Sanbūkiyya Discussions in Jurisprudential Arts

The Sanbuki Discussions in the Art of Principles
(Almighty be His soul’s sanctity)
Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Nakooyan

Bibliographic Entry
Author: Nakooyan, Mohammad Reza, b. 1327 AH (approx. 1948 CE)
Title: Al-Mabahith al-Sanbukiya fi al-Funun al-Usuliya
Publisher: Sobhe Farda Publications, Islamshahr
Publication Year: 1393 AH (2014 CE)
Pages: 60
Dimensions: 5/9 x 19 cm
ISBN: 978-600-7347-28-7
Category: Shia Jurisprudence – 14th Century
Dewey Decimal Classification: 297.312

Preface
This treatise is a brief classification concerning the most important discussions of rational principles, noting the specific method particular to this field. It investigates some select subjects in the field of rational principles free from any extraneous discussions or unnecessary analysis. The text includes critiques and discussions on the opinions of five prominent jurists: Sheikh Ansari, Akhund, Kambanai, Iraqi, and Mirza Na’ini, after a thorough investigation of their perspectives. Additionally, the treatise introduces novel usulī (jurisprudential) theories that are unique in their specific objectives, as outlined in the Sanbuki approach.

We have also authored an extensive work on the field of Usul in ten volumes, offering new suggestions and conceptualizations regarding various linguistic and rational issues that have not been thoroughly explored in other books, contrary to the prevailing norms of previous jurists in their widespread publications. The treatise delves into extensive discussions of contradictions and arguments, offering a critique of existing approaches.

This booklet is based on a set of notes I wrote during teaching sessions, focusing on subjects essential for research and scrutiny. These discussions include Usul principles, practical Usul topics concerning the jurist, layman, and the general public, as well as the division of preliminary discussions and the four primary Usul principles. Additionally, it explores topics such as certainty and conjecture, the rational notions of good and bad, and the logical interrelations between commands and prohibitions, as well as the benefits and harms of things.

This treatise also investigates the concepts of conceptual and real doubts, and the foundational four principles of Usul: presumption of innocence, continuity, choice, and burden. In conclusion, we pray for divine success, and thanks to God, first and foremost.

Sanbuki 1: The Subject of Usul Science

The distinction between sciences lies in their unity, either in subject matter or in objective purpose. Every science requires a real unity in its subject matter or a unifying goal in its purpose. It is not possible to generalize a distinction in terms of subject or objective, as in the case of natural sciences, which focus on subject matter, or in the case of mathematical sciences, which emphasize goals.

In the realm of Usul and other jurisprudential sciences, even if their subjects vary or are similar, the unifying goal is clear. However, the view presented by Akhund regarding the unification of objectives, and by Na’ini on the unity of subject matter with certain conditions, is not fully accurate. Kambanai’s approach, which draws on Asfar (The Transcendent Wisdom), is closer to the truth. Though this concept appears in earlier works by philosophers, Sadr al-Din Shirazi (Mulla Sadra) fully expounded it, but it is not a unique feature of Kambanai.

Furthermore, the views of other scholars such as Sheikh Ansari, the author of Al-Fusul, and Akhund are problematic regarding the establishment of a subject for Usul science. This is evident and requires no further explanation.

It is essential to understand that an essential quality is something that does not require special conditions for its existence. For instance, an intrinsic accident does not require any intermediary qualification in its application to the subject. Thus, in Usul studies, this intrinsic nature should not be confused with other forms of categorization.

Regarding Sheikh Mufid’s distinctions on finer details, especially when related to shared accidents or essential qualities, these are either overly elaborate or misplaced.

The final point in this section addresses the relationship between the nature of knowledge and essential accidents. The discussions in this area have been expanded upon in Hikma (philosophy) by Avicenna, Sadr al-Din Shirazi, and others, and they hold an indirect relevance in Usul as well.

Sanbuki 2: Issues in Usul Principles

This section introduces foundational matters that serve as a prelude to detailed technical discussions in Usul science. It includes four subtopics: two related to the subject of Usul, and two on its issues.

1. On the Obligor (Mukallaf)
   In Sheikh Ansari’s writings, the obligor refers to one who is obligated in theory, not in practice, with the qualifier of “difference” being necessary but not extraneous. This contrasts with the views of Sheikh, where the distinction of difference does not apply, as clarified by other scholars in their commentaries.
2. On Defining the Mujtahid and the Common Layperson
   A Mujtahid (jurist) and a layperson are both subject to divine legal rulings equally, with no inherent discrepancy between them. The obligor encompasses both the Mujtahid and the layperson, despite the Mujtahid’s advanced understanding of religious laws compared to the layperson, who might even be considered equivalent to the infallible in their lack of access to direct knowledge.

Sanbuki 3: Conjecture (Zann)

This section deals with the concept of conjecture in four main areas: first, the meaning of possibility and impossibility; second, proving the non-impossibility in consideration; third, establishing the original principle; and fourth, determining the proof and legitimacy of specific legal and rational conjectures.

It is necessary to first differentiate between certainty and conjecture in terms of their recognition and legitimacy. Certainty, being intrinsic, carries necessary legitimacy, whereas conjecture holds a conditional legitimacy. This distinction is fundamental in understanding how legal scholars and rationalists treat conjecture in their discussions.

In Summary
The works presented in this treatise are structured to address critical topics within the framework of Usul al-Fiqh (Principles of Jurisprudence). By examining the views of classical scholars and offering new insights, Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Nakooyan provides a comprehensive and innovative approach to understanding the methodology and theoretical foundations of Islamic jurisprudence.

The Second View: The Opinion of Akhund
He asserts that if the legal construct in the context of evidentiary rules is the very same as legal validity (which was his view), then there is no issue with the matter at hand. This is because, when there is congruence between the two, the path to the reality is provided. There is no multiplicity in the matter, so no perceived contradiction arises between them. If there is a disagreement between the two, the individual is excused, without needing to seek a specific legal duty. This holds true even when the legal validity is concomitant with both conjunction and union, assuming they exist in the present. However, this form of legal union does not constitute opposites or contraries. The real criterion in a ruling pertains to its relevant subject matter, while in the case of apparent rulings, it concerns the very path of the rule.

The Third View: The Opinion of Mirza Naeini
He argues that the foundations of the matter can be approached in three categories: evidentiary rules, established principles, and unestablished principles.

For established evidentiary rules, their function is purely procedural and purely revelatory. The function of evidentiary rules eliminates the possibility of opposition, meaning there is no assigned legal duty in this regard to create a contradiction. The status of evidentiary rules, in such a case, is akin to that of knowledge or certainty.

Similarly, for established principles, they too are procedural, applying only in the specific cases for which they are determined. No legal judgment is applied in these instances that might lead to contradiction.

The problem arises with non-established principles that are not directly related to reality but rather serve to define the practical function, such as in cases of caution or certainty, as seen in the principle of “innocence” or “exemption.” These cases involve apparent rulings, which can be made easier to understand, as suggested by the Sheikh with the evidentiary rules, although with slight differences. Mirza Naeini’s statement, though insightful in places, suffers from some issues, especially concerning the contradiction between apparent and real rulings. This contradiction does not truly exist because the apparent ruling is in the service of the real one, and there is no genuine contradiction. Furthermore, the obligation to exercise caution is a pathway to preserving reality. If it aligns with reality, no problem arises; if it deviates, there is no obligation, as there is no real ruling to preserve.

What Simplifies the Matter
There are several points that help clarify the matter:

1. The Law of Contradiction: The principle of contradiction and its logical consequences apply equally to both real and nominal facts. The only distinction is that in the case of real matters, impossibility is intrinsic, whereas in the case of nominal matters, the criterion is external. Thus, refutations from some major scholars, such as Khui and the late Allama, are without merit.
2. No Multiplicity in Real and Apparent Rulings: There is no multiplicity in real and apparent rulings in any of the areas where the rules apply, such as evidentiary rules or established principles. Real rulings are the true rulings, and apparent rulings are simply means of directing towards reality. Therefore, whether there is congruence, contradiction, or anything else, the individual is rewarded if they act properly, even if there is a difference in the effects of the rulings. However, this difference arises in relation to the actor and the act, not in relation to the legislator, because reality remains constant in all circumstances. The legal construct is about directing one towards reality, and nothing more. This distinction in the reasoning is irrelevant in relation to the legislator’s side.

Thus, there is no multiplicity in the subject matter, and the Sheikh’s position is invalid. Akhund’s explanation has various stages, some of which are correct from certain perspectives, but his explanation is ultimately inconsistent in all contexts. Mirza Naeini’s explanation, with its detailed and multifaceted approach, is flawed in some areas, and in the end, he ends up reversing what he had originally posited. The views of Khomeini and others, despite their number, add little to the debate and often introduce errors. Ultimately, there is no significant difference beyond this, even though the developments in the subject are numerous.

The Legal Consequences in the Matter
The four points regarding the legal consequences of the issue indicate the fundamental presumption in the matter, which is the non-validity of presumptions.

1. Is the Prohibition in Legislation Normative or Instructive? Sheikh and Naeini affirm the former, while Akhund and Iraqi favor the latter. Sheikh’s position is correct because legislation pertains to elucidating the criteria and following the commands of the lawgiver.
2. Does the Culpability of Legislation Extend to the Action or Not? There are two opinions: Sheikh holds that it does, while Akhund holds it does not. The correct view is that it does not extend; the prohibition is a matter of the action itself.
3. Is the Obligation to Follow an Evidentiary Rule in Belief and Action Associated with Its Validity? Akhund’s view is more general than this, but it is incorrect. Sheikh and Naeini’s view, which specifically affirms a relationship between the duty to act based on an evidentiary rule and its validity, is correct.
4. Is the Judgment on the Prohibition of Legislation Procedural or Substantive? Mirza’s view is procedural, and it is correct because this judgment does not relate to reality itself.

In conclusion, the presumption, as Akhund maintains, is that presumptions are not valid unless supported by evidence. The prohibition does not relate to the principles in question, which is an essential understanding for any legal scholar. The issue at hand is the origin and nature of the presumption itself.

Text 1: On the Principle of Validity and Its Relevance to Legal Theory

The principle of validity across its various sections is impossible, and the potential for validation based on proof is void, as it lacks any evidential support. This applies whether the validation is Ash’ari in nature—wherein it is nothing more than a matter of fulfilling a prescribed act—or whether it is Mu’tazili, where in reality there is an actual judgment, but the presumption based on circumstantial evidence results in a predominating benefit regarding the reality of the act. Similarly, the Imamite form of validation reflects an approach towards reality, without interference from the validation perspectives of the Ash’ari or Mu’tazili schools.

The second matter concerns the status of knowledge and evidence in relation to reality. Knowledge of reality is subsequent to the reality itself, and the acquisition of evidence is also subsequent to the reality. Just as acquiring evidence is subsequent to obtaining the proof, reality does not become expanded or contracted as a result.

The third point pertains to the function of indicators (amārah) in the process of verification. The epistemic function of a method is contingent upon knowledge; thus, when the knowledge of an item changes, the associated evidence also changes. The evidence remains valid only within its context, and if it is used outside its designated sphere, it loses its validity. Therefore, the role of the indicator is akin to knowledge, and the status of what is associated with the indicator is equivalent to the status of what is learned from knowledge.

The fourth matter deals with psychological errors. This is based on the assumption that a jurist’s reasoning is valid, as long as it is derived from legitimate sources. If reasoning stems from personal inclinations, preferences, or flawed premises, it is not considered valid or excusable. In this sense, the invalidation of the initial judgment occurs, and reasoning becomes legitimate only if based on valid sources of evidence and proof. Otherwise, it holds no authority or excuse. This concludes the discussion on this matter from the perspective of religious rulings.

Regarding the matter of what is entailed by the theoretical demands of the law, it is also invalid, since non-independent intellectual matters are based on conjectural reasoning. This reasoning provides an excuse only if there has been no deficiency in the premises. Otherwise, in addition to not being considered a valid argument, it does not provide an excuse in case of a change of opinion. In the absence of change, however, the error becomes a matter for the wrongdoer to resolve.

Text 2: The Restriction of Universal and the Qualification of the Absolute

It should be understood that the restriction of a universal and the qualification of an absolute do not necessarily imply that the statement becomes metaphorical. The rule of generality and absoluteness in terms of their comprehensiveness is diverse. In theory, whether the universal is wide or narrow, there is no fundamental difference in the meaning intended. The investigation into this matter goes beyond merely understanding the general and absolute terms correctly.

Thus, after restricting the universal and qualifying the absolute, one should not erroneously question the validity of the general and absolute statements concerning the remaining cases. This is because validity hinges on the absence of metaphorical usage.

The categories of restriction and qualifiers based on a general standard are numerous. Ambiguity in qualifiers may either relate to concepts or to instances, each of which has multiple categories.

The ambiguity in concepts occurs either in terms of complete dissimilarity or in terms of less and more. In either case, the qualifier may be either connected or disconnected. Similarly, ambiguity in the instances, whether connected or disconnected, can lead to various categories. While the legal rulings in both cases are often different, the discussion can be split into two sections: one dealing with conceptual ambiguity and the other with ambiguity in instances.

In cases of connected qualifiers, the universal loses its validity whenever there is ambiguity, whether the universal and the specific are completely different or one is a lesser or greater part. This is because the ambiguity of the qualifier contaminates the universal, preventing its appearance from being valid. In contrast, when the qualifier is disconnected, no ambiguity spreads to the universal, whether the two are related or not. However, if they are completely different, the universal loses its validity because, even though it still maintains its generality after the disconnection, the knowledge of its restriction alters its meaning. In cases of doubt regarding the restriction, the universal retains its authority.

Text 3: Practical Principles and Their Categories

At this point, the practical principles and their proofs can be outlined briefly. The foundational issue is what can produce the result of inferring the secondary legal judgment.

The issues pertaining to practical jurisprudence are of four kinds: the first leads to certain knowledge of a religious ruling, such as discussions related to logical implications, which are not linguistic but intellectual in nature, as was traditionally addressed by earlier jurists.

The second category leads to specific legal mandates, whether minor or major, such as studies concerning linguistic rules and religious proofs.

The third category addresses the general legal principles related to the determination of apparent rulings in cases where the true judgment is unknown. These principles are called the practical legal principles, and the proof for these is termed the “jurisprudential proof,” in contrast to the “interpretative proof” for the primary legal rulings.

The difference between real and apparent judgments is related to their sequence: the real judgment is independent of doubt, while the apparent one arises from uncertainty. Beyond that, there is no significant distinction between the two.

The fourth category concerns intellectual principles, which define the legal duties to be followed when other principles are insufficient.

Thus, all principles of jurisprudence are divided into four categories: those based on certain knowledge, those relying on religious proofs, those based on apparent rulings due to doubt, and those relying on intellectual principles when all others fail.

Text Translation:

The fourth principle is “engagement” (اشتغال), and the measure of doubt in it is the knowledge of the duty-bearer (المكلّف) regarding the original obligation (التكليف), and his hesitation concerning its subject matter when it exceeds one particular case, and the possibility of exercising caution in it. To clarify, what is said regarding the measure of doubt in this regard is akin to the doubt in “falling” (السقوط), as in the case of the doubt in the establishment of the obligation (الثبوت) in the context of the original duty.

There is no debate when the knowledge is certain regarding the actual obligation, whether the compliance is required or the violation prohibited, due to the necessity of avoiding a contradiction in the will, or for reasons other than this. The point of this inquiry is in the context of certainty, where the key focus is knowledge of prohibition or obligation, based on the generality and inclusiveness of the evidence in relation to the uncertain case. The question is whether permission can be granted in this regard by the principles of legal maxims (الأصول), or not. This is the aspect that should be explored in this context, as well as in the case of contrasting situations.

The inquiry is regarding the obligation on the duty-bearer based on the proof from generality and inclusiveness, without direct, certain knowledge in the case at hand, as to whether this generality or inclusiveness can be restricted by legal principles or not. In summary, it can be stated that permission based on overall knowledge does not result in a restriction on the actual evidentiary rules, rather it causes a delay in pursuit of a more important goal, with the actual legal duty remaining operative, and complete in its desired effect, as seen in the cases of evidence and initial uncertainties, without mixing specific conditions and situations.

After this, the discussion is divided into two main questions: The possibility of permission in principle, and whether such permission can actually occur in practice.

In the first case, it can be stated that knowledge of the evidence is necessary from the rational perspective, with no distinction between cases of general or specific doubt. However, there is no impediment for the legislator (الشّارع) to allow permission, and the obligation to follow such a decision is not an obstacle to granting permission, as permission to violate does not equate to permission for disobedience, because there is no knowledge of the actual reality and judgment, just as in the case of certain knowledge. This is not only impossible but also reprehensible due to the lack of certainty regarding the facts.

The key factor in permitting or denying permission in this context depends primarily on the legal traditions (الروايات) related to the specific subject. However, proving this point is highly complex and intricate, and adherence to caution is extremely important.

This is the general discussion regarding the four foundational principles. The detailed examination and further clarifications regarding these issues will be addressed in their appropriate places.

Bibliographic Information:

• Author: Mohammad Reza Nikounam (۱۳۲۷ – )
• Title: Al-Mubāḥith al-Sanbūkiyyah fī al-Funūn al-Usūliyyah
• Publisher: Sobḥ-i Fardā Publications, Islāmhshahr, ۱۳۹۳ (2014)
• Physical Description: 60 pages, 9.5 × 19 cm
• ISBN: 978-600-7347-28-7
• Library Classification:
  • Dewey Decimal Classification: 297.312
  • Congress Classification: BP159/8/N8M2 ۱۳۹۳
• National Bibliographic Number: 3503979
• Language: Arabic
• Subject: Shi’ah Jurisprudence Principles (Usūl al-Fiqh) – 14th Century
• Type: Scholarly Work