingent upon existence and that the mystical perspective considers the Necessary Being as pure existence itself, which is what is necessary and not mere potential existence. Furthermore, the claim of Avicenna is that the nature of the Necessary Being is such that it does not have either mental or external individuals. This argument is presented in the Niyat (The Book of Notes) and Al-Isharat wa al-Tanbihat, where he argues the existence of the Necessary Being through his discourse on existence in its entirety.

This argument concerning the Oneness (Tawhid) is not conclusive, because at best, it proves the nature of the Necessary Being, conditioned upon its non-existence (bāshart lā), but this being does not have a true or mental individual. However, this argument does not negate the existence of another Necessary Being with the same characteristics — where its determination is identical to its essence and it has no individuals — in comparison to the first Necessary Being.

What has been pursued up to this point is foundational discourse, whereas what follows is more of a fundamental discussion, meaning that until now, we have argued that the nature of the Necessary Being conditioned upon non-existence is not a valid concept. From here, however, the discussion shifts to accepting this concept, but asserting that such a nature cannot be necessary. Rather, by assuming such a nature, its possibility is proven. At this stage, the first point is raised, which involves questioning the identity of determination with the essence of the Necessary Being.

Abu Hamid, in this section and in the subsequent three sections, critiques and dismantles the foundational claim of the Peripatetics concerning the identity of determination with the essence of the Necessary Being. He aims to prove the incompatibility of the necessary essence with each of the four possible forms that have been depicted for it.

Abu Hamid’s argument against the first position is that if the determination of the nature of the Necessary Being is identical to its essence, then this determination must fall into one of two categories: either it is an external determination, or it is an intellectual (mental) determination. In both cases, whether the determination is positive or negative, the necessary implication is that the essence of the Necessary Being depends on a subject — whether external or mental — because, by the rule of identity, the determination’s effects — the existence of the subject — would apply to the essence of the Necessary Being. But a Necessary Being cannot be dependent on a subject, for then it would cease to be necessary. Hence, we reach the conclusion that a Necessary Being is incompatible with dependency and therefore does not exist in this manner.

The phrase, “The concept of that nature is different from the concept of any other determinations,” means that the concept of the determination of the Necessary Being’s nature is distinct from the concept of other determinations of beings. According to your claim, the determination of the Necessary Being is identical to its essence, whereas the determinations of other beings are additional to their essence, as was stated in relation to the essence of the divine, which is identical with its existence, while for possible beings, essence and existence are separate.

If the discussion concerns the concept of determination, it pertains to the representation of meaning and its example. Otherwise, the intent is not to claim that the concept of determination is identical with the Necessary Being itself, for the concept, as a mental entity, is neither necessary nor possible but is rather a mental construct. Therefore, if we are speaking of a concept, it is because we are in a discursive mode, and the only means of engaging in this discussion is through concepts. However, a concept is an expression of a meaning that points to the actual subject. Thus, a concept that represents the Necessary Being’s example is identical with the nature of the Necessary Being, unlike the concept of other beings.

The phrase, “which are accidents requiring the realization of subjects to which they attach in both external and intellectual existence,” means that determinations in the possible beings, which are additional to their essence and attach to their essences, are accidents that require a subject — whether in external existence or intellectual (mental) existence.

The phrase “in both external and intellectual existence” indicates that external determinations require external subjects, such as “white” and “the wall,” and intellectual determinations require mental subjects, such as “universal” and “human.” This is self-evident.

The phrase, “whether existential or non-existential,” means that determinations and accidents are either existential, such as “seeing” or “Zayd,” where the determination requires the existence of a subject (e.g., Zayd), or non-existential, such as “blind” or “ʿAmr,” where the determination requires the absence of a subject.

Abu Hamid’s argument is as follows: The concept of the determination of the Necessary Being — unlike possible beings — is identical with its essence. Determination requires a subject, so the essence of the Necessary Being requires a subject, which contradicts the necessary existence of the Necessary Being. However, in possible beings, because the concept of determination is distinct from their essence, the necessity of their existence does not imply dependence on a subject.

A critique posits that three kinds of determination are involved here: a) the concept of determination in general, which, in terms of either gradation or verbal commonality, applies to both the Necessary and the Possible Beings; b) the special determination of the Necessary Being, which is identical with its essence; and c) the determination of other beings.

Now, considering these three elements, we can say that the determination of the nature of the Necessary Being — which is identical with this nature in the real world — can be a necessary condition of determination in general. The application of the general concept of determination to the nature of the Necessary Being and to other beings, such as the natures of possible beings, is either through gradation or verbal commonality. However, it cannot be through common meaning, because in this case, the determination of the Necessary Being would not be a rational concept. Moreover, it does not require the realization of subjects to which it attaches, as in the case of the Necessary Being, which is independent of any subject. Conversely, the determinations of other beings, which are not identical to their essence, do require subjects.

Abu Hamid responds to this critique by stating: “As we have clearly stated in our philosophical works, the concept of determination and its meaning is a singular, necessary concept that is uniformly applied to its individuals and examples. For example, we say, ‘the determination of the Necessary Being’ or ‘the determination of possible beings,’ just as we say, ‘the slave of Zayd’ and ‘the book of Ali’. Hence, if a difference is observed in the examples and individuals of determination, it is not due to a difference in the meaning of determination itself, but rather due to the addition of different subjects. This is similar to how the same concept may manifest in the Necessary Being in one manner and in possible beings in another manner. It is self-evident that the concept of addition does not require a detailed understanding of the added subject. That is, since the addition does not require understanding the added subject in its essence, only a general conception of it is sufficient, as in the example ‘the slave of Zayd,’ where a detailed understanding of Zayd is not necessary for understanding the concept of slave.”

By presenting this, Abu Hamid suggests that the need for understanding the added subject is not absolute. Even without a complete understanding of the added subject, the concept of addition itself remains intact because the relation of addition is not rooted in any real connection between the terms. Therefore, the determination, as a concept, does not change into a non-determination, and since determination does not change into non-determination, determination is an accident that, when identified with the essence of the Necessary Being, would lead to its dependency.

The phrase “since it has been established by those who affirm the nature of the Necessary Being as being necessary,” refers to the words of Avicenna in his Fourth Discussion, which states that the nature of the Necessary Being cannot have an individual form, because if it has an individual, it will no longer have the capacity to be necessary. If it must be necessary, it should have no individuals. Therefore, if we accept that it has only one individual, it follows that some individuals of it are necessary while others are possible and impossible, which is entirely absurd. However, the mystic’s position is that what has no individual is existence itself, not the Necessary Being. Existence, which is the determination and particularity, is identical with it.

The phrase “the impossible individuals, both mentally and externally, are limited to the four forms,” suggests that natures whose individuals are impossible can be conceived in four forms. The first form posits that determination is identical with the essence of the Necessary Being. Abu Hamid explains that none of these four forms are correct, and thus the Necessary Being must have individuals. Your claim was that the Necessary Being cannot have individuals, and if it does, it must conform to one of these four forms. If it is proven that all of these forms are flawed, then, since you consider the Necessary Being as a nature, and nature, by its very definition, implies the potentiality for individuals, it follows that the Necessary Being must have individuals. You intended to negate the necessity of individuals from the nature of the Necessary Being, and if it is shown that these forms are wholly invalid, nature, by virtue of its generality, must include individuals.

The meaning of the statement by the philosopher, which says, “The determination of the Necessary Existence is identical with Its existence in the external world (or external reality),” is that the Necessary Existence is inherently distinguished from others by its essence itself, not by any additional attribute that is external to Its essence, and by virtue of this attribute, it is distinguished from other entities. This is because if an additional attribute were required by the Necessary Existence, which is what brings about Its distinction from others, it would imply that the Necessary Existence depends on something external to Its own essence, which contradicts its very nature.

The notion of essential determination in the essence of the Necessary Existence, according to the Peripatetic explanation, has opened the door for numerous objections and misunderstandings. The first of these is that if the determination of the Necessary Existence is identical with Its essence, then the essence of the Necessary Existence would have to be a purely abstract personality. This would mean that the Necessary Existence would be identical to the abstract identity or external reality, including all of Its inherent attributes. Under such an understanding, it would be impossible for the Necessary Existence to distinguish between itself and other entities because the identity in the external world, which is a social or relative form of existence, is constructed from attributes and characteristics that relate the entity to external things. It would be clear that such entities could not serve as objects of perception or as objects of abstract reasoning. In this context, Abū Ḥāmid is addressing and rejecting this misunderstanding by stating, “and it does not follow.”

Having refuted the idea that the Necessary Existence cannot be the same as an abstract personality (i.e., the external attributes), his aim is to clarify the meaning of what the mystics say—according to their understanding of truth—that “the determination (of the Necessary Existence) is intrinsic to Itself.” What this means is that the Necessary Existence, in relation to other remaining entities, expresses the same idea that the individuality of a particular person expresses when compared to others.

If it is claimed (as the second misunderstanding) that the necessary consequence of this statement and the analysis of determination is that either the forms of determination are not limited to four forms (in the sense that more than four possible ways of determination must be considered, thereby contradicting your logical limitation) or that the last form is to be removed from the realm of determination, becoming a common attribute applicable to all entities, which would imply the universality of the Necessary Existence and the problems associated with it, the response would be as follows:

It is impossible for the determination of the Necessary Existence to be identical with Its essence if such determination requires a shared attribute (which would conflict with Its uniqueness and individuality). This is because determination in the Necessary Existence is not based on an external attribute. Instead, the distinction of the Necessary Existence arises from its very essence. The uniqueness of the Necessary Existence is in relation to external things, yet its distinction is in its own essence.

Therefore, the statement that the determination of the Necessary Existence is identical with Its essence needs to be understood in light of mystical philosophy, where the concept of existence is taken as absolute and unconditional. Existence in this context is self-determined, not conditioned by anything external. This kind of determination is not something extraneous; it is purely intrinsic to the essence of the Necessary Existence, which has no otherness within it.

Thus, the Necessary Existence, in the mystical understanding, is self-determined, and this self-determination is not dependent on any external qualities or attributes, as in the case of material entities whose personalities or characteristics are conditioned by their external, physical attributes. The uniqueness of the Necessary Existence is intrinsic to Its very being, and this uniqueness transcends any relational or contingent distinctions that apply to finite entities.

In summary, the discussion pivots around the nature of determination (tashakhkhus) and distinction (tamyīz) in relation to the Necessary Existence. Determination here is an essential, intrinsic feature, whereas distinction in contingent beings arises from their external characteristics, which is not applicable to the Necessary Existence. Thus, the Necessary Existence is indivisible and singular in Its essence, not reliant on external attributes to define its individuality.

As was mentioned regarding determinacy, determinacy is singular and becomes multiple through additions. Similarly, distinctiveness and differentiation are one, and it is the additions that make them different. Therefore, the concept and essence of distinctiveness are one. In the case of the Necessary Being (حق‌تعالى), since existence is identical with its essence, its distinctiveness is also identical with its essence. However, in the contingent beings, since their existence is additional to their essence, their distinctiveness is also additional to their essence. If their existence is material, their distinguishing characteristics are also material, such as length, width, and depth, which pertain to their additions. In material beings, length, width, and depth signify distinctiveness. In contingent beings, these are existential accidents that indicate distinctiveness, whereas in the Necessary Being, they are manifested as negations (أعدام). Therefore, the Necessary Being is not a nature, universal or substantial, but rather, it is the Truth itself. The Truth is existence, and existence, determination, and distinctiveness are identical with its essence, with the signs being negations because “There is nothing in the house except Him.”

The Eighteenth Link
On the Non-Existence of the Third Form

He said:
“We do not accept that it is unthinkable for any of the intellects, for we have demonstrated in all our philosophical works that it is intelligible and thinkable, and is intellect by its own essence. Furthermore, it is intelligible with respect to all intellects according to their considerations, additions, and relative perspectives, even if it is not intelligible to most intellects regarding the very essence of its truth.”

The Eighteenth Link: The Non-Existence of the Third Form and the Possibility of the Cognition of the Necessary Being

We do not accept that the nature of the Necessary Being (and existence under the condition of necessity) is unthinkable for any intellect. This is because, as we have demonstrated in our philosophical writings, the nature of the Necessary Being must be both intelligible and thinkable, and intellect in itself. It cannot be said that it is not intelligible by itself in any way.

Even if we concede that it is not intelligible by its essence to the separate intellects, it is still incorrect to claim that it is not intelligible by way of additional considerations and perspectives. By the additional relative attributes, it must be intelligible to all intellects, even if it is not comprehensible to most intellects regarding the very essence of its truth.

The essence of this discussion is that one of the forms in which the nature of the Necessary Being could not have mental or intellectual individuals is the form in which it is not intelligible at all, neither in essence nor by any means, which would invalidate the shared nature of its individuals. But if the Necessary Being is intelligible in some way to all intellects, and in its essence to some, this shared nature does not become invalid.

Remarks on the Text

The philosophers, according to the four forms, said that the Necessary Being’s nature could not be universal or have mental and external individuals. The first and second forms have already been refuted. In this link, the third form’s non-existence is discussed.

The philosophers argued that the nature of the Necessary Being could not be intelligible to the intellects, and because it is not intelligible, it does not have mental or external individuals. However, this claim is incorrect because the nature of the Necessary Being is intelligible by its essence, both to itself and to others, depending on the level of intellectual capacity. The issue lies in the distinction between intellectual cognition in an objective, real sense, and intellectual cognition in an abstract, conceptual sense.

The Nineteenth Link
On the Non-Existence of the Fourth Form

He said:
“We do not accept that its conjunction with otherness or the conjunction of otherness with it is impossible, unless by ‘otherness’ we mean something contrary or opposed, as you will soon understand. For the relative attributes, additions, and negative and existential conditions can indeed be associated with it, in one form of association or another. It is important to consider this carefully.”

The Nineteenth Link: The Non-Existence of the Fourth Form

We do not accept the claim that the conjunction of the nature of the Necessary Being with something else, or the conjunction of something else with it, is impossible, unless by “otherness” one means something that is oppositional or contrary. As you will soon understand, the relative attributes, additions, and negative and existential conditions can indeed be associated with the Necessary Being. They do not negate its essence but merely pertain to different forms of association.

The essence of this statement refers to the non-existence of the fourth form in relation to the Necessary Being’s nature. If the term “otherness” refers to an oppositional or contradictory entity, it is true that no such conjunction can exist. However, if “otherness” refers to relative attributes, additions, or existential conditions, then the Necessary Being can indeed be associated with them in a way that does not compromise its essence.

In comparison to the individuated natures, it will differ from actual existence and necessarily follow it, based on the assumption that the sharing is of a semantic kind, meaning the nature itself is actual existence. Therefore, absolute being, as it is predicated on both itself and others, would differ from it and necessarily follow it, unlike when we regard it as absolute and encompassing existence, which is necessary and self-sustaining; nothing other than it supports or distinguishes it from other than itself in its very essence, since everything else is pure non-existence and does not require any external differentiator.

The outcome is that when it is claimed that the Necessary Being is a specific nature, individuated like other individuated beings, it follows that it must differ from the absolute being predicated on both itself and its opposite, and also be opposed to other possible individuated beings. Thus, the issues that follow from this are evident.

However, if we regard the absolute existence, which does not allow for any distinction, quality, or individual differing from another, as the Necessary Being, then no objections raised against those claiming individuation will apply.

If it is said: There must also be one of two consequences: either the negation of possibility and possible beings, and all other essences, or the Necessary Being must have an aspect of possibility. Both of these seem obviously impossible.

We say: If by the negation of possibility, we mean its complete negation, this necessity is disputed. However, if we mean its negation as pertaining to existence in terms of its being existence, this negation is accepted. Nevertheless, the impossibility of this negation is also disputed. Possibility, as we noted in the introduction, is only a consideration that applies to things in terms of their relation to knowledge, and there is a clear difference between the appearance of knowledge and the appearance of existence.

Note that such discussions for the sharp-minded and intuitive individuals are clear axioms, but for others who are merely followers of traditional opinion, they are of little benefit and are hard to grasp. Hence, “Whoever God does not guide with light, has no light.”

This is an objection, a summary of a refutation against the mentioned argument. The refutation proceeds as follows: what you mystics have expressed, claiming that it is impossible for the Necessary Being’s essence to be the nature of the necessary existence (or the necessary existence conditionally required from all limitations and its relation to the absolute existence), if your reasoning is correct, it follows that the absolute existence would also not be necessary, because the reasoning applies in this case as well.

The explanation is as follows: it is impossible for the Necessary Being to be the absolute existence itself, because if the essence of absolute existence has rational individuals (the reason for denying rational individuals) is that if a nature has no rational individuals, it cannot have external individuals either. But if it has external individuals, one of them must necessarily be actualized, and the remaining individuals will be impossible, as it is impossible for the essence of the Necessary Being to have multiple individuals or for none of them to be actualized.

When it is established that from the essence of the absolute existence, only one individual can be actualized, and the remaining individuals are impossible, it follows that the existence of this individual must be from the other, and therefore, its necessity will be contingent upon something other than itself. The impossibility of other individuals must also be contingent and not intrinsic to the essence.

The clarification is that the nature of the Necessary Being must necessarily be a generic nature. Otherwise, the individuals of this nature would have different essences. This would require a composite nature in the Necessary Being, and composition is impossible. When the nature of the Necessary Being is generic, the necessary essence of the individuals cannot differ. Hence, if some of its individuals do not entail necessity and others do not entail impossibility, it follows that this necessity is not intrinsic but contingent, coming from outside. Therefore, it follows that the Necessary Being requires something external for its necessity. The impossibility of requiring an external cause is clear. If a nature cannot have external individuals—since it has invalidated the four types of individuals—then if the absolute existence is different from the specific individual possibilities, the term “existence” is used ambiguously, as there is a difference in meaning between the absolute existence and the existence of possible beings, and the only commonality is the term used.

If absolute existence is not distinct from the essential realities, it would follow that the possible existents must possess intrinsic necessity, as it is clear that each detail of the absolute existence must necessarily possess the attributes of that reality.

Thus, Abu Hamid responds to this objection by stating that the refutation applies to those who consider the Necessary Being’s nature to be individuated, set against other individuated beings (i.e., possible beings); for such an individuated nature is different from absolute existence and is contingent upon it. As such, absolute existence would be distinct from the existence of possible beings, with the Necessary Being being a necessary condition for the particularized existence. The mystics, however, regard absolute existence as the same as the necessary existence, which encompasses all beings, and thus does not require an external differentiator, as everything outside of it is pure non-being.

The result is that the Peripatetics, having argued that the Necessary Being is a specific individuated nature (in conditional existence), are forced to claim that the Necessary Being is distinct from absolute existence. Absolute existence is predicated both of the Necessary Being and the possible individuated beings. This leads to the same issues as noted earlier. However, if we accept absolute existence as the encompassing existence that includes everything, without any external distinctions, then no issues raised against those asserting individuation apply.

If it is argued: One of two issues must apply to the mystics as well: either they must deny possibility and the possible beings and other essences, or they must admit that the Necessary Being has an aspect of possibility. The impossibility of both of these is evident.

We respond: If the negation of possibility refers to its total absence, this consequence is impossible. However, if it means the absence of possibility as it relates to existence as such, the necessity of this is confirmed. The impossibility of the absence of possibility from existence is denied, as possibility, as noted in the introduction, is a consideration related to knowledge, and there is a clear distinction between the appearance of knowledge and the appearance of existence.

Such inquiries are, for the wise and intuitive, some of the most self-evident truths. However, for those merely following the paths of others, they are of little benefit and are hard to comprehend. Therefore, “Those whom God does not grant light will have no light.”

On the Absolute Nature Being Self-Sustained in Reality

He said:

If it is claimed that the essence of the Absolute — insofar as it is Absolute — can exist by itself in reality, without needing to be coupled with any specificities or determinations, and if it is logically proven that it is inherently necessary, then it would not be appropriate to raise the kind of doubt mentioned here. It would not be proper for you to begin answering, as committing to such a response — although it deviates from the intended method — would add unnecessary length to the discussion, increase the number of premises, and give the opponent the chance to object, counter, and undermine the argument.

That being said, we assert that we know with certainty that each individual instance of possible, specific, real existence is a member of the class of the Absolute Real existence. We also know with certainty that the necessary existence by itself, which contradicts each of the specific possible existences, is also one of its members.

We say that the sharp-witted and insightful individual knows with certainty that the real, existent universe that exists by itself in the external world cannot be formed by anything within it or through its conjunction with anything else. However, the majority of people believe that the rule of the Absolute is the same as the rule of other absolutes in real essences, and they fail to recognise the difference between the two forms. As a result, they immediately entertain the possibility of the claim, and therefore, it is necessary to refute this possibility, assuming the objection has been raised.

Addressing other doubts that prevent certainty and logical conclusions in unfamiliar contexts, compared to the established habits of the majority, is beneficial to those of sharper intellect, who are far from the vices of dullness and ingrained fictitious or imaginative traditions. It also does not stray from the proper method of reasoning.

It is clear that addressing all doubts and uncertainties prepares the weak-minded for the truth to shine through, preventing the disturbed and confused thoughts caused by the usual distractions and deeply-rooted misconceptions.

A Detailed Analysis of the Doubts and Objections

If an objection arises: If it is possible that the essence of the Absolute — in terms of its absolute nature — could exist in the external world by itself, without needing to be accompanied by any specific qualifications or determinations, and that inherent necessity would logically apply to it, then the possibility mentioned here would never be relevant. Thus, it would not be right to begin the answer with this possibility, neither to reject nor to refute it.

Rejection is not possible because it would fail to touch the two premises of the argument: the first being self-evident, and the second being logically proven. Refutation is also not possible because a failure of the argument would only apply to something not included in the evidence presented. Since the essence of the Absolute, as we are discussing it, is a member of the class of the Absolute, it cannot be a counterexample to the argument.

If this is the case, then it is inappropriate for someone familiar with the methods of inquiry to begin responding to such an objection. To do so would deviate from the established rules of debate, and committing to such an answer would do nothing but unnecessarily lengthen the discussion, multiply the premises, and allow the opponent to object, refute, and weaken the argument. All of this is to be avoided in the laws of dialectical discourse and logical reasoning.

As for the second objection, the reasoning goes as follows: If it were true that the Absolute existence — in terms of its absolute nature — is necessarily existent, it would follow that existence would be a shared property of all instances of existence, which would be false. The necessity of this follows logically, but the conclusion is false because we know with certainty that each possible, specific instance of real existence is a member of the class of Absolute Real existence, just as we know with certainty that the necessary existence, which contradicts each specific instance of possible existence, is also a member of it.

Now, these two objections, due to their reliance on premises that are widely accepted and familiar to most intellects — especially the premise that forms the foundation of the first objection — require a certain level of intuitive insight to overcome. This is because the sharp-minded individual will escape the entanglements of accepted sophistry and straightforward reasoning. Through this intuitive insight, one can untangle the knots of ingrained beliefs and erroneous traditions, free from the distortions of practical cognitive capacities when seeking theoretical truths.

The relationship between reasoning and intuition in intellectual inquiry is like the relationship between conduct and attraction in other areas. This is why it was said in the response: “The sharp-witted individual knows with certainty that the real, existent universe that exists by itself in the external world.”

The existence of all other things in the external world comes about through the radiance of a spark of its light and the manifestation of a trace of its appearance. It is impossible for it to be formed in the external world by anything that exists within it or through its conjunction with anything else. When the clarity of this premise reaches a level of understanding that no one doubts — especially those who have delved into the deeper aspects of reasoning and the certainty of knowledge — the intention is to draw attention to the errors and the steps of their misjudgment, apologizing for their grave mistake, and for engaging in an unnecessary response that provides room for objection and refutation.

However, the majority of philosophers believe that the rule of the Absolute is similar to the rule of other absolutes in real, intrinsic essences, and they fail to distinguish between the absolute nature of existence and the absolute nature of other real essences. They mistakenly believe that the Absolute cannot stand by itself without being qualified and specified. Therefore, they entertain the possibility that the necessary existence must be a specific, determined instance, and that it cannot be a self-sustaining reality in the external world unless it is coupled with something else.

Their reasoning is akin to someone who, in the realm of perceptual experience, claims that since no object can be perceived without light, the light itself must also require another light to be perceived. However, such a claim is easily dismissed in the case of physical objects, where no one doubts the reality of light as an inherent quality of perception. But in the case of intellectual matters, where the discussion pertains to abstract and theoretical concepts, the issue is less clear to many, just as an blind person might fail to respond to such a question.

This is one of the divine wisdoms: that illusion serves as a guard to the inaccessible domain, ensuring that no misguided or shallow intellect can impose its own laws upon it, except those of His chosen ones, whose hearts have been illuminated by the light of certainty, so they can see the truth as it is.

This is the teaching of Allah: “And whomsoever Allah does not grant light, they have no light.” (Quran 24:40).

In this connection, two major and fundamental criticisms are raised against the mystics’ claims. The first concerns the style of mystical discourse, which asserts that if the claim is self-evident, there is no need to engage with those who challenge or deny it. The second criticism pertains to the subject of the discussion, namely the absolute necessity of existence.

The first criticism argues: the mystic, who claims that God is the absolute existence and that nothing exists in contrast to Him—neither is He bound to anything nor associated with anything—should not, in such a case, engage in any further discussions or debates on the matter, especially since the claim is self-evident.

The mystic’s response to this criticism is clear: Yes, God is indeed the absolute existence, and there is no doubt in this matter. Therefore, there is no room for debate or dispute. The mystic’s only intent is to elucidate this profound truth for those who are capable of understanding it, not to engage in arguments.

The second criticism, which pertains to the core of the discussion, argues that the absolute necessity of existence is incompatible with the notion of contingent beings. The mystics argue that “absolute existence is necessary,” not that “the necessary is existent.” Consequently, the talk of possible beings is futile because when existence is necessary, there is no room for the contingent, and the possible cannot exist. However, this is not the case, and absolute existence encompasses both necessary existence and the contingent existence within it.

It is important to note that the root of this criticism lies in the nature of the absolute: whether the absolute is something that exists in particular forms or whether it exists by itself. The philosopher, in his view of the general nature of things, believes that the general nature of something is necessarily defined by its particular instances. Therefore, it is impossible to consider the absolute without limitations. He sees nature as a general concept, but for the mystic, in the case of the absolute existence in reality, there are no particularities or specifications, as the only thing opposite to it is absolute non-being.

The second criticism stems from a confusion between concept and referent. The critic takes the absolute existence of God and the necessary being as a nature, thus associating it with the necessity of having particular instances. However, the mystic’s view is that it is erroneous to apply the concept of nature to God, the absolute existence. The mystic speaks instead of a truth that is the essence of existence, a reality that is the embodiment of external being.

The phrase “Haqīqat al-Muṭlaqah — as it is absolutely — is self-standing in existence in the real world” refers to the belief in philosophy that the realization of the absolute depends on particular beings. But the mystic argues that the absolute stands on its own, independent of particular beings. If it were dependent on particular instances, it would no longer be absolute and could not be necessary. From the mystic’s perspective, the necessary being is the absolute existence that stands independently in the external world without any particulars.

The term “from the denial and the contradiction” suggests that one should not allow the opponent to refute or contradict their argument. The denial occurs when it is claimed that the absolute existence is not necessary, but rather the nature that is necessary. The contradiction arises when the critic claims that the mystic’s argument, based on the necessity of absolute existence, could be used to prove the necessity of any contingent existence.

In the phrase “the engagement with the response — while it diverts from the method of argumentation — does not benefit except for prolonging the discussion,” Abu Hamid’s argument is flawed. It is incorrect to deny the opportunity for the opponent to engage with the argument and to refuse to allow them to raise objections. From a psychological perspective, it is crucial to act differently. Now that the mystic is certain of their claim and belief, they should allow the opponent to raise objections in order for the truth to become evident to them as well. Yes, if the claim is false or erroneous, all avenues for attack should be closed. This, however, aligns with the methods of falsehood, deceit, and pretense, not with the ways of the mystics and the saints of truth. In fact, one of the hallmarks of truth is the allowance for the opponent to present their views. This is the way of the Qur’an and the infallible saints.

It should be noted that such a criticism has not been raised by the philosopher against the mystic. The philosopher, who is wise and rational, raises objections based on understanding. If the mystic cannot respond convincingly, it is not the philosopher’s fault, but rather a limitation of mysticism that fails to win over the intellectual. This points to the reality that there are flaws in the mystics’ arguments regarding the proof of the personal reality of existence, and their words contain inadequacies.

The criticism states that if existence is necessary without condition, then there can be no possible existence. Furthermore, the claim of necessary existence with conditions is also pointless. The mystic’s response is that your argument is correct. We affirm that the absolute existence is necessary, and we have no room for the possible. Everything that is other than existence is merely manifestations and reflections of this singular reality.

The phrase “through its wisdom, the bonds of deep-rooted traditions and beliefs are undone” emphasizes that the strength of conviction does not necessarily prove its truth. Beliefs may be deeply entrenched, but they are not necessarily accurate. Sometimes, beliefs become so entrenched in the mind that they appear certain, not because they are true, but because they have been repeated over time, like habits formed through repetition. This kind of practical entrenchment is common in society and among people.

The phrase “the sharp and insightful one knows for certain” refers to the role of intuition and attraction in both philosophy and mysticism. Intuition in philosophy is similar to attraction in mysticism, just as mystical practice corresponds to intellectual thought in philosophy. Issues and matters can either be self-evident or theoretical. Theoretical issues can be based on intellectual thought or intuition. If the movement towards the goal is gradual, it is intellectual thought; if it is instantaneous, removing some premises, it is intuition. Intuition can be unconscious or conscious. Intuitions are a form of theoretical knowledge, but they differ from intellectual thought in their speed, gradualness, and the number of premises involved.

In mysticism, some practitioners move gradually, while others are influenced by attraction, experiencing sudden transitions that carry them through vast distances in a short time. In spiritual practice, movement can be gradual or sudden, or even a combination of both. The nature of attraction and spiritual practice varies among individuals, but they all manifest in the spiritual journey, not in moments of idleness.

“Sharpness” refers to quickness of perception, and “intuition” carries the same meaning. The difference between “sharp” and “intuitive” lies in the active capacity of the “sharp” one and the momentary nature of the “intuitive.” Someone who possesses intuition is not merely thoughtful but has an enlightened understanding. A person with sharp insight can grasp the understanding that the objective reality of existence, and the essence of the divine truth, which is without counterpart, is inherently present in the external world, and it does not require the existence of other beings to manifest.

The phrase “the objective reality of existence is self-sustained in the external world” refers to the divine truth, i.e., absolute existence, which is free from any opposition or limitation, unlike contingent existence, which depends on other forms of existence.

This is a reference to the second response to the two objections mentioned earlier. Since the questioner claimed necessity in the disputed matter, it can be countered by stating that the claim of necessity in the matter under dispute is not admissible, as per the requirements of the science of those who engage in intellectual discourse. Our assertion that “every self-evident truth is not disputed” implies that “everything disputed is not self-evident,” but such a statement is merely a matter of contention, and the substance of the doubt remains unchanged.

The decisive answer to the substance of the doubt is that the particular possible existence, which is defined as the existence of specific entities with particular determinations, additions, and relative states of non-being, cannot be considered as individuals of the absolute existence. This is because the term “specific existences,” which refers to individuals of the absolute existence, cannot be understood without addressing one of four possibilities: either the intended meaning is the subject of these determinations, without considering the accompanying accidents (the first case), or the accidents are considered without regard to the subject (the second case), or the meaning intended is the subject with the consideration of the accident (the third case), and this leads to two possibilities: either the accident is considered as merely incidental or as part of the essence (the fourth case). Therefore, four distinct possibilities emerge, and there are no further logical or existential possibilities. Under none of these scenarios can the absolute existence have individuals that are possible in themselves.

This is because, if what is meant by the specific existence is the subject of some of these determinations, attributes, and states, without taking those attributes into account — which is the first of the four cases — it is, in essence, the one essential existence, necessarily existing by itself.

If what is meant is something of the accidents, existing by accident — as accidents always occur by accident and attributes come after their subjects — without considering the existence of the subject (the second case), we do not accept that it is an individual of the absolute existence. This is because it is self-evident that, in this regard, it is essentially non-existent. How could it be said to be an individual of the absolute existence if existence itself cannot be predicated of it as “it is”? The individuals of existence are those that exist by their own essence, on which the concept of existence applies.

If what is intended is the combination of both aspects — that is, the compound of the subject and the accident — then we do not accept the possibility of such a compound existing. This is because, as has been established by intellectual authorities, it is impossible for existence to be a part of any essence in the real world. In the realm of existence, no composition occurs; thus, the existence of such a compound is inherently impossible.

If you argue that impossibility would only apply in cases of absolute impossibility, and not just external impossibility, we would not accept this reasoning. Anything that could be an individual of the absolute existence, and upon which existence is predicated as “it is,” must necessarily imply existence by itself. It is impossible for it to be the cause of non-existence in any stage.

If what is meant is the subject of the accidents, considering it as the subject of those accidents as they manifest in the world, then all the specific existences, in this respect, are inherently unified. They are not separate; rather, they are all manifestations of the one necessary existence, since that which exists by itself does not change with the addition of attributes. The unity is intrinsic to its essence, while the multiplicity is only the result of the accidental attributes that are added, and therefore the individual with the property of possibility is nothing but the added, non-essential attributes.

From this investigation, it is established that it is impossible for the absolute existence — inasmuch as it is absolute existence — to have different essential individuals that vary in terms of necessity, possibility, and impossibility. This is because true unity is inherent in its essence.

This reasoning further clarifies the point made earlier in the introduction that possibility arises in relation to the apparent aspect of knowledge, while necessity relates to the apparent aspect of existence. There is a clear difference between these two appearances.

As for the claim of incompatibility between the possible and the necessary, this is based on the assumption of multiple individuals of existence and the exclusive association of one individual with necessity, which is flawed as demonstrated in the previous argument. Therefore, there is no need to extend the discussion further.

If an objection is raised: “The mental existence, which is impossible to exist outside the mind, is an individual of the absolute existence, among whose individuals is the objective and external individual, which is inherently necessary.”

The response to this would be: The mental existence is the same as the objective existence by essence, although it differs in certain respects. This is because intellectual meanings (which correspond to mental being) are incidental to certain levels of objective existence (which corresponds to the absolute existence). Alternatively, when the objective existence is attributed additional properties (such as the requirement to be a scholar or to engage in thought, in order for us to say that this too is a form of existence), these are accidental attributes that are superimposed on the mental meanings. In this context, there is no reference to hypothetical existence arising from the attributes of mental meaning, as is the case with other properties and conditions that are superimposed upon all essences and relations. For our discussion in metaphysics pertains to an existence that exists by its essence and has inherent necessity.

I say:

This is an objection to what was previously proven regarding the impossibility of differences in the individuals of absolute existence with respect to necessity, possibility, and impossibility. The argument is as follows: Mental existence is an individual of the absolute existence, because it is a type of the absolute existence, yet it is impossible for it to exist in the real world, because, were it to exist in the real world, it would no longer be a mental existence. Just as the necessary being is also an individual of the absolute existence, though it must exist in reality by its essence, it follows from this that the individuals of absolute existence must differ in necessity, possibility, and impossibility.

It should not be said: “The entity that is impossible to exist externally is the one that exists in the mind—inasmuch as it exists in the mind—and not the mental being, which is akin to external accidents.” This is because mental existence refers to the occurrence of an intellectual image, and it is undeniable that, insofar as intellectual images are incidental to minds, they do exist externally.

To respond, we say: The intellectual images are merely incidental attributes to the minds. What has formed within them is a different matter than the image itself, as the intellect refers to it upon its formation within the mind. This occurs in the second stage of intellectualization, and therefore, it is impossible for these intellectual images to have existence in the external world. This results in the mentioned contradiction that the mental existence is impossible in the external world, whereas the necessary existence is necessarily present.

The answer to the main objection is that: Mental existence is identical to the objective existence by essence, although it differs in the manner in which we perceive or define it. The distinction lies in the way that mental existence is conceived by the intellect, not in the essence of the existence itself. Therefore, the intellectual existence is, in truth, the same as the objective existence, with its “mental” nature being merely an intellectual distinction.

The verification of this argument requires establishing a preliminary point, which is that the absolute existence, as understood by the great philosophers (not in the sense adopted by later commentators as referenced in the introduction), has primary conditions referred to as “essential aspects.” These aspects appear in such a way that the essence manifests according to them.

In simpler terms, the essence requires the manifestation of its attributes, revealing the necessary perfections of its names that follow from its essential completeness, as detailed later. These aspects are sometimes referred to as “the fixed essences” and, in other contexts, as “the names.” They differ in their relation to the proximity of the essence, some being general and encompassing all particular manifestations by their very nature. These are known as “degrees” or “levels,” and the essence cannot manifest at a further level without first appearing at a closer one. This manifestation spans from the realm of spirits, intellects, and forms, extending all the way to the material world, with the final stage of this process being the “objective existence.”

Once this is understood, it becomes clear from previous discussions that these aspects and the special attributes that pertain to existence—whether general and referred to as “degrees,” or particular and surrounded by these general conditions—are mere intellectual considerations and non-existential relations that do not affect the true nature of existence. Therefore, it is now clear that mental existence, which is one of these degrees, is in fact identical to objective existence by essence, although it differs in the manner of intellectual consideration. This is because intellectual meanings also pertain to objective existence, though in some of its degrees or in specific conditions that are superimposed upon it.

In summary, the connection of all these intellectual considerations and attributes, at any level, pertains to objective existence itself, as it is the ultimate form of manifestation and the first in rank. Therefore, be alert.

The statement of Abu Hamid, “Hypothetical existence is not considered here,” is a rebuttal to an objection that might be raised, which is that the question still holds: the intellectual meaning of existence, which is incidental to mental images, is distinct from the true, original meaning of existence that is united with objective existence and the true realities of being. The image of the objection pertains to the first form of existence (the intellectual), not the second (true existence), as previously clarified.

To clarify the refutation: The intellectual form of existence is beyond the scope of this discussion. In this treatise, the focus is on existence that exists by itself and has inherent necessity, not on the hypothetical, relative existence which is an intellectual construct.

In other words, intellectual universals and their like are akin to essences. Since essence by nature is devoid of existence, it manifests in some levels (i.e., in the mind) and does not acquire existence in others (i.e., in the external world). However, the individual of external existence, by its nature, is a manifestation of existence and inherently entails universality. Therefore, at a certain level of existence, it does not entail negation.

In the previous section, we mentioned that the commentator has accepted the core of the objection; however, the objection is unfounded from the outset. This means that the combination of the accident and the subject is impossible both in the mind and in the external world. Hence, absolute existence does not have individuals, whether necessary or possible. Just as the combination of accident and subject is impossible in the external world, it is also impossible in the mind, for there is no difference between the mind and the external world in matters of combination. Just as external combination requires existence, so too does mental combination. The only difference between the mind and the external world is that in the realm of the mind, we have the ability to imagine and conceptualise impossible and impossible entities. One of the subtleties of the human mind is that through the play of imagination and psychological manipulation, it can combine existence with an essence that is non-existent, and make that which is impossible in the external world to exist in the realm of the mind. Therefore, it should be noted that this difference between the mind and the external world does not impact the fundamental similarity in the ruling of the combination of existence and non-existence.

Having explained this matter, the objector now presents the issue in this way: it is impossible for mental existence to be realised as external existence, because, as established in philosophy, mental existence is bound by the absence of causality, while external existence is the source of effects. If mental existence were to become external existence, a contradiction between causality and its absence would arise. Therefore, the realisation of mental existence in the external world is impossible. Thus, one individual of absolute existence—namely mental existence—cannot manifest externally, while another individual (the necessary existence) has an external necessity, and its mental aspect is impossible. You argued that absolute existence cannot have individuals, and that absolute existence is a type that is uniform in its effects—necessity, impossibility, and possibility. Yet, differences appeared in the individuals of existence, meaning the absolute existence that you claim to be necessary may indeed be possible.

It is necessary to correct the form of the objection because the beginning and the end of the argument, as well as the objector’s claim, are inconsistent. You say, “Mental existence cannot appear in the external world.” We reply that mental existence exists as mental existence and is not necessarily existent. Therefore, mental existence is possible in itself and necessary through something else, and it has a characteristic: it cannot exist in the external world. Thus, this individual of existence, as you have constructed it, possesses three characteristics: it is possible in itself, necessary through something else, and cannot exist externally. However, the other individual—namely the necessary existence, whose external manifestation is necessary—also has three characteristics: it is external existence, necessary in itself, and impossible to be mental.

If the dividing principle between these two individuals of existence is possible, it is impossible for them to be individuals of it, because possible in itself cannot be the dividing principle between the necessary in itself (i.e., necessary by condition) and the impossible in itself (the realisation of mental existence externally). Yes, possible in itself can divide between the necessary through something else and the impossible through something else, but it cannot divide between the necessary in itself and the impossible in itself.

Thus, the objector must be told to abandon the terms necessary in itself and impossible in itself and instead use the term necessary through something else in their objection, such as the external existence of Zayd, which is necessary through something else, and the mental existence of Zayd, which is impossible through something else in relation to the external world. Now, since both of these individuals are possible in themselves, the dividing principle can be possible in itself.

In the divisional discussions of philosophy, existence is divided into external and mental existence. External existence is that which causes effects, while mental existence is the essence or concept of things as they are in the mind, which corresponds to the external essence but lacks its effects. Therefore, it refers to the external world and is inherently indicative of the external.

In the phrase “The mental existence is an individual of the individuals of absolute existence, because it is a division of it,” the use of “individual” is better than “division” because “division” also accommodates gradation, whereas the discussion here concerns the individual of mental existence, which can be an individual of absolute existence.

If an objection is raised in philosophy: What is impossible to realise externally is the mental existence constrained to mentality. However, if that same mental existence, from the perspective of being a description of psychological faculties and knowledge, is considered, such as the existence of a knower, it will have an external realisation. The response would be: Although the existence of a knower is external, mental existence and the intellectual form united with the intellect never finds its way to the external world, even though, by secondary consideration—i.e., since the intellect itself has external realisation—intellectual forms will also have external existence. However, it must be noted that in such a case, which arises from mental constructs, mental existence does not become external.

The philosopher Abu Hamid answers the core of the objection—seeking individuals for absolute existence—by saying: the mind is a level of the external, and as existence is essentially multifaceted, one level is material, another is immaterial, one is external, and one is mental. All these levels of existence are objective, although some levels depend on others. For instance, the world of matter depends on the world of imagination, and the world of imagination depends on the world of intellect. As a result, no one should claim that mental existence does not have objective existence. Just as will and power, and other psychological phenomena, are attributes of the soul, knowledge too is an attribute of the soul, and from this perspective, it does have external existence.

On the other hand, the term “existence” in this world does not refer to the general mental existence—what later philosophers termed “general existence”—because this meaning is a creation of the mind and a second-order philosophical concept. Rather, by existence, we mean the essence of external existence, which encompasses the entire reality and exists even without the mind. Thus, general existence pertains to the attributes of essences, relations, qualities, and states, whereas actual existence is that which is inherently necessary.

The phrase “The mental existence is the actual existence by essence” in the work of Abu Hamid is a core response. Mental existence is actual existence by essence because, in reality, we have only one existence, which is identical with externality, and in contrast to it, is nothingness. The discussion of existence in relation to the mind is a divisional issue, and you have confused the absolute existence with the restricted existence. Therefore, the answer is complete, and no further elaboration is needed.

Once Abū Ḥāmid had completed elucidating the first requirement in this science — which was to establish the personal unity of existence through reasoning and demonstration — and had dispelled the various probabilities (i.e., the existence of individuals for the Absolute Nature), and refuted the stance of the opposing school by demonstrating the fallacy in their foundational principles, as stated in the introduction of the treatise, he wished to supplement this analysis with a clarifying approach. This supplementary explanation would suffice for the objector if viewed with fairness and consideration, providing further insight for the seeker who desires a deeper understanding. The objective was to show that the desired outcome — the proof of the mystical unity of existence — is one of those matters that does not require extensive elaboration for its realization.

The clarification is as follows: They (the philosophers) hold a belief about the essence of the Necessary Existent (i.e., God) and His identity that contradicts the essential attributes which must necessarily belong to Him. Moreover, any belief that contradicts the conclusions of previous doctrines and rulings becomes evidently false to the one who reflects upon it deeply, and this will become clear in the course of the ensuing argument. For this reason, this section is referred to as “the warning.”

The contradiction in their belief is this: They believe that the Necessary Existent possesses a special, singular essence — i.e., an individual, particular existence that is inherently different from other individual existences. However, they also assert that this essence is the cause and origin of all other existences and types of beings. In other words, they believe that it is the origin of all remaining existents, even though it is inherently distinct and incompatible with those other existents. Furthermore, they hold that this Necessary Existent falls under the category of absolute, individual existence, encompassing all other individual things. This belief persists regardless of whether one views existence as an abstract concept, as some (the Illuminists) suggest, or as a real, concrete truth, as others (the Peripatetics and scholars) argue.

In summary, they judge that the Necessary Existent falls under the general category of existence, just as it falls under all other overarching universal concepts, such as being a “thing,” being “one,” and being an “efficient cause.” This judgment also includes the attributes essential to Him, such as “omniscience,” “omnipotence,” “volition,” and so forth. It is clear that the belief in the primacy of this essence — which is a relation — and its fundamental status as the cause and origin of all other things, conflicts with their belief in its incompatibility with all its effects. Similarly, their belief that this essence is incompatible with all other existents conflicts with the belief that it shares in the absolute existence that it uniquely defines. Furthermore, their belief in its inclusion under general concepts and categories, such as being a “thing” or “cause,” contradicts the belief in its incompatibility with all its effects, as this would imply a shared existence with other individual beings.

Therefore, to anyone who has any intuition regarding the nature of existence, it becomes evident that such a belief about the Necessary Existent is far from intuitive reasoning, and indeed contrary to sound intellect and correct thought, as it entails a clear contradiction and explicit impossibility.

If it is argued that the necessary shared characteristics are merely external attributes, since absolute existence, according to them, is an accident of the essence of the Necessary Existent, just as its causal status is also an external relation to the other existents, and the same applies to other universal concepts such as “essence,” “cause,” and so on.

Moreover, they view existence as a mental concept that applies to individual essences in the mind, and similarly, they regard all universal attributes as mental constructs. Thus, the shared characteristics of essence and particular existences in such concepts would not contradict their distinctness in the external world according to their system of thought.

We respond: From the previous discussions, and from what will follow in the sensory and intellectual proofs, it becomes clear that existence cannot, by its very nature, be divided into different individual realities. To claim that the concept of absolute existence applies to individuals would thus be an unsound, speculative assertion.

It is also clear to anyone with even the slightest understanding of the methods of those who possess refined tastes, intellect, and virtuous qualities, that necessity dictates that individual existence (which includes all individual existents that come into being through the absolute principle in the external world) must be actual and unified. The variations and multiplicity of these existents arise from the mental or relational additions and qualifications, and not from any intrinsic division in the essence itself. Therefore, when the term “existence” is understood by the Peripatetics as a mental concept, their understanding is irrelevant to the truth of the matter, as has been repeatedly stated.

Thus, it seems that the phrase “Reflect, and so on,” is likely a reference to dispelling these two points of contradiction.

The term “priority” in this context (i.e., in the words of Abu Hamid) is not suitable for the intended meaning, as it implies a preference of one side over another, whereas the intended concept is different. The intended meaning is necessity and determination, not preference.

This can be clarified in response as follows: The choice of the term “priority” follows the refutation of the view of those who consider determinations and essences as objective realities, yet do not regard the creator of their existence as an objective reality. The reason for this is that the term does not carry the implication of mockery or reproach that would make the opponent reconsider their belief; rather, this word annihilates the deeply rooted convictions in their inner self, as is the nature of rhetorical devices. Therefore, in this case, it is necessary that determined existences—because they are determined—be regarded as mental meanings and natural attributes, considering their relative additions and considerations. This stands in contrast to the view of the majority of philosophers, who believe that the absolute being is a second-order concept (i.e., a mental concept), and that real entities with independent existence in the external world are determined essences (based on the theory of the primacy of essence).

This idea can be understood through examples of perceptual illusions, such as the mistaken belief that due to poor eyesight, one might think the colours in the external world are intrinsic to the objects themselves, and that the absolute light—self-evident in its essence and a clarifier of all other lights—has no existence in the external world except in the form of colours. The cause of this judgment is the accumulation of ignorance, stemming from ingrained misconceptions, which prevents the perception of light in its pure form, obscured by the thick, dense manifestations of darkness. Similarly, the reason that the Peripatetic philosophers accept the existence of determined essences but do not accept the absolute truth is due to a similar blindness of insight. They do not see the light itself but only its illuminated forms. The wise mystic does not deny their claims but rather acknowledges their position, for their insight comes from their limited ability to perceive the light.

If someone is blind and questions the existence of daylight at sunrise, it is not surprising.

Since this stage is itself a stage of the manifestation of the Truth, fitting the faculties of perception and serving as a medium for the perfection and beauty of the divine, we do not deny them. Therefore, Abu Hamid and other scholars of inquiry do not pronounce their views or those of others as false. It is possible that in Abu Hamid’s statement, “first,” this is the intended meaning.

Anyone who enters your domain, desiring you, is seeking you, and I, the witness of this vast domain, desire all those who have come to you.

Considerations of the Text:

This passage begins with a discussion on the subdivisions of the issue of the personal unity of existence. These subdivisions concern the reconciliation between differentiation and unity or the absolution from both negation and resemblance; the essence and absolute essence; the first determination and the Muhammadan reality; divine self-manifestation and detailed knowledge of the Truth; the divine mercy and the stages of its self-manifestations, as well as the three worlds of intellect, imagination, and matter.

Abu Hamid, after explaining the unity of God in the language of mystics and completing the affirmation of the personal unity of existence—that the Necessary Being is, in reality, the absolute existence, not the existence “with a condition” (as held by the Peripatetics)—begins discussing the identity of the absolute Necessary Being and how the details of His names and attributes manifest through the fixed essences and tangible forms in these worlds.

For a better understanding of this passage and subsequent discussions, it is important to pay attention to several key points:

a. The true Necessary Being is the absolute being, not the “existence with a condition” as the Peripatetics say.

b. Apart from the reality of this singular existence, everything in the world is a manifestation and determination of that truth. Using expressions such as “imaginary,” “additions,” “considerations,” “falsehoods,” “illusions,” or “nothingness” to describe the divine manifestations is misleading and confuses the issue, for being is the Truth, and the manifestations of the Truth are also divine. God, in His action, is the Doer, and being God is His essence.

c. In the mystical understanding of unity, the Truth is freed from pure negation or resemblance. If the Truth is considered without multiplicity, and unity is mistakenly understood as absence of difference, we fall into the abyss of “negation” (ta’ṭīl). If all multiplicity is seen as simply the Truth, we fall into the pit of “heresy” (zandaqa). True unity occurs when both multiplicity and unity are considered, which means seeing the Truth in the multiplicity and observing the multiplicity within the unity.

However, it should be noted that the “multiplicity” here refers to the apparent multiplicity, not the “gradational multiplicity” understood by philosophers of the Ṣadrā school.

A significant point is the statement that “focusing on the consideration or non-consideration of manifestations and multiplicity is not without its issues,” as the individual doing the contemplating is the one whose actions must stem from the truth of the manifestations.
The Peripatetic philosopher sees the absolute being as a comprehensive concept that applies both to the essential Necessary Being (i.e., God) and to the particular contingent existences. The mystic, however, views the absolute being as the Necessary Being itself, not as a comprehensive concept encompassing both the Necessary and contingent beings.
The term “priority” in the phrase “Indeed, the absolute necessary being is more priority to be considered as such than those determinations” should be understood as absolute priority, not preferential priority, just as it is used in the verse “And those who are of kinship are more entitled to each other” (Quran 33:6). The term “more obligatory” also indicates a priority of determination. Without considering this priority as absolute, it would imply that Abu Hamid’s usage of the term is an expression of courtesy or mercy towards his opponents.
Some other mystics believe that “the possible exist and are diverse, but the Creator and the Agent are not outside of these possibilities; in fact, the Absolute Existence is united with the possibilities, even is identical to them.” This statement leads to the negation of the possible entities and their existential validity; for in this case, there is no one to bestow existence upon them, since it is assumed that the Necessary Being, which is outside of the possible, does not exist, and a thing cannot be the cause of its own existence. The possible in itself cannot possess necessary existence either. The statement of His Holiness, “And differentiation without union is negation,” refers to this belief.
From these ideas, it becomes evident that both views contain contradictions, because union without differentiation leads to the denial of union itself. The Truth, in the state of the hidden reality of its essence, is independent of the worlds, and, by virtue of its manifestation and appearance, is identical to the multiplicities. These multiplicities arise from the hidden unity of the essence, and the multiplicity in the world is the result of the manifestation of this unity. Therefore, He is both the manifest and the manifestation, but in two different respects. For this reason, He stated: “The union of both is unity.”
Hence, the belief that “existence is a single reality, without multiplicity or attributes, and the diverse possible entities that are perceived are illusory and of false essence” is a belief in negation, not heresy, as they have assumed. For when one says that only God exists and nothing else, this negates the action of God; this is differentiation without union, which is indeed negation.
On the other hand, union without differentiation – which is heresy and unbelief – is when it is stated that the multiplicities and the created beings are none other than God and that there is no God beyond them. In other words, when they say, “Some mystics have gone to the belief that the possible entities exist and are numerous, but the Creator and the Agent are not outside of these possibilities; and the Absolute Existence is united with the possibilities, even is identical to them,” this is heresy and unbelief, not negation, as they have assumed.
Moreover, the first statement made by them, “A group of mystics have stated that existence is one reality without multiplicity or attributes, and the perceived multiplicities are illusory and false in essence, imagined by the mind as secondary, as it imagines states,” is a very sound statement. As Sadr al-Din Shirazi also points out in his works, some ignorant individuals, falsely attributed to mysticism, have spread such erroneous views.
However, the second statement, “Another group of mystics has stated that the possible entities exist and are numerous, and there is no Creator or Agent outside of them; the Absolute Existence is united with them, in fact, it is identical to them,” cannot be definitively interpreted as negation (according to their view) or heresy (according to our belief); because it is possible that those holding this belief mean that the Divine is not separate from His creatures. The Divine is united with His creatures, and creatures are manifestations of the Divine. Of course, the first part, where they say, “The possible entities exist and are numerous and there is no Creator or Agent outside of them,” is free of objection. However, in the second part, if instead of saying, “And the Absolute Existence is united with them, in fact, it is identical to them,” they had used the phrase “the possible entities are united with the Absolute Existence,” this objection would not arise.
The twenty-seventh connection: That Absolute Existence has no name or form
It is said:
“Once this is established, you will understand that the Truth is Absolute Existence, which has no difference or multiplicity; in fact, it is pure Existence, in which nothing else is mixed, and nothing else is blended with it. In this regard, there is no composition or multiplicity in it; in fact, it has no real name or form. It has no attributes or descriptions, because attributes, names, and judgments are not attributed to the Absolute Essence except through consideration of particularizations and distinctions. The negation of what is other than the absolute in relation to it — which entails the negation of judgments, attributes, and real distinctions — is a negative judgment whose origin is a non-real particularization, thus a contradiction is not valid when thoroughly examined.
Therefore, reflect upon this.”

When we say “God is indeterminate” or “God is absolute,” we refer to the reality and external truth that lies beyond the reach of our minds and reason, not to the description through which we speak of that indeterminate truth. This is because our concept of the absolute is limited, and our notion of indeterminacy is itself shaped by the limitations and constraints of our minds. This is what is referred to as “created” in the sayings of the Imams, as stated by Imam Baqir: “Whenever you distinguish Him by your assumptions in the most subtle meanings, He is a created, manufactured being like you, and your understanding of Him is ultimately flawed.”

Thus, the absolute truth and its manifestations have no container of determination. However, what falls within the scope of our perception—through intellect, mysticism, and intuition—are all mental determinations, which only reflect the absolute truth, the indeterminate, and the independent from the world.

In the case of the “absolute void” (a term used to describe something that has no existence whatsoever, neither mentally nor in the external world), there is something that cannot be described. For instance, when dealing with something that is void, we cannot say it is “laughing” or “writing.” This is because the act of reporting something requires the existence of the subject to which the predicate is applied. Without the existence of both the subject and the predicate, reporting becomes impossible. Therefore, in the phrase “Zayd is standing,” both “Zayd” and “standing” must exist for the statement to be true.

Thus, when nothingness is pure void and complete non-existence, it is evident that no report can be made about it.

Objection: The very statement that “nothingness cannot be reported” is itself a report about nothingness, since the subject here is nothingness and the predicate is that it cannot be reported. This itself is a type of report on the absolute void.

Answer: In logic, we have learned that predication has two types: primary (intrinsic) and common (artificial). The term “predication” refers to the unity of the subject and the predicate, and this unity can be conceptual or existential.

Primary Predication: This occurs when the subject and the predicate are united conceptually. In this case, the existential and conceptual unity is strong. For example, when we say “man is a rational animal,” the concept of man and the concept of rational animal are one and the same in meaning. This is a primary predication, as it is a self-evident truth; each thing is, by definition, itself.
Common Predication: This occurs when the subject and the predicate are united in existence, although conceptually they are distinct. For example, “man is a writer” is a common predication. Being a writer is not inherent in the concept of man, but in reality, they are united and coexist in one being. This type of predication is more commonly used in various sciences and industries.

Thus, when we say “the absolute unknown cannot be reported about,” it refers to the fact that no report can be made in the primary sense. However, in the secondary sense, the very statement itself reports the absolute unknown, but this unknown is a mental construct and is known in some form, although in primary predication no report can be made. Likewise, “the absolute void cannot be reported about” can be understood in the primary sense as being beyond report, but in the secondary sense, we can indeed report on it.

As the commentator has stated, the phrase “reflect upon this” suggests the difficulty of comprehending this idea with the intellect, and the only way to reach this truth is through the refinement of inner understanding and focus on the divine truth.

The statement by the commentator, “The real, self-sustaining, and independent cosmos is the absolute cosmos,” is indeed a correct and solid one. However, the subsequent phrase, “and certainly it is the true One, meaning that everything else—essences and particularities as such—is non-being,” is somewhat problematic. This is because it conflates two aspects: one is the true reality and its manifestations as they are in themselves, which are objective and real; the other is how we perceive and interpret those manifestations, which is subjective and mental.

Thus, we should not mix these two perspectives. In the second perspective, regarding conceptual understanding, not only are the essences and particularities subjective and mental, but the absolute cosmos itself—though it is truly one—also falls within the realm of mental interpretation and representation, a representation of the divine reality. Conversely, from the first perspective, regarding the objective reality of the absolute cosmos, essences and particularities are also real and should not be mistakenly considered as non-being.

In summary, our understanding of the divine truth, its manifestations, and its attributes is based on mental constructs and intellectual exercises, reflecting the reality of the absolute truth, which exists beyond the limits of human cognition.

The phrase “Indeed, difference and multiplicity are only imagined in the stages of its descent,” means that once the divine essence becomes determined and the divine names manifest as attributes of the essence, these names, after the interaction and collision of universal names, give rise to more specific and individualized names in the world.

The benefit of these relational attributes and the collision of divine names accrues to the created beings, who, due to their weakness and limitations, cannot fully grasp the divine attributes and names as a whole. Thus, they break them down into parts and call upon God using those names. This is a mercy and kindness granted to all beings, although special beings and saints do not fragment God’s names as we do and do not need to recite a thousand names in a short time to understand them. If someone recites the “Jowshan Kabir” prayer in one breath and comprehends the meanings of these names, they will not be able to permanently transcend the realm of physical existence. However, we are instructed to recite it outwardly, even though we are unaware of its deeper meanings.

The statement, “As for the divine essence, which is in its absolute self-manifestation… there is no room for any attributes or conceptualizations in it,” means that in the state of absolute non-manifestation, the idea of attributes or mental conceptualizations is irrelevant. The state of “no name, no form” signifies that there is no trace or indication through which the intellect can grasp or enter. When no name exists, no reality can be discussed or comprehended. In the absence of names, we cannot reach any further understanding of the divine essence.

The phrase “even from this consideration” implies that this conceptualization of “no name, no form” is also exempt, as it too is a mental construct.

The subsequent phrases regarding “and the negation of all other than the absolute” refer to the divine essence and critique certain misunderstandings about this issue.

In understanding this connection, it is essential to consider three principles:

Even in the realm of the absolute non-manifestation, the divine essence holds names and attributes, albeit in a non-manifest form, such as “All-Merciful,” “The Compeller,” and so forth. The idea that God has no names or attributes in the absolute state refers only to the specific, determined names and attributes, not to the essential, undetermined ones.
The descent of the divine essence through the stages of creation, in the unity of its essence and the detailed manifestation of its attributes, brings about the appearance of names and attributes in the world. These manifestations are fully real and not merely mental or imaginary constructs. There is no room for any form of conceptualization or subjective attribution in this state.
Our intellectual representations of these realities are incomplete, subjective, and mentally constructed. The true essence of the divine names and attributes, as they are in themselves, transcends the limitations of our understanding.

The statement “things are not truly real but are mentally constructed non-being” presents a clear fallacy. How can all determinations be mere mental constructs? What we have sought to demonstrate is the personal unity of the essence of existence, and the multiplicities are but manifestations of that unified reality. The attribution of mental constructs to the divine essence is problematic, as the divine essence cannot be reduced to mere non-being or mental constructs.

Finally, regarding the distinction between divine attributes and created attributes, the argument is flawed. While created beings may have attributes that are inherently determined, the attributes of the divine essence transcend these limitations, as the divine essence is not inherently determined and is beyond the reach of mental constructs.

It is evident to the perceptive and attentive person that the essence of this statement is that the cognitive truth — i.e., the intellectual perception attributed to the immaterial — is not an absolute reality. Rather, it is a specific type of realization, which involves the presence of the influencing factor and its immediate effect. This varies according to the differences in the perceivers’ abilities, as the stronger the influence of the factor, and the fewer the intermediaries required, the more intense this connection becomes. On the other hand, the weaker the influence and the greater the necessity for intermediaries, the weaker this connection will be.

Some have reached the stage where the power of influence reaches the level of self-determined affirmation, whereby the effect is achieved, and the influencer becomes identical with itself in its connection without the need for intermediaries or instruments. This is the highest form of influence, beyond which no further enhancement can be conceived. Thus, the relational and subtle causative connection with the perceived object cannot be imagined to be greater in any way. Others have reached such weakness that they cannot influence without additional will and choice, and yet they still require numerous intermediaries and various causes. This represents the extreme of weakness in influence, and likewise, the relational and subtle causative connection in this case is exceedingly weak, to the extent that it reaches mere accidental comparison.

It is thus understood that the terms ‘attainment’ and ‘affirmation,’ when not implying the conflict and non-compatibility mentioned earlier, convey what is meant by the terms “emergence” and “manifestation” in a more precise and complete manner, with subtle insights and delicate clarifications known only to a select few. This is also the case with the teachings of ancient philosophers, whose methods of communicating the truth have remained unchanged. However, when later thinkers, particularly those in the tradition of the Peripatetics, adopted these teachings and adapted them to their own lower perceptions, confusion and disagreement emerged. The terminology they inherited from their predecessors has been passed down through a lineage that leads to the great uncoverers of truth and the pillars of prophecy, such as Hermes, known in religious texts as Idris, and Agathodaimon, known as Seth. These individuals represent the foundational teachers of wisdom, whose writings have deeply influenced the transmission and cultivation of knowledge. One should not neglect the profound symbolism in their words, as many secrets are hidden in obscure corners.

Now we begin the discussion on the detailed implications of names, which was touched upon previously in relation to the intrinsic unity of the self, and the manner in which these names emerge and manifest, descending from their broader categories, kinds, and species. Additionally, we must determine the relationships these names have with each other — that is, which names fall under the dominion of which other names, and the particular contexts in which these names are valid. This is because every name has a beginning that only manifests in a specific context, and its inherent qualities appear solely in a certain stage of the descending order of the self. Furthermore, this name is only applicable to the self in that specific context (or as we term it, in that particular manifestation). This interpretation is one of the meanings conveyed by the teachings of the non-infallible prophets, may God be pleased with them, that the names of the Divine are “prescribed” (i.e., they are not arbitrary or unilaterally determined). The structuring, arrangement, and sequence of these names are key issues in this discipline (the science of mysticism), as noted in the preface of this book.

On the other hand, as has been stated numerous times, since the discourse in this treatise is aimed at the intellectuals and scholars, and is in accordance with the method they use to establish their arguments, it is necessary to remain consistent with the established terminologies and common expressions among them, so that the meaning is communicated effectively to their level of understanding. May God Almighty guide them out of the confines of illusion, for an awareness of the common terms used by these scholars and aligning the discourse with their terminology is essential to ensuring clarity of understanding for those seeking growth. This is because there is a hidden, intimate connection between the esoteric meanings and the terms used in mystical tradition, and grasping this connection is essential to understanding the underlying principles. Only by the light of guidance and the lamp of prophecy can one truly comprehend this relationship. Therefore, it is appropriate to briefly introduce some of these terms throughout this text.

Having understood the previous points, it is essential to know that in the divine essence, with regard to its undifferentiated nature — sometimes referred to as the “Unseen of the Unseen” or the “Absolute Essence” — it is impossible for something to be conceived that would require determination, limitation, or the need for multiplicity. Therefore, the first meaningful description of the essence, which is considered in its true form, is a true unity, wherein there is no place for multiplicity or differentiation to be imagined. Even multiplicity in relation to this true unity does not entail contradiction or opposition. Unity does not, in this regard, contradict the essence itself.

It was established in the preface that unity can be understood in two respects:

Absolute Unity: This is a comprehensive unity wherein no aspect suggests division or duality, and even the absence of multiplicity is not considered within its meaning. This type of unity is not to be confused with relative unity, where the negation of division is explicitly considered.
Relative Unity: This refers to a type of unity in which a single entity remains undivided and distinct from other, similar entities. Multiplicity — either accidental or inherent — is in contrast to this form of unity.

In this text, the unity discussed is the first form, and the Absolute Essence refers to this type of unity. In this regard, the essence encompasses everything, with no aspect or level falling outside its scope. Even the material world is not external to the essence. Therefore, the necessary characteristic of this essence, in its knowledge of itself, is that the essence is fully present to itself, an internal realization.

There is an important point here, which holds many benefits for understanding. This is the fact that the unity considered here (the absolute, self-sufficient unity) has two dimensions:

The Aspect of the Essence’s Hiddenness: In this dimension, the essence is understood as a singular, indivisible reality, where all other relations and additions are disregarded. It is here that the essence is called “the One” (Ahad), which is the inner manifestation of the absolute unity, as opposed to the external manifestation referred to as “the Unique” (Wahid).
The Aspect of the Essence’s Manifestation: In this regard, the essence is acknowledged as possessing all relational attributes and additions, which are the grounds for the divine names and attributes. This is similar to the numerical unity, which remains absolute unless considered in relation to its potential for further multiplication.

When this is understood, it becomes clear that the essence, when considering both aspects of its hidden and revealed nature, manifests in two distinct ways for the perceiver and observer: as “the Revealed” (Zahir) due to one aspect and “the Hidden” (Batin) due to the other. However, there is no true distinction between the essence in itself in these two aspects.

This conclusion reveals the fact that between the two aspects of the essence (the hidden and the revealed), there is no real distinction when it comes to the essence itself. The names “the Unique” (Wahid) and “the One” (Ahad) are ultimately indistinguishable.

Thus, one must reflect carefully on this subtle point, for it contains profound secrets. May God, in His mercy, guide us all to these realizations.

The phrase “أنّ أسماءَ الحقَّ توقيفيّةٌ” refers to the specific manifestation of each name, the arrangement and structure of those names, and the state of each name. This existential matter is distinct from the “tawqīfī” (prescribed) nature discussed in the jurisprudential issue, which, as an incidental matter, appears in theological and mystical texts, and addresses the permissibility or impermissibility of attributing certain names and attributes to the Divine, which are not mentioned in religious texts. As discussed extensively in our detailed work on the Divine Names and Attributes, there is no firm religious evidence against the application—whether in naming or describing—of names not explicitly mentioned in the sacred texts, provided that these names and attributes do not imply deficiency or limitation, but instead express the perfection of existence. Thus, no religious authorization is necessary in such cases.

The state of the names is not connected to their prescribed nature either in concept or in actualization, and introducing this as an issue for the arrangement of names without any doubt is futile and unfounded. Thus, both the concept of religious authorization in the issue of the prescribed nature of names in jurisprudence and theology is incorrect, and using it in the context of the state of names in mysticism is also erroneous. In fact, this concept in mysticism can be seen as a paradox, since the state of the names and their order is not in anyone’s control, and thus does not impose any rulings or obligations. Moreover, in this regard, there is no disagreement among mystics, while in jurisprudence and theology, the issue of the prescribed nature of names is a contentious matter, with varied details, and falls within the realm of actions performed by God’s servants.

The phrase “لا يَطّلعُ على تلک المناسبة إلّا بنور الولاية ومشكاة النّبوّة” implies that between the mystical teachings and philosophy, there is a hidden connection, and understanding this connection plays a crucial role in grasping the fundamental concepts. No one can perceive this connection except through the light of guardianship (wilayah) and the niche of prophethood (nubuwwah). It is this guardianship that is the inner essence, truth, and foundation of prophethood and imamate. Prophethood is the outward manifestation of guardianship, and imamate is the continuation of prophethood.

In the explanation of the phrase “أنّ الذاتَ باعتبار اللّا تعيّن ـ المسمّاة بـ ِ “غيب الغيب” تارةً، و “الهويّة المطلقة” أخرى”, the commentator speaks of the true, essential unity of the divine essence. He considers the divine essence, in its non-determination, as the “ghayb al-ghayb” and the “absolute identity” (huwiyyat mutlaqah). However, we regard the concept of “ghayb al-ghayb” itself as a form of determination and consider the essence, in its non-determined existence, as being above “ghayb al-ghayb.” Of course, our understanding does not reach beyond “ghayb al-ghayb” or “ghayb al-ghuyub” (the hidden of the hidden). It should be noted that the domain of “ghayb al-ghayb” and “absolute identity” should have no determination, although it itself is a type of determination, for it is a name and its essence, which is without name, is the ultimate truth.

Regarding the levels of descent from the domain of non-determination—where there is neither name nor form—and the other levels of the divine and created manifestations, it must be understood that these manifestations and descents are infinite and not confined to a specific number, and thus cannot be limited or bounded. Any boundary placed upon this truth belongs solely to our conceptual frameworks.

It must be understood that the domain of existence and individuation is not the domain of determination. The existence and individuation of being do not require determination, but determination requires existence. Therefore, the domain of appearances is entirely the domain of determinations. “Ghayb al-ghayb” is itself a form of determination and manifestation. We consider one domain of manifestation from non-determination, which is “ghayb al-ghayb.” Similarly, we observe a domain of determination that is “absolute identity,” and another form of determination that becomes “oneness” (ahadiyyah) and “unity” (wahidiyyah). However, what we have not considered is the essence of non-determination itself. Therefore, the divine in the domain of non-determination is not without existence but rather exists as non-determination; because existence does not require determination, but rather it is this manifestation and descent that accepts determination.

In explaining the phrase “وكذلک الوحدةَ لا تُغايرُ الذاتَ” it must be stated that this true unity—opposed to multiplicity—does not differ from the essence. This unity is a branch of the absolute and is considered its manifestation. Therefore, the absolute is above unity, just as absolute identity has no determination, although it itself is a kind of determination. Here too, the true unity is itself the determination of the unity of absoluteness.

The absolute identity, considered initially and descriptively as the true unity, has two aspects: one is the aspect of concealment, which is “oneness” (ahadiyyah), and the other is the aspect of manifestation, which is “unity” (wahidiyyah). The unity as a domain, from the perspective of its unity, is “oneness” (ahadiyyah), and unity as the origin of numbers is the “unity of names” (wahidiyyat asma’) of the Divine.

It should be noted that if this identity, and its concealment and manifestation, are considered within the framework of perception and symbolism, they are within our grasp, and this is the realm of abstraction and expression. However, if the intended meaning is the actual declaration of the truth that the Divine possesses the manifestation of oneness and the true identity, then the matter is no longer one of mere abstraction but of truth. Therefore, the phrase, “إذ به يحصل له باعتبار كلِّ مرتبةٍ من المراتب العدديّة نسبةٌ واسمٌ خاصٌ ليس فيه شىءٌ من هذه النّسب والأسماء سوى محضِ الاعتبار,” is merely abstract and symbolic. However, in the realm of reality, there is never an issue of abstraction, much less one of mere abstraction. Fire is fire, it has heat and smoke, regardless of whether anyone considers it or not. All of these exist, whether they are contemplated or not. Yes, the contemplation of them is what constitutes abstraction. However, the extent of abstraction is determined by the proximity and the witnessing of the actual, which imbues the abstraction with truth.

Regarding the phrase, “متعلَّقُه طرفُ ظهور الذات وانبساطها واعتبارِ اثبات النّسب والاضافات كلِّها، ويسمّى الذاتُ به “واحدآ”، وبهذا الاعتبار يَصيرُ الذاتُ منشأَ الاسماء والصفات,” it should be clarified that it is not the case that the origin of all names and attributes comes from the manifestation of the essence. Rather, the inner essence also possesses names and attributes. In the realm of oneness, the names are merged and undetermined. In the realm of unity, it is not the case that all names are manifest, but rather the inner names also exist. To put it another way: inner names and external names are expressed in terms of “unity,” while in terms of the merger and indeterminacy of the essence, they are referred to as “oneness.”

In the passage “Fā’lam: That there is no distinction in the first consideration between the Essence and each of the four names, just as there is no distinction between each of them with respect to one another,” it should be noted that the divine names, in the realm of manifestation, possess an actual state, not a merely nominal one. Hence, necessity precedes life, just as life precedes knowledge, and knowledge precedes power. Power, in turn, precedes sustenance and governs it, and all these priorities and dominions are real, not merely hypothetical. This precedence and subordination occur within the realm of determination, manifestation, and appearance. In the realm of the inner, all the names are identical to the Essence. Therefore, if there is a difference in the rulings, consequences, and effects, it exists within the realm of equality, or even higher, within the realm of mutual correspondence. This means that each of the divine names encompasses all the names. Although the states may differ, the name remains the same.

An objection arises in the phrase, “One might say: The statement of the author here does not align with what was previously established by reasoning regarding the affirmation of absolute, essential unity,” up to, “This would lead to confusion and lack of firm grounding.” The objection suggests: You stated that the Essence of the hidden of the hidden is a concealed treasure and unknown, and that there is no distinction, duality, or otherness in that realm; thus, determinations and considerations are inconceivable there, as it is beyond the reach of intellects and imaginations. Yet now, you introduce the idea of the Essence having knowledge of itself, implying a distinction, just as necessity and causality imply separation between cause and effect. As a result, a specific determination for the necessary being seems to be established.

The response in the phrase, “For we say: The source of this dispute lies merely in the expression, and the author’s use of the aforementioned terms, rather than the expression of the objectives using the terminology of the philosophers,” up to “Indeed, what matters in its realization is the attainment of something for a purely abstract matter which has a kind of effect on it,” contains two responses to the aforementioned objection: The first is that the terms of the philosophers are prone to such issues; otherwise, no distinction or separation can be inferred from the existence of causality and so on. The second is that their expressions are not problematic in this way, as demonstrated by Abu Hamid in his work “Hikmat Rashidiya,” where this statement in the sense of attainment is the opinion of some of the later philosophers.

The 29th Connection: On the Knowledge of the Truth by Its Attributes and Necessary Consequences

The passage states:

“Then, the recognition of the Essence itself includes the recognition of all other attributes that necessarily belong to it, as they are identical to the Essence, and the recognition of all that these attributes necessitate, both collectively and individually.”

In this section, it is expressed more appropriately as “knowledge” rather than “recognition,” as knowledge is a more accurate term. The term “necessitates” is preferred over “comprises,” as “necessitation” better aligns with the idea of essential connection. The knowledge of the Essence about itself is inseparable from the knowledge of all other attributes that are essentially necessary to it because these attributes are identical to the Essence. This knowledge also includes the knowledge of everything that is necessitated by these attributes, whether in a collective or individual manner.

I Say:

Since absolute identity necessarily entails the mentioned manifestation called “the first manifestation,” referred to as “the scientific relationship,” it must include the awareness of all attributes that are necessary for the Essence, as they are identical to the Essence in this specific determination, whether as necessary attributes due to another determination or as essential attributes. It also includes the awareness of what these attributes necessitate in terms of specific rulings for each of them. It has been established that all levels, even the sensory, are observed in this presence as identical with the Essence, as the Sheikh says:

“I am you, you are us, we are Him, and all are in Him, He is the One, ask those who have reached.”

This is referred to as the “perfection of the divine names.” Therefore, the mentioned determination necessarily entails the awareness of both the essential and the divine names, which is the manifestation of the Essence upon itself in its determinations, resulting from the purest emanation — the most sacred emanation — that excludes any notion of the recipient being separate from the giver and the act of giving.

This is what is referred to by them as “clarification,” or in the manifestations of the divine Essence, it is termed “self-manifestation.” The latter is confined to four forms, with no more than these. For the manifestation of the Essence in its manifestations, it can either be in relation to the apparent or in relation to the manifestation itself.

The First Possibility:

The manifestation of the Essence in relation to the apparent can only be conceived in terms of a comprehensive, unified, and all-encompassing display of its qualities, such as the “Complete Human,” since the manifestation of the Essence upon itself in its determinations can only occur in its entirety and unity. This can only happen in a manifestation that possesses complete universality and the capacity to accept all that confronts it, which is the Complete Human, nothing else. As it is stated in the Qur’an:

“It was not you who threw when you threw.” Or in the case of the tree calling upon Moses: “Indeed, I am Allah.”

The Second Possibility:

This is when the Essence manifests upon itself through its individual manifestations. The manifestation is either in the essence of that specific manifestation, in its own particularity, as the individual entities of the world each have a manifestation in themselves, based on their specific degree, as mentioned in the Qur’an:

“There is no thing except that it praises Him.”

Or, the manifestation is through another individual, based on the relationships and correspondences between them, such as the agreements or contradictions between individuals in the world. All these forms can be inferred from the statement: “Collectively and individually.”

Important Notes:

In this connection, the discourse revolves around the necessary consequences of the knowledge of the Essence by itself, including the attributes and their manifestations. The knowledge of the Essence by itself and its essential attributes, as well as the scientific manifestation — which is identical to the Essence and free from duality — is referred to as the “clarification of the divine names.” The knowledge of the Essence by its manifestations, which involves duality, is referred to as “self-manifestation.”

After discussing the knowledge of the Necessary Being regarding its Essence in the previous connection, it is now time to address the necessary consequences of the knowledge of the Essence itself.

It should be noted that “actual knowledge” occurs in the realm of self-manifestation, which is distinct from the knowledge of the Essence. The actual knowledge is different from the scientific manifestation because the former involves multiplicity and can accept the realm of diversity, while the latter involves the unified, singular appearance of the Essence. The fixed entities (the divine names’ manifestations) exist by the knowledge of the truth, not independently. Their external existence is both created and real.

The necessity of this manifestation arises from the absolute identity and non-differentiation of the Essence, which is ultimately realized in the manifest knowledge of the Essence and the emanation of the divine names.

It may be thought here that this statement does not align with what has been previously stated—that the perception of the necessary being itself entails the perception of all its attributes and substances, since they are identical with it—because it necessitates the existence of substances. If it is claimed that these substances do not exist, then, apparently, there would be a contradiction between the two statements. Therefore, it is said, “The consideration of the conceptuality of essences and substances is merely the consideration of their non-difference from the rational subject.” It is clear that this consideration differs from the view that considers them as created or caused and distinct in their existence. Thus, when the considerations differ, there is no contradiction between the two judgments.

As for the explanation that the conceptuality of essences is considered only in terms of their non-difference from the rational subject, the reasoning is that, as far as their distinction is concerned, they have no existence at all—neither externally nor mentally.

Externally, they have no existence because, inasmuch as they are distinct from the rational subject, they are separate from it in terms of existence in the external world. Anything that is separate from it in this manner cannot exist externally, as previously explained, because the true essence of existence does not distinguish between its instances; thus, anything that is distinct from existence as such cannot exist externally by necessity.

Mentally, conceptuality in the sense held by the Peripatetic philosophers—namely, that something exists in the potential cause, which is interpreted as the mental impression of the object, called “passive knowledge” in their terms, or in the active cause that is interpreted as “presence,” referred to as “actual knowledge”—is denied to essences in this regard. Because, in this regard, essences are distinct from the rational subject, they are distinct from existence in the same manner that a cause is distinct from its effect, whether as potential or actual. As we have learned, what is distinct from existence as such cannot have a portion of existence or realization, neither in itself nor externally.

Furthermore, the concept—inasmuch as it is conceptual—must not be distinct from the knower, except by a kind of addition. Hence, something that is distinct from something in existence, such as essences, cannot be considered conceptual in this way, as was previously discussed.

This point is further supported by what has been mentioned by some of the insightful individuals among mystics: “Any kind of knowledge of something—be it any type of knowledge—is, according to true perception and clear revelation, the act of the knower manifesting that known in itself by the shared essence between the knower and the known, which unites them, causing no distinction.” Similarly, knowledge, in this unity, is the act of the knower manifesting the distinct nature of the known from the knower, thus calling one “the known” and the other “the knower,” since in unity there is no multiplicity. This second form of distinction involves a concept that entails the shared essence between the knower, the known, and knowledge, which is distinction itself, and another necessary condition that must not be revealed.

I have presented this statement in this context because this issue is beyond the understanding of those who rely solely on rational proofs without sound perception. I hope they will reflect on the clear meaning of their statements, so that God may reveal to them some of their hidden symbols, for “This is not difficult for God.”

If it is established that essences and substances, considering their distinction from the rational subject, have no share in existence at all, then it is impossible to attribute existence to them in this manner, or to consider them with respect to it. If existence were attributed to them and considered with respect to them, it would only be the true, self-existent existence, and it would not be correct to say that they are dependent on the rational subject based on one of the two non-hypothetical kinds of existence (i.e., the real existence). This is because the existence attributed to the essence in this case would only be the true, self-existent existence, which cannot be dependent on anything, as dependence pertains to something existing by hypothetical existence, which has been shown to be entirely non-existent.

To summarize: if essences and substances are considered in terms of their distinction, they are necessarily nonexistent, and cannot be described as created, caused, or having any other attributes. If, however, they are considered abstracted from this distinction, existence can be attributed to them, but they cannot be described as needing or depending on anything, such as being created or caused, because the existence attributed to them in this case is the true existence, which is absolute in its richness. Therefore, the belief in their createdness or causality in either case is flawed.

As the late Abu Hamid demonstrated, he clarified the true unity of existence and emphasized the nature of the conceptual distinction that leads to the appearance of multiplicity. He now seeks to clarify the ultimate understanding of the Peripatetic philosophers and their source of confusion on this matter (i.e., God’s knowledge of things other than Himself).

The explanation of this matter is that: the perception of this truth (i.e., the self-knowledge of the essence) inherently includes the perception of (or the necessitation of knowledge of) other attributes, but also leads to a general, not detailed, understanding of the collective order, which is organized and systematic in the external existence. For in this realm (the first determination and the state of unity), there is no room for details or particular judgments, as you have already realized. This is because the manifestation of the essence in totality (and the state of unity) is such that multiplicity does not exist within it, and this manifestation is one of those four forms necessary for the knowledge (or perception) of the essence. In this state, perception cannot be attached to existence except by a unifying relation (i.e., the union and merging of names), which results in the precedence of certain details (i.e., divine attributes) and the delay of others. Otherwise, neither unity nor the essential state of the essence can be conceived.

Thus, this (the cause within the essence) leads to knowledge of the existential order (i.e., knowledge of the manifestations according to the mystic belief), not the belief of the Peripatetics who assert: “Knowledge of the cause leads to knowledge of the effect, which is distinct and separate from the cause in its existence.” They did so because they denied the will and choice of the ultimate cause (in the realm of the effect), and were consequently compelled to attribute to the cause an essential attribute of knowledge, which requires an orderly and precise system of existence (i.e., the system of effects), known as “grace.” And this grace represents the system of the world (in its manifested forms) within the knowledge of God, in which the first effect (the intended first cause) is eternally present with all the ordered effects from eternity to eternity. Hence, they argue that knowledge of the cause leads to knowledge of the distinct and separate effect. Since this foundation is based on a fallacious premise, it is invalid, for it assumes that the essences and fixed substances, by virtue of their distinction from the essence, possess a self-existent existence, whether they are considered created (according to the Ishraqi belief) or caused (according to the Peripatetic view), despite their differing opinions. As has been shown, the fixed substances (or essences) in this context (i.e., in terms of their distinction) have never experienced existence, and simple non-existence cannot be considered as created (in the view of Avicenna and his Peripatetic followers, who assert the primacy of existence) or as caused (according to the Illuminationists, who assert the primacy of essence).

It might be thought that this statement (that the fixed essences have never encountered existence) contradicts what has been said earlier, where it was claimed that the perception (knowledge) of the necessary being by itself necessitates the perception of other attributes and essences, as these attributes are identical with the essence. In this case, if the attributes and essences are identical with the essence, their existence is implied. Thus, if it is said that the attributes and essences are nonexistent, there would appear to be a contradiction between the two statements.

Therefore, Abu Hamid said: “The consideration of the conceptual nature of essences and substances is merely the consideration of their non-difference from the rational subject.” There is no doubt that this consideration (in which the conceptual and the knower are identical) differs from the consideration of their being created or caused and distinct in their existence. Hence, when the considerations differ, there is no contradiction between the two judgments. Therefore, fixed substances or essences, when considered in terms of their distinction from the essence, do not have any real existence. Instead, they exist only as identical with divine knowledge.

This passage refers to an objection that could be raised and addressed here. The objection is that, according to your belief (based on personal unity of existence in mysticism), it is necessary for essences and individuals to be intelligible only if their non-difference from the essence of the intellect is considered. This intelligibility would be impossible, as intellect and intelligibility are opposed in terms of their mutual relationship. Such opposition between the two can only be conceived when they exist as distinct subjects in relation to their being. Therefore, when the distinction between two subjects is removed, both intellect and intelligibility cease to exist.

Abu Hamid responded to this objection in two ways: the first response was dialectical in the form of a refutation. He argued that if your premises, which suggest the opposition between intellect and intelligibility and the necessity of a distinction between the two subjects in terms of existence, are correct, it would follow that neither the necessary existent nor any of the immaterial angels (nor the material angels mentioned in the traditions as appointed to matter and bodies, nor even the intellectual presence of humans) could possess intellect in relation to themselves. However, in truth, this is not the case.

Since the objection is not fully resolved by this response and it rather extends the scope of the issue to other cases, Abu Hamid referred to a more substantive explanation aimed at eradicating the root of the problem. He stated that although the opposition between intellect and intelligibility is a form of antithesis, mere consideration in their acquisition suffices (it is not necessary for their opposition to be in existence; rather, their opposition is conceptual). Just as the mere consideration of the real essences (i.e., appearances) suffices for the conception of their antithesis, the emergence and existence of these essences (appearances) here, in the realm of unity, can be conceived merely by considering them. Therefore, the opposition which stems from the existence of these essences is better understood in terms of their being conceptual.

In further clarification, he said that essences, in their opposition to the essence of the existent, are not truly existent; rather, they exist as relationships and relative determinations, as you know that the true unity (which is referred to as “absolute existence”) is impossible to manifest as anything other than itself, as any other existence outside of it would be pure negation and complete non-existence.

It is said: “Be aware that everything other than God is nothingness.”

Essences, in their opposition to existence, never truly exist except in so far as this truth, through its manifestation (the essential manifestation) and reflection (the manifestation through names), leads to the emergence of these forms in various degrees of concealment and disclosure according to our perception, not according to the reality of the thing itself. Therefore, when we compare one of these appearances with another, we find that some are clearer and more luminous because they leave more noticeable effects on our senses, while others are less luminous due to having fewer effects. Hence, the distinction we observe between these appearances is purely relative and based on our perceptual faculties.

Thus, it is evident that these multiple appearances and their determinations are relational perceptions and conceptual additions, but the essence of the truth itself is free from these relations and additions. This is akin to sunlight when it shines on coloured glass pieces, where the light appears differently according to the nature of the glass, even though the light itself has no colour. Similarly, essences’ existence is determined solely by these relational concepts.

It is also understood that since essences are conceptual, their attributes — whether intellectual or intelligible — are also conceptual by default. Hence, with respect to their external or actual existence, there is no true distinction between the intellect and the intelligible, as actual distinction requires the existence of separate subjects. Since the subject in both cases is unified through this essential unity (the essence of existence), it is not correct to say that an essence exists in relation to either an intellectual or external existence in this realm (the truth of existence). This is the situation where existence exists solely through consideration, without an external entity (the “considerer”).

Indeed, essences exist because they are intrinsically tied to the essence of the truth, just as they exist for themselves. It is through this relational addition — the addition that the “considerer” has, and the addition which connects with the reality of existence — that they exist. This addition, however, is purely conceptual. Reflect upon this statement, for it offers the ultimate clarification on this matter. May God Almighty lead you to the intended goal.

Notes on the text:

The speaker’s view in this book is that there is one truth and its appearances. These appearances are not distinct from that truth; rather, they are its manifestations.
In contrast, the “philosophers” (specifically Peripatetics, Neoplatonists, and theologians) have their own understanding of existence and its manifestations. Although all these schools agree on God’s knowledge of both Himself and the creatures, each has its own approach.
Philosophers aim to prove God’s knowledge of creatures before their creation through causality or by showing that God’s knowledge is the cause of their creation. The mystic, however, argues that both these routes cannot prove God’s knowledge of creatures, as ultimately they claim that knowledge of God’s essence is the cause of His knowledge of created beings. Mystics reject such duality and multiplicity, and in doing so, they negate the possibility of proving God’s knowledge of His creatures by these means.
The mystic’s position is that God’s knowledge of Himself is identical to His knowledge of existence. Therefore, there is no multiplicity in God’s knowledge. This means that knowledge, according to mysticism, is not general nor multiple but unified.
Philosophers challenge the mystic’s view, suggesting that if there is no distinction between intellect and intelligible objects, then the opposition between the two, a necessary condition for the mutual relationships, would be mythical. They argue that the concepts of intellect and intelligibility imply mutual opposition, which can only exist if the two are distinct.
Abu Hamid, followed by his interpreter, responds to this challenge with both a refutation and a solution. The core of his argument lies in the idea that the opposition between the intellect and intelligibility is only conceptual, not real. Just as essences exist merely through conceptual relationships, so too do the attributes of intellect and intelligibility exist in a purely conceptual manner.

Shiite Jurisprudence
Chapter Seven: Shiite Jurisprudence

Introduction

To preserve religion at all times, especially during the time of Occultation, the matter of jurisprudence — apart from its rational necessity — is foreseen by divine law. This very aspect guarantees the eternal existence, actualization, and survival of the religious life of society; because the governance of society and the responsibility of addressing its public affairs and solving its problems within the realm of religion, without the foresight of the lawgiver, will lack a sound and lasting structure. The continued vitality of religious law during the period of Occultation itself serves as a testament to this reality. The endurance of religion across all social domains — from politics and economics to governance, jihad, guidance, leadership, the implementation of divine laws, dealing with problems, confronting enemies of religion, defending it, and maintaining the purity and integrity of society — is achieved on this axis and in this manner.

Shiite jurisprudence is the knowledge of obtaining the intent and meaning of the divine communicator in a systematic way, and at least with the help of a divine state, through the appearance and emergence of religious evidence (the Qur’an, Sunnah, and other sources recognized by divine law); whether the intention of the lawgiver is found in doctrinal and epistemic propositions or in the ethical or legal provisions of religion.

In contrast to such jurisprudence, there exist schools and approaches that are outward-oriented and one-dimensional. Jurisprudence, as the knowledge of “understanding the purpose of the communicator,” requires a religious and jurisprudential linguistics; not only the language of legal propositions but also the language of all religious propositions, so as not to fall into the trap of one-sided, superficial jurisprudence. This is because understanding the intent of the communicator is achieved through holding the epistemological system and the character of the lawgiver, not simply by acquiring knowledge of some of his statements or conducting a one-sided analysis of them or deriving the lexical meaning of words without considering the true intent and purpose of the communicator. The true jurisprudent is the one who attains the goals of the master. Attaining the goals of the master is not possible without understanding the subject and the criterion, as well as accessing the lawgiver’s epistemic system. Hence, the jurisprudent is one who, in addition to jurisprudence, possesses knowledge of mysticism, philosophy, psychology, sociology, and most importantly, “anthropology,” as necessary and prerequisite sciences. Therefore, jurisprudence is the understanding of the content of religion, which is derived through the power of reason and thought from the externalities of religious law. The content without the appearance, or the appearance without the content, lacks divine legitimacy and religious validity.

For the realization of understanding the content of religion while preserving its external appearance, Shiite jurisprudence consists of three fundamental pillars:

The systematic and scholarly understanding of the meaning and intent of divine law, relying on divine grace or endowed authority.
The identification of the specific case and the external subject of the ruling (subjectology).
Recognizing the actual reason and rationale behind the legislating of the ruling, avoiding any form of analogy, ijtihad, or baseless consideration of expediency (rationalizing the criteria).

This jurisprudence places significant emphasis on the aforementioned three principles, which has prevented it from becoming trapped in the short-sightedness and narrow focus on the apparent words, rules, or forms of evidence, and from resorting to a narrow understanding through the “precautionary” approach, delivering legal rulings without the use of precautionary expressions.

Since jurisprudence does not have a specific subject matter, but rather is a body of knowledge where each group of issues and rulings involves distinct subjects that come together for a particular purpose, and its issues are organized based on the natural coherence and social and external realities, we have structured it into fourteen main sections and seventy-four books (chapters). In the following, some specific rulings or those of particular interest are presented within this structure.

Section One: Imitation (Taqlid)

Introduction:
A person, despite the health and abilities that come with maturity, intellect, power, and free will, is honored with the title of “responsible” and “obligated.”

Obligation and responsibility render a human being as a valuable entity, such that without one of these four attributes — being a child, insane, weak, or without willpower — though their shortcomings are not reprehensible and are treated with love and compassion, they are not held responsible. It is only with the understanding and acceptance of this responsibility that a person can fulfill their first valuable act, which in its intent of devotion, constitutes their first worship. This very responsibility is what places upon them extensive duties and obligations. Moving away from any of the four attributes (maturity, intellect, power, and free will) at any time or for any individual places them outside the scope of obligation, and no ruling applies to them. Hence, the foundation of obligation is built upon what is referred to in jurisprudence as the “conditions of obligation.” Naturally, obligation has signs that the law has outlined for it. These signs are discussed in Section Five.

Each responsible person occupies one of two fundamental positions:

Either they are a jurist (mujtahid) and fulfill their obligations through their own findings, or they do not hold this position and belong to other individuals who, in such cases, must follow a qualified jurist. In this case, they are referred to as “mukallid” (imitator). Taqlid, which pertains to various legal rulings and chapters of jurisprudence, simplifies and facilitates the correct application of the Qur’an and Sunnah, with the legal code serving as an accessible interpretation of these two sources.

Discussions related to authority and leadership, including how imitation and obedience to a qualified jurist work, are addressed in Section Eleven.

( ) A person who is obligated (to perform ablution) may wash the entire limb multiple times and, on the final occasion, when pouring water, intend to perform the ablution. Whether the first, second, or third washing occurs depends on the intention to purify the entire limb with the ablution. If, for example, the entire limb is washed twice with the intention of ablution, the third washing with the intention of ablution would be impermissible.

( ) If, during the wiping of the feet, the individual places their entire hand on the entire foot and lightly wipes it, it suffices.

( ) If, after activities such as plastering, painting, mechanical work, etc., something remains on the body which does not prevent water from reaching the skin, the ablution remains valid. However, if the substance is considered a barrier or there is doubt as to whether water reaches the skin beneath it, the substance must be removed.

( ) In many professions where individuals work with paint, varnish, plaster, cement, grease, or in the case of workers, builders, and farmers whose hands are often cracked, or in areas where kohl is applied to the eyes, the barrier material must be removed in such a way that water can reach the outer layer of the skin. The ruling concerning the kohl area is the same, and after removing the barrier, the appearance of darkness caused by the substance does not affect purity. In most cases, after washing with the appropriate cleansing agents, the material residue is not considered to have a physical presence in a way that would invalidate purity. As such, there is no need to perform ablution or a ritual wash for wounds or cracks that might bleed. In all such cases, after ensuring there is no negligence in removing the barrier, simply removing its physical presence in an ordinary manner suffices, and the appearance of the substance should not be considered a physical hindrance. There is no need to be obsessive in such cases, as religious rulings are easy and accessible for everyone.

( ) If the skin is oily, and its oil does not constitute a substance preventing water from reaching the skin, the ablution is valid. However, if one is certain that the area is so oily that it prevents water from reaching the skin, the barrier must be removed before performing the ablution.

( ) The use of synthetic paints by both men and women is not problematic. After washing, no physical substance remains from the paint; even substances that are not considered a physical barrier by common understanding do not pose an issue.

( ) If before wiping the head, one closes the tap, causing a small amount of water or moisture to remain on it, and then wipes it, the ablution remains valid. This is because the hand, after having been wetted by the ablution, does not carry sufficient moisture from the tap to be considered as moistening the head in such a way that would invalidate the ablution. Discussing these issues in jurisprudence tends to lead to obsessive thoughts.

( ) If someone repeats the wiping of the feet because the first attempt did not absorb enough water, and there is no visible trace of the initial moisture in the second attempt, there is no need to dry the area before the second wiping, but the intention for the second wiping must be made.

( ) If a part of the hand or another part of the body becomes bruised, discolored, or develops a blister—even if blood or water is trapped under the skin—the ruling for that area remains the same as for healthy skin. Common understanding does not consider it a wound, and as long as water does not harm the area, ablution must be performed. If water would harm the area and the wound is not considered to be on the skin, the person must act according to the treatment for a bandage and perform tayammum (dry ablution). If it is considered a wound and water would harm it, treatment with a bandage suffices, and tayammum is not required.

( ) Touching the film or tape on which the Qur’an is recorded, or the screen of a television or monitor, does not present an issue, as these do not carry the legal status of the Qur’anic verses. However, touching any surface that is considered by common understanding to display the Qur’anic text, such as printed images or silk screen prints, is impermissible without ritual purity.

( ) The names of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), the infallible Imams, and Lady Fatimah (PBUH) are considered sacred, and touching them without ritual purity is impermissible.

( ) Touching the phrase “Al-Qur’an al-Karim” written on the cover of the Qur’an without ritual purity is forbidden.

( ) Touching the names of God, His attributes, or any form of the Divine Name, regardless of the language, is forbidden for one who does not have ablution. This includes coins or currency on which the Name of God is inscribed.

( ) Any pronouns referring to God must be treated as the Name of God and require ritual purity before being touched, even if they are not directly from the Qur’an.

( ) In the case of a ritual wash, the order of washing the limbs must be followed, beginning from the upper parts of each limb and proceeding to the lower parts.

( ) In a ritual wash, short hair, which is considered part of the body and has its skin visible beneath it, must be washed. However, washing long hair, such as a woman’s hair, is not obligatory.

( ) If water is applied to the skin in such a way that the hair does not become wet, the ritual wash is valid. However, if water cannot reach the skin without wetting the hair, it must be washed so that water reaches all parts of the head and body.

( ) If moisture is emitted and one is unsure whether it is semen or something else, it must be treated as semen if it is emitted with desire and the body becomes weak afterward. In women, it is more common for the moisture to not be semen, and only if one is certain that it is semen should the proper procedure be followed.

( ) Finding semen in a discharge from a woman is difficult, and the principle of non-impurity applies unless one is sure that it is semen.

( ) A person who does not have control over the release of semen may perform a single tayammum for each prayer if washing for each prayer is not possible. However, if possible, they must perform a wash for each prayer. If the release of semen is involuntary and continuous, it permits the use of tayammum.

( ) For someone using a stoma bag who experiences uncontrollable discharge of stool or wind, if they are certain they have enough time to perform ablution and pray within the prescribed time, they should perform their prayers during this time. If the time is not sufficient, they should perform only the obligatory parts of the prayer, leaving out the recommended parts. If difficulty arises due to this situation, their prayer remains valid in the current state.

( ) In the case of ritual impurity (junub) where the person cannot perform a full wash, tayammum suffices as a substitute for the ritual wash in such cases. After performing the first tayammum for impurity, there is no need to repeat it unless another major ritual impurity occurs, in which case another tayammum for ritual impurity is necessary.

( ) The release of semen in any form necessitates a ritual wash, provided there is certainty or assurance that it has been released. However, in cases such as prostate surgery where the semen particles dissolve in the urine, it does not cause ritual impurity.

( ) Tayammum on dust, sand, pumice stone, or clay that has been properly purified is valid.

( ) Tayammum on limestone, marble, and other stones, as well as burnt gypsum and lime, is permissible, but it is invalid on gemstones such as agate or turquoise.

( ) Tayammum on dust that gathers on cloth or carpet and is considered soft sand is valid.

( ) Tayammum performed on a wall of clay that leaves dirt on the hands when touched is valid.

( ) Tayammum performed on damp earth or hardened clay is valid, and it is permissible to perform tayammum on moist earth or clay.

( ) One may touch the Qur’anic script with tayammum, and it is permissible to be in the Masjid al-Haram or Masjid al-Nabawi or other mosques, even if they are not passing through them.

( ) If one performs tayammum instead of the ritual wash for impurity (junub), they do not need to perform ablution for prayer. However, if they perform tayammum for other types of impurity, they must perform ablution before praying, and if they cannot do so, they must perform another tayammum as a substitute for ablution.

Fasting in Islam and Its Rulings

In a sacred hadith, it is mentioned: “Fasting is for Me, and I will reward it accordingly.” The fasting of the holy month of Ramadan, which is exclusive to the sacred religion of Islam, is considered the most superior among all fasts.

Obligation of Fasting and Puberty

The criterion for the obligation of fasting is puberty. In our society, it is rare for a girl to reach puberty at the age of nine. Generally, the age of puberty in girls is thirteen.

Compensation for Unperformed Fasts

If a girl who has reached puberty is unable to make up her fasts from one Ramadan to the next due to severe physical weakness, it is not necessary for her to make up the fasts, but she must give a “mod” of food (equivalent to ten dirhams of wheat or barley, about 750 grams) to the poor for each missed fast.

Discharge During Fasting

If a person becomes ritually impure (janabah) during the night of Ramadan or during another obligatory fast and knows that if they sleep, they will not wake up until morning, they must not sleep without performing the necessary ritual purification (ghusl). If they do sleep and do not wake up before the morning, their fast is invalid, and they must make up the fast and perform the atonement (kaffara), unless staying awake is too difficult for them or they are unaware that remaining in a state of janabah is prohibited. If they believe they may wake up, they may sleep, but upon waking, they must perform the ghusl before sleeping again.

Validity of the Fast with Impurity

If someone becomes ritually impure (janabah) during the night of Ramadan or during another obligatory fast and is certain that they will wake up before dawn, they may sleep, and after waking up, they should perform the ghusl. If they sleep until the morning without waking up, their fast remains valid.

Impact of Wet Dream on Fasting

A wet dream during sleep does not count as the first sleep of the night. However, if they wake up and sleep again, the first sleep would then count as the beginning of the night.

Obligation of Ghusl after Wet Dream

If a person experiences a wet dream while fasting, it is not obligatory to perform ghusl during the day, and the fast remains valid, although it is recommended to maintain ritual purity.

Correctness of the Fast with Wet Dream in Ramadan

If someone wakes up after the call to dawn prayer and finds themselves in a state of ritual impurity (janabah), even if they know they were impure before dawn, their fast is still valid.

Deliberate Vomiting and Impurity during Fasting

If a person deliberately vomits or becomes impure during Ramadan by engaging in intercourse during the night and wakes up multiple times only to fall asleep again, their fast is only invalid if they sleep without waking up before dawn.

Purification for Women Before Fasting

If a woman becomes pure from menstruation or childbirth before the dawn prayer but deliberately fails to perform ghusl (or the required tayammum if necessary), she must complete the fast for that day but must make up for it later. Similarly, if she deliberately neglects ghusl or tayammum during her missed fasts, she cannot observe the fast for that day.

Moon Sighting for Ramadan

If the beginning of the month is confirmed in a particular city, it is also valid for other cities that share the same horizon, meaning if the moon is sighted in one city, it should be visible in others unless there is an obstruction such as clouds. The cities should be aligned in terms of their latitudinal and longitudinal positioning to confirm the beginning of the month.

Special Considerations in Regions with Extended Days or Nights

In areas with long days and very short nights (or the reverse), the time for prayers and fasting should be determined based on the schedule of the nearest moderate location.

Validity of Selling Food to Non-Fasting Muslims

Selling food or drink to a Muslim who is not fasting is permissible if they are unaware of the sin of breaking the fast or are exempt due to being ill or traveling. However, selling in public, where the violation of fasting is apparent, is not allowed.

Hajj

The “Hajj” is a significant divine aim and a test that leads to spiritual transformation. It is a means of personal journeying towards God, with social, political, economic, and cultural benefits as well. Islam mandates this major gathering of Muslims of diverse nationalities to get to know each other, resolve issues facing the Islamic world, and strive for the growth and prosperity of Muslim nations.

Loans for Hajj

It is not obligatory to take out a loan for performing Hajj, even if one is financially capable of repaying it after performing the pilgrimage.

Debt and Hajj

A person who is in debt and has the means to repay it should not embark on Hajj until their debts are paid. If the cost of Hajj would leave them with no means to pay off their debt, they are not considered able to perform Hajj, regardless of any loan they may take.

Section Five: Medical Ethics

The following are some of the ethical guidelines regarding medical practice and the provision of healthcare services in Islam.

(M) It is permissible to donate living organs for transplantation to save another person’s life, provided that it does not endanger the life of the donor. Although this may occur for a price, it should not be driven by a state of poverty in society, which might lead people to engage in such actions solely for financial gain.
(M) If the life of a patient is at risk, and they cannot afford the necessary medication due to poverty or other reasons, it is the duty of the government to provide the necessary treatment, including surgery or other forms of medical care. If the government fails to provide the required resources, then it becomes an obligatory duty on the doctor and, by extension, the entire Muslim community to ensure the patient’s treatment.
(M) Where it is necessary for a patient to receive treatment free of charge, it is the doctor’s obligation to provide care without requesting financial compensation.

Section Six: Banking and Insurance

Revenue: The rules and regulations provided by Islamic law for various stages and levels of economic activities—both individual and collective—form the basis of the Islamic economic system. Meeting the basic needs of society, ensuring social justice, and realising the spiritual and material capabilities of the Islamic community, all while adhering to legal limits, require systems such as an interest-free banking system and insurance.

Among the key sources of capital and investment in the Islamic community are public savings and banking facilities, which are incorporated into the framework of “Islamic contracts.” Insurance provides security and assurance for investors.

This section outlines the rulings concerning Islamic banking, promissory notes, and insurance.

(M) A service fee is the compensation given to bank employees or those working in charitable lending institutions (such as credit unions), in return for their efforts to maintain accounts and provide other services. If an additional amount is charged for this purpose and used for the employees’ wages or other similar needs, there is no objection.
(M) An insurance contract, in all its forms, is a rational agreement and does not necessarily need to be validated under the principle of “gift with compensation.” In this contract, the policyholder pays a premium—whether monthly, annually, or in a lump sum—and agrees that, in the event of a mishap or any unfortunate occurrence, the insurer will compensate for any losses specified in the insurance policy. The insurer is obliged to honour this agreement and compensate the policyholder.
(M) Pension contracts are considered a new form of agreement and are governed by the general principles of contract law. The parties involved must be identified, rational, mature, and free to make their decisions. The ambiguities in pension contracts do not render the contract invalid as long as they do not conflict with rational considerations. Essentially, this contract is similar to an insurance contract and can be accepted as an independent agreement, subject to the directive of the Qur’anic verse: (أوفوا بالعقود) [Fulfil the contracts].

Section Seven: Religious Taxes and Public Assets

Revenue: The most important financial elements of an Islamic government, which enable it to carry out its objectives, are khums (a religious tax), zakat (almsgiving), the spoils of war (anfal), and taxes.

These sources play a critical role in strengthening the Islamic state, defending religious beliefs, and promoting the message of Islam, particularly khums, which is one of the pillars of faith and a key sign of the legitimacy of Shia Islam and its leadership.

These funds assist in alleviating the poverty of the needy, addressing essential spiritual and material needs, fostering unity and compassion between the affluent and the poor, ensuring equitable distribution of wealth, and strengthening the government’s capacity to manage Islamic affairs and state administration.

Zakat is a fundamental pillar of Islam, akin to prayer and fasting.

Failure to pay zakat, if it stems from denial of a fundamental religious tenet, amounts to disbelief, which contradicts the beliefs in God and His messenger. Paying zakat ensures the preservation of wealth, as zakat al-fitr contributes to the well-being of individuals. Zakat addresses the deficits within the Islamic community and aids those in need.

The general structure of society requires collecting a certain percentage of citizens’ income, referred to as taxes.

This practice is a common reality in any society, whether primitive or civilised, religious or non-religious. However, there should be careful consideration of the extent and manner in which this is applied to individuals and groups. Moreover, such contributions should create reasonable expectations among the people, and any negligence or failure to meet these obligations will result in disruption in the management of society.

(M) Khums may only be paid to a just mujtahid (Islamic scholar) who has the capacity to use it appropriately. It is forbidden to pay khums to anyone who is neither a mujtahid nor just, or who cannot use it correctly, even if they are learned or righteous.
(M) The share of the Imam must be utilised according to the directive of a mujtahid. The share of the Sayyids, however, does not require the mujtahid’s permission to be owned, though the manner in which it is spent must align with the mujtahid’s guidance.
(M) A mujtahid possesses authority over the distribution of khums, but does not own it.
(M) The use of khums by a mujtahid, as long as it is in accordance with their religious guidance, brings ownership to others, even if the expenditure is for the mujtahid’s own purposes.
(M) A mujtahid may only receive religious taxes if they have the necessary authority and capacity to distribute it appropriately. If a mujtahid does not possess the power or ability to manage the funds properly, they are not allowed to collect khums. Although a mujtahid may have deep knowledge of religious issues, they might not have the capability to manage these funds effectively, which is why receiving them would not be permissible.
Section 8: Fish and the Permissibility of Eating Fish
(1) If a fish with scales is caught alive from the water and dies outside the water, the fish remains pure, and its consumption is permissible. However, if it dies in the water, it is still pure, but consuming it is forbidden, even if it dies due to poison or venom.
(2) If a fish is caught using a net and it dies in the water after being captured, it is permissible to eat. On the other hand, fish without scales, even if caught alive from the water and dies outside of it, remains forbidden.
(3) If a fish comes out of the water in any way, such as being thrown by a wave or as the water level recedes, and the fish remains on dry land; if it is caught before dying, it is permissible to consume once it dies. However, if it dies before being caught, its consumption is forbidden.
Section 9: Family
Introduction: The blessed union of marriage is a harmonious melody and a symbol of the unity and oneness of two souls. Marriage, founded on desire, passion, and love, reveals itself in the synchronization of two souls, lifting them from lethargy, weakness, and isolation in the divine light and glory of God. It creates the foundation of love and joy and provides a fertile ground for the existence of a new life, the offspring.
The heavenly teachings of Islam, in their consideration for human health and well-being, emphasize the purity and consciousness of both parents before the appearance of a child. A comprehensive set of guidelines has been presented to ensure that today’s children, who will one day become parents, embark on their social and familial lives in purity and health, preparing them for a life free from future hardships. These guidelines are known as marriage and marital law.
(1) If there is concern that refraining from marriage could lead to committing something forbidden, it is essential to take measures to prevent such acts, even if marriage itself is not obligatory.
(2) A non-mahram man and woman should not be in seclusion in a place where no one else can enter, even if they are there for prayer or reading prayers.
(3) Seclusion of a non-mahram man and woman in a car, where no one else is present, is not permissible. If there is a risk of corruption or sin, it becomes forbidden.
(4) Any form of normal interaction between a man and a woman for the purpose of mutual acquaintance and making a decision for marriage, conducted within reasonable and limited bounds, is permissible. However, such interactions should not be prolonged, especially in our society where women are more vulnerable.
(5) Friendship with the opposite sex, or having a girlfriend or boyfriend, is not permissible if there is no mahram relationship.
(6) A man consulting with a male doctor, unless absolutely necessary, or if it involves touching or viewing the body of a woman, is forbidden. The system and society must address the deficiencies in this area by promoting the education and knowledge of women. Violating religious guidelines in medical procedures, such as injections, is not acceptable, except in rare, necessary situations.
(7) If a man and woman deny an illicit relationship, investigating these matters is not permissible. Referring them for medical examination is also not allowed, unless absolutely necessary. A medical opinion alone is not sufficient in such cases.
(8) A father’s consent for a daughter’s marriage is not a requirement. However, the daughter must respect her father, provided his actions are reasonable. Therefore, a mature daughter who is capable of determining her best interest may marry without her father’s consent, particularly if her father or paternal grandfather obstructs the marriage or is overly stringent.
(9) A mutual agreement is sufficient for a marriage contract. However, for the formalization of the marriage, once the woman has accepted the man’s proposal, the man’s acceptance is sufficient, and the woman’s acceptance can be considered as an offer. There is no difference between permanent and temporary marriages in this regard.
(10) The use of white gold or platinum by a man is not problematic.
(11) The use of gold by a man is permissible if it is discreet and does not lead to an appearance that imitates women. Therefore, using gold is acceptable for men if it does not imitate women or is not used for decorative purposes.
(12) If a woman has a daughter from another marriage, her second husband may marry that daughter to his own son, who is not the biological son of the woman.
(13) A man may marry the mother of a daughter whom he has married off to his son.
(14) The daughter of a woman from a previous marriage will always be mahram to the man who married her mother, provided that the man had intercourse with the mother. There is no difference between daughters born before or after divorce.
(15) A temporary marriage contract must specify both the duration and the amount of the dowry. If either is left unspecified, the contract is invalid, even if due to negligence, ignorance, or forgetfulness.
(16) A woman entering a temporary marriage can stipulate that her husband does not have intercourse with her. In this case, the husband may only derive pleasure in other ways. If later, she agrees to intercourse, he may do so.
(17) A man may look at the face, hair, and physical beauty of a woman whom he intends to marry, as long as this is done without intention of temptation or pleasure. Multiple viewings are allowed if necessary for ensuring future compatibility. The same applies to a woman looking at a man she intends to marry.
(18) For a woman, covering her body is obligatory, except for her face and hands up to the wrist. There is no specific requirement for a particular garment, but tight or revealing clothing that causes temptation is forbidden.
(19) Islamic dress is a religious obligation, and its aim is to promote modesty and prevent frivolity or immorality. It can be achieved through various types of clothing, including the use of the hijab. Therefore, the importance is on modesty rather than specific garments, and neglecting this obligation is sinful, although it does not constitute apostasy.
(20) The best form of covering for a Muslim woman is one that maintains dignity and modesty. Traditional types of veils may not be suitable for active Muslim women in society. A system that allows for convenient and functional Islamic dress is recommended.
(21) A woman’s face and hands may be uncovered. The use of veils or face-coverings such as the niqab is considered socially disruptive and inappropriate in Islamic societies.
(22) Women can participate in sports as long as they are dressed modestly, and the aim of modesty is maintained. If done without harmful side effects, such participation is permissible.
(23) Women’s attendance at male sports events, if done legally and without negative consequences, is not prohibited.
(24) It is impermissible for women to wear strong or unusual perfumes when outside the home, as this would lead to an unlawful situation if they go out wearing such scents.
(25) Wearing “celebrity” clothing, which draws excessive attention, is forbidden for Muslims.
(26) Body contact through clothing or handshakes, without pressure or direct skin contact, is generally permissible, unless it leads to corruption or temptation.
(27) A person is required to cover their private parts in front of anyone who has reached the age of maturity or those who can distinguish between good and bad, even if they are mahram. However, a married couple is exempt from covering their private parts in front of each other.
(28) A woman may wear wigs or similar items to cover her hair, provided it does not lead to corruption or spread immorality.
(29) A man dressing in women’s clothing for film production purposes is permissible, as long as it is known that it is for acting and not real life.
(30) Watching or looking at a woman’s body, whether Muslim or non-Muslim, on television, in magazines, or other media, is permissible if done without temptation or desire. However, looking at the body of a familiar Muslim woman without the usual exceptions is not permissible unless she is covered.
Introduction: The natural relationships and healthy social interactions among Muslims are of significant importance in Islam. The sacred law of Islam provides extensive guidance for ensuring these relationships are safeguarded from harm, purged of any kind of corruption, enhanced with purity and sincerity, and cultivated to foster well-being and happiness. It offers numerous directives on cooperation, justice, kindness, honesty, mutual respect, and abstaining from practices such as backbiting, slander, envy, deceit, and treachery. Islam also emphasizes the grandeur and dignity of the Muslim community, maintaining human dignity, and upholding all necessary preconditions to ensure these values are respected. Thus, part of the legal framework in Islam is based on rational and social principles, with key concepts such as cooperation and mutual assistance taking a central role. The spirit of cooperation, friendship, and social solidarity that emerges from this fosters mutual motivation and shared benefit, which ultimately leads to an increase in both material and spiritual progress. Practices like oaths, vows, covenants, charitable deeds, and sureties strengthen and enhance the stability of society. These actions also ensure a balance, facilitating the establishment of social justice. Additionally, Islam provides rulings on charity, lost property, lotteries, contests, endowments, residences, and other forms of social engagement. Many of these actions can be viewed as acts of kindness and philanthropy towards fellow human beings. Furthermore, rulings regarding wrongful possession and reparation emphasize the importance of respecting individual property rights.
(M) Social Interaction Among Muslims: Social relations among Muslims are based on the observance of each other’s rights, respect for one another’s dignity, and safeguarding of their honour. Therefore, Muslims are expected to observe principles such as justice, kindness, honesty, respect, goodwill, sacrifice, fulfilling trusts, keeping secrets, reconciling individuals, consulting one another, and cooperating in good deeds. This holds especially true in interactions with parents, relatives, religious leaders, scholars, teachers, women, children, the deprived, the weak, and the elderly, as well as those who are afflicted with hardship or misfortune.
(M) Avoidance of Harmful Practices: Muslims must avoid behaviours such as gossip, slander, envy, arrogance, prying into others’ affairs, lying, flattery, deception, bribery, suspicion, incitement, betrayal, hypocrisy, mockery, injustice, and the violation of one another’s rights in their social interactions.
(M) Respect for the Dignity of Believers: Inflicting harm on a believer in any form, including insulting, diminishing, or dishonouring them, is forbidden. In some narrations, the sanctity of a believer’s honour is considered more sacred than that of the Kaaba, and harming them is equated with fighting against God. Therefore, it is essential that everyone preserves one another’s dignity and avoids insulting, belittling, or mocking others.
(M) Avoidance of Insulting Language: Using profane language, even towards a disbeliever or an immoral person, is forbidden, as such behaviour reflects poorly on the speaker, showing them as lacking character and sensibility. However, in cases of dispute, where the profanity accurately reflects the negative qualities of disbelievers or enemies, it is not considered slander but a necessary expression of truth.
(M) Disrespecting Government Authorities: Disrespecting government officials, particularly when they are carrying out their duties or defying regulations, is considered a grave offence, more serious than merely insulting a Muslim. This type of insult, unlike general disrespect towards a Muslim, is punishable by legal penalties, and even if the official forgives the offender, they may still face legal action. This is because the authority vested in a government official by the Islamic state is a matter of public right, not individual prerogative.
(M) Mockery and Ridicule: Any form of ridicule or mockery that humiliates an individual or group is forbidden. Even if such actions are not intended to cause harm, they still violate the dignity of the person targeted.
(M) Cartoon Depictions: Drawing caricatures is not prohibited unless it involves defaming or degrading a Muslim. However, if the depiction is intended to mock, it becomes impermissible, even if the individual depicted consents.
(M) Satellite Dish Use: The use of satellite dishes is not inherently problematic, provided the individual or family has an appropriate level of religious and cultural awareness, avoiding exposure to prohibited content. However, if the content transmitted promotes corruption in society or within the family, it becomes forbidden. Merely having educational programmes is not sufficient to negate the harmful effects of such content. Muslims must be cautious, as such media channels are often part of broader cultural policies aimed at undermining Islamic ethics and destabilising the faith of individuals, leading to political, economic, and cultural domination over Islamic nations.
(M) Respect for Sacred Spaces: The sacredness of places like mosques and the sanctity of religious ceremonies should be upheld. These spaces must not be defiled by trivial actions or behaviours that detract from their solemnity, such as clapping or frivolous gestures.
(M) Celebrating Religious Festivals: Hosting events like the Eid al-Zahra (celebrating the daughter of Prophet Muhammad) is considered a virtuous act, as long as these celebrations do not involve prohibited actions or foster division among Muslims.
(M) Giving Money at Shrines: When donating money at a shrine, it is important to ensure that the funds are used for good causes, otherwise, it may amount to wastefulness. Ideally, one should donate money directly to the poor in the name of the Imam or shrine.
(M) Debt Repayment: If a debtor has nothing but essential household items and cannot sell them without facing hardship, the creditor cannot force them to sell their belongings. However, the debtor should make efforts to earn money through lawful means to repay the debt, and the creditor should exercise patience.
(M) Efforts to Repay Debts: A debtor who is able to work, but does not currently have the means to pay their debt, must endeavour to engage in work or find lawful means to repay their dues.
(M) Sale of Debts: If a person holds a promissory note, cheque, or bond, they are permitted to sell it to a third party before the due date for a lesser amount. In such cases, the third party may claim the full amount from the debtor upon payment of the debt.
(M) Settlement (Sulh): Settlement involves reconciling a dispute by either relinquishing some portion of one’s property or rights, or receiving something in return. This is known as “Sulh Muawwad” (compensated settlement). If no compensation is involved, it is termed “Sulh Ghair Muawwad” (uncompensated settlement), and both are considered valid.
(M) Sports Competitions: Competitive activities such as horse racing, archery, or modern military competitions (including with firearms, airplanes, and tanks), even if accompanied by betting, are permissible. In general, all competitions that do not involve gambling are permissible.
(M) Card Games and Chess: Games like poker and chess are not considered gambling today and are therefore not prohibited, unless played with the intention of gambling.
(M) Physical Sports: Competitive sports such as swimming, running, wrestling, and football are allowed, provided they do not result in undue physical or psychological harm. Betting on these events is permissible if the stakes are not excessive.
(M) Religious and Academic Competitions: Organising competitions that elevate the religious, academic, or artistic level of the community, such as Quran recitation or writing competitions, is permissible, even with prizes, as long as the competition remains free from gambling.
(M) Charity-based Lotteries: If a charity issues tickets to raise funds and conducts a lottery, this is permissible, provided all contributors are informed, and the prize is awarded fairly.
(M) Entertainment and Leisure: Entertainment, such as watching movies, theatre, or using social media, is allowed if it does not promote immoral behaviour or spread falsehood. However, it should not interfere with obligatory duties, especially in the case of children.
(M) Lottery Tickets: The sale of lottery tickets is permissible under certain conditions, provided that the money raised is used for charitable purposes and does not result in harm or exploitation.
(M) Finding Lost Property: If lost property is found and cannot be identified by any distinguishing marks, and its value exceeds a certain threshold, it is required to be given in charity unless the rightful owner is known.
Section (X): Summoning Spirits, provided that it does not lead to dishonor or harm to them, nor disrupt public order or similar concerns, is not objectionable.
Section (X): Singing and vocal performance, if not associated with any falsities or if they do not arouse unlawful desires, cause corruption, or promote immorality—even if accompanied by musical instruments—are not objectionable.
Section (X): Music involves the use of musical instruments, and singing based on rhythmic patterns. There is no inherent prohibition on music or pleasure derived from it; the prohibition pertains only to the negative consequences and the evils accompanying it. The prohibitions mentioned in religious law refer to its use in corrupt, tyrannical contexts during the reign of oppressive caliphs. It is necessary for a proper religious system and Islamic governance to confront anti-moral music, ensuring it aligns with appropriate standards without being frivolous or harmful.
Section (X): A pleasing voice, sound, or music in itself is not unlawful, even if it is extended or accompanied by rhythm and melodies. The critical factor is that, when paired with other sinful actions—such as nonsensical speech, immorality, or promoting negligence or anti-religious sentiments—its use becomes forbidden.
Section (X): The singing or performance by women is not forbidden if it does not induce or involve prohibited activities, or lead to immorality or idolatry. Even if the music is enjoyable, it is permissible as long as it does not provoke or involve any detrimental consequences. Women’s solo singing or public speaking, even before men, is permissible as long as it does not incite harm or degrade public morals. There is no requirement to conceal the voice in the same manner as the body.
Section (X): Women’s active participation in various societal functions is not objectionable, provided their dignity and public modesty are maintained, and they avoid committing unlawful actions. Their involvement should not undermine their familial responsibilities. Additionally, it is advisable that their roles be part-time to prevent fatigue and preserve family integrity.
Section (X): Any intellectual or practical inclination toward supporting oppressors and aiding their sinful actions or encroachments on rights is unlawful. This includes working in the service of oppressive or non-Islamic states, as it implies supporting falsehood or injustice—unless there are exceptional circumstances aimed at aiding Islam and the Muslim community.
Section (X): For individuals in government institutions or organizations who are not compensated for their services, accepting money or any other form of compensation during work hours is prohibited—especially if it leads to unethical or unlawful actions, or violates others’ rights. However, if this compensation is necessary for the achievement of a legitimate right or to prevent injustice, it may be permissible within necessary limits.
Section (X): Preventing bribery is the responsibility of the state and the administrative system, as well as the people. If an individual witnesses a serious disruption in their work due to failure to pay bribes, this is not objectionable, provided it does not involve a legal violation. Furthermore, giving gifts or gratuities for legitimate services does not raise concerns.
Chapter Eleven: Islamic Macro Policies
Introduction: The macro policies of Islam are the principles and guidelines that govern every aspect of the regulated religion. No ruling or action can contradict these policies.
Islamic macro policies uphold the essence of Islam in all spheres of belief, culture, politics, and economics. They define the relationship between Muslims and the Islamic state, as well as the interaction between Muslim rulers and their people. These policies also respect individual and social freedoms, human dignity, and guide Muslims to avoid cultural, political, and economic dependency on foreign powers. Moreover, they provide a correct methodology for exporting Islamic culture and countering foreign cultural aggression.
Section (X): Muslims must regulate their social relations and rights in accordance with Islamic teachings, avoiding foreign innovations and customs.
Section (X): No Muslim should carry out an unlawful order from a superior or assist in preventing Islamic rituals, usurping rightful freedoms, or engaging in anti-Islamic actions.
Section (X): Legislation contrary to Shari’ah, forcing people to comply with it, and aiding the implementation of such laws is forbidden.
Section (X): Attending a class taught by an instructor who holds erroneous beliefs or propagates anti-Islamic ideas is impermissible.
Section (X): Engaging in the purchase, sale, or support of misleading publications, such as newspapers and magazines, or reading them, is forbidden—except when done to critique or refute them by those who have the required knowledge and capability.
Section (X): Wearing gender-specific clothing in the presence of others—such as a man wearing women’s attire or vice versa—is forbidden.
Section (X): If a Muslim is able to lead society and the nation to implement Islamic rulings, they must strive to do so and collaborate with those pursuing this goal.
Section (X): A Muslim’s home is sacred, and one cannot enter it without permission. Likewise, spying on others through roofs, wall gaps, or doorways is impermissible.
Section (X): For a person to assume leadership or a religious position, they must be free from weakness, old age, ignorance, or selfish desires. They must possess religious knowledge, intellectual clarity, and the social harmony necessary for leadership.
Section (X): Popular allegiance to a scholar (marja’) is restricted to religious and moral issues that require deep legal reasoning, and in matters that are clear and widely known, seeking the scholar’s guidance is not necessary.
Section (X): The diversity of qualified religious scholars ensures the prosperity of the Islamic community and prevents unnecessary conflicts, with each scholar working towards the benefit of others.
Section (X): Establishing regional or national Islamic institutions or governments is permissible if it strengthens the religion, but intervening in the affairs of another scholar’s community is forbidden. Islamic unity and collective religious solidarity are important values to maintain.
Section Twelve: Islamic Judiciary and Penal System
Introduction: Islam provides preventive measures within its legal system to cleanse society of crime and dispute. The judicial and penal system aims to maintain order by preventing wrongdoings.
This section addresses the key aspects of Islamic law, including the methods of proving crimes such as confession, testimony, oaths, and the application of penalties like retribution, compensation, and punishment.
Section (X): A ruling issued by a judge, who meets the necessary conditions, is binding. This applies whether the judge was appointed by an infallible Imam, a qualified jurist, or mutually chosen by the parties involved in a dispute. In the first two cases, the judge is considered “appointed,” and in the latter case, the judge is referred to as “arbitrator.”
Section (X): The requirements for a judge—whether appointed or chosen by mutual agreement—include maturity, intelligence, faith, justice, being male, and legitimate birth. Expertise or being the most knowledgeable in the country is not a prerequisite, but the judge must possess a deep understanding of legal rulings and relevant social skills.
The relationship between the world and the hereafter, which manifests distinctly in the Barzakh (the intermediary realm between death and resurrection), introduces novel dimensions to human life that are neither entirely of this world nor of the hereafter. Instead, they encompass both realms. In this state, a person is neither entirely in this world nor entirely in the hereafter; they are neither alive nor dead. They possess no will but are aware; they lack movement yet have vitality; they are at rest yet in motion. Therefore, Islam, in harmony with profound epistemological thoughts, regards the dead as alive, preserving the sanctity of human beings and believers both in life and death. Consequently, the rules of life are established in the realm of the deceased as well. The only distinction between the two groups is that the implementation of these rulings rests with the living, and all obligatory or non-obligatory duties fall upon the deceased’s close relatives, whether family members, acquaintances, or strangers. In this context, some of the rulings are related to the following matters.
1. It is obligatory for every Muslim to turn the dying person (the “Muhtadhar”) towards the Qibla. If the dying person is willing and attentive, there is no need to obtain permission from their guardian; in other cases, if possible, permission should be sought from the guardian.
2. It is recommended to recite the following verses for alleviating the agony of death at the bedside of the dying person: Surah Yasin, Surah As-Saffat, Surah Al-Ahzab, Ayat al-Kursi, verse 54 from Surah Al-A’raf (Indeed, your Lord is the One who created the heavens…), the last three verses of Surah Al-Baqarah, and any portion of the Quran that can be recited.
3. A doctor, with the help of their expertise and the tools at their disposal, can confirm whether the heart of an individual has ceased to function, but they cannot declare that the person has died. Therefore, it is essential not to rush in burying such individuals.
Although it might be claimed that the cessation of a person’s heartbeat equals their death, even though modern medical knowledge, with its advanced tools and instruments, confirms this, it is possible that in the future, this understanding could be challenged. It is plausible that in the future, medical science and tools will advance to the point where they can demonstrate that some individuals whose hearts have stopped are not, in fact, dead, and that efforts will be made to cure them. Thus, the cessation of the heart does not necessarily equate to death. A physician can only confirm the cessation of the heart, and declaring death requires a certain level of certainty, as recognized by common knowledge, and one should not hasten the burial of individuals in such cases.
4. It is obligatory to perform the funeral prayer for a deceased Muslim, even if they are a child, provided that the child’s parents or grandparents are Muslim, and the child has reached the age of six.
5. The “Prayer of Terror” (Salat al-Wahshat) can be performed at any time during the first night in the grave, but it is preferable to offer it after the Isha prayer.
6. Opening a grave in a manner that causes dishonour, such as desecrating the graves of saints, martyrs, scholars, and pious individuals, is forbidden, even if years have passed since the grave was made.
7. In modern warfare, where battlefields are expansive and often extend over kilometres or even further, and where enemy artillery and other projectiles can reach great distances, the entire area where soldiers gather is considered part of the battlefield.
8. If the enemy kills individuals through bombing far from the battlefront, they do not receive the status of martyrs, even though they may earn the reward for dying in the way of God.
9. If the body of a martyr has become exposed due to some cause, it must be wrapped in a shroud without the need for ritual washing (Ghusl).
10. The martyr is treated as someone who has been washed (ghusl), and thus, there is no need for ritual washing after their death. This also applies to individuals who were killed as part of a legal punishment (such as qisas or hudud) before their execution if they had performed the ghusl beforehand.
11. Those who are to be killed as a part of the law (as qisas or for a required legal punishment) do not require ritual washing and shrouding.
The Islamic judge decrees that these individuals must perform their own washing while alive, observing the three required stages of washing. Afterward, they should wear two parts of the shroud (the loincloth and the shirt), and after their execution, the third piece is placed on them. A prayer is then offered for them, and they are buried in the same state. It is not necessary to remove blood from their body, nor does it need to be purified if, due to fear or panic, they have soiled themselves.
Sources of Law
Freedom
Truth
Justice
Guardianship
Legislative Guardianship
Guardianship: The Best Interest of Society
Divine Appointment and the Blessing of Guardianship
Guardianship as the Most Noble of Phenomena
Infallibility of Guardianship Law
Divine Law
Transcendent Revelation
Revelation of the Qur’an
Obligation to Obey
Superiority of Guardianship over Knowledge
Superiority of Guardianship over Justice
Legislative Guardianship
Liability of Unauthorized Intervention
Position of Guardianship
True Guardianship-Based Society and Civil Societies
Legal Education as a Foundation of Law
Legal Duties
Legal Addressees
Awareness of the Law
Ijtihad and Taqlid; The Path to Understanding the Law
Submission to the Law
Belief
Comprehensive Law
Certainty of Belief in the Law
Fiqh in Doctrinal Matters
Limits of Taqlid and Legal Compliance
Guardianship of Fatwa and Religious Rulings
Divine Law and Juridical Law
Fiqh and Taqlid as Procedural Paths
Unity and Integrity of Leadership
Difference Between Leadership and Leadership as an Office
Guardianship of Rulings
The Goal of Guardianship Governance
Monotheism and Guardianship; The Philosophy of Islamic Governance
Revitalization of True Values
Guardianship of the Jurist
Divine Appointment of the Jurist
Leadership: The Teacher of Divine Law
Indicators of Guardianship Leadership
Islamic Republic System
Formal Recognition of the Conditions of the Jurist
Intrinsic and Acquired Conditions
Conditions of the Jurist
Reason
Maturity and Masculinity
Ijtihad and Scholarly Expertise
Justice and Spiritual Purity
Non-penurious and Broad-minded
Absence of Self-oppression
Completeness of Leadership
Practical Capabilities
Action in the Present Moment
Adequacy of the Jurist’s Leadership
Primacy of Adequacy over Fiqh
Hope in Divine Assistance
Guardianship of Creation
Importance and Sanctity of Guardianship
The Relationship Between Religion and Politics
General Guardianship
Respect for Rights, Creation, and Society
Religious Brotherhood
Mature Political Participation
Popular Allegiance
Denial of Popular Delegation
Temporal Limitations of Popular Legitimacy
Legitimacy of Popular Support
Direct Election of Leadership
Active Participation of the People
Grand Strategic Decisions
Responsibility of Leadership
Legitimacy and Implementation of Rulings
The Diversity of People’s Nature
The Life of the Law
Preventing Disruptive Individuals in Society
Human Protection
General Amnesty
Support of Guardianship for All Members of Society
Civil Guardianship of the Jurist
People-Centered Communication
Guardianship and Leadership
Scope of Guardianship
Gentle and Soft Guidance
Accountability of Leadership
Accusation of Leadership
Accountability for Leadership Errors
Responsibility of Senior Officials
Oversight of the Jurist
Recognizing the Qualified Mujtahid
Taqlid Without Investigation
Scientific and Specialized Judicial Body
Disagreement Between Leadership and Management Systems
The Relationship Between the Scope of Guardianship and Power
Leadership Strategies
Maintaining Guardianship System
The Government’s Fundamental Focus on System Preservation
Identifying the Enemy
Supportive Policies for Allies
Preserving Political Relations with Certain Enemies
Hypocrites
Preventing Action Against the System
Defiance of the Guardianship Enemies
Dissatisfaction from Complacent Individuals
Surprising the Enemy
Efficient Ways to Address Adversaries
Initiative Actions
Self-Interest of Responsible Officials
Priority of Economic Relationships
Power and Security
Power of the Islamic Community
Leadership Power
Virtuous Leadership
Patience and Endurance of Leadership
Patience and Honesty of Leadership
Truth and Integrity in Society
Leadership’s Pursuit of Truth
Guardianship Leadership’s Relationship with the People
Divine Education of the Jurist
Overall Wellbeing
Social Welfare and Cultural Growth
Free Education, Health, and Medical Services
Leadership Rights Over the People
Termination of Weak Leadership
Avoidance of Fear and Intimidation
Measuring Power Through Leadership’s Implementation
Foundations of Leadership Power
Specialization-Based Influence
People’s Awareness
Security Contracts
Respect for Unity and Guardianship Centers and Scholars’ Homes
Critique of Leadership
Distinction Between Power and Tyranny
Rejection of Force
Separation of the System from the Clergy
Freedom: A Fundamental Pillar of Guardianship Society
Freedom of Speech
Rejection of Guardianship
Prohibition of Propaganda Against Religion
Guardianship of Officials and Officers
Fairness and Self-assessment for Accountability
Investigation of Belief in Jurisprudential Guardianship
Merit-Based Governance
Officials’ Attributes
Expertise and Competence
Devotion, Sincerity, and Spirituality
Sufficiency of Officials
Clean Origin
Purity of Intention
Modesty and Frugality
Dangers of Materialism in Officials
Wealthy but Uncaring Elites
Prohibition of Aristocratic Propaganda
Male Officials
Female Management
Guardianship of Friday Prayer Leadership
Officials as Role Models for Society
Accountability of Officials
Oversight of Officials’ Work
Easy Proof of Crime by Officials
Punishment of Corrupt Officials
Special Attention to Fraud and Case Fabrication
Training of Officials
Indispensability of Governance Even Without Competent Officials
Officials’ Mistakes
Injustice and Corruption of Officials
Salaries of Officials
Rights of Leadership and Senior Officials
National Management Structure and Entities Under Leadership
Independence of Powers and Organizations
Execution of Guardianship by Officials
Systemic Leadership
Military and Security Forces
National Security and Intelligence Forces
Media Forces
Judicial and Arbitration Powers
Independence of the Judiciary
Appointment of Judges
Non-Shi’a Judges
Relationship Between Judiciary and Fatwa
Legitimacy of Judiciary for Qualified Judges
Responsibility of Leadership for Judicial Errors
Governance of Judiciary over the Ruler in Court
Ease and Free Access to Legal Claims
Security of Defendants and Criminals
Roots of Crime and Offense
Proportional Punishment for Crime
Punishment for Public Corruption
Punishment for Spies
Family as a Source of Power
Encouraging Permanent Marriage
Organizing Temporary Marriages
Foreign Policy
Temporary Commitments to Infidel States
Constant Betrayal by Infidel States
Loyalty of the Islamic System to its Commitments
Declaration of Peace and Ceasefire
Security for Refugee Non-Muslims
Security for Diplomats and Representatives
Multiple Qualified Jurists of Guardianship
Difference Between Guardianship and Taqlid
Divergence of Fatwas
Taqlid of Deceased Jurists
Multiplicity of Jurisprudential Authorities
Division of Ijtihad and Taqlid
Correctness of Taqlidi Practices
Specialization
Disavowal of Unjust Rule
Oppressive Authorities
Injustice of Unjust Officials
Destruction of Faith by False Claimants
Division in Corrupt Governance
Deliberate Errors
People: The Spirit of Social Authority
Faithful Awareness as Antithesis to Tyrannical Claimants
Collaboration with Tyrannical Rulers
Actions Against Oppressive Governments
Restitution of Rights
Influence in Tyrannical Systems
Legal Concealment of the Law
Guardianship of Commanding the Good and Forbidding the Evil
Guardianship of Husband Over Wife
Marriage Guardian
Compatibility in Skills and Occupations in Marriage
Visual Compatibility in Marital Choices
Simplicity and Sincerity in Marriage
Subject of Husband’s Guardianship
Mahr (Dowry) Law
Maintenance and Living Expenses of Wife
Financial Independence of Wife
Proof of Marriage by Mere Claim
Management of Wife in the Household
Fundamental Role of Women in Social Health
Father’s Guardianship Over Children
Rejection of Mother’s Guardianship
Guardianship of the Elder Son
Loss of Guardianship by Apostates and Killers
Economic Law of Guardianship
This book describes the concept of sustainable Islamic economy and its structure, as well as how to achieve this goal. Economic management is the most crucial part of national governance, influencing everything within the country. Hence, any negligence in systemic economic management or inefficiency and corruption can lead to weakness, stagnation, corruption, and despair in all parts of the country, undermining its security and power. Even though the country’s military and defense forces might appear strong, insecurity and corruption will inevitably spread throughout the nation.
This book states: “In the system of Wilayat al-Faqih, the first priority of the leader is to manage the economy and ensure affordable living with minimal cost while preserving social harmony. In this system, in practice, economic organization precedes culture and religion, although in the formulation of economic laws, culture and religion take precedence, and the economy is influenced by them. The practice of culture and lifestyle, according to economic income, follows after the implementation of the economy. The religious and national culture in the Wilayat system is highly influenced by the economy, which is managed by the leadership and not the government. The economy should be in the hands of the Islamic system and leadership because it provides the financial resources for the society, and after leadership, it forms the foundation of governance and management of society.”
This translation strives to keep the original meaning intact, offering a formal, academic style appropriate for the content. Let me know if you need further adjustments!
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Some of the titles in this book are as follows:

Islamic Sustainable Economy: A Guarantee of Security
Guardianship over the Economy
Religious Jurisprudence: The Foundation of the Engineering of the Guardianship Economy
The Doctrinal Roots of the Guardianship Economy
Exclusive Model of the Guardianship Economy
Leadership: The Economic Model of Society
Denial of Greed
The Jurisprudential Responsibility of the Scholar
Subjugated Ownership
Ownership Rights and Residence
Guardianship Conditional upon Property
Revival of a Popular Economy: The Goal of the Economy
Systemic and Modern Economy
Legal and Legitimate Business
Intrinsic Value of Halal Work
Freedom of Work and Employment
The Value of Knowledge and Specialisation, and Avoiding Mercenary and Profit-centric Mindsets
Profitable Popular Business
Acquiring Illegitimate Wealth
Creation of Employment Opportunities
Capital and Advanced Industrial Tools
Ensuring Investment Security
Competitive Market
Popular Distribution, Supply, and Pricing
Disciplined Distribution
Needs Assessment: A Prerequisite for Job Security
Economic Transparency
Economic Identity
Economic Information Bank
Identification of Property and Products
Prohibition of Capital Hoarding
The Completeness of Active Capital
Continuous Economic Growth and Advancement
Prohibition of Promoting Elitism and Worldliness
Prohibition of Exploitation, Opportunism, and the Necessity of Preserving Workers’ Rights
Severe Punishment for Usury and Interest-based Money
Cutting Off the Grounds for Fake Jobs
The Importance of Speed in Economic Activity
Prohibition of Wasting Goods
Production of Substandard Goods
Public Ownership of State Assets
Preservation of State Assets
Why to Take from Ownership
Daily Income Tax
Distribution System
Protection of Taxpayers
Value of Production and Added Value
Islamic Interest-free Bank
Support for the Needy
Support for Martyrs’ Families
Systemic Care for the Needy
Eradication of Poverty through Creating Stable and Sustainable Income
Sponsorship of the Needy and Progress Programmes
Avoiding Degrading the Poor, Promoting Unemployment, and Charity Mentality
Public Corruption, Informational and Economic Rent-seeking
Public Corruption, Hoarding, and Creating Accumulation
Profit-driven Officials
Priority of Economic Relations
Economic Warfare Field
Religious Dues
Financial Claims
Financial Resources

Chapter Eight: Sources of Rights

Income

“Right” is a phenomenon emerging from existence. This is why it can be subject to rational study and philosophical inquiry. This means that rights are governed by a system that originates from an absolute truth, which affects the relationships of all phenomena.

In this book, we have discussed both the philosophy of law and some fundamental legal issues from a rational perspective.

The philosophy of law is a relatively new discipline, and its specialist must be proficient not only in pure philosophy and law but also in the philosophy of science. An expert who lacks expertise in pure philosophy cannot uncover the philosophy of law, for we regard law and legal systems as emanating from “existence”—specifically “the truth of existence,” not a philosophy based on “the primacy of existence and the derivative nature of essence.” Law stems from the phenomena of existence and is based on it, not from societal reality (custom) or social agreements (treaties), which are secondary to law.

In this field, we have discussed both the theoretical and practical philosophy of law. However, we do not cover all aspects of the philosophy of law, but rather focus on those issues that we hold specific views on—issues that have intellectual and philosophical complexities and details that have remained obscure to most legal scholars and philosophers. Especially since, in the philosophy of law, one must know both pure philosophy and, in addition to knowledge of law, have a solid understanding of psychology and sociology.

We also have a two-volume work titled “Fundamental Law”. This book, in its ten chapters, covers the following topics:

Chapter One: What and Why of the Philosophy of Law;
Chapter Two: Legal Schools of Thought;
Chapter Three: Sources of Law;
Chapter Four: The Relationship between Law and Other Disciplines;
Chapter Five: Justice;
Chapter Six: Social Justice;
Chapter Seven: Public Interest;
Chapter Eight: The Philosophy of Penal Systems;
Chapter Nine: The Right to Freedom, Determining Destiny, and Immunity;
Chapter Ten: The Government of the Islamic Republic.

What is Right? The Philosophy and Science of Law

In Hebrew, “right” means “stable and fixed.” In Arabic, it is referred to as “Haq.” In Persian, it means “law” or an essence and concentration.

In the philosophy of law, we propose the following definition of “right”:

“A process that forms a framework and creates a necessary relationship between two or more aspects, which emerges from the existence and nature of a phenomenon in establishing a connection either with itself or with others. This process specifies the limits and boundaries of dependence, ownership, and its nature, either as an obligatory priority or a non-binding preference, and provides a preventative alert against transgression or violation.”

This definition clearly shows that the right is interpreted based on the view one has of existence and its phenomena, and the philosophy of law is based on pure philosophy. If a philosopher of law lacks a sound and logical understanding of pure philosophy and misinterprets the structure of nature and creation, what is not right will be mistaken for right.

The definition we have provided for “right” is both comprehensive and exclusive, and it is a definition based on the true genus and species of the concept, not an arbitrary one. Our aim has been to incorporate some of its essential consequences due to their importance, although a shorter definition could have been provided by saying:

“A mutual, external, composite relationship between several aspects that is established by observing the existence and nature of phenomena, and determines the nature of their relationships as they truly exist.”

We should not consider “right” to have a mental origin; rather, it is something that exists externally, though it is never a simple or basic matter—it must consist of at least two aspects and reflect a relationship between two things. This relationship manifests as shared, and both existence and its phenomena play a role in shaping it. Each phenomenon embodies many rights in this interaction, which is why the right of each phenomenon differs from that of another.

With this explanation, we can define the science of law and say:

“The science of law is the conscious ability to apply binding rules or preferences derived from the relationship between several entities, granting an individual the power to enforce them.”

We consider the philosophy of law to be a science and a form of knowledge, but we regard law itself as merely a craft, providing legal professionals with the capacity to execute the knowledge they have acquired. The legal philosopher, unlike the lawyer, possesses the capacity and authority to discover and systematize the truth of law, while the lawyer relies on pre-taught knowledge and is a mere imitator, not a producer of new insights. Science is a simple and unified entity, not involving multiplicity, and it is an active capability inherent in the self; in contrast, a craft, when equipped with rules, can be skillfully applied. Its ability is passive, shaped by prior knowledge, and until creativity, innovation, and production occur in the realm of knowledge, no new production emerges in a craft.

Earlier, we presented a definition of right and legal knowledge, and here we aim to provide a definition of the philosophy of law. In order to avoid ambiguity in this definition, we present it somewhat later. This definition, to conceptualize the philosophy of law, is somewhat lengthy, and for this reason, it should not be criticized. Later, we provide a concise definition of it. We define the philosophy of law as:

“The philosophy of law is an interdisciplinary science that, in an applied manner, discusses the nature and structure of law, its origins, and the process of abstracting rights, boundaries, consequences, goals, and aims—systematically and organically (not essentially), descriptively (not prescriptively)—to render legal knowledge and its propositions rational, legitimate, and comprehensible, and to uncover the relationships between them.”

To rationalize and philosophically justify this definition, it is essential to consider that phenomena have both substantial and existential aspects. Earlier, we stated that the “existential” aspect pertains to reality and is manifested externally, while the “substantial” aspect is the truth of something, what makes an entity what it is. The substantial aspect is the awareness and knowledge of the identity of something, while the existential aspect relates to the changes and transformations the entity undergoes in the external world. Proof always follows the substantial aspect. The scope of the philosophy of law is confined to the substantial aspect of rights, not what happens in reality, which can be fabricated and have no basis in nature or the fabric of creation. In contrast, the substantial aspect of a right is connected to its truth and method of creation, from which it is derived.

The questions of the philosophy of law are the threefold inquiries that arise from a thing: whether the question concerns the essence and identity of something (the “what” of the matter), its cause and existence (the “whether” of the matter), or its identity and the reasoning for it (the “why” of the matter). These questions are sequential. Asking “what” something is—simply seeking to explain its title—can be done even if the thing has no external existence. However, one cannot ask about the “why” or the truth of something that does not exist; the “why” follows the “whether.”

The philosophy of law seeks to answer these three types of questions concerning rights. It aims to demonstrate what a particular right is and whether the proposed matter is a right or not. It further inquires whether this right is established and, if so, why it should be accepted either as mandatory and obligatory or as a non-binding preference. The philosophy of law addresses the substantial aspect of rights, and what happens in the external world is unrelated to this science, with the description of events in the realm of the external world belonging to legal science and its branches.

A legal philosopher should seek to answer the three questions mentioned regarding any right, but a lawyer does not have this responsibility. A lawyer is only responsible for describing and categorizing rights.

The legal philosopher, in his philosophy, strives to discover rights from their origins and sources, seeking to gain knowledge and produce science in understanding rights by looking at the substantial aspect of each right. However, discovering relationships in the existential realm and explaining them is the responsibility of the lawyer. Thus, legal philosophers should not be expected to know the philosophy of law, as this knowledge is far superior to law itself and should not overlap with other sciences, as such intermingling leads to fallacies and misunderstandings. The root of this problem lies in the lack of a powerful logic in science and the weakness in the ability to philosophize and engage in creative thinking. One who does not understand logic and philosophy can neither possess the philosophy of law nor a dynamic, effective, and up-to-date jurisprudence. Rather, it leads to popularism, regression, or eclecticism, becoming a pitfall that engulfs the individual.

Anyone skilled in the philosophy of law will find the power to reason and prove rights scientifically and will create the foundation for presenting rights derived from the natural relationships and the creative structure of their manifestation. The philosophy of law provides the standard for any right, although this definition returns to the definition we have of rights. It is the philosophy of law that determines the measure of everything, delineates its boundaries, and provides a framework for phenomena. It is the philosophy of law that uncovers rights, defines, and validates them, providing the foundational and structural judgment for each right. The more robust this foundation is, the more it strengthens the edifice of rights, keeping legal science safe from popularism, widely accepted assumptions, traditional norms, religious dogma, or government oppression, bringing it closer to truth and proving rights as they truly are, away from the dangers of social conventionalism, tradition, ornamentation, and despotism.

If the philosophy of law is systematically and logically formulated, and the legal philosopher follows the rules in discovering and proving rights, while the lawyer possesses the ability to correctly receive and implement them, conflicts in this field will cease. However, any flaws in the foundational principles of reasoning and the methods of interpretation and philosophizing in this domain, along with the failure to adhere to its principles and rules, will lead to misunderstandings of rights and generate scholarly disputes among legal philosophers and differences among lawyers.

From the above, a brief and concise definition of the philosophy of law can be offered:

“The philosophy of law is a science that, in an applied manner, uncovers, analyzes, and justifies the essence, nature, and necessary connections of the existence and phenomena of law, focusing on its substantial aspects.”

The philosophy of law is considered a secondary form of knowledge. Primary knowledge involves the understanding of phenomena in the external world. All human sciences and knowledge fall under primary knowledge; however, secondary knowledge derives from primary knowledge and pertains to knowledge about primary knowledge itself and the understanding of other forms of knowledge. Legal science is also primary knowledge, its subject being the social system. However, the process of how we come to know this science, its pathways, methods, and sources, is discovered through the study of legal science itself and is not directly linked to the external world and society, which is the subject of legal science. Therefore, the philosophy of law is secondary knowledge.

Moreover, in another classification, knowledge can be either essential or instrumental, having a future-oriented quality and not directly providing knowledge, but being the means for knowledge. Legal science is neither essential nor instrumental knowledge because law has an adjectival existence, and an adjectival existence cannot possess essential existence. Just as there is no such thing as “law” in the external world, law is not an instrumental science. Rather, it expresses relationships between phenomena and their existence, and these are relational descriptions. Law expresses the relations between entities, not the inherent qualities of the entities themselves. Sciences are either essential, instrumental, or descriptive, and law is a descriptive science that expresses the effects of relationships between phenomena.

Law is not concerned with the tools of relationships between things but with measuring these relationships. The descriptive existence of relationships has no permanence; its stability lies in its movement. The philosophy of law explains the nature of the existence or manifestation of legal knowledge and later addresses the connection of this knowledge with other sciences. Therefore, philosophy of law, being descriptive, focuses on the foundational aspects of legal knowledge.

“Philosophy” in general refers to making something comprehensible, or more precisely, arriving at the truth of something. The philosophy of law, similarly, seeks to make legal science comprehensible and rational by organizing it. Philosophy involves becoming aware of something in a descriptive sense, not a specific sense. Tracing something in detail is knowledge, not philosophy. Philosophy deals with the attributes of a subject, whereas knowledge seeks to understand its essence. Philosophical statements, from a literary perspective, often rely on verbs of the heart and incomplete actions, whereas knowledge is specific and relates to the essence, being presented simply. Philosophy transforms external phenomena into comprehensible, secondary philosophical knowledge.

The philosophy of law is an attempt to make legal science comprehensible, orderly, and rational.

Having discussed the essence of the philosophy of law, it is worth noting that the philosophy of law is descriptive, not prescriptive. It is a scientific discipline that discusses legal science, uncovering its characteristics and attributes. Similar to logic, it is not a prescriptive science that passes judgments within its subject.

However, we do not fully agree with this root classification and do not consider any science to be prescriptive because if science is to preserve its scientific nature, it must be descriptive. Judgment belongs only to God. The judge applies legal materials to the case documents and extracts legal reasoning from this system of interpretation. The judge is merely a just translator of the documents and laws, and if another judge follows the same process, the same judgment will be reached. If a judge deviates from these materials, even with knowledge, they cannot act upon their knowledge without evidence but must refer the case to another judge

The boundaries between ethics and law must be maintained; however, individuals in society should not be encouraged to make use of their legal rights. Instead, cultural, intellectual, and practical deterrents should be designed so that life is conducted with warmth, love, kindness, compassion, selflessness, tolerance, understanding, ethics, and nobility, rather than being based solely on legal obligations. An ethical and compassionate life takes precedence over a legal one. Society should be encouraged to pursue dignity, with legal rights reserved for situations where moral options are not applicable. However, the superiority of an ethical life over a legal one does not imply that legal norms should become ethics or that ethics should be transformed into law.

Law and Sociology, Psychology, and Jurisprudence

The involvement of sociology in legal science arises from the fact that as societies evolve from primitive to modern and civilised structures, their laws also change. Research on the diverse structures of society, from rural to urban, leads to the development of different legal frameworks. Therefore, the law of any society must be considered in relation to the social structure that governs it. On the other hand, the distinction between sociology and law — the former being descriptive and the latter prescriptive, normative, and obligatory — creates a distance between the two. Despite this difference, law cannot exist in isolation from society. Rather, it needs to be informed by sociology and should derive its principles from it.

Law — whether it is individual, social, or international law — is an obligatory matter that is consulted in situations where peaceful, cooperative, and harmonious life, mutual understanding, and communication are at an impasse. This is because, beyond its prescriptive and adjudicative authority, law also has an executive and practical obligation, except in international law, where practical remedies are needed to address its shortcomings.

However, sociology is a descriptive science that outlines the structures of different societies — in terms of factors such as region, land, or belief system — without having prescriptive or executive implications. Sociology can be used in law, but law does not have any practical application in sociology, as law represents prescription and obligation, while sociology involves non-obligatory descriptive statements. Law deals with the “oughts,” while sociology describes the “is” — the former being contingent on the latter, not the other way around. This is why sociology can serve as a foundation for law and social propositions can guide us towards discovering certain rights, but the reverse is not true in systems where law is authoritative.

This principle also holds true in psychology’s relationship with law, as is the case with sociology. However, the relationship between law and jurisprudence is different. Jurisprudence, which encompasses both obligatory and non-obligatory matters, also involves descriptive elements, making it broader than law. Not all jurisprudential propositions are legal, but some prescriptive rulings qualify as legal rights, though even these have a descriptive aspect, despite being framed in an obligatory manner. In relation to philosophy — which speaks of the “is” — it is possible to transform these into “oughts” and derive legal rights from them. However, this proximity should not result in a blending of disciplines. Ultimately, the key is that law can benefit from various sciences, but these disciplines should not be confused or turned into one another. The boundaries of each field should be maintained.

The earlier statement that “the social structure of every era has been in a way that the structure of society in primitive tribes differs from that in modern democratic societies” is not entirely accurate and reflects a superficial understanding of society. The essence of societal structure in primitive societies is still present in modern societies without much change. In the past, a tribal chief’s commands were absolute, and his duty was to preserve the tribe’s traditions and ensure order and security. However, due to the unwritten nature of laws and traditions, personal desires could interfere with governance, neglecting the rights of the subjects. In the past, only the rights of the ruler or tribal chief were recognised, whereas today, a separation of powers and citizens’ rights based on elections and democracy prevail, taking into account not just the ruler’s rights, but the rights of the people. However, this is merely a superficial change, and the core of governance remains unchanged. In earlier times, the tribal chief was the guardian of tradition, while today, a ruler must adhere to laws that cannot be detached from the people’s beliefs. Nonetheless, through manipulation or tyranny, the law is often bypassed, and while rulers today are not independent and must operate within the law, they still manage to disguise their personal desires under the guise of legal authority. The coercive power of past rulers has been replaced by the coercive power of law.

The nature of society and its laws in any society maintains a consistent essence; changes are mostly superficial in form, not in substance. Moreover, human nature is unchanging. However, human understanding and scientific knowledge evolve, allowing humanity to access its natural rights more transparently and comprehensively, based on the social structure and codified laws of the time. The codified laws of today were once inherent in the minds of rulers in the past, who exercised them independently and according to tradition. Even so, the disputes of the past are still present today, albeit with different tools. While the law has become clearer and more detailed over time, it remains vulnerable to the same manipulations, and the oppression once exerted through physical force is now legitimised through legal frameworks.

This is not to suggest that we should return to the past, as life in earlier times was like a jungle of inequities, whereas today it is a modern jungle. Humans have always faced challenges, and we have still not resolved issues like hunger for millions of people. We do not wish to return to the past, but there are qualities from the past — such as loyalty, love, and the respect for boundaries and dignity — that were more evident in previous generations and have since faded.

The technological advancements of today’s world can be likened to glasses that a jurist wears, allowing them to better discern rights. As a result, discussions on individual rights, especially in international law, which once focused solely on the rights of states, have evolved. However, this clearer vision should not lead to manipulation or coercion.

In conclusion, the world is progressing, but not necessarily for the better, and the darkness of the current age continues to overshadow the clarity of knowledge in various ways. Nonetheless, the modern world is better in the sense that the speed of communication and technology allows diverse voices to be heard, making it much more difficult to silence these voices, even for those in power. Thus, the truth, even if hidden in the dark today, will eventually reach the light for everyone to hear.

Justice

Justice is one of the fundamental and crucial issues in the philosophy of law. The discussion of types of governments is based on understanding what justice truly is, because without knowing the nature of justice, it is impossible to design a truly just government.

The concept of justice dates back to the philosophers of ancient Greece. In his work “The Republic,” Plato defines justice as “giving each thing its due” — meaning that each person should receive what they deserve. According to this, positions should be assigned based on merit; in this way, governance and society are based on a meritocratic system. In a meritocratic system, it is the knowledgeable individuals who are qualified to take charge. Plato, in particular, identifies the wise individuals as philosophers and scholars.

The semantic analysis of justice shows that there is no disagreement regarding its definition. Everyone understands the concept of justice in the same way, based on the definitions presented by Plato and Aristotle. However, what remains debatable is the application of justice in specific cases. Disputes and conflicts arise when this concept is applied to particular circumstances.

There is no disagreement in the definition of “justice” or “fairness.” Justice means maintaining balance and distributing things based on their respective merits. It is essentially a process of achieving proportionality, not equality. Even though fairness in some cases might take the form of equality, it is not inherently about equal treatment for all. Rather, it is about ensuring each individual receives what they deserve based on their abilities and contributions.

The Sources of Justice

There is a disagreement among thinkers regarding the source of knowledge of justice and where justice can be recognized. Each philosopher has chosen a different path: nature, religions, society, reason, the heart, the state, law, public conscience, and ethics are some of the claimed sources in this discussion, and we will examine the epistemic value of each in the continuation. These sources have been proposed either from an epistemological perspective or from a legal perspective.

The ancient Greek philosophers, who were naturalists, considered nature to be the primary and most important source of justice in their epistemological discussions. They viewed humans as natural beings and recognized them as natural creatures (rational animals). Based on this, they aimed to derive justice — a system governing humans — from human nature. They argued that just as animals have the right to life and existence, humans also have natural rights that everyone is obliged to respect, and justice is nothing other than this. The extraction of justice from nature is done through the senses and human intellect.

If we take a philosophical view of nature, we must consider nature as a phenomenon of oppression and tyranny. A careful observation of nature reveals that this phenomenon is extremely powerful, and a predatory lion, with all its strength, turns a beautiful deer into its prey. A devastating flood damages a city. A high-speed storm destroys everything in its path. An intense earthquake suddenly overturns a city. A volcano can disrupt all continental flights and trap many travelers in foreign lands. In nature, the stronger tends to eliminate the weaker. How can such a violent phenomenon be a source of justice and its inspiration? Nature does have an admirable quality in that there is a kind of order governing it, and it is not a fragmented phenomenon. The order of nature has given each phenomenon its specific nature, and the predatory and destructive elements of nature are also harmonious and proportional. A flood destroys everything in its path, whether it is an animal or a human, rich or poor, and this too is a form of order. And it is this order that can make it a source of knowledge. Many of the virtues — including justice — are obtained through rational thought and by following a methodical process of interpretation and inference from nature.

Distributive Justice Criteria

Distributive justice may be based on per capita, entitlement, or merit and deserving qualities. Marxist systems consider the distribution of wealth and resources to be based on entitlement, and they provide equal rights to workers and doctors. Liberal systems, however, base the criterion on merit. For social justice, we say that neither a pure per capita distribution is just, nor one based solely on merit and attributes; rather, the criterion of each should be considered, and distribution should be made according to it. Denying merit leads society towards decline and weakness, preventing it from flourishing and advancing. In some cases, entitlement is taken into account, as when a road is to be constructed. Whether the contractor is a believer or an unbeliever, the right to payment is based on entitlement — that is, it is not that a believer receives extra payment for praying while constructing the road. This would be like inviting someone to a self-service dinner: they can take as much food as they need, but if the food is distributed per capita, they cannot take more than their allotted portion. The distribution criterion for achieving social justice differs for each issue and must be considered in each case. Social justice is not limited to either of these two; just as it cannot be reduced to a single quality, it must be proportional to each individual case.

Philosophy of the Penal System

There is no dispute regarding the need for a penal system in the legal and judicial structure of any government. All peoples and nations, throughout history, have deemed it necessary to control society through such a system. However, what is disputed is what constitutes a crime and what the extent and nature of punishment should be. There are fundamental differences in this regard among both religions and human schools of thought.

The occurrence of crime in society is inevitable, just as there is a possibility of error and mistake in thought. For this reason, humans have developed the science of logic to protect themselves from errors. Except for those who have divine revelation, no one is free from error. However, there are various viewpoints on how to deal with wrongdoers and what factors might prevent crime. Each philosopher has selected a particular standard. In our book The New Foundations of Law, we examine and analyze the viewpoints of three schools of thought: the principle of justice, the principle of utility, the reform of the offender, and the solace of the victim. In examining these viewpoints, we have noted that each school has articulated part of the philosophy of punishment, but it is incorrect to restrict the philosophy of punishment to one perspective. Sometimes the aim of punishment is deterrence, sometimes reform of the individual or society, or providing solace to the victims. Each of these aims plays a conditional role, not an absolute one, in the process. For example, if economic conditions become such that many people are unemployed and homeless, even the virtuous may commit crimes to find refuge, even if it is in a prison. In such a case, prison punishment, especially in winter, rewards the crime rather than deterring it. Such discussions can be clarified by a wise philosopher familiar with standards, and they find their place in the philosophy of jurisprudence, which is a field that is now obscure. The philosophy of jurisprudence, like the philosophy of law, is one of the essential disciplines, and one of its topics is identifying the standards for legal rulings. The scientific and empirical aspects of the execution of a ruling must be considered.

Some punishments may have a positive effect in certain regions and provinces, while in other areas with different cultures and ethnicities, they may have negative effects. It is not appropriate to apply a single punishment uniformly across all regions.

We mentioned that jurisprudence has three aspects: the study of the subject, the study of the standards, and the study of the ruling. A ruling cannot be made without understanding the subject and the standards. In judging the nature of punishment, the outcome and effectiveness of it must also be considered, and this is a principle in the philosophy of punishments. Determining the effectiveness and outcomes of punishment is a difficult task and can only be carried out by an experienced philosopher or a well-organized research group with knowledge in sociology and psychology. Just as a jurist without understanding the spirit and psyche of the obligated individuals and the society they live in cannot issue a scientific fatwa for them, if a fatwa is issued without these considerations, it lacks legal sanction and, if it is rigid, can lead to the backwardness of society and cause the masses to turn away from religion.

A systematic society must monitor any violations and ensure that there are punishments for wrongdoers. The need for punishment stems from the laws of nature. Nature does not leave someone who harms it unpunished; however, the crucial question is why a transgressor must be punished and what the philosophy of punishments is. Does society have the right to punish a criminal, or does the necessity of rehabilitation, reform, and education of the individual give legitimacy to punishments? For example, the system of kaffarat (atonements) in Islam is designed to rehabilitate a Muslim who has not followed the faith and religious laws. Even though kaffarat imposes a duty on the individual, it ultimately benefits society, as it removes the transgressor from the community, ensuring the sanctity of Ramadan and the protection of divine laws. This is an example of a punishment whose primary goal is the individual’s rehabilitation but also serves a social function.

Another form of punishment does not have a rehabilitative aspect for the individual and its impact is directly on society. For example, the punishment of qisas (retaliation) involves killing the murderer, thereby removing their life from the social sphere. Although the individual is purified from the sin, no direct rehabilitative benefit is achieved, but it serves as a lesson to society to respect others’ lives, or else face the consequence of retaliation.

Punishments can vary widely, including fines, imprisonment, flogging, exile, and death. However, determining their appropriate measure and extent can only be derived from divine revelation. Ordinary humans, due to their lack of knowledge of the criteria of justice and the relationships between various phenomena and crimes, cannot issue judgments in this matter.

On the other hand, when a punishment has a legitimate basis, it is possible to offer privileges to those who exercise self-restraint and live virtuously, and rewards should be given to those with a clean record. This ensures that the penal system is not solely focused on punishment but also on rewarding virtuous citizens.

Establishing a system of rewards and allocating a budget for it prevents many potential damages within society and is a form of investing in the preservation of resources allocated to the pursuit of criminals.

An overemphasis on punitive systems tends to be rooted in violent tendencies. Those who focus on the deterrent aspect of punishment view the punishment as legitimate only if it instills fear in others. This approach to punishment leads to the promotion of violence, and unfortunately, the field of law has not remained immune to this, becoming contaminated by violence. This kind of system exhausts citizens and pushes them toward crime, unlike a reward system that generates joy and fosters a sense of progress in society, creating an atmosphere of freedom where people feel they are advancing toward excellence. This stands in contrast to a penal system that induces contraction and rigidity.

To prevent criminal behavior, social knowledge and the culture of justice should be promoted through the expansion of the space for rewards and emphasizing the sanctity of prohibited and sacred matters, rather than through a penal system that has a constrictive nature. Nevertheless, a penal system remains necessary and unavoidable. The judicial system must address both wrongdoing and good actions, balancing the two in its approach to ensure a complete educational method. Neglecting virtues and focusing only on errors creates an atmosphere of coercion, leading individuals to

This issue is also discussed in the context of justice, where a just person is one who, primarily, possesses truthfulness; meaning that they are what they truly are and do not play a role that is not their own. This implies that if goodness and the ability to avoid sin are not inherent in someone’s nature, and they manifest them through their will, they are truthful in the fact that they lack justice. Such a person is superior to one who decorates themselves with external virtues, engages in hypocrisy, ostentation, and displays, pretending to be just.

A person who embraces Islam and accepts it sincerely must, in accordance with their sincerity, adhere to religious duties, which define the boundaries of their freedoms. They have chosen Islam freely, and if they are sincere, they must walk in accordance with its path. In an Islamic society, a non-Muslim must be a citizen of the Muslim community to the extent they have accepted, committing to the rights of citizenship and peaceful coexistence based on Islamic law, without causing harm to Muslims; just as Muslims must respect their privacy. Such a society is truthful. In this society, Muslims follow the religious rulings sincerely, while non-Muslims adhere sincerely to the rights of citizenship, as they have accepted them. Both are truthful, but the Muslim is truthful in the truth, and the non-Muslim is truthful in reality.

An Islamic society is one in which the Muslim holds true sincerity in truth, and the non-Muslim holds true sincerity in reality, without either disturbing the other. The subject of an authentic and true community is the belief of the believer and their knowledge, which is rooted in heart-based conviction, belief, and contentment. The duty of non-pious and non-believing people is not accepted: (إِنَّمَا يَتَقَبَّلُ اللَّهُ مِنَ الْمُتَّقِينَ). The subject of a truly believing community is a truth that holds value and correctness, not falsehood, while the subject of a real community of citizenship is social belief— not intellectual or heartfelt belief—which may be false, as there is no intellectual foundation for it, and the person is not undertaking religious duty but is merely compelled by social obligation, even if they do not have heartfelt satisfaction with it.

Freedom and truth possess two aspects: one is the realm of affirmation and reality, and the other is the realm of confirmation and truth.

Real truth manifests in the forms of “justice” and “equity,” while genuine truth appears in the forms of “love” and “leadership.” Societies must either be based on justice or on leadership. The subject of justice-based societies is real truth and fairness, which do not require faith or right. The subject of leadership-based societies is genuine truth and love, which is referred to as “leadership” or “Wilayah.” Therefore, a free or true society is either monotheistic and religious, or real and civil, and anything else is a degenerate and tyrannical society that operates on falsehood. In a leadership society, the hearts, love, and the truth that governs them are of value. In such a society, the individual is central, not the community; rather, the community is a by-product of the individual’s heart— a heart that is greater than the community itself. In this society, the heart is the ruler, the subject, and the cause of unity, and hearts that create a space of monotheism give identity to unity, making all hearts one. Just as God possesses personal unity and is one person, the heart is also one, and all hearts gather around one individual and leader, who is the wali (guardian) of God. In a leadership society, the leader is a true person, and the management is centred around the infallible individual, with the system being ideological— an ideology that promotes freedom, self-sacrifice, and love. This society guarantees both worldly and otherworldly well-being for its followers, and no one feels tired, lost, or abandoned. Everyone reaches freedom, authenticity, and love, and strives to live in a manner consistent with Islam until the moment of their death (وَلاَ تَمُوتُنَّ إِلاَّ وَأَنْتُمْ مُسْلِمُونَ).

However, a real society has a systemic and collectivist orientation. This is a civil and popular system that only achieves fairness and justice, without promoting self-sacrifice, empathy, or the values of love, which are not propagated. This society may have health, but not ultimate well-being in the afterlife. It may bring a person to ease, but leads them to fatigue, abandonment, and despair because it lacks the knowledge, which is a natural human need. This is a sensory and empirical society where feeling and emotion are displaced by mere sensation.

As we stated earlier, the essence and truth of freedom are defined by “authenticity” and “truth.” For one to find themselves, they need both knowledge and awareness. They also need a law to guide their will and choice in the right direction, preventing them from deviation and misguidance, thus avoiding the need for liberation— understood both as an escape from the centre and as a return to the right path after a deviation. Therefore, the right to freedom entails the right to knowledge, lawfulness, and respect for the law. These two principles ensure balance, harmony, and the flourishing of freedom. From this perspective, the law should be seen as a framework for restructuring and controlling the flourishing of freedom, with a necessity for movement that aligns with the initial framework, without which liberation would lead to collapse and destruction. Thus, freedom, in its true meaning, is relative. The relativity of freedom is based on an internal gradual element inherent in freedom and an external balance imposed on it by the law— a law that must be derived from the nature and essence of human beings to align with their freedom. In other words, the law is not an arbitrary construct, but rather needs to be discovered from human nature and instinct. The most sound law, which fully encompasses human nature and essence, is divine revelation, which is infallible. Any movement contrary to it leads to the negation of freedom and the enslavement of the individual. Freedom, with its gradual and proportional elements, is always positive and constructive, while negative freedom does not exist. However, human choice and desires often disregard this gradual and proportional element, rushing to attain something or overstepping their bounds, leading to conflict and strife.

It is true that freedom is a description that follows constraint, and it is an active attribute, yet, with all its characteristics, it is embedded within human nature. The original state is that a constrained individual should progress towards freedom and express their unique potential and perfection; that is, freedom is the foundation, and no one can impose limits on another unless there is a specific reason for that limitation.

In any case, we consider freedom to be a natural institution of humanity, the root and origin of rights, not the rights themselves. Therefore, natural freedom is not a right that can be renounced but a natural institution. Neglecting it constitutes a deviation. Freedom, before being a right, is an external truth.

The discussion that follows critically addresses some of the theories of freedom, as explored in the book “New Foundations of Rights.”

Freedom from the Islamic Perspective

Islamic law is a framework of openness, not confinement. Islam never burdens its followers; its law is easy and accommodating. However, it is important to note that this openness does not mean lawlessness; rather, openness within the bounds of law is part of the Islamic principle that religion is expansive and freedom-oriented. Islam states that everything is permissible unless designated as prohibited. The legal system of Islam functions like a traffic guide that, by following it, enables the flow of traffic and prevents accidents and death. These rules are like the anchor of the human ship; without them, humanity would be cast into turbulence. The religious prescriptions are descriptive, not prescriptive; they outline the correct place for everything. Such a religion does not create fear or terror among its followers.

What has been discussed refers to the foundational aspect of religion. As the Qur’an states: (يُرِيدُ اللَّهُ بِكُمُ الْيُسْرَ وَلاَ يُرِيدُ بِكُمُ الْعُسْرَ). We have further analysed this concept in our seven-volume work “The Jurisprudence of Music and Singing.” However, in practice, unfortunately, the approach of some religious scholars has not been aligned with this principle. Some have imposed their own sense of piety, purity, and spiritual cleanliness on the people, wrongly assuming that everyone should live like the Prophet. If it is said that the Qur’an itself states: (وَمَا خَلَقْتُ الْجِنَّ وَالْإِنسَ إِلَّا لِيَعْبُدُونِ), we would argue that the purpose of creation has levels, and this saying indicates one aspect of it.

The Pinnacle of Creation

If this statement refers to innate or existential worship (‘ibādah takwīniyyah), then such worship occurs naturally and requires no external prompting. However, if legislative worship (‘ibādah tashrī‘iyyah) is intended, then worship is not the ultimate end of creation. Rather, it is a path—humans are situated along this path, not at its final destination. Each individual exists at a distinct level, according to their unique capacity for perfection. Every person must be expended in accordance with their station, and live in a way befitting their own purpose. The same is true of taqwā (piety) and īmān (faith)—they cannot be uniformly demanded of all people.

An indiscriminate call for millions to perform the most elevated forms of worship—such as the night prayer (ṣalāt al-layl)—without regard for the stratification of religious duties, has the effect of distorting the practice of religion. It reduces religious observances to superficial forms, affecting matters such as dress, where headscarves become loosely worn, garments shortened, and even slashed wherever possible. However, if society remains open and even idolaters are allowed to carry out their ordinary affairs while the sanctity of religion is preserved—as prescribed by religion itself—then a healthy society for the religious will be sustained, and widespread disorder will not emerge.

We conclude this discussion with two illuminating narrations that affirm awareness, freedom, piety, and moral autonomy, and that underscore the simplicity and ease of the Sharī‘ah, devoid of hardship and imposition upon God’s servants. The implication is that if individuals fulfil only what God has actually required of them and observe the limits of divine law, their lives will be simple and unburdened. Departing from the Sharī‘ah, on the other hand, makes life harsh, disordered, and unpalatable:

(A) “Sulaymān ibn Ja‘far al-Ja‘farī asked the Righteous Servant, Mūsā ibn Ja‘far (peace be upon him), about a man who goes to the market and purchases a fur cloak but does not know whether the animal was ritually slaughtered (dhakīyah) or not. May he pray in it?” The Imam replied, “Yes, you need not inquire into such matters. Verily, Abū Ja‘far (peace be upon him) used to say: The Khawārij imposed hardship upon themselves due to their ignorance—truly, religion is broader than that.”

(B) “Everything in this world is greater when heard than when seen; and everything in the hereafter is greater when seen than when heard. Let hearing suffice you in place of seeing, and reports suffice you in place of the unseen. Know that whatever decreases in this world but increases in the hereafter is better than that which increases in this world but diminishes the hereafter. How many things that are lacking yield profit, and how many augmentations bring loss. That which you are commanded to do is more abundant than that which you are prohibited from. What has been made lawful for you exceeds what has been forbidden. So leave aside the little for the sake of the abundant, and what is narrow for what is expansive. Your sustenance has been guaranteed; you have been commanded to act—do not let that which is assured for you take precedence over that which has been made obligatory.”

Immunity, Respect, and Full Enjoyment of Individual and Collective Rights:

Immunity refers to the full enjoyment of both individual and collective rights, ensuring the continued reassurance provided by the security umbrella mentioned earlier, safeguarding individuals and their dependents from the encroachment of others.

Naturally, the establishment of immunity is dependent on a precise understanding of the rights of each entity and the necessary authority for their enforcement. Immunity for individuals encompasses various forms of security—judicial, social, educational, professional, economic, psychological, and more. Immunity is a secondary and dependent right, not a primary one, and it comes after the rights of freedom, choice, and sovereignty. The right of sovereignty grants governance authority to the state, not ownership. States in an Islamic system are custodians, not independent owners. The Islamic ruler is tasked with ensuring security—either through guardianship in divine systems or via a surrogate rule in democratic systems. Surrogate rule either involves the delegation of authority to a specific person or group or through representation. Surrogate rule is a legal construct and not a true divine authority.

Immunity is a right. The creation of immunity is a duty placed on the state, in exchange for the legitimacy granted by the people in democratic systems to exercise sovereignty. In response to the legitimacy granted by the people, the state has the responsibility to protect them and their belongings. In divine systems, ensuring security is both a divine obligation and a right of the people, falling upon the ruler. In this regard, the religious ruler’s responsibility surpasses that of rulers in democratic systems, who are only accountable to the people.

The exercise of the right to immunity and its establishment takes shape through legal frameworks and organizational systems, including military, judicial, police, and social institutions.

In the Realm of Divine Authority:

In terms of affirmation and in the context of the Infallibles: In practice, the broader the legitimacy granted by God or the people to the ruler, the greater the ruler’s responsibility. Conversely, any state that deems itself superior and more deserving of exercising sovereignty bears a greater responsibility for the protection of its people. On the other hand, the less the state intervenes in the private affairs of the people, the fewer duties it perceives toward them. For example, a state with minimal interference in private matters—such as the economy or culture—will have a lesser responsibility to ensure the economic or cultural security of families against poverty, bankruptcy, or cultural conflicts.

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic, in Article 3, recognizes the duty of the state to ensure comprehensive security for the people and establish equitable judicial security. This constitution maximizes state involvement in various aspects of life and, as such, mandates that the state ensure immunity for its people in every domain it intervenes. Therefore, the educational system, as well as healthcare, should be free of charge.

The Experience of Governments:

Historical experience demonstrates that the less power governments attribute to themselves, and the lower their legitimacy, the more immunity they afford the people and the less they infringe upon their rights. This is particularly true in religious systems when the ruler is infallible. For instance, when the noble verse (النَّبِىُّ أَوْلَى بِالْمُؤْمِنِينَ مِنْ أَنْفُسِهِمْ) was revealed, some Jews, due to their knowledge of Prophet Muhammad’s character and his integrity, sought his protection and authority, believing that he could safeguard their immunity and property without requiring them to adopt Islam.

We do not speak of such a government because it was limited to the time of the Infallibles, and our discussions here pertain to the era of the occultation and the governance of non-infallible individuals.

In the Era of Occultation:

In the absence of the Infallible, the more the government minimizes its intervention in private matters and grants people more autonomy in managing their affairs—by creating systems for societal governance while limiting physical intervention—the greater the protection of the people’s immunity, and the higher the potential for justice to be realized.

Immunity, Social Health, and the Role of Cultural Growth:

Immunity arises from the well-being of the society, which branches out into various forms, such as codified law, the selection of virtuous and capable leaders, and the promotion of a culture of lawfulness and the advancement of this culture scientifically.

Among these, the role of social health is paramount. If social health is absent, even a perfectly legitimate and accurate law lacks enforceability. Security depends on social health, which in turn depends on cultural growth and empowerment. Therefore, immunity is not a primary, first-order right; it is a result of a healthy society. Social health, understood as the comprehensive well-being of the community, free from corruption and degradation in all cultural, moral, economic, administrative, social, political, and military aspects, is essential for immunity. Immunity is a consequence of security, and security, in turn, is a result of well-being. Power is an element contributing to well-being, but not the sole cause.

Immunity, Social Health, and International Relations:

In a healthy society, both individuals and rulers learn to recognize and respect the rights of others, considering violations as disrespect for human dignity. This foundational principle holds true for both individual and collective immunity as well as international immunity. Countries in good health can engage in relations, transport, cooperation, and interaction. An example of public health in international terms is the existence of Interpol, which facilitates the pursuit of criminals across countries.

Defining Well-Being:

Well-being is a collection of knowledge and assets (mental, emotional, and physical capabilities) that provides individuals and society with dignity, self-esteem, and the power to prevent violations. Violation results from deficiencies in one of the spiritual, mental, emotional, sexual, physical, or material areas. Based on this, poverty, in all its forms, eradicates well-being, and the more society advances comprehensively, the greater its security and immunity.

For immunity to be realized, its foundational principles must be observed. Immunity cannot be achieved merely by sustainable development and welfare; it requires well-being. Societies that lack well-being, even if they have organized resources and public welfare, will fail to respect the rights of their people.

Immunity and security are not matters dictated by commands, laws, or decrees; they are a function of the culture of well-being—a culture created through merit-based leadership and the advancement of cultural norms. This culture involves various elements, and even a small loss of any one element can result in the loss of the entire system, just as a weakness in a part can lead to the collapse of the whole system.

The Islamic Republic’s Government:

A country has three foundational components: the land, the people, and the government. People are the descendants of the earth, growing upon it. Human beings are made from the earth, and after death, they return to it. The earth influences both their genetics and their spirit. Some of the fundamental differences among people stem from the soil upon which they live.

Next, we turn to the “people” aspect; as they precede the government in importance. Without people, there can be no foundation for governance. People are born free, and no one has dominion over others. However, as people develop, become more organized, and move away from a natural life, they come to realize the necessity of governance to manage and regulate their society.

After the people, we address the government. Historically, governance has always been a tool for managing the populace and was often exercised by the wealthy and powerful, either through force or through dynastic succession. However, in modern societies, governance has shifted to the right of choice and representation of the people.

Governance, in its natural and historical context, comes after the people; however, it must be noted that, in the contemporary world, the government influences every aspect of society. The rights of the people are determined by the type of governance in place, and it is not the case that people independently define their own rights. As we’ve stated earlier, the discovery of people’s rights and governance is a philosophical issue, one that can be discerned through reason and logical inquiry. This discovery is made by legal philosophers who derive these rights from the “existence” of phenomena and the relations between them.

Thus, the discourse on the government over people, in this regard, reflects a deviation in the discussion.

Foundational Rights and Governance:

In democratic systems, the government is accountable to the people, as it is elected by them to represent their interests. Even in monarchies and aristocracies that were purely authoritarian, rulers still had to consider the welfare of their people. In democratic governments, people strive to elect the most capable and people-oriented individuals.

The initial discussion of constitutional rights, however, focuses on the people’s rights under the system of governance. The first right granted to the people in the constitution is sovereignty, whether based on geographic regions or the people’s vote.

We argue that the foundation of constitutional rights is based on three pillars: homeland, people, and religion. Without these, there can be no true governance.

The government of the companions, their followers, and religious scholars is legitimate only if their affiliation with religion is valid and confirmed, and the ruler is a person who is a jurist, just, and possesses the necessary qualifications. The legitimacy of the rule of a jurist, just ruler with qualifications is also based on a republic framework and popular approval.

The term ‘ijtihad’ refers not only to knowledge of Islamic jurisprudence but also to a comprehensive set of skills, alongside a divine virtue, which grants the ruler the capability to manage and lead effectively. Without such qualifications, the government would be ignorant and unwise. In this context, ‘fiqh’ is understood in a broader sense, not in its specific, current meaning as a well-defined academic discipline, but rather as the ability to govern, which includes fields such as philosophy, sociology, psychology, and economics, among others. These disciplines, in total, represent the methodology of life in all its aspects. This does not mean that the ruler must have mastered all of these disciplines, but rather that they must have the capability to manage them. A just jurist must be competent in the fields necessary for proper governance and should manage these areas with the help of competent advisors. The ruler, under their management and influence, will then administer society.

The qualifications of a jurist can be lost at any time, in which case, they automatically lose their position without the need for anyone or any council to dismiss or deactivate them. However, in some cases, a jurist’s qualifications may remain until their death, although it is also possible, considering the public good and reason, for their governance to be temporary and for a limited term.

What has been discussed here refers to a just jurist who is not infallible. However, an infallible individual never loses their position or authority, as their infallibility guarantees their leadership until the end of their life.

It should be noted that Shi’ite governance does not rely solely on popular approval, where people can choose anyone they desire as their leader or ruler. Governance ultimately belongs to God alone, and it is He who can grant it to an individual. As believers who accept Islam, we must derive our way of life and governing principles from God. On the other hand, the legitimacy of governance does not mean the complete rejection of the role of the people, because the people are the means through which this type of governance exists and persists. If divine governance is like the blood, the people are like the veins that allow it to flow. Without the people, religious governance cannot function. The ruler, therefore, has an intrinsic relationship with the people.

The Necessity of the Ruler’s Qualifications in an Islamic Government

So far, we have discussed two forms of religious governance: first, the rule of an infallible person whose legitimacy is absolute both in principle and in practice, and second, the rule of a just jurist with qualifications, whose legitimacy is conditional on the possession of these qualifications. In principle, these qualifications are clear and well-defined, but in practice, they must be verified. Following a ruler who lacks these qualifications is a sin, as it entails a deviation from the religious framework, and such governance may be made temporary or limited based on necessity.

Only some Shiite jurists possess the qualifications to govern, and it is not true that all those who are considered jurists and religious scholars have the necessary conditions for leadership and governance.

In the era of occultation, those who take power do so only through tolerance and flexibility, not precision or correctness. This flexibility, however, should not extend to the point where actions clearly contradict religious principles, which would lead to a sin. If such a situation arises, the government’s legitimacy must be reassessed. A jurist is not required to enforce governance by force or manipulation. The implementation of Shi’ite governance by a qualified, just jurist must avoid leading to oppression and disobedience. It is important to approach this issue realistically, avoiding an overly idealistic view that could turn Shi’ite governance into a theoretical utopia, as described by Plato. For instance, Plato suggests that a ruler should set up a tent in the desert, working harder than anyone else while consuming less than all. Under such conditions, who would be willing to shoulder the heavy responsibilities of leadership without the necessary resources to manage a country effectively, unless they were frivolous or naïve?

Even with the rule of a qualified, just jurist, other jurists and scholars may maintain influence within their own areas of expertise. However, they should not interfere in matters of leadership as defined by law, just as the ruler should not interfere in the affairs of individual jurists. Jurists must obey the ruling jurist in governmental matters and refrain from undermining them. However, in matters relating to their own scholarly domains that do not intersect with governance, their opinions remain valid and should be respected, as long as they do not conflict with the authority of the ruling jurist.

The leader of an Islamic society and state should make decisions based on clear principles, and the law must provide a framework for their duties. The leader must have competent advisors and specialists who can monitor their actions. The Shi’ite tradition, in principle, does not lack in this regard, and the design of this system has been thoroughly planned and envisioned.

Ruler-Centered Governance in the Islamic Republic

In a republic, as seen in democratic systems, there is no central ruler. In such systems, people elect a “president” to execute the law. This system, however, has various forms. One form is the “Islamic Republic,” which is systematically designed and closely resembles the governance of an infallible ruler. In this system, unlike a typical republic, a ruler exists, and the position of leadership holds authority. The leader must be a jurist, a thinker, a specialist, a capable manager, and just, in line with divine virtue. Because the ruler is an expert in religion and jurisprudence, their decrees are derived from religious principles. As their rule depends on justice, if they allow personal desires to influence their decisions, they lose legitimacy not by external dismissal but through a natural loss of authority.

In this system, there should be periodic mechanisms, such as elections or other methods (e.g., public pledges or demonstrations), to verify the ruler’s legitimacy, especially among the younger generation who have the right to choose. Popular legitimacy is significant because it ensures that the ruler does not become tyrannical, thus preventing alienation from religion by the masses. By confirming their popularity and legitimacy, the ruler can present a more attractive and beloved face of religion.

The term “Republic” in “Islamic Republic” does not indicate a democracy or governance by the people. Rather, it denotes public approval of the system. Thus, “Islamic Republic” is distinct from typical republics and is a competitor to them.

In the Islamic Republic, “republic” refers to the acceptance of God’s sovereignty and the law of Sharia by the people, not governance by the people, where the people are considered on par with or above the law and ruler. Such a system would contradict the Islamic concept of governance, where the people are beneath the law, and their role is to enforce Sharia and religious decrees. The Shi’ite understanding of governance during the occultation allows for the identification of a ruling jurist, particularly when several jurists hold equal qualifications or when the most qualified among them is identified, either through election or public pledges.

The Islamic government has four fundamental characteristics: legitimacy, specialization, justice, and public approval. Its legitimacy comes from God, and the ruler is appointed by divine will. The ruler must be knowledgeable and skilled, and in addition, to avoid selfishness and arrogance, they must be just. To prevent tyranny, they must have public approval. In principle, this form of government has all the attributes of an ideal system.

Therefore, governance in Islam is based on four core principles: first, legitimacy, where the ruler is divinely appointed; second, specialization, where the ruler must be knowledgeable; third, justice, meaning they must have integrity; and fourth, public approval, where if the people do not accept the qualified ruler, they incur sin, whereas if they accept the ruler, they are entitled to reward. However, if the ruler does not meet the necessary qualifications, following them is considered a sin.

Additionally, if a ruler realizes that they do not meet the necessary qualifications, in light of the condition of justice, they should step down from power. Otherwise, their justice will be questioned, and they will naturally lose their position without needing to resign.

Finally, the monitoring of the ruler’s actions falls under the fourth pillar of the system—the advisory or intellectual body—and is reinforced by public conscience and religious awareness, ensuring the ruler’s legitimacy is grounded in the community’s understanding and moral health.

In conclusion, in a religious government, the identity and nature of governance are derived from religion itself, not merely a label attached to governance. If a religious government lacks the necessary conditions, it only carries the label of religion without embodying its true essence.

The Islamic Republic does not represent a partnership or shared governance between the people and Islam; rather, it represents the acceptance of God’s sovereignty and the primacy of Sharia in all aspects of life. People are committed to fulfilling their duties under Islamic law, just as a loving parent would guide their children for their well-being. Therefore, an Islamic government must have justice as a fundamental principle, a characteristic absent in democratic systems.

The Islamic Republic is a manifestation of people’s acceptance of Islam and its governance, where the system’s authority comes from God, not through democratic election. The people’s role is to implement the law of Sharia with dedication and love, seeing it as a source of guidance and goodness for their lives.

Based on what is stated in the Constitution, the structure of the Iranian government is hierarchical, with the leadership institution at its top. The leader holds the position of the Supreme Leader, and this leadership is embodied by the office of the Jurisprudent (Velayat-e Faqih). However, the leadership, according to the Constitution, is at the top of this hierarchy; otherwise, above the leader, there is Islam itself. The government must be Islamic, and the leader is merely the caretaker of the Islamic government.

The Constitution articulates the Islamic method of governance, which is based on the system of Velayat-e Faqih, as follows:

“From the perspective of Islam, government does not arise from individual or group class interests or dominion, but rather it is the crystallization of the political ideals of a people with shared beliefs and thoughts who organize themselves in order to open the path towards the ultimate goal (moving towards God) in the course of intellectual and ideological transformation.”

In the Islamic government, reaching “God” is the ultimate goal, and everything, including the economy, is a means, not an end; moreover, it is a means for elevation, perfection, and well-being, not for corrupting humanity or for its suffering.

Article 4 of the Constitution establishes Islamic principles as the standard for all decisions and actions of the Islamic Republic system:

“All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, and other regulations and laws must be in accordance with Islamic principles. This article overrides all other fundamental principles and laws and regulations, and it is the responsibility of the Guardian Council to determine this.”

This article explicitly states that all laws must be Islamic and assigns the responsibility of determining this to the Guardian Council. However, the determination of the Islamic nature of laws is not clearly outlined by the current composition of the Guardian Council. The term “Islamic principles” is undefined, and it is unclear whether it is equivalent to jurisprudence or not. While the Guardian Council is made up of jurists and legal experts, one must first determine whether only mainstream jurisprudence is the standard and foundation of Islamic sciences. Furthermore, the Guardian Council needs legal workgroups consisting of jurists, philosophers, psychologists, sociologists, and experts from other disciplines as appropriate, who can issue fatwas, allowing the jurists in the Guardian Council to be guided by them. This would ensure that their decisions are scientifically grounded rather than being based on the transient social forces that could undermine their legitimacy.

We refer to this advisory body as the intellectual body of the system, which is absent in the Constitution. It should be noted that organizational think tanks, due to their lack of intellectual coherence and comprehensive theorizing, cannot possess the power of thought that comes from an independent authority with awareness of both Islam and modern sciences. The intellectual output of such an authority would represent collective intellectual production from experts and workgroups. If the system is to be governed scientifically and based on Islamic principles, it requires the design of such a body to generate necessary scholarly output. Without it, the system would have to rely on jurists who individually engage in scholarly efforts, though such individual efforts cannot provide the necessary foundation for governing an entire society.

The Constitution, in Article 5, identifies the most important institution of the Islamic Republic system—the leadership position and the Jurisprudential Authority—and assigns the authority of leadership and governance to the Supreme Leader:

“In the absence of the Vali al-Asr (may Allah hasten his return), the leadership and governance of the Muslim community in the Islamic Republic of Iran rests with a just, pious, knowledgeable, courageous, and capable jurist, who, in accordance with Article 107, assumes the role.”

The term “leadership and governance of the Muslim community” reflects the Shiite ideology, where the movement is based on the concept of Imamate. Shi’ism has its identity through the Imam, and this ideology must manifest during the period of occultation, or else it would become irrelevant. The manifestation of Imamate during the occultation period is known as Velayat-e Faqih.

Velayat refers to the internal aspect, while Imamate refers to the outward, public leadership of the people. Imamate and Velayat represent a type of intersection between God and the people. Velayat refers to the divine aspect, while Imamate addresses the visible aspect, which interacts with the people.

The Supreme Leader is a derivative of the Imam, and his powers, like those of the Imam, are defined by his level of ijtihad (jurisprudential insight) and justice, because the Imam possesses divine knowledge and infallibility, while the Supreme Leader’s authority is contingent upon ijtihad and justice. The difference between divine knowledge and ijtihad, as well as between infallibility and justice, is the difference between the finite and the infinite.

The leadership of the Supreme Leader represents macro-level management. Therefore, the person holding this position must be an individual with the requisite knowledge, expertise in ijtihad, management skills, and justice, rather than a council. However, the oversight of this leadership should be managed by an independent intellectual body that is authorized by the Supreme Leader. The current structure of the Assembly of Experts and the Expediency Discernment Council does not possess the capability to fulfill this task, and this body should consist of competent scholars from both religious seminaries and academic institutions, working independently on this matter.

The Constitution, in Article 5, sets forth the qualifications for leadership, but the terms used are vague or underdeveloped because there is no standard for them. Additionally, there is no central academic authority capable of defining and explaining these qualifications in a way that is beyond criticism.

This represents a flaw in the Constitution, as none of the attributes mentioned for leadership have clearly defined standards. Article 107 states:

“The Assembly of Experts will review and consult about all jurists who meet the conditions mentioned in Articles 5 and 109. If they determine that one of them is the most learned in jurisprudence or in political or social matters, or if they have public acceptance or have notable qualities in one of the characteristics mentioned in Article 109, they will choose him as the leader. Otherwise, they will select one of them as the leader.”

The confusion in this article stems from the lack of a structured mechanism within religious seminaries to determine the most qualified jurists for leadership, as there are no established criteria or tests for this. In religious seminaries, it is still unclear what the criteria for identifying the most learned are, and who qualifies as such.

Article 109 of the Constitution outlines the qualities of the leader but does not provide any explanations for these qualities. It merely states:

“The qualifications and qualities of the leader are:

The necessary scientific qualifications for issuing fatwas in various fields of jurisprudence.
The necessary justice and piety for leading the Islamic community.
Correct political and social insight, management skills, courage, and sufficient power for leadership.

If there are multiple candidates who possess these qualifications, the one with stronger jurisprudential and political insight takes precedence.”

One of the qualities that is not explained here is the term “jurist.” We have elaborated on the definition of this important term in our book “Sociology of Religious Scholars.” Based on this discussion, a jurist with the required qualifications has the expertise to deduce religious rulings, which is much more complex than managing a society. Therefore, while management is an independent science, a jurist who is capable of correctly and comprehensively deducing religious rulings has a better understanding of both the theoretical science of management and the practical implementation of it.

The Need for the Establishment of a Fourth Branch in the System

What can supervise the leadership during the occultation period to prevent it from falling into the trap of despotism is the establishment of a fourth branch in the system, which would provide oversight both in the selection of the leader and in his performance. This specialized council would recognize the scientific position of the jurists based on their knowledge and writings, and it would prevent the influence of opportunists and power-holders—who may be influential but lack true integrity—from taking control of this important office. This would ensure that the continuity of Imamate during the occultation period would maintain its discipline. A council selected by true experts would not be based on a system of patronage or executive orders but would be independent and competent.

If such a fourth intellectual branch were established, the responsibility would lie with the viewpoints it provides. Unless there are obvious flaws in the execution of its ideas, the responsibility for decisions would not fall on the leadership directly. In the Islamic Republic system, the ruler is not the manager of society; rather, the government is responsible for planning and the ruler has the power to implement decisions and set the broad policies of the system, as outlined in Article 110 of the Constitution.

Evaluation of the Leadership

If the Supreme Leader possesses the necessary qualifications outlined in the initial phase, he will also possess specialized skills in leadership. Some of his commands have a purpose in issuing them, rather than being their origin, such as his fatwa regarding the death of Salman Rushdie, which aimed to curb the atmosphere of insult against Islam, rather than focusing on the killing itself. Similarly, some actions are born from a cause. In such cases, the objective may be both expressed and implied.

Leadership exists when the people are unintentionally guided towards a smooth path, and they suddenly find themselves victorious without realizing how it happened. Additionally, a leader will never be accused of ignorance, as his position requires him to be well-informed about every necessary matter. However, at times, the best course of action may require him to refrain from intervening and to leave the decision to experts or public opinion in order to ensure that the decision is more specialized and credible. This does not mean that the experts or the public hold power over the leader; rather, they act as instruments or tools for the leader to utilize. Ultimately, the final decision rests with the leader, and his authority remains intact.

In any case, the Supreme Leader, due to his scholarship and wisdom, will not be surpassed by anyone in making judgments or identifying issues. He may need consultation on some matters, but his ability to issue rulings for specific situations sometimes involves subtle tactics that no specialist can fully understand, much like some of the acts of the unseen figures mentioned in the Qur’an.

Ultimately, true leadership is held by one who has the ability to design and implement such subtle tactics without others being able to decipher his actions. Leadership does not simply involve managing affairs in a normal or conventional manner but requires an ability to govern with wisdom and foresight, often unseen by the public until the outcomes unfold.

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The Necessity of the Ruler’s Qualifications in an Islamic Government

Ruler-Centered Governance in the Islamic Republic

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