The corporeal resurrection is a profound religious and philosophical reality

Preface

Although the universe is a wondrous manifestation of the Divine Truth, the return to this Truth is never overlooked by anyone or anything. Contemplating the descending and ascending journeys of humanity and all other creatures and particles of the universe draws the attention of any thinker, and no intellectual can remain indifferent to it. As expressed in the celestial words “Indeed, to Allah we belong, and indeed to Him is our return” (Quran 2:156), attention is drawn to these two meanings.

The principle of resurrection, the return of human beings to the afterlife, or the continuation of the existential journey of man and the world in all realms of existence, is a tangible truth. Beyond the fact that it cannot be denied or forgotten, the overall fate of all people is tied to it, and humanity cannot remain indifferent to it.

The very existence of the world and human beings is an obvious proof of the possibility of life after death. As such, this concept has been familiar, palpable, and widespread among all human beings, regardless of their thoughts, beliefs, or ideologies, since ancient times. Each group, according to its worldview and belief system, has discussed and pursued it in its own way.

One could argue that the psychological motivations and the allure of the effects and characteristics of the principle of resurrection are closely tied to the discussions of the origin and the search for God. These two issues have attracted the attention of thinkers throughout history. Just as the discussions of the origin and resurrection philosophically correlate, they are also perfectly harmonized in their consequences. A person cannot remain indifferent to the origin of existence and its ultimate purpose.

Thus, the concept of resurrection is a universal reality, and as such, it must be acknowledged that interpretations and reasons for resurrection are diverse. It is not the case that all human beings throughout history have had a uniform understanding of it. The reasons for resurrection and the interpretations of its nature cannot follow a singular course of thought, and every school of thought, by necessity, speaks of it in its own language, offering its own explanation. These explanations range from simple, general, and universally comprehensible ideas to more intricate philosophical, religious, and scientific arguments, as well as various subjective and objective interpretations.

It is worth mentioning that not all historical interpretations regarding the principle of resurrection or its characteristics are entirely correct. However, one can still firmly believe in the real existence and tangible truth of resurrection, as the continuous presence of this principle in human thought and belief serves as a clear testimony to its truth.

From this brief context, two key insights can be drawn: First, the idea of resurrection, like the concept of the origin of the world, is one of the most fundamental and profound intellectual topics, not specific to any particular cultural or ideological group. It is rooted in the innate nature of all human beings. Secondly, to correctly understand the principle of resurrection and its characteristics, and to identify the proper reasons for this important matter, a thorough and patient analysis must be conducted, ensuring that the most clear and reasoned explanation is provided.

The Role of the Spirit in Resurrection

Regardless of its nature, the truth of resurrection is pursued by the human soul, and it is the soul that gives continuity to its reality.

The truth of the human soul holds a superior position, and its existential reality has numerous characteristics and effects, the foremost of which is its immateriality, detachment from matter and weight, which defines its nature and ensures the continuation of human life in all realms and throughout the course of existence.

Thus, the other characteristics and effects of the soul are subordinate to the principle of its immateriality. The true essence of humanity and the existential pull of human life and its evolutionary journey are dependent on the soul’s immaterial nature.

Once the immateriality of the soul is established, the most important issue of resurrection—despite its complexity and gravity—is the eternal nature of the afterlife, particularly the eternal suffering of the disbelievers and enemies of truth in hell, and the nature of physical resurrection as depicted in the Quran.

I have addressed the issue of eternal suffering and the unending torment in a separate treatise entitled “The Eternity of Hell and Everlasting Punishment,” in which I analyze and explore various dimensions of this subject. In this work, I aim to demonstrate the concept of physical resurrection in line with the teachings of the Quran, employing a philosophical approach and avoiding any form of allegorical interpretation or justification. I intend to present all its various aspects and critically examine the views and beliefs of others in this regard.

This subject has been one of the most contentious among scholars, including theologians, philosophers, and mystics.

The existence of spiritual resurrection and the ensuing spiritual pleasures or deprivation in the afterlife is accepted as a reasonable and substantiated truth among divine philosophers and mystics. However, there has been considerable debate regarding physical resurrection and the acceptance of bodily resurrection, with numerous varying opinions concerning its interpretation and validation.

Some theologians and literalists consider the afterlife and the soul to be purely material, rejecting spiritual resurrection and the possibility of immaterial pleasure and punishment. This group denies the existence of immaterial entities, perceiving the soul and other immaterial realities as material in nature, attributing the concept of immateriality solely to the Divine Being. For these thinkers, the soul cannot be immaterial, and no created entity can possess the attributes of immateriality or eternity.

Thus, this treatise first discusses the nature of immateriality, the immaterial soul, and the compatibility of immateriality with the contingency of created beings. It aims to provide the theological grounds for accepting spiritual resurrection. In continuation, it establishes physical resurrection, the eternal nature of material pleasures and punishments, and the afterlife as described in the Quran.

It has become evident that the primary challenge for philosophers and mystics lies in the eternity of material existence and the physical resurrection, while for theologians and literalists, the difficulty lies in accepting the immateriality of the soul and spiritual resurrection.

Just as the immateriality of the soul and the spiritual resurrection are neither denied by reason nor by the Quran, they must be addressed and clarified to dispel misconceptions among literalist theologians and others who might reject or neglect these concepts. It must be shown that rejecting the immaterial nature of the soul and spiritual resurrection is unfounded.

Similarly, physical resurrection, as described in the Quran, must be clarified so that the ambiguities, denials, justifications, and allegorical interpretations presented by philosophers and mystics can be dispelled. This will not only resolve the intellectual confusion surrounding the physical resurrection but also shed light on the Quranic teachings in a way that aligns with reason and sound thought.

In this treatise, both spiritual and physical resurrection, as understood by reason, thought, and the language of the Quran and Sharia, will be affirmed. Through this, we aim to present a clearer understanding of these important topics.

Though the primary challenge in this work is the validation and analysis of physical resurrection, the discussion of the immaterial soul and spiritual resurrection will also be briefly addressed to provide a complete foundation for the full discussion.

This study strives to present an accurate portrayal of physical resurrection, one that aligns with the teachings of the Quran and the traditions of the infallible ones, without deviating from reason, sound philosophical arguments, or the clear, unaltered text of the scriptures.

The second group of individuals claim to provide rational proof for the affirmation of bodily resurrection. Some of them, such as Shaykh al-Ishraq, have proposed the theory of the imaginary form, while others have put forward the theory of the subtle existence.

Both Farabi and Shaykh al-Ishraq argue that after the soul separates from the body, it attaches itself to the substance of celestial bodies, air, or smoke, depending on the level of the soul. This attachment does not imply that the human soul governs a new material body; rather, the materials that form the new body of the soul serve only as the subject and cause for the manifestation of the soul’s sensory perceptions. The relationship between the soul and its new body in the afterlife is not akin to the relationship it had with its physical body prior to death.

However, this applies solely to lower souls, as true mystics and sincere believers are not in need of such a body, as the spiritual and afterlife pleasures keep them eternally intoxicated.

Some have proposed the theory of the imaginary form, asserting that the human soul need not be accompanied by any material body, and that having an imaginary form suffices. The imaginary form lies between matter and the abstract, possessing all forms and appearances without the burden of matter or weight. It operates with greater efficacy, much like the forms seen in dreams, where the soul functions independently of the physical body. Similarly, when awake, the soul interacts with its material body, yet in a dream, it operates through its imaginary body, unaffected by the material form.

Those who proposed the theory of the imaginary form essentially argue for a position between objectivity and appearance, positing that the soul’s form, whether associated with this body or another, operates without the necessity of matter, dismissing the role of the physical body.

These theorists argue that the soul’s afterlife body is tied to such imaginary forms, such that both higher and lower souls possess such a body.

In this regard, the theory of Mulla Sadra deserves mention. He approached the issue intellectually and seriously endeavoured to resolve it. He proposed the theory of the invented body, which he considered a manifestation of the soul and referred to it as the “luminous body.”

He posited that the human body, in the light of the soul’s identity and manifestation, is beyond materiality and only the soul’s invention brings it into existence. He maintained that it is the human soul that forms its own body, and that the true nature of humanity is the soul itself, which constantly manifests such a body, without resorting to external materiality or resemblance. He did not consider materiality or weight as possessing identity or substance, nor did he attribute objectivity to it.

This paper critically reviews and assesses all existing views, concluding with a detailed examination of the Qur’anic perspective on the resurrection. In the end, the preferred theory, specific to this article, is presented.

And our final prayer is: Praise be to Allah, Lord of the worlds.

On the concept of “substance” and “spirituality”:

Spirituality refers to a state where an entity exists independently of matter and its material effects, and is not dependent on matter for its existence. Existence is not confined to the material world; there are also immaterial entities that exist in the universe. Consequently, beings in the world can be divided into two categories: material beings and immaterial beings. It is not true that existence is synonymous with matter, as some materialists claim, who argue that existence and matter are equivalent.

Theologians, though they do not equate existence with matter, acknowledge the principle of spirituality and divide existence into two categories: the spiritual (pertaining to the Divine) and the material (pertaining to contingent beings). In their view, all immaterial entities, whether angels, spirits, or souls, are considered as material.

If someone accepts the principle of spirituality, they must provide proof for its restriction to the Divine. There is no necessary correlation between spirituality and the concept of the eternal, nor is there a necessary link between spirituality and the eternal or the Divine existence. The differences in theological discussions usually concern the nature of contingent existence, not the nature of the spiritual or eternal. A contingent being can be both eternal and spiritual, just as a Divine being can be eternal and spiritual.

Therefore, existence is not confined to matter, nor is the concept of eternity exclusive to the Divine, as both material and spiritual beings can possess the attributes of eternity, with the former being dependent on the latter for their existence.

Arguments for the Spiritual Nature of the Soul:

The arguments for the spirituality of the human soul can be divided into two main categories: rational and scriptural arguments. Among scriptural arguments, there are two major schools of thought: one that prioritises logical and rational arguments while interpreting religious texts through reason, and the other that focuses solely on scriptural sources and interprets them within a theological framework. The former group comprises philosophers, and the latter group is made up of theologians.

Though each group presents different arguments, both ultimately affirm the existence of an immaterial reality that transcends the physical realm. Below are some of the rational and scriptural arguments that support this view:

1. The Concept of Universality and Abstraction:
   Human beings can perceive abstract, simple, and universal concepts that cannot be reduced to material forms. The ability to conceptualise these ideas demonstrates that human cognition operates beyond the limitations of matter.
2. The Effects of Spirituality:
   Every material being has effects that cannot be renewed once the material existence is lost, whereas a person’s knowledge, once forgotten, can be recalled without the need for physical reformation, indicating that the soul’s nature is not material.
3. The True Nature of Personality:
   Individuals perceive their essence independently of their material components, demonstrating that the true nature of the self lies in the soul rather than in the material body.
4. The Limitation of Matter:
   Material beings are subject to physical limitations, but the human mind is not constrained by these limitations, suggesting that the soul is not material.
5. Spiritual Attention Beyond the Senses:
   Even when sensory faculties are inactive, such as during sleep, the soul continues its development and attention to spiritual matters, further indicating that the soul is immaterial.

Scriptural Evidence:

• The Divine Command:
  The Qur’an states: “And they ask you about the soul. Say, ‘The soul is of the command of my Lord.'” (17:85). This verse indicates that the soul is a divine command, transcendent of the material world, and beyond human comprehension.
• Creation in Stages:
  The Qur’an outlines the creation of humanity from clay, followed by the development of bodily parts, concluding with the creation of the soul: “Then We created another creation” (23:14). This demonstrates the separation of the material and spiritual components of human existence.

Hadith Evidence:

The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) said: “He who knows himself, knows his Lord” (Tafsir al-Jalalayn). This highlights the connection between spiritual knowledge and divine understanding, indicating that the soul, as distinct from the body, is the primary locus of divine knowledge.

No living being is destroyed or annihilated. Since our material world and worldly life come to an end with death, and a person no longer remains in the world of matter, having a form of annihilation, its end cannot be equated with the complete non-existence of the world and human beings. The continuation of existence requires a specific form for its endurance, which holds the title of the continuity and length of the life of the world and humanity, referred to as the afterlife and the higher life, where existence ultimately culminates.

If it is argued that the death of a human being is not the same as the death of the world, and that the world can persist even without the existence of human beings, there is no necessary connection between these two phenomena, the response should be: What is certain and beyond doubt is that the death of the human being will occur, and with the death of the human being, the afterlife is established. Without the existence of another world, the existential progression of human life would not be possible. When this world is incapable of bearing such a burden, an afterlife must exist. Furthermore, the claim of a third world in humanity does not hold, as it lacks purpose or wisdom, and without the second assumption, the third does not exist. The third world is essentially the second world, which is the afterlife.

Moreover, it must be said that the transformation and final annihilation of the cosmic world and its material forms is an established religious, scientific, and philosophical matter. Since its end cannot be accompanied by complete non-existence, there must be another world that exists in continuity with this world, where existence progresses, and this world is referred to as the afterlife.

Three. Final and Efficient Causes

The existential movement of a human being, if from matter to matter and from a sperm to dust and death, would be equivalent to non-existence. Beyond this, annihilation cannot be the final cause of the movement and progression of a human or any other being. This is because such non-existence would be equivalent to the absence of a cause, and the absence of a final cause is akin to the absence of an effect. However, the existence of movement, action, the world, and existence are self-evident concepts in human thought. Therefore, the existence of action, the cause of the agent, and the agent itself affirm the final cause. The final cause cannot be realised in this world, which is one of death and annihilation. Only the afterlife, therefore, can sustain the existential progression of beings, especially humans.

These arguments also serve to prove the spiritual resurrection, because the essence of all movements in beings, particularly humans, is their spirit, which is eternal, and the body and material elements are not independent entities. A person is nothing other than the spiritual essence, which accompanies the body.

The Relationship of the Soul with the Principle of Resurrection

With the establishment of the principle of resurrection and the existential nature of humanity in this return, human beings must, by necessity, possess an essence called the soul and spirit. Even some theologians, who regard the resurrection as solely physical, consider the return to be based on the soul of humanity, albeit with the belief that the soul is material. It is the soul of a person that gives him his existence, and it is the soul that continues the existential journey of a human being, whether the soul is material or immaterial.

The movement of humanity and its existential journey from potentiality to actuality is a process led by the soul, which is the true identity and essence of this journey. The soul, which constitutes the true identity of a human being, shapes his essence, nurtures him, and in all states and worlds, serves as the basis for his individuality, whether in terms of intellectual and moral development or in relation to good, shortcomings, beauty, and ugliness.

After the principle of resurrection is established, there is no difficulty in proving the spiritual resurrection, except for the fact that the theologian faces a challenge in understanding the primary attribute of the soul, which is its immateriality, and may wrongly regard it as material. This issue was thoroughly explored and clarified, and once the error in this matter was demonstrated, the reason for the theologian’s insistence on materiality became apparent.

The Fallacy of the Belief in the Separation of the Soul

A fallacious belief is the misconception that the separation of the soul results in either polytheism or an impossible occurrence. However, polytheism and disbelief are solely linked to the belief in multiple gods, the denial of God, or the rejection of other essential aspects of religion. In this regard, none of the aforementioned situations is realised.

Reasons for the Denial of the Afterlife

It is noteworthy that the denial of the afterlife is particularly characteristic of those who, in some way, reject the concept of the divine cause of the universe. The denial of the divine cause necessarily entails the denial of the final cause.

The concept of the afterlife is one of the oldest human thoughts, and the Holy Quran explicitly addresses some of the deniers of the afterlife.

Concerning the reality of this world, the Holy Quran states: “This is the provision of the worldly life, and with Allah is the best return” (Quran 3:14). It also says: “And the worldly life is nothing but the enjoyment of delusion” (Quran 57:20). Similarly, it states: “And the provision of this worldly life compared to the Hereafter is but little” (Quran 87:14).

These verses present the world as a temporary and illusory provision, highlighting its fleeting nature and considering it insignificant in comparison to the afterlife.

The deniers of the afterlife believe that there is no such thing as an afterlife, and that everything exists solely within the limits of this world, which ultimately ends in the annihilation of human beings. The Quran mentions them as follows: “And they say: ‘There is nothing but our worldly life. We die and live, and nothing destroys us but time’” (Quran 45:24).

They assert that only time governs our existence and that no afterlife exists; they believe that we die and are never resurrected, with the reality confined to this worldly existence, and that we ultimately perish. This group, known as the “Dahris” or “Materialists,” holds the view that human beings are completely annihilated with death, and that they do not undergo any form of resurrection.

Such beliefs stem from a lack of proper reflection and intellectual engagement, as the Quran describes them: “They have hearts with which they do not understand, and they have ears with which they do not listen, and they have eyes with which they do not see” (Quran 7:179). While they possess the faculties of heart, ear, and eye, they fail to utilise these senses properly to discern the truth. Though they are endowed with the full range of human faculties, they do not use them for proper understanding, and they behave more like animals, as the Quran states: “They are like cattle, indeed they are even more astray” (Quran 7:179). In Islamic jurisprudence and theology, they are labelled as disbelievers and polytheists, and they are considered impure, alongside substances such as urine, blood, and excrement, not to denigrate them, but to highlight the reality of their state.

Reincarnation

As previously mentioned, the affirmation of the afterlife, along with its eternal nature, is incompatible with the theory of material change and the perishable nature of the body. Some, like the Dahris who reject the afterlife but do not consider annihilation to be the end of human existence, believe in reincarnation. They propose that the human soul, upon death, transitions into another body, thereby denying the afterlife but advocating for the continuation of existence through reincarnation.

One of the primary arguments of reincarnationists is the issue of the return of the deceased and the so-called paradox of the eater and the eaten. Despite its ancient roots, this idea remains prominent.

The Paradox of Returning the Deceased

In response to the paradox of returning the deceased, it must be clarified that this issue does not actually pertain to the concept of bodily resurrection. Furthermore, it must be stated that the return of the deceased is fundamentally impossible in all its particulars, and those who view it as possible have not adequately understood the subject and its details. While they may believe that they are defending the concept of resurrection, they have only exacerbated the problem without resolving any of its difficulties.

The return of the deceased, though considered impossible, does not apply to the concept of physical or spiritual resurrection. In fact, nothing becomes completely extinct, and thus the issue of returning the extinct does not arise. The question of returning the extinct is, in essence, a mistaken one, as nothing truly becomes extinct or ceases to exist. The existence of all things, including humans, continues through divine will, and nothing is truly lost or annihilated.

The Paradox of the Eater and the Eaten

The paradox of the eater and the eaten does not concern those who believe in a purely spiritual resurrection, as the issue at hand involves the physical body and matter. However, belief in a purely spiritual afterlife is an incomplete and insufficient stance that does not align with the Qur’anic understanding of the afterlife.

Those who believe in bodily resurrection, both theologians and Islamic philosophers, recognise this. Many Islamic theologians, who consider the soul to be a very subtle form of matter, respond to this paradox by asserting that the components of the human body can be categorised into primary and secondary parts. God preserves the primary components of the body, which are essential to its identity, while the secondary and extraneous parts are subject to change. This view, however, is not scientifically grounded, as the idea of primary and secondary components lacks clear evidence, especially since it is evident that all parts of the body undergo constant change. Those who consider the soul to be material also cannot escape the idea that the soul too would undergo changes, as no component of the human being remains unchanged.

Moreover, those who argue that God preserves the primary parts of the body without providing specific evidence are not offering a scientifically valid argument. This leaves the issue open to speculation and conjecture.

Philosophical Response

Philosophers, particularly Mulla Sadra, argue that the true essence of a person is the soul, and that matter plays a temporary and transitional role in the process of human development. While humans cannot exist without matter in this world, their essence is not bound to it. The soul, when placed in its proper context, forms a bond with the body and moulds it according to its needs. When the soul’s state changes, the material components of the body also change, but the body does not possess an eternal identity.

The body, in its material form, does not play a significant role in the everlasting existence of the human being. The human essence remains intact through both the soul and the body, with the body adapting to the needs of the soul. Hence, materiality does not have a lasting identity of its own; it merely serves as a temporary vessel.

Refuting the Paradox of Reincarnation

Reincarnation does not pose an obstacle to the acceptance of bodily resurrection and is entirely unrelated to it. Reincarnationists may accept the concept of resurrection, even if they believe in reincarnation, by suggesting that even if the soul is reborn into another body, it will eventually face resurrection after undergoing purification and development.

However, some proponents of reincarnation, who do not perceive an afterlife as separate from reincarnation, are indifferent to the true nature of the afterlife as defined by Islamic law. Even though reincarnation is scientifically untenable, its proponents might argue that if the soul were to reunite with another body, it would retain its original body. Furthermore, the body must be of a compatible nature with the soul, as the soul forms its own body and cannot adapt to a body that was not designed for it.

In addressing reincarnation, two points must be made clear. Firstly, those who initially proposed the concept of reincarnation failed to recognise the true nature of human existence and the ultimate aim of human development. Secondly, secularists and materialists have supported the spread of reincarnation to undermine the concept of an afterlife, as it serves as a way to promote atheism and disinterest in the afterlife.

The concept of duality and pairing in all things is derived from these verses. It can be stated that all material things and phenomena in both this world and the afterlife have corresponding pairs, as Allah says: “This is what they shall taste, boiling water and foul-smelling pus, and other similar ones” (Quran, 56: 93). “Hameem” refers to boiling water, and “ghassaq” refers to extremely foul-smelling pus, while “azwaj” means companions or similar ones. As it is stated: “The fuel is people and stones” (Quran, 66: 6). All of these matters, in a manner akin to the nature of the action of human beings, are presented to the inhabitants of Hell.

The pairs in Hell can refer to the worldly wives who, despite being together with their husbands in Hell, will not experience enjoyment or satisfaction. Contrary to the world, in Hell, the couples will intensify each other’s torment rather than providing peace and comfort. This is highlighted in the verse: “Gather those who wronged and their partners” (Quran, 36: 59). Whereas, regarding the righteous, it is said: “Gardens of Eternity, which they enter, along with those of their parents and spouses who are righteous” (Quran, 13: 23).

The Qualities of Heavenly Women

In the Holy Quran, the women of Paradise are described with the following characteristics:

• “Purified spouses” (Quran, 56: 74): These women are pure, free from impurity in their sanctity, eternal, and never separated from their husbands. There is no divorce, separation, or lack of affection.
• “Lowering their gaze, keeping their eyes on their husbands alone” (Quran, 37: 48): These women only look at their husbands and have no thought of others.
• “They are like precious gems, and pearls” (Quran, 56: 23): These women are as beautiful and precious as rubies and pearls.
• “Companions of equal age” (Quran, 56: 35): The term “Arab” here refers to women who show great love and affection towards their husbands, with their love manifesting in playful interactions, indicating mutual affection.
• “And we made them virgins” (Quran, 56: 36): All the women of Paradise are virgins, exhibiting freshness, vitality, and a unique kind of bloom.
• “And we married them to wide-eyed houris” (Quran, 56: 37): These women are like the houris, divine beings with a pristine, luminous form, mirroring the pure, righteous women from the world who have reached their spiritual heights through truth and purity.

Conclusion of the Verses

From all the various verses discussed, it becomes clear that the magnificence of the heavenly afterlife can be understood and accepted without ambiguity. These features and titles signify the inner purity of the physical and material body, in conjunction with its spiritual essence. Maintaining the unique conditions of each realm, one truth and one reality manifests across both worlds.

It is the sustenance of the afterlife that appears as the form of the afterlife, and it is the pure, righteous woman who embodies the heavenly form. The actions of humanity are shown in the afterlife, without any deficiency, flaw, or loss of their material physicality. The material beings in the world, with their worldly characteristics, transform in the afterlife into beings of their eternal nature, without any alteration in essence or imitation.

Thunderstrikes and Resurrection

“The thunderbolt seized you while you were looking on” (Quran, 7: 98): The thunderbolt refers to the terrifying sound that results from the collision of wind and clouds, leading to fear, fainting, and sometimes death, all of which are implied by the meaning of “thunderstrike.” The term “thunderstrikes” appears several times in the Holy Quran.

“Then We resurrected you after your death” (Quran, 2: 56): Resurrection, in its essence, refers to raising and causing phenomena to come into existence. Although it has various applications, it can be attributed to both God and others, and the act of bringing the dead to life can occur in both the worldly and otherworldly context. It can also refer to awakening from death, unconsciousness, or sleep, as indicated in various verses:

• “And the dead are resurrected by Allah” (Quran, 36: 12).
• “Those who disbelieve think they will not be resurrected. Say: ‘Yes, by my Lord, you will surely be resurrected’” (Quran, 64: 7).

Thus, all these references highlight a single concept: the act of resurrection is consistent, whether it pertains to the physical resurrection of the body or the spiritual awakening of the soul.

The Resurrection of the Dead

Numerous verses address the resurrection and raising of the dead, all of which emphasize the alignment of the afterlife with the life of this world:

• “Who will return us to our graves?” (Quran, 36: 52). This question refers to the disbelief regarding resurrection, but it serves as a clear indication that the afterlife is analogous to worldly life, even though it differs in certain aspects.
• “Indeed, Allah resurrects those who are in the graves” (Quran, 36: 12). This is a clear reference to the fact that resurrection, even in its most basic form, reflects the continuation of life in the afterlife, akin to life in this world.
• “If you are in doubt about the resurrection, then indeed We created you from dust” (Quran, 22: 5). Just as it is difficult to comprehend the creation of humans from dust, so too is it difficult to accept the similarity between life in the afterlife and life in this world. The creation of humans from dust itself serves as evidence of the physical reality of resurrection.
• “They said: ‘When we have become decayed bones, will we be raised as a new creation?’” (Quran, 17: 49). Their doubt pertains to how they will be revived after physical decay, highlighting the connection between human existence in both worlds.

The Essence of Life

In Islamic theology, life is considered a manifestation of the divine attributes. As one of the most profound divine names, “Al-Hayy” (the Ever-Living), life is not merely biological existence but encompasses various forms, including human, animal, and even plant life. It also includes metaphorical forms, such as social, religious, and spiritual life.

• “And Allah sends down water from the sky and revives the earth after its death” (Quran, 30: 48). This analogy is used to describe the resurrection of the earth, a symbol of the resurrection of human beings in the afterlife.

Thus, life in the afterlife, although it differs in its nature from worldly life, remains essentially a continuation of the soul’s journey and existence, perfectly aligned with divine wisdom.

“And We said, ‘Strike him with part of it’ [95].

This verse refers to the revival of a murdered person whose killer was disputed, and each one distanced themselves from the responsibility. It instructs that the deceased be struck with a part of the cow’s body to witness how the divine power manifests and brings life to the dead.

“And We said, ‘Strike the stone with your staff'” [96].

This verse pertains to the Prophet Moses, stating: “When Moses prayed for water for his people, We instructed him, ‘Strike the stone with your staff,’ and twelve springs gushed forth from it.” Here, when Moses struck the stone with his staff, not only water but twelve different springs appeared, each suitable for the needs of the people. It is important to note that this miraculous event occurred when Moses struck the stone, not the ground.

It was not only Moses and his staff that performed this miracle. Rather, it demonstrates that all manifestations of divine power, even the mere act of striking with a cow’s bone, can lead to the manifestation of life, similar to how Moses’ staff, when used in a higher context, caused water to flow. This highlights the continuity of life in all stages of existence.

The truth to be understood from this event is that death and life are universal concepts in all creatures, and just as the earth, though barren, is revived, so too will the dead be resurrected on the Day of Judgment. There is no contradiction or impossibility in this, as the Divine power will manifest in a form that is consistent with the material and spiritual aspects of creation.

As noted in another verse, the people of the Book, even when acknowledging the existence of Hell, accept the certainty of their brief stay in it, saying: “The fire will not touch us except for a few days” [97].

The distinction between mass (touch) and lams (contact) here highlights that mass indicates the certainty of a punishment, even if it is not consciously perceived. It is a sensory experience that may not involve full awareness, while lams implies a deeper sensory experience that typically involves full awareness. The Qur’an states: “If a blow strikes you, it has struck the people in the same manner” [98], showing that even physical pain or hardship is an inevitable reality.

From this, we understand that divine punishment, while real and material, can affect both the physical body and the spiritual soul. The term mass indicates the inevitable experience of such suffering, as opposed to lams, which would imply conscious awareness and an element of relief.

The Appearance of All in the Presence of the Divine

“Wherever you may be, Allah will bring you together” [105].

This verse emphasizes the universal nature of God’s power, indicating that on the Day of Resurrection, everyone will be resurrected with their entire being – body and soul – reunited. The verse reinforces the idea that the resurrection is not a mere spiritual phenomenon but a holistic one, encompassing both the soul and the body. God has the power to bring this about in any circumstance, whether someone is alive or deceased, regardless of their location.

“Wherever you are, death will find you” [108].

This verse addresses the inevitability of death. It assures that no matter where one might be – in a fortress or a high tower – death will find them, emphasizing that death is an essential existential truth, not merely an abstract concept. This reality is defined by the divine power that brings death at its ordained moment. The verse further assures that the resurrection on the Day of Judgment will occur in the same form in which individuals existed in this life, with no diminution or alteration of their essence.

“The punishment will not be lightened for them, nor will they be reprieved” [109].

The verse here underscores that the punishment for disbelievers is permanent and unrelenting. There is no lightening of their torment. This is a material suffering, and while it might be claimed that the soul experiences it, it cannot be said to be purely spiritual, as the punishment is depicted as tangible and real. The use of the term mass further affirms this material reality.

“And they will never escape from the Fire” [110].

This expression indicates that the physical nature of the punishment is irrefutable. “Never escape” connotes a permanent, irreversible state, marking a significant departure from any illusionary escape from suffering.

“And Allah will not speak to them on the Day of Resurrection” [111].

The silence of the Divine on the Day of Judgment highlights the severity of the punishment. God’s speech, which is a manifestation of His will, is absent for those who deserve punishment, signifying a total severance from divine mercy.

“Wretched is the resting place” [112].

The term mihad (resting place) here implies a prepared place of abode, traditionally understood as a physical, material realm. This further emphasizes the tangible and material aspects of the punishment and the reality of the existence that awaits the disbelievers in the afterlife.

“Know that you will meet Him, and give glad tidings to the believers” [113].

The final verse points out that the believers, who live a life of piety and righteousness, will ultimately meet their Lord in the afterlife. The reference to meeting with God on the Day of Resurrection speaks to the reunion of the entire being – body and soul – as it was in life. The notion of meeting is grounded in the material and existential reality of the afterlife, where both body and soul come together once again.

The Story of Uzair (Ezra)

It is appropriate here to refer to three important stories: the story of Uzair, the request of Prophet Ibrahim, and the Companions of the Cave, each of which holds great significance in the context of resurrection and life after death.

The story of Prophet Uzair in Surah Baqarah relates to the themes of life, death, resurrection, and the revival of the dead. In this story, Uzair, upon passing through a ruined town, marvels at the idea of how God could bring it back to life after it had been destroyed. God causes him to die for one hundred years and then brings him back to life. He is asked how long he has been dead, to which he responds that it feels like only a day or part of a day. God then shows him the decayed remains of his donkey, which have come back together, illustrating the power of resurrection.

This remarkable event emphasizes that the resurrection is not an abstract or distant concept but a real, tangible process in which physical and spiritual bodies are revived without losing their essence. It shows that death is not the end, but part of the ongoing divine plan that leads to the ultimate reunion of the individual with the Divine. Through this story, the certainty of God’s power and ability to bring life to what was once dead is made manifest.

The Breath of Ibrahim and Divine Revivification

“Then call them, and they will come to you running” – The act of calling and praying is the breath of Ibrahim, which, although the act of revivification is the prerogative of the Almighty, with Allah being the doer and Prophet Ibrahim being the supplicant, is akin to the process where life, even after being crushed in birds, reveals itself sharply and intensely.

In this narration, similar to the story of Uzair, the writer avoids irrelevant or misleading discussions. There is no need to examine the specific names of the birds, the number of mountains upon which the flesh was placed, the names of those mountains, the location of the shore, or the type of the dead animal. What matters is the manner of revivification and the restoration of life to the dead, through the power of the Divine, as witnessed by Prophet Ibrahim.

Differences between the Two Narratives

Although the two narratives of Ibrahim and Uzair both ultimately convey the same truth and depict the revival of life, there are several distinct differences between them that are worth noting.

In the story of Uzair, the specific name of Uzair is not mentioned, whereas in the story of Ibrahim, his name is explicitly referenced.

In Uzair’s story, there is a 100-year death, of which Uzair was initially unaware. Upon dying and being revived, he becomes aware of it. Conversely, Prophet Ibrahim actively engages in the process of death and revivification of animals.

In Ibrahim’s story, the event involved a single instance of death and revivification, while in Uzair’s story, the process of revival is linked to three distinct stages: the preservation of untouched food and water, Uzair’s death, and the decay of the donkey, which signifies different stages of death and revival. These stages are important and are experienced within a specific time and space, unlike the story of the people of the cave, which may imply a prolonged unconsciousness or sleep rather than death.

Ultimately, what can be derived from the Qur’anic verse concerning the death and revival of animals is the understanding that Allah’s power does not extend to the impossible, and the revival of animals after their death – even after the mixing of their parts, which are indicative of their material essence – clarifies the concept of bodily resurrection. This event, while taking place in the world, can display the physical and spiritual resurrection of the dead without being in any way inconceivable.

The People of the Cave

In Surah Al-Kahf, aside from the many profound truths, there are wonders that are unique to this Surah. The story of Musa and Khidr, the tale of Dhul-Qarnayn, and the story of the People of the Cave are the key narratives in this Surah. The story of the People of the Cave is not only a testament to the divine authority of Allah but also the most vivid demonstration of the complete realization of the resurrection of both body and soul. This Surah, being a Meccan Surah, recounts the tale of the People of the Cave from verses 9 to 26. The context of this passage is linked to a question posed by the Jews to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), seeking knowledge about the scriptures of the past. The verse concludes with: “We relate to you their story with truth.”

In a remarkable account, a group of faithful people, disillusioned with society, take refuge in a cave, and sleep for over three hundred years, awakening with the perception that they had slept for a day or part of a day.

“Do you think the People of the Cave and the Inscription were a wonder among Our signs?” (18:9)

Allah (SWT) says to His Messenger: This story is not the only wonder of Our signs. Rather, all of creation, with its many characteristics, can be a source of wonder for the wise.

Though the terms Cave and Inscription refer to one tale, their multiplicity of titles serves a specific purpose that is not the focus here.

“Remember when the young men took refuge in the cave” (18:10).

The title young men signifies their bravery and faith. This story reveals that these individuals faced severe difficulties in their time, leading them to seek refuge from their society and turn to their Lord, saying, “Our Lord, grant us mercy from Yourself and provide for us the right course of action” (18:10). Thus, when they took refuge in the cave, they were enveloped in Allah’s mercy, and their supplications were fully answered. Allah put them into a deep sleep, as if they had died, without them experiencing death in the conventional sense.

The verse says: “We caused them to sleep for many years in the cave” (18:11). This demonstrates that they remained alive, not dead, during their sleep.

Then Allah says: “And We revived them, so that We might show which of the two groups was more precise in calculating the period they remained in their sleep” (18:12).

When they awoke, a question arose among them: “How long have we been asleep?” Some of them thought it was a day or part of a day, while the more enlightened among them said, “Your Lord knows best how long you have slept.” This demonstrates the complete understanding and insight of these young men.

From this series of questions and answers, it becomes clear that the group was not small, and that they engaged in conversation with one another. Allah says: “And thus, We raised them up so they could question one another” (18:19).

The Qur’an also describes how the sun interacted with their cave in a way that was gentle and harmonious, providing them with perfect conditions for their prolonged slumber without causing discomfort.

“…And you would have thought them awake, while they were asleep” (18:18). Their bodies were turned from side to side by the sun, in a manner that would prevent them from being harmed by their physical state. “We caused them to shift from one side to the other” (18:18). Their loyal dog lay at the entrance, guarding them.

The sight of their bodies, though appearing as though they were awake, filled any onlooker with awe and fear. Their appearance was contradictory, and the unusual arrangement of their bodies seemed unnatural to observers. The verse says: “If you had looked at them, you would have turned away from them in flight and been filled with terror” (18:18).

After their awakening, the group wished to send one among them to the city to buy food, testing the current state of the world around them. This event, filled with subtlety, revealed their story to the people. The people learned that Allah’s promise of the Day of Judgment was true, and that the resurrection was a reality.

“Thus, We made their story known, that they may know that Allah’s promise is true, and that the Hour is without doubt” (18:21).

The people gathered around the cave, though the people of the cave themselves did not continue their lives in the world. Their lives came to an end, as Allah says: “They said: ‘Build a structure over them. Their Lord knows best about them.’” (18:21).

Though the tale of the People of the Cave provided enlightenment regarding resurrection, it does not pursue other questions regarding their fate. Allah says: “Their Lord knows best about them.”

The significance of this event can be understood in several key points:

1. Length of Sleep: The story of the People of the Cave highlights the theme of a miraculous sleep lasting for over 300 years, while in the stories of Ibrahim and Uzair, the themes of death and revival are explored. The story of Ibrahim revolves around the death and revival of birds, while the story of Uzair discusses human and animal death and the preservation of food and water.
2. Stage of Revival: In the narrative of Ibrahim and the People of the Cave, the story follows a singular theme, while Uzair’s story involves three stages: the preservation of food, the death of humans, and the revival of animals, creating a unique and thought-provoking scenario that emphasizes the divine will at work in different conditions.
3. Harmony and Protection: The condition of the People of the Cave involved a unique harmony between the cave’s environment, the movement of the sun, and the shifting of their bodies, all contributing to their physical well-being during their deep sleep. This reflects the divine intervention that ensures the preservation of life.

The central idea of these events—whether they relate to death, revival, sleep, or waking—demonstrates the interconnectedness of body and soul, further reinforcing the notion of bodily resurrection.

Further Verses on Bodily Resurrection

Additional verses emphasize the reality of bodily resurrection, closing the door to any misinterpretation or rejection of the concept:

“Our Lord, surely You will gather the people for a Day of which there is no doubt” (3:9).

This verse clearly implies a physical gathering of people, similar to the conditions of this world, while also acknowledging the reality of the afterlife.

Other verses such as “How, when We gather them for a Day that there is no doubt” and “On the Day when faces will be bright and others dark” (3:9) further illustrate the bodily aspects of the resurrection.

These verses, among many others, help establish the physical and material nature of the resurrection, and refute interpretations that attempt to spiritualize or intellectualize it to the exclusion of its tangible, bodily reality.

Conclusion

The narrative of the People of the Cave, along with other stories from the Qur’an, provides a compelling affirmation of both bodily and spiritual resurrection. This makes it clear that resurrection in the afterlife is a physical reality and not simply a metaphorical or spiritual concept.

The Death of Ibrahim and Divine Resurrection

“Then call them, and they will come to you in haste.” The act of calling and supplication is the “breath” of Ibrahim, which although the act of resurrection belongs to Allah alone, and Allah is the Creator while Ibrahim’s role is that of the supplicant and intermediary for resurrection, the essence of life in birds is deeply embedded, manifesting life through rapid movements.

The author of this narration, similar to the story of the Prophet Uzair, does not delve into unnecessary or irrelevant discussions. It is not required to investigate the names of those birds, the number of mountains on which the meat was placed, the names of those mountains, or where the shores of the sea lay, or what kind of animal the dead body was. What is significant is how resurrection and the restoration of life to the dead is manifested by the divine will, as seen by Prophet Ibrahim.

Differences between the Two Stories

The stories of Ibrahim and Uzair, while both ultimately expressing the same truth and both illustrating the concept of resurrection, have certain differences that are noteworthy, and some of these will be pointed out.

In the story of Uzair, the name of Uzair is not mentioned in the relevant verse, while in the story of Ibrahim, his name is explicitly mentioned.

In the story of Uzair, there is the concept of a hundred-year death, though Uzair himself is unaware of his death initially. After he dies and is resurrected, he becomes aware of his death. In contrast, Prophet Ibrahim himself actively engages in the process of causing death and resurrection to the animals.

In Ibrahim’s narrative, there is a single instance of both death and resurrection, whereas the resurrection in Uzair’s story involves three distinct forms: the freshness of water and food, the death of a human without the dissolution of the body, and the disintegration of the animal’s body. All of this happens within a single time and spatial context, giving it great significance. The only common element between these two stories is the resurrection from death, unlike the story of the People of the Cave, where the condition may have been one of unconsciousness or sleep, not death.

Ultimately, from this blessed verse regarding the death and resurrection of animals, we can conclude that Allah’s power does not involve the impossible. The resurrection of these animals after their death and disintegration of their parts, which reflects the material aspect and the preservation of their physical components, also serves as a strong illustration of bodily resurrection. Although this phenomenon occurs in the world and can manifest in varying temporal and spatial conditions, it serves as a clear indication of the resurrection of both body and soul, without anything impossible involved.

The People of the Cave

The surah of Al-Kahf, beyond its many profound truths, presents unique wonders that are characteristic of this chapter.

The stories of Moses and Khidr, Dhul-Qarnayn, and the People of the Cave are among the narratives in this surah. The story of the People of the Cave, in addition to demonstrating Allah’s sovereignty, offers the clearest evidence for the complete realisation of both bodily and spiritual resurrection. This surah is a Makki surah, and from verses 9 to 26, it recounts the story of the People of the Cave. This context also sets the stage for the previous background, wherein the Jews, seeking knowledge from previous holy scriptures, posed a question to the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). In the end, Allah says, “We relate their story to you in truth” (18:13).

Remarkable! A group of faithful individuals—who had distanced themselves from everyone and everything, losing all hope—take refuge in a cave, where they fall into a deep sleep. They remain in this state for over three hundred years, and when they awaken, they believe they have slept for a single day, or part of it.

“Do you think the People of the Cave and the inscription were among Our signs a wonder?” (18:9)

Allah the Almighty tells His Messenger that it is not only this incident that is among His astonishing signs, but indeed all of creation with its diverse characteristics can be a source of wonder for any discerning mind.

Although the terms “cave” and “inscription” refer to the same event, their use as separate titles has a distinct purpose, which we do not aim to elaborate here.

“When the young men sought refuge in the cave” (18:10)

The term “youth” here indicates their nobility and faith. From this account, we understand that they had fallen into such extreme hardship due to the events of their time that they had no option but to flee from their people and seek refuge in their Lord, just as they said: “Our Lord, grant us mercy from Yourself and provide for us from our affair right guidance” (18:10).

When they turned to Allah in refuge and apparently entered the cave, Allah’s mercy was upon them, and their supplication was completely accepted. Allah caused them to fall into a deep sleep, in which they remained alive and were not affected by death. As He says: “We covered their ears in the cave for a number of years” (18:11), then says: “Then We raised them up again” (18:19), referring to their awakening from their long slumber.

“When We awakened them, it was to see which of the two groups could better calculate how long they had tarried” (18:12)

When they awoke, they were puzzled about how long they had been asleep. Some of them thought it was a single day or part of a day, while others—among the wisest—said: “Your Lord knows best how long you have been asleep.” This shows that they were all aware of the reality of their situation.

From the various questions and answers that followed, it becomes clear that their number was not small, and they conversed among themselves. Allah says: “Thus We made them to question one another” (18:19).

“And you would have seen the sun when it rose, inclining to the right of their cave, and when it set, leaving them on the left, while they lay in the open space” (18:17)

This verse beautifully describes the relationship between the sun and the cave, indicating how it perfectly accommodated them. The sun’s movement was gentle, without causing discomfort, and the cave provided a comfortable space for them, ensuring they remained undisturbed and unharmed by the passage of time.

Their loyal dog, with its outstretched limbs, guarded the entrance to the cave, like a lion safeguarding their lives and their form: “And their dog stretched his forelegs at the entrance” (18:18).

Their state was such that anyone who observed them might have been frightened by their appearance. Their position, as though they were awake yet sleeping, gave the impression of being simultaneously alive and at rest.

If you had looked at them, you would have turned away from them in fright, and filled with terror at the sight of them” (18:18)

After they awoke, they sought to understand their situation, and through this interaction, they helped the people around them understand the reality of life and death, thus providing a clear message about the resurrection.

“Send one of you with this silver coin to the city” (18:19), “And thus did We make their case known that they might know that the promise of Allah is true, and that the Hour, there is no doubt about it” (18:21).

We made this happen so that all people would know that Allah’s promise is true, and that the Hour is certain.

When the people became aware of them, they gathered around the cave. Though the people’s curiosity grew, the young men’s lives came to an end. As it is said: “They said, ‘Build a building over them. Their Lord knows best about them’” (18:21).

The account of the People of the Cave, though it provided a platform for the masses to better understand the reality of resurrection, raises questions that the Qur’an does not address further, as it says: “Your Lord knows best about them.”

The characteristics of this event can be summarised as follows:

a. This account speaks of the sleep of the People of the Cave for three hundred years, whereas in the stories of Ibrahim and Uzair, the themes of death, resurrection, and revivification are involved. Ibrahim’s story involves the resurrection of birds, and Uzair’s recounts the death of a man and an animal and the freshness of water and food.

b. While Ibrahim and the People of the Cave deal with a singular event, the story of Uzair includes three distinct states: the freshness of water and food, the death of a person without decomposition, and the decay of an animal’s body, all occurring in one time and place, which invites reflection on the unique nature of these phenomena.

c. In the story of the People of the Cave, there is a special harmony to the conditions that allowed for such a miraculous event: the position of the cave, the way the sun’s movement aligned with it, and most importantly, the way their bodies were preserved and moved, preventing any deterioration.

Another point of interest is that anything can happen given the proper conditions and possibilities, unless it involves an inherent impossibility. Animals that were disintegrated are revived, people sleep for an extended period without experiencing true death, and seemingly impossible events unfold, all of which clearly manifest Allah’s omnipotence.

The key takeaway from the stories of the People of the Cave and others is that the connection between body and soul is essential. All these events combine both the physical and the spiritual realms, emphasizing the unity and connection between them.

These verses clarify the close relationship between body and soul, leaving no room for allegorical interpretations. They provide a clear and undeniable illustration of both bodily and spiritual resurrection

reinforcing the concept of resurrection in the afterlife as both tangible and real. In the text of Tajreed, after presenting two arguments regarding the necessity of fulfilling promises and the profound wisdom underlying them for the establishment of the concept of the Afterlife, it is stated: “And necessity dictates the confirmation of the bodily aspect of the Prophet’s religion, given its possibility.”

The Merciful Lord has promised rewards for the righteous deeds of the believers. The fulfilment of such promises cannot occur within the scope of duties and actions in this world. It is only achievable in the context of action and in another realm—namely, the Afterlife. In the Afterlife, human beings are resurrected, and without any further duties or responsibilities, they receive the rewards for their good deeds.

In the text of Tajreed, after presenting two reasons for the necessity of fulfilling promises and the profound wisdom behind them to establish the principle of the Afterlife, it is stated: “And necessity dictates the confirmation of the bodily aspect of the Prophet’s religion, given its possibility.”

The Merciful Lord has promised rewards for the good deeds of the believers, and the fulfilment of such promises cannot take place within the scope of duties and actions in this world. It is only achievable in another realm—namely, the Afterlife. In the Afterlife, humans are resurrected and, without any further duties or responsibilities, receive the rewards for their righteous deeds.

Another reason for the necessity of the Afterlife is the divine wisdom in ordaining duties and prohibitions for people. Thus, the rewards and punishments associated with these duties must materialize. If there are discussions about the non-fulfilment of divine threats, there can be no possibility of deviation in the divine promise.

The Afterlife is necessary according to the profound wisdom of God, and the reasons mentioned are sufficient to prove the existence of the Afterlife. However, they do not confirm the bodily resurrection, and a purely spiritual resurrection would suffice to achieve the divine purpose.

Khwaja states that the bodily resurrection is a distinctive feature of the Prophet’s religion, and according to the late Allama—commentator of Tajreed—numerous verses support this notion. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that such a resurrection is impossible, and its possibility is acknowledged.

Allama states that bodily resurrection is possible because the term “resurrection” refers to the gathering of scattered parts, and this is inherently feasible. The Almighty God is capable of such a resurrection.

Allama further explains that Khwaja’s statement aims to address the objections posed by philosophers regarding the bodily resurrection. Khwaja argues that the necessary components to be resurrected on the Day of Judgment are the primary parts of the body, which will be reunited with the soul. It is not necessary for the other parts of the body to be resurrected, as the primary parts of the human body remain unchanged throughout a person’s life and do not merge with the body of another. This assertion, while rationally possible, is also emphatically supported by religion, as evidenced by numerous verses and narrations.

Khwaja’s assertion about the possibility of bodily resurrection refers specifically to the possibility of resurrecting the primary components of the human body on the Day of Judgment. However, it was noted earlier that such a resurrection does not align with scientific discussions, as we do not recognize specific “primary” parts of the body in this context. If certain theologians’ claims that the soul is also material are considered, the very essence of the human soul would no longer remain constant, and the entire spiritual and bodily identity of a person would undergo constant change, with no permanence or stability.

The claim of the necessity of religion regarding the existence of the Afterlife or bodily resurrection is valid, but the nature of the resurrection or the type of bodily resurrection remains unclear and should not be assumed to be inherently necessary. In fact, it can be argued that it is impossible for the Afterlife, eternity, or immortality to occur with a mutable material substance, in any form. Consequently, the issue of bodily resurrection becomes a matter of rational debate, leaving no room for its possibility. Therefore, those who, like Sheikh and others, assert that reason has no role in the specifics of resurrection and that only religious texts should be followed, are not engaging in theological speculation but are rather concerned with the issue at a deeper level. In contrast, for a spiritual resurrection, there is no such issue, as both reason and religion are in agreement.

Allama, in his commentary on Khwaja’s statement, does not introduce new ideas but merely elaborates on Khwaja’s words. He states that early philosophers denied bodily resurrection, while religious figures universally affirmed it. The necessity of the bodily resurrection is evident from the divine revelation and is confirmed by numerous verses in the Qur’an. While it is indeed a possible concept, the Prophet’s teachings have further emphasized it, and all believers are required to accept it: “People have disagreed here; the early ones denied bodily resurrection, while the adherents of faith unanimously affirmed it… It is proven by the necessity of the Prophet’s religion, and the Qur’an attests to it in many verses. Though it is a possible reality, the Prophet’s teachings have reinforced it, and every believer must accept it.”

Early Christian theologians, proponents of reincarnation, Al-Ghazali (from the Ash’ari school), Ibn al-Haytham (from the Karamiyya), and some Shiite theologians and Sufis hold the view that the responsibility, the essence of accountability, and the reward and punishment in this world belong solely to the disembodied soul, and that the body has no role in this process. Thus, in the Afterlife, it is only the disembodied soul that receives reward or punishment.

In response to the objections of philosophers, as repeatedly mentioned, Allama states that the primary components of the human body are preserved and cannot be merged with the body of another. Thus, humans will be resurrected on the Day of Judgment with these same primary parts and will be held accountable for their actions.

However, the flaw in this response has already been pointed out: there are no such distinct “primary parts” in the human body, and all material parts of the body undergo constant change and transformation. Furthermore, this claim lacks substantial supporting evidence and requires an appropriate counter-response to the objections raised.

Allama attributes the denial of bodily resurrection to certain groups and individuals, stating that they view resurrection and individual identity as being limited to the disembodied soul. However, such attributions lack historical accuracy and are not entirely precise, and the generalization of these views is vague. Moreover, the reference to early Greek philosophers or other philosophers is not supported by solid historical evidence, and the statement remains unclear and ambiguous.

Allama al-Hilli continues: “The resurrection involves this very manifest body. This is a great principle, and its affirmation is a pillar of the religion. Those who deny it are, by consensus, infidels. Anyone who does not affirm bodily resurrection, or the reward and punishment in the Afterlife, is an infidel by unanimous agreement.”

There is no dispute among the people of various faiths regarding the possibility of bodily resurrection because God, the Almighty, is capable of all things, and there is no doubt that bringing the body into existence again after it has perished is possible. As Allah Almighty says: “Is He not the one who created the heavens and the earth able to create the likes of them? And who revives the bones when they have decayed? Say: He will revive them, He who created them for the first time.” The Qur’an is full of references to resurrection, even though people differ on the nature of resurrection and destruction.

The belief in the physical resurrection, which is the cornerstone of the religion, is only affirmed according to the Imamiya school; because the only way to prove it is through narration, as reason can only indicate its possibility, not its actual occurrence. The reports of its occurrence are from God, and the occurrence of an abomination, such as lying about God, is impossible. This is the meaning behind the statement: “It is only affirmed according to the Imamiya school.”

The belief in a bodily resurrection, with the same physical body, is a fundamental pillar of the sacred religion of Islam, and its denial is tantamount to disbelief. The Qur’an repeatedly refers to this, and its possibility is rationally plausible, while its actual occurrence is a matter of revelation and law.

There is no dispute regarding the denial of the afterlife in general being a form of disbelief, as this is a necessity of the religion. However, the denial of the resurrection in the very same body is a matter of reflection and question, since such an issue is not an absolute certainty of the religion; otherwise, the diverse views and opinions on the matter would not exist.

While the Qur’an clearly addresses the concept of the afterlife, including the physical resurrection and various details of the afterlife, the claim that the nature of the post-resurrection body is easily understood is questionable. Otherwise, thinkers and followers of religious beliefs would not have been so confused and divided on the issue.

Although the physical resurrection is indeed a teaching of the Qur’an and can be considered one of its clear aspects, the exact nature of this resurrection is not immediately obvious, and it is not necessary for one to believe in the specifics of the physical resurrection to believe in the afterlife. Thus, denying or being unable to grasp it does not amount to disbelief, as demonstrated by Ibn Sina, who accepted the general concept of resurrection but left its details to religious texts, not considering it within the scope of human reason.

Therefore, denial of the visible body and ignorance of its nature in the afterlife is not a fundamental aspect of the religion, and its denial does not equate to disbelief. There is no consensus on this, and the affirmation of the afterlife does not contradict the denial of a visible body. The possibility of physical resurrection and God’s power over all that is possible does not necessarily imply the creation of a body from a decayed form, because it is possible that the body has not completely disintegrated and can be reformed without a complete resurrection. According to the Qur’an, the creation of the heavens and the earth or the revival of scattered bones does not necessitate the creation from absolute nothingness, and these phenomena can occur without such a process of annihilation and restoration. While it is true that the belief in a bodily resurrection is specific to the Imamiya, the exact nature of the resurrection is a separate issue. The impossibility of lying by God is undeniable, but this does not necessitate a resurrection of the visible body, and even the great scholar Allama did not specifically discuss the nature of the post-resurrection body.

Thus, the statements in his work, despite their thoroughness and detail, do not provide a rational argument for the necessity of a physical resurrection. They merely outline the correct belief regarding the affirmation of the afterlife.

Fazl al-Qushji’s Statement and Its Critique

“The scholars differ regarding the afterlife; the majority of religious groups agree on the bodily resurrection, while a group of scholars holds that it is a spiritual resurrection, which can be proven through rational arguments. As for the bodily resurrection, there is no room for rational proof either to establish or negate it. However, it must be believed in as described by the prophets because they are truthful. Another group denies both, but the truth is that both the bodily and spiritual resurrection are real: the spiritual one can be proven by both reason and law, while the bodily resurrection cannot be independently proven by reason, though many Qur’anic verses clearly affirm it in a way that does not allow for interpretation. Thus, the bodily resurrection is a necessity of the religion of Muhammad, as it is a possible event announced by the truthful, and it must be believed in. We say it is possible because it involves reassembling the scattered parts, which is a possibility by necessity.”

Fazl al-Qushji’s statement, despite its differences and detailed approach compared to Allama’s, echoes the views of Khwaja and Allama al-Hilli. He considers belief in the bodily resurrection to be a necessity of the religion, and although reason has no way of proving it, its possibility is rationally conceivable. The law has provided multiple verses that confirm its occurrence, and by rational possibility, he refers to the reassembly of the disintegrated body after decay.

As mentioned earlier, objections to the reassembly of scattered body parts leave no ground for rational possibility, and the only argument for it is scriptural narration. Clearly, merely the possibility of an event does not define its essential nature.

Thus, agreeing with the belief in the afterlife and what the prophets have said is correct, and the Qur’an indeed contains verses about the bodily resurrection, to the point that no interpretation is required. While it is correct that the bodily resurrection is a necessity of the religion and that belief in it is obligatory, the claim that the reassembly of scattered parts is a rationally necessary possibility is problematic. Such an event is not a necessity of reason.

Allama Majlisi’s View in Bihar al-Anwar and Critique

Allama Majlisi, in his esteemed book Bihar al-Anwar, provides a note on the resurrection, stating: “Know that the belief in bodily resurrection is accepted by all the religious groups, and it is a necessity of the religion. One who denies it is outside the fold of Islam. The noble verses in this regard are clear and cannot be interpreted. The hadiths are numerous and cannot be rejected or criticized. Most of the atheistic philosophers deny the bodily resurrection, citing the impossibility of resurrecting the deceased, but they provide no argument against it. They argue from self-evidence or weak speculations that are easily refuted by those who have insight and have abandoned the blind following of the atheistic philosophers.”

He continues by quoting from Fakhr al-Razi’s Nihayat al-Uqul: “But we know with certainty from the consensus of the prophets, peace be upon them, from the first to the last, that the bodily resurrection is affirmed, and we must be certain of the existence of this resurrection.”

He also cites from Allama’s commentary: “The Muslims are unanimous on the resurrection of the bodies, in contrast to the philosophers.”

Furthermore, he quotes from Allama Duwani’s commentary on Aqa’id Ansariyya: “The resurrection, meaning the bodily resurrection, is what is understood from the words of the scholars of the law, for it is what must be believed in. One who denies it is considered an unbeliever, according to the consensus of the three major religions and the clear texts of the Qur’an in many places, which do not admit any interpretation.”

Allama Majlisi, in his commentary on the verse: “Does man not see that We created him from a drop of sperm and then he becomes an open disputant, and he strikes for Us an example and forgets his own creation? He says, ‘Who will revive the bones when they have rotted?’ Say, ‘He who created them for the first time will revive them, and He is, of all creation, Knowing.’” (Qur’an 36:77-79) writes: “The commentators say that this verse was revealed in relation to Ubayy ibn Khalaf, who disputed with the Prophet (peace be upon him) and brought to him a decayed bone, crushing it in his hand and saying, ‘O Muhammad, can God bring this back to life after it has decayed?’ The Prophet (peace be upon him) responded: ‘Yes, and He will resurrect you and cast you into Hell.'”

He then states: “This is something that completely eliminates any possibility of interpretation.”

In conclusion, Majlisi argues that the belief in bodily resurrection is a consensus of all religious groups and is a necessity of the religion. Those who deny it are outside the fold of Islam. The Qur’anic verses on this subject are clear and cannot be interpreted, and the hadiths on the matter are numerous and cannot be rejected or questioned.

Critique of Allama Majlisi’s Views

Allama Majlisi’s claim that the belief in bodily resurrection is a consensus of all religious groups and a necessity of the religion is incorrect, as even within Islam, there are varying opinions. Some are unaware of the concept of bodily resurrection, and it cannot be deemed an absolute necessity of the religion, as the clear teachings of the Qur’an and Hadith are open to differing interpretations. If it were truly a necessity of the religion, there would be no disagreement or variation in beliefs.

His assertion that one who denies bodily resurrection is outside the realm of Islam is a statement made without adequate support and is problematic.

Many philosophers do not deny bodily resurrection; instead, they accept it in some form or reserve their position out of religious obedience. It is incorrect to claim that most philosophers deny it, as this generalization is inaccurate.

While Majlisi affirms the Qur’anic verses on bodily resurrection as clear and non-interpretable, the issue of resurrecting the decayed body is not inherently tied to the affirmation or denial of bodily resurrection. This notion of resurrection does not depend on the creation from absolute nothingness but can occur through other processes, making Majlisi’s understanding incomplete.

In his assertion that the consensus of the prophets on bodily resurrection is definitive, this too is flawed, as the consensus on an issue of rational and theoretical debate is not applicable, and divine revelation itself, as conveyed through the prophets, serves as the absolute proof of its truth.

Finally, his statement that bodily resurrection cannot be reconciled with rational thought should be critically examined, as the philosophers, theologians, and even religious scholars approach this matter from diverse standpoints, all of which may hold validity in the scope of their respective views.

The Commentary of Sharh Sialkoti

In his commentary on the phrase “The philosophers deny both,” Sharh Sialkoti states: “The philosophers who affirm the world of Ideas (Aalam al-Mithal) acknowledge the existence of heaven and hell, and all other matters conveyed by the Shari‘ah, but they discuss them within the realm of the world of Ideas. They do not regard them as tangible realities, as the Muslims do. Most of the philosophers classify them as forms of intellectual pleasures and pains.”

Sialkoti critiques the previous statement by the author of Mawaqif. The philosophers, in their rational approach, do not consider the resurrection of the bodies to be perceivable, which is not inherently incompatible with the belief in bodily resurrection through scriptural proof. This inconsistency might stem from the philosopher’s focus being on naturalistic scholars who deny both the afterlife and the origin (cause) of creation, thus positioning them as naturalistic materialists or proponents of a form of pseudo-philosophy. These individuals, who are disconnected from the fundamental concepts of origin and afterlife, lose their position in existence and cannot truly be considered philosophers.

Bodily resurrection is a complex issue that Islamic philosophy and theology have been deeply engaged with, leading to many misconceptions and doubts. Each philosopher has either alluded to, neglected, or offered their own interpretation of this matter.

Some accept only spiritual resurrection, offering numerous reasons for their stance; others discuss the bodily resurrection in the form of an ideal or conceptual reality, while a third group mentions the predominance of the soul and its manifestations as the source of existence.

In contrast, the theologians and traditionalists assert that nothing exists beyond material creation, including the soul, and they limit both the pleasures and punishments to material realities and a purely material afterlife.

These individuals, who adamantly deny the possibility of spiritual transcendence, consider the human soul to be a subtle form of matter—like rose in a flower or oil in an almond—and view it as a refined physical substance, dismissing its independence from the material world.

However, these philosophers align with the naturalistic deniers of origin, resurrection, and divine unity without fully realizing or intending any negative consequences.

The issue of resurrection should be thoroughly debated, analyzed, and critiqued by all scholars of theology and philosophy to present a clear understanding of the Qur’anic position. It must be shown that spiritual pleasures and pains exist without the presence of matter and that resurrection is not limited to the material form, even though material punishment and reward are also real. The Qur’anic teachings do not allow for a division or categorization in this regard.

Islamic philosophers believe that change and decay are intrinsic to matter, and separating matter from these characteristics is impossible. Therefore, they either deny or gloss over these aspects, with the understanding that the afterlife is eternal and free from decay and destruction. Even if the eternity of hell or the permanence of its torment is questioned, the existence of heaven and stable spiritual states cannot be denied. The author of this text will present arguments in the final section of the book to support this view.

Assuming that the eternity and permanence of the afterlife reflect stability and continuity, it is illogical for changing matter to possess such eternal qualities.

If we accept the eternity of hell and its punishment for the damned, as well as the eternity of bliss for the inhabitants of paradise, which is universally agreed upon, we must understand these realities as occurring in a non-material realm. This way, the possibility of permanence and eternity can be envisaged; otherwise, it is impossible to reconcile the two principles of permanence and change in the material world.

In this context, the views of prominent philosophers and mystics on bodily resurrection will be discussed, to better clarify the different dimensions of this issue.

Avicenna’s Perspective

The late Avicenna (Ibn Sina) in his book Al-Isharat restricts the discussions of torment and pleasure to spiritual and abstract concepts and does not mention bodily resurrection. He does not consider bodily resurrection to be a rational issue and does not believe it can be proven through reason. He merely accepts it as a matter of religious conviction, considering it a belief that he holds on faith.

Avicenna relegates the matter of bodily resurrection to the Islamic Shari‘ah and does not attempt a rational proof for it. As he explicitly mentions in Al-Shifa, he leaves the discussion of this matter to the “truthful narrator” (the Prophet), avoiding any rational argument for it.

One could argue that Avicenna’s belief in bodily resurrection stems from his firm religious conviction. Otherwise, from a purely rational and scientific perspective, this issue would not be accepted. Avicenna, due to the philosophical doubts or arguments he encountered in this regard—though not all-encompassing—would likely have denied bodily resurrection from a scientific standpoint. However, because of his deep philosophical and theological thoughts, he did not see denial as befitting a Muslim philosopher. He closed off the rational path to proving it and relied solely on his religious faith.

In other words, one could say that if not for the clear directives of the Shari‘ah and the explicit statements of the Qur’an about bodily resurrection, Avicenna would likely have rejected the concept. He would have, like many of his philosophical arguments—such as those about the knowledge of particulars or the union of the intellect and the intelligible—denied it and would have reduced the afterlife to purely spiritual matters.

Here, two important points must be considered: First, Avicenna’s approach, despite his immense intellectual and scientific achievements, reflects his deep faith and belief in the Shari‘ah and religion. His willingness to defer to religious authority on matters outside the scope of human reason indicates the strength of his belief and humility in the face of divine revelation.

Second, the limitations of human thought and the shortcomings of human reasoning in understanding the true nature of existence highlight the profound need for religion and divine guidance. This underscores the necessity for each individual, at every stage of intellectual and spiritual growth, to rely on religion, the Qur’an, and the guidance of the infallible spiritual leaders. Any neglect or hesitation in this regard could lead to confusion or even misguidance.

Thus, in a broader sense, it can be said that although Avicenna did not consider rational proof for bodily resurrection, his firm belief in it serves as the best testimony to the reality of bodily resurrection. With the support of divine revelation and a theological intermediary, Avicenna regarded bodily resurrection as a true reality. Without this support, he would not have spoken about it, and would likely have denied its possibility.

Avicenna states in his work:

Chapter on the Resurrection of Human Souls:

“You must know that the resurrection is something affirmed by the Shari‘ah, and there is no way to prove it except through the Shari‘ah and the confirmation of the prophetic news. It pertains to the body at the time of the resurrection, and the joys and sorrows of the body are well known. These need not be elaborated further. The true Shari‘ah, which was brought to us by our chosen Prophet Muhammad, has comprehensively discussed the matters of happiness and misery based on the body.

As for the matters that can be understood by reason and demonstrative logic, the prophetic news has confirmed them, such as the happiness and misery that are fixed for the souls, although our imaginations fall short of fully conceptualizing them now, due to the causes that have been set in place. The divine philosophers desire to achieve this spiritual happiness more than they desire material happiness; indeed, they seem to pay little attention to the material joys, even when they are granted. They do not regard them as significant compared to the spiritual happiness, which is the closest to the First Truth, as we shall describe shortly. So let us understand the nature of this spiritual happiness and its opposing misery, for the bodily aspect is taken for granted by the Shari‘ah.”

In these words, Avicenna divides resurrection into two parts: one is the bodily resurrection, which is affirmed by the Shari‘ah, and is the material resurrection in the afterlife. He says that there is no proof for it except through the Shari‘ah and the confirmation of prophecy. The other is the spiritual resurrection, which, in addition to being confirmed by the Shari‘ah, can also be established through rational proof. In this regard, he says that the divine philosophers do not regard material happiness as comparable to spiritual happiness, which is far superior. He adds that in this context, we focus only on spiritual happiness and misery, as the physical and material happiness has been extensively discussed in the Shari‘ah, leaving no need for further elaboration.

Eighth Pattern of the “Isharat” (Signs)

In the eighth pattern of his book Isharat, Sheikh (Ibn Sina) discusses the concept of happiness and misery. He asserts that intellectual pleasure is more complete than sensory pleasure. In another admonition, he states that pure spiritual misery is more intense than physical misery, and further clarifies that he does not discuss the resurrection or the afterlife here. However, the eternity of happiness and spiritual misery implicitly alludes to the spiritual afterlife. He states: “And intellectual perception, when free from any mixture, reaches the essence without contamination, while sensory perception is entirely mixed. The details of intellectual perception are almost infinite, while sensory perception is limited, even if it includes both the stronger and the weaker perceptions.”

It is clear that the relation of pleasure to the one experiencing it is analogous to the relation of the perceived to the perceiver, and the relation of the grasped to the grasping. Thus, the relationship between intellectual and sensory pleasure is like the comparison between the First Truth (God) and the sensory sweetness, which cannot be equated.

In his eleventh admonition, he states: “The pain of spiritual fire exceeds the pain of bodily fire.” The pain of spiritual fire is greater than the pain of bodily fire, whether it occurs in this world or the hereafter. Sheikh is not addressing the physical fire and its torment in the afterlife here, but rather, he focuses on the discussion of pure happiness and misery without mentioning bodily punishment in the afterlife. However, one can infer the material punishment of the afterlife from this. The Sheikh aims to demonstrate that in the afterlife, spiritual punishment is even more significant than material punishment.

In his commentary on the Isharat, Khwaja (Nasir al-Din Tusi) confines himself to explaining Sheikh’s ideas and does not express his personal opinion on this matter. To understand his viewpoint, one must refer to his independent works.

Theology of Healing

In the seventh chapter of his book Shifa (Healing), Sheikh discusses the afterlife, similar to how he addresses it in his book Najat (Salvation), asserting that belief in the bodily resurrection is based on sacred law and the affirmation of the Prophet’s message, while rationality does not provide a means to prove it. However, he does view the spiritual afterlife as something that can be understood by reason, just as it is confirmed by the sacred law:

“The afterlife, some of it is transmitted through the law, and there is no way to prove it except through the sacred law and the Prophet’s message. This pertains to the body at the resurrection, and the virtues and vices of the body are clear and do not need learning…; while some of it can be grasped by reason and logical demonstration, which has been confirmed by prophecy, and that is the happiness and misery of the soul.”

Based on these statements, it can be concluded that Sheikh does not see the bodily afterlife as something that can be demonstrated by reason or logic, since eternity, permanence, and stability do not align with the transitory and changing nature of material substances. He believes that reason cannot prove this, and thus defers to the sacred law on this matter. Even so, it can be argued that the philosopher, in his intellectual pursuit, does not leave room for blind faith, and wherever reason fails, he suspends judgment, but if evidence is available, he does not hesitate to accept it.

Analysis and Critique of Sheikh’s Views

Sheikh’s statement, “The philosophers’ desire to attain this spiritual happiness is greater than their desire to achieve bodily happiness. It is as if they do not pay attention to the latter; even when they receive it, they do not regard it as significant compared to this happiness, which is the closest to the First Truth,” is correct in that spiritual pleasures are far superior to material pleasures. However, it is not accurate to separate material pleasures from intellectual pleasures. All pains and pleasures, from material to spiritual, are experienced through the soul’s faculties, and material pleasure cannot exist without considering the soul’s immaterial nature. It is not proper to classify pleasures and pains into two completely separate categories, each contained in its own specific realm. It is the soul that, in its immaterial aspect, perceives all pleasures and pains, and what differs between these types of experiences is the object of perception, which in one case is material and in another, immaterial.

Another important point is the difference between the disregard for material pleasures and the neglect of material pains. For people of virtue, avoiding material pleasures is easier than avoiding spiritual and intellectual pleasures, but neglecting material pain is not as easy. Material pains, unlike pleasures, have an inherent existence in the soul, making them harder to bear. For example, when someone has a headache, it is not easy for them to ignore it, and it may even disturb their mental balance and wellbeing. Thus, material pleasures engage the soul’s attention and are part of the soul’s being, while pain, having an absence or lack, can be borne once it manifests. A mystic may disregard material pleasures, but they cannot easily dismiss the reality of material pain, which disrupts their peace and balance.

Punishment and the Material Afterlife

Punishment and suffering in the afterlife are far greater than the material suffering in this world, and one cannot remain indifferent to them. Whether the punishment in Hell is material or spiritual, the spiritual torment has its own unique intensity. Thus, Sheikh’s statement, “Sensory punishment is limited in scope, even when it is intense,” is incorrect. Sensory punishment may not be confined to a few instances and may indeed be infinite. The severity and diversity of it are distinct from its scope, and one should not allow the comparison between spiritual and material suffering to diminish the importance of material suffering.

Therefore, the pain of deprivation and spiritual fire, although more intense than bodily fire, does not imply that material suffering—especially the torment in Hell—can be trivialised. The statements made by Sheikh here are far less significant than those in the prayer of Imam Ali (a.s.), which contains the highest expression of the awareness of both material and spiritual suffering. Imam Ali says, “O Lord, have mercy on the weakness of my body, the delicacy of my skin, and the fragility of my bones… You know of my weakness when faced with the slightest trials of this world and its punishments, and the misfortunes that befall its people.”

Imam Ali does not trivialise the pain and torment of the physical world in comparison to the spiritual torment of the afterlife. He expresses a profound awareness of all forms of suffering, as shown in his prayer: “Grant me, O my God, my Master, and my Sustainer, the patience to endure Your punishment, but how can I endure separation from You? Grant me the patience to bear the heat of Your fire, but how can I bear being distanced from Your grace?” Imam Ali expresses a deep awareness of both material and spiritual suffering, and highlights the importance of both.

The Difference between Heaven and Hell

Another important point that needs attention is the difference in the existential degrees between Heaven and Hell, and the states of the inhabitants of both. The immaterial world is pure and free from the corruption of materiality, whereas material beings are never free from the stain of weight and form. Hell, though it may be spiritual in some sense, does not lack the material aspect. Thus, spiritual suffering in Hell is not limited to just the immaterial; it involves both material and spiritual dimensions. However, the experiences of the inhabitants of Paradise are pure of the material corruption, as their pleasures, both material and spiritual, are not stained by any impurity.

Thus, although in both Heaven and Hell there is a combination of material and spiritual experiences, the existential state of each is different and distinct. In this sense, it is crucial to understand the nature of both spiritual and material experiences, as described in the Qur’an and the Hadith.

The need for matter exists only due to the weakness and insufficiency of the material world, not because it plays any significant role in the true existence and emergence of being. The connection between matter and form is an imperfect link to the whole; its essence is accompanied by the deficiency of matter, and in its completeness, it is free of it.

The individuality and self-expression of anything lie in its particular existence, and the characteristics of individuality are signs of the being and the markers of the individuality of a phenomenon, not the cause of its existence.

The individual characteristics of a human being can be transformed and intensified, allowing anyone to truly grow in their essence.

The stronger the existence and identity of something, the more its manifestations will arise, and the qualities of anything, as derived from its natural causes and its agent and recipient forms, are gradual. These can also appear suddenly or be innovatively created, appearing through the will of the imagination.

Although the imagination of a person is an entity separate from their body, after death and the decay of the body, it will remain with the person, and their perceptions—whether intellectual or sensory—will not separate from them in this world or the afterlife.

The true criterion for all types of human perception is the essence of the soul, which can appear without matter. Additionally, all thoughts, traits, scientific and practical qualities, and the moral good and evil of the human soul have their respective consequences of good or bad, and no perception or action is without effect.

After stating these principles, Sadrā concludes: From what has been mentioned, we can deduce that the resurrection of humans on the Day of Judgment will be with the very same tangible and perceivable individual, in different forms.

The foundation of human existence lies in the soul, and the body is not essential. The resurrection, regardless of the body it is associated with, does not differ because it is the human soul that constitutes their essence. Thus, the very person who has died, leaving behind their physical body, will be resurrected and manifest in the Hereafter, even if the material remains of their earthly body have decayed and perished.

The body in the Hereafter of a believer is radiant, elevated, enduring, and alive, devoid of death, sickness, or old age. Conversely, the body of a disbeliever will be accompanied by unpleasant features, according to their prior state, as described: the disbeliever’s teeth will be like Mount Uhud, and their face will resemble that of a dog, wolf, or pig.

On the Day of Judgment, it is this worldly body that will be resurrected, even though its material essence is no longer the same as earthly matter; for the true essence of a human being is in its form, not in its materiality, and the endurance of one’s existence does not conflict with the transformation of its features.

In the Hereafter, everything a person sees will merely be the qualities and perceptions of their soul. No pre-formed entity is created except by the soul, and whatever the soul perceives, it experiences. Every creature is the product of its previous state, and the stronger the essence of a person, the greater its persistence; likewise, the more challenging the experience, the greater the difficulties faced.

Therefore, it is not appropriate to ask: Where are the Heaven and Hell of a person? Are they in this world, outside of it, or in some other place? The concept of the Hereafter is not a material space, but rather the inner and essential reality of a person in the Hereafter, which appears in a harmonious unity.

A person experiences their presence in the Hereafter through their own perceptions and actions, and the consequences of their actions, whether in Heaven or Hell, will be manifested by their own soul. Some are bound to the comforts of gardens and palaces, others to the pleasures of the eternal Paradise, and yet others to misfortune, deprivation, torment, and fire.

There are various differences between the bodies of this world and those in the Hereafter. The body in the Hereafter possesses life, vitality, and permanence, while in this world, bodies are lifeless, dark, and bear death within them. Some bodies, which possess temporary life, will have no place in the Hereafter, as nothing temporary exists there.

The bodies of this world arise with potential and possess heaviness and mortality, whereas the bodies of the Hereafter are already actualized and active. The bodies in the Hereafter are limitless, while material bodies of this world are limited.

Sadrā analyzes the bodily resurrection in his book Mabdaʾ wa Maʿād as follows: Many philosophers, mystics, and some theologians, such as Ghazālī, Kābī, Ḥalīmī, Rāghib Isfahānī, Qāḍī Abū-Yazīd Dabbūsī, as well as scholars from the Shiʿah tradition like Shaykh al-Mufīd, Abū Jaʿfar, Sayyid Murtadā, and al-Ṭūsī, all believe in both spiritual and bodily resurrection, although there is disagreement regarding the nature of the bodily resurrection in the Hereafter. Some question whether the body in the Hereafter is identical to the body in this world or similar to it. Each group also disagrees on whether all parts of the body will return, or whether the totality of the body as a whole will return.

Many Islamic scholars have stated that the body in the resurrection differs from the worldly body in its individuality.

The truth is that the human body will return in its entirety, not as a mere likeness. Anyone who denies this has denied the Shariah and is considered an unbeliever. Similarly, those who affirm the return of a similar or partial body deny the resurrection.

Resurrection involves the return of the entire soul and the physical body of this world, not a different soul or body, nor any different parts. This belief is the correct understanding of the Hereafter, and anything less is misguidance, rejection of many clear verses, and disbelief.

Some philosophers, who reinterpret the clear verses of the Qurʾān regarding bodily resurrection, claim that the language of the Qurʾān is intended for the common people and uses metaphors, as is common in Arabic, and thus the teachings about bodily resurrection should be interpreted metaphorically. They are misguided. The great Shaykh cannot be considered a denier of bodily resurrection; he has acknowledged both spiritual and bodily resurrection in his writings, although he does not see bodily resurrection as an intellectual proof and leaves it to the Shariah.

Sadrā affirms that bodily resurrection is demonstrable by reasoning. In his Transcendent Theosophy, where he considers the alignment of religious judgments with rational principles, he maintains that bodily resurrection, in accordance with the apparent meanings of the Qurʾān and the Sunnah, is proven without any need for reinterpretation.

Sadrā goes on to say that there is a special relationship between matter and form in the Hereafter. The material aspect of the Hereafter is not entirely like earthly matter; it is an active, pure matter that is free from the qualities of potentiality and heaviness found in earthly matter. This pure matter allows forms to emerge more easily and quickly. However, how to properly define this matter, especially its subtlety, remains a subject for further philosophical and theological inquiry.

Sadrā also addresses the concepts of space and time in the Hereafter. He argues that the Hereafter does not resemble the material world in its spatiality, because the Hereafter is the complete and true world, and there is nothing outside it to be considered as having space. In contrast to this world, space only applies to incomplete and individual parts. Therefore, the notion of space for Heaven and Hell in the Hereafter only pertains to certain relative phenomena, not their entirety.

In conclusion, Sadrā’s teachings on bodily resurrection, while emphasizing alignment with Shariah, nevertheless contain elements that approach interpretation in ways that might deviate from the clear teachings of the religious texts. This results in an interpretation of bodily resurrection that does not entirely conform to the traditional religious understanding but is rather closer to a spiritual interpretation.

Critique and Considerations of Sadrā’s Theory

1. Principles and Foundations: Sadrā’s understanding of bodily resurrection relies on many foundational principles. The more premises used in a logical argument, the more likely it is to be subject to critique. Each premise can be challenged, making the entire argument vulnerable.
2. Reinterpretation of Texts: While Sadrā rejects all forms of reinterpretation of the bodily resurrection and associates those who deny it with unbelief, he himself engages in a form of reinterpretation, especially regarding the nature of matter in the Hereafter. This raises questions about the consistency of his approach.
3. Material Aspect of the Hereafter: Sadrā’s discussion of the materiality of the Hereafter and the body’s return without the need for heavy, earthly matter contradicts the clear texts of the Shariah. His explanation of the return of the body as a purely symbolic, non-physical form challenges traditional interpretations of the Qurʾān and Hadith.
4. Apart from the fact that, even assuming materiality for a particular group, the issue remains unresolved, the problem of the impossibility of the existence of worldly matter in the hereafter still persists.
5. Furthermore, based on interpretation, if we consider all the forms of the afterlife as perceptual – as indeed they are – there is no contradiction between the material existence of the afterlife forms and their perceptual nature. Is it not the case that a material form cannot be a perceptual one? And is all knowledge and perception confined to mental forms and composite sciences? Why can’t all material and existent entities in both the worldly and the afterlife realms possess a simple, existential perception and a closer manifestation, offering praise, glorification, and worship of God? Why would this not reach its pinnacle in the afterlife, where they attain higher perceptions under the conditions of the hereafter? This is reflected in the Qur’anic reference to the earth, where it states: “On that Day, it will inform its news, because your Lord has commanded it.” [Qur’an, 99:4]. The earth is made to speak, and it receives revelation, attaining a level of perception where it recites the laws of the afterlife and narrates the story of humankind. This in no way contradicts its materiality or its nature as the earth.
6. In critique of Mulla Sadra’s theory, it can be briefly stated that false mental imaginations and misconceptions entrap an individual so profoundly that they deny even the most evident truths and fall into deprivation.
7. In his Asfar, Mulla Sadra, citing Ibn Arabi, describes the life of bodies as follows: “Know that life in all bodies is of two kinds: an accidental life due to a cause, which is the life we attribute to the spirits, and an afterlife inherent life in all bodies, similar to the life of spirits. However, the life of spirits appears in bodies by the spread of their light within them and the manifestation of their powers. The inherent life of bodies, however, is not like that. For whatever is created as a guide, by its inherent life, it always glorifies its Lord, for it is an intrinsic quality, whether spirits are within it or not…” [Ibn Arabi, Fusus al-Hikam]. He considers all existents, both material and immaterial, to possess inherent existential life, and views their existence as life itself, with spiritual and mental life being its manifestation.
8. The glorification of God through intrinsic life is true for all material entities, even for the fundamental matter and prime matter, which he deems necessary.
9. Although Mulla Sadra often states that the perception and knowledge of beings is proportional to their existence, and that existence is coextensive with perception and knowledge, he denies the perception of matter, while not denying the existence of the corporeal matter.
10. It must be said that, in this regard, he conflates intrinsic and simple perception with complex and acquired perception and analytical knowledge.
11. All entities, by their true existence and in proportion to the extent of their being, have the right to glorify and sanctify God, and the worship of each thing corresponds to its existence, such that even a disbeliever, who denies the truth, does so in terms of acquisition and conception. This denial is based on a false acquisition, but the essence of existence, through its simple and intrinsic glorification, sanctifies and affirms the truth.
12. In critique of Ibn Arabi’s statement, Mulla Sadra writes: “I say: It should be known that revelation and reasoning are witnesses that the body which has intrinsic life is not the body which is material, corrupt, perishable, and changing in essence moment by moment. We have clarified this through definitive proofs, scriptural evidence, and the consensus of great philosophers and sages, that these bodies in this world are all corrupting and perishable at every moment, not enduring even for a moment. How, then, could they have intrinsic life, which is the life of glorification and speech?
13. Rather, the body which has intrinsic life is another afterlife body, having perceptual existence, independent of matter and substance, not needing a spiritual guide to manage it, for it is the essence of life and soul, not requiring another soul…
14. What the Sheikh [Ibn Arabi] has said is not true in its apparent meaning. The verses of the Qur’an, such as “And there is nothing except that it glorifies Him with praise”, indicate that all bodies have life and speech, whether according to their materiality or the soul and angel governing them, not due to the physicality or materiality of the body itself, which is dead and dark by nature, mixed with the annihilation of passing existence.” [Ibn Arabi, Fusus al-Hikam].
15. It must be understood that both revelation and reasoning are clear proofs that the body with intrinsic life is not a material body, for the material body does not endure and cannot possess intrinsic life.
16. The body that possesses intrinsic life is a different kind of body in the afterlife, one with perceptual existence, and is not dependent on matter or substance. It does not require a spiritual guide, for it is the essence of life and soul, and its existence is identical to its perception.
17. Thus, Mulla Sadra’s assertion that the intrinsic life of material bodies is impossible and only applicable to afterlife bodies lacks proof. While he claims that perception is linked to permanence, he fails to account for the fact that existence in its transient state can still possess perception and intrinsic life.
18. One must argue that the problem in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy of knowledge is that he does not regard matter as capable of knowledge, and does not distinguish between simple and composite knowledge. He views matter as something mixed with disorder and non-being, whereas simple knowledge is simply the existence of matter. Matter, as an existent, cannot be regarded as a mixture of being and non-being.
19. Thus, the view that material bodies are entirely composed of non-being and lack intrinsic knowledge or life is fundamentally flawed.
20. Mulla Hadi Sabzevari
21. Some of the late Haji Sabzevari’s poetry on the resurrection (ma’ad) reads as follows:
22. “Whoever has truly selected with the intellect,
    Is a climber on the ascent to the world of intellects.
    Whoever confines resurrection to the spiritual realm,
    Is as one who limits the body in the material realm.
    The one who combines the two has succeeded,
    And the one who advances, having won, has the prize.
23. Then they diverged in their statements,
    Regarding the return of the very body or something similar.
    Each one inquired about each part,
    Of the body, and its features or form.
24. Some even said this latter view has no proof,
    For the people of paradise are naked and unadorned.
    Others validated the material form,
    With celestial bodies or smoke,
    Used for shaping their images,
    From their images and their forms.
25. Some validated reincarnation,
    And adopted a kind of essence for each eternal being.
    Distinguishing them by preserving their parts,
    To return as one, united in essence.
26. The Ishraqi philosopher spoke of an image,
    And the souls remained souls in their words.”
27. In these verses, Haji Sabzevari states: The spiritual resurrection is rationally accepted, and anyone who limits resurrection solely to the spiritual realm is akin to certain Peripatetic philosophers and many Muslims who deny the world of intellects, separations, and even disembodied souls. Both groups fall short in grasping the realities of existence. Accepting both the spiritual and bodily resurrections is the proper understanding and leads to salvation.
28. There is disagreement regarding the bodily resurrection: whether it will be the same body returning or a likeness of it, and whether it will rise as a whole, as in the totality of its parts and attributes, or in some other form. The latter view is generally not supported.
29. Some, like Abu Nasr Farabi and Avicenna, have analyzed bodily resurrection using the concept of celestial bodies or smoke. Others have embraced reincarnation, and some propose the reunion of the body’s scattered parts. The Ishraqi philosophers have spoken of resurrection in terms of an exemplary world.
30. Haji Sabzevari holds the view that the very body of this world will be resurrected, not a likeness of it, in such a way that if someone were to see it, they would say: “This is so-and-so, the same person who existed in this world.”
31. After presenting his views, he asserts that anyone who denies this is denying the shariah.
32. He supports this argument by claiming that the essence and truth of anything is in its form, a view he shares with Mulla Sadra, suggesting that Sabzevari’s thoughts align closely with those of Sadra. Upon examining Mulla Sadra’s beliefs, however, critiques that apply to his views on resurrection can similarly be applied to Sabzevari’s stance.
33. Allameh Tabatabai
    Al-Mizan Tafsir
34. In his book Al-Mizan, Allameh Tabatabai says: “The logical proofs, though strong, do not provide the detailed specifics found in the Qur’an and Sunnah regarding resurrection, due to their lack of intermediate premises necessary for deduction, as mentioned by Avicenna. However, they do address what humans may encounter in terms of intellectual and ideal perfections on the path to happiness or misery after the soul separates from the body, through intellectual and ideal abstraction, which is supported by reasoning.”
35. This statement reflects Avicenna’s view that the details of the resurrection are beyond the capacity of human intellect, which can only grasp generalities, and thus can only express the spiritual resurrection, happiness, misery, and intellectual or ideal abstraction.
36. Elsewhere, he writes: “Belief in the resurrection is one of the fundamental principles upon which religion stands. Its denial leads to the denial of commandments, prohibitions, warnings, prophecy, and guardianship. It is a denial of the divine religion in its entirety.”
37. He emphasizes the foundational importance of resurrection in religion, asserting that it cannot be denied.
38. Regarding the verse: “And if you are surprised, [then] astonishing is their saying, ‘When we are dust, will we indeed be raised in a new creation?'” (Qur’an 36:78), he responds to the objection that the essence of humans perishes upon death, leaving nothing to return in a new form. He states: “The human being is not merely the body composed of various material organs that cease to exist upon the disintegration of the body. Rather, the true essence of a human is the spirit and soul, which preserve the identity of the body, even though the body changes over time. Death occurs when God takes the soul from the body, severing its connection. Resurrection is when God recreates the body and reunites it with the soul for the resurrection, where humans will stand before God for judgment.”
39. In this explanation, Allameh maintains that the human being is not just the material body but rather a spiritual essence. Death occurs when God removes the soul from the body, and the afterlife involves God re-creating the body and reuniting it with the soul.
40. Mulla Sadra and Allameh Tabatabai’s Views
41. In his exegesis, Allameh Tabatabai does not delve into the specifics of bodily resurrection in detail, unlike in Asfar and Maqasid. Though he occasionally comments on general philosophical issues, he refrains from offering detailed philosophical insights into bodily resurrection. He also appears to struggle with fully articulating the resurrection of the body within his system.
42. In Al-Risalah Al-Tawhidiyyah (Theological Epistles), he briefly mentions bodily resurrection in the epistle titled “The Human After Death.” There, he writes: “Resurrection is the return of all things to their original state. This is necessary by default. It is necessary for the human body to reunite with the soul, transforming the worldly state into a final state of perfection and total life. The body, like the soul, will become radiant and enlightened.”
43. This statement suggests that the resurrection of the body is necessary, but it does not provide a conclusive argument that the material body is an essential part of the human essence. Allameh’s view implies that the material body undergoes transformation and reaches its final perfection, becoming light-filled like the soul.
44. While he affirms bodily resurrection, his reasoning does not conclusively establish that the material body is an essential aspect of the human essence, distinct from the soul. His understanding of bodily resurrection is aligned with the notion that the body will be transformed, possibly taking on a spiritual or light-like form.
45. Ibn Arabi in “Al-Futuhat al-Makkiyyah”
46. Ibn Arabi writes about the place of Hell: “Hell is one of the greatest creations of God, and it is God’s prison in the afterlife. It is called Hell because of its deep pit, said to be seventy-five hundred years deep, with extreme heat and cold, containing the greatest degrees of both heat and cold.”
47. This description of Hell as an enormous creation reflects the vastness and severity of its torment. However, the specific details, such as the depth and the extreme heat and cold, are not supported by rigorous scientific or theological evidence and remain speculative.
48. Critique of Ibn Arabi’s Views
49. While Ibn Arabi’s description of Hell as a vast and terrifying place is not unreasonable in the context of Islamic theology, his assertion of precise measurements for its depth and the degrees of heat and cold lacks solid evidence, making these claims speculative. Furthermore, the Quran does not mention coldness as a feature of Hell, which is typically depicted as a place of fire and intense heat.
50. The Intermediate Realm (Barzakh)
51. Ibn Arabi also writes about the intermediate realm (Barzakh): “Know that Barzakh is a dividing realm between two matters, neither being completely material nor purely spiritual. It is like a mirror, where forms appear without being able to accept material or spiritual realities. Souls in Barzakh are bound to their actions until the Day of Resurrection, when they will be resurrected from these forms into the afterlife.”
52. The intermediate realm (Barzakh) is described as a state between material existence and pure spiritual existence. It reflects forms that carry the consequences of human actions in this world, continuing until the Day of Resurrection, where they will be resurrected.
53. The Author’s View on Barzakh
54. Barzakh or the intermediate realm exists as a bridge between the physical and the purely intellectual realms. It is a state where forms appear without being fully material or spiritual. Those who engage in deep spiritual practice can witness these forms while awake, while others see them only in dreams or as part of their journey in the afterlife.
55. The existence of Barzakh is essentially a reflection of the interaction between physical reality and spiritual existence, and it provides the transition between the physical world and the intellectual world.
56. The concept of the intermediary (Barzakh) and the separated imagination can be categorized into two types: the descending separated intermediary and the ascending separated intermediary.
57. The descending separated intermediary refers to the realm of “Al-Dhar” and “Zarrah,” which is also known as the world of “Qalu Bala” (the world before the earthly existence and the physical realm). This realm precedes the world of nature and materiality, providing the prior substance from which human life takes shape. It is the place from which the human soul’s seed is drawn, possessing its pre-material form before descending into the earthly world.
58. The ascending separated intermediary, on the other hand, refers to the realm between death and resurrection. It is a space through which the soul of a deceased person experiences after leaving this worldly life. This realm exists prior to the resurrection, where the soul progresses toward its final state. The soul’s journey here is a process of ascension, continuing until the Day of Resurrection.
59. This intermediary is termed “ascending” because it exists after the completion of the descent into the tangible, material world. Its emergence is by divine will, with human actions and desires influencing its realization. In contrast, before the earthly realm and the end of the descending intermediary, humans are not actively involved in or connected to it; they are entirely under the control of external causes and conditions.
60. In the ascending separated intermediary, the material meanings and concepts of the earthly world take shape, manifesting in the forms of thoughts and actions of the person. The person’s thoughts, both good and bad, take on different forms, affecting the individual’s experience of either reward or punishment. Those who have lived virtuous lives will see their goodness manifest strongly, while the wrongdoers will experience the severity of their misdeeds.
61. This realm carries the soul with a subtle layer of the earthly world and a faint shadow of the conditions of the Resurrection, placing the individual in a state of either torment or bliss. The righteous perceive their virtues and the unrighteous feel the repercussions of their vices, with each individual’s fate being shaped by their actions and thoughts during their earthly life.
62. On Resurrection and the Afterlife
63. Shaykh al-Akbar (Ibn Arabi) writes about the Resurrection: “Know that the reason this day is called the Day of Resurrection is that all the servants of God will rise from their graves to stand before the Lord of the Worlds. The people have differing opinions on the resurrection of bodies, and we will not delve into the views of those who interpret the resurrection and the afterlife in purely intellectual or non-sensory terms. This interpretation contradicts the reality of the matter. The resurrection involves two stages: the resurrection of bodies and the resurrection of souls, which is a spiritual resurrection. The former is physical, while the latter is spiritual.”
64. He further elaborates that both physical and spiritual resurrections are valid, as he affirms the existence of physical resurrection, the scales of judgment, the bridge (Sirat), the fire of Hell, and Paradise. These concepts, though tangible, also serve to demonstrate the immense power of God and are all true and a reflection of His ultimate dominion.
65. Shaykh al-Akbar emphasizes that human beings’ understanding of the natural world is limited, primarily based on the finite lifespan of a person, which he believes is capped at around 120 years. However, he also stresses that this is not an absolute limit, and the possibility exists for human beings to live for thousands of years, or even eternally, in line with divine will.
66. On the Impossibility of the Eternal Nature of the Earth
67. The argument for the eternal nature of the physical world is often based on the continuous and uninterrupted divine grace, but such a view is philosophically and theologically problematic. Divine grace, as an eternal and boundless force, does not necessarily require the perpetuity of the earthly world, as the world of grace is not confined to the material world alone. Therefore, the idea of an eternal physical world is neither necessary nor supported by reason, especially when the focus should be on the eternity of the afterlife rather than the ongoing existence of the physical world.
68. The concept that the natural world is eternal contradicts both scientific understanding and religious doctrine, as the world will eventually transition to another form, and its current system is not eternal. Even though the physical universe might appear vast and timeless, its eventual dissolution is inevitable, and the emergence of a new phase, possibly in the afterlife or in another divine form, is expected.
69. In conclusion, while divine grace is eternal and unbroken, this does not imply the eternal existence of the physical world or the eternal duration of human life on Earth. Rather, what continues eternally is the divine grace and the realm of the afterlife, which remains ever-present, independent of the material world.
70. Critique of the Discourse of Sayyid Haidar Amili
71. Although Sayyid Amili acknowledges the possibility of both spiritual and physical resurrection through the three dimensions of Shari’a, Tariqa, and Haqiqa, he does not make efforts to address the doubts and objections raised against it. The entire discourse surrounding resurrection and divine power hinges on the plausibility of such an event. If the arguments of those who deny the physical resurrection are presented—particularly the idea of gathering the particles of the body—it would become clear that the possibility of resurrection cannot be upheld by divine power unless these objections are properly addressed. Without a response to the doubts of deniers and skeptics, the possibility of resurrection remains unsubstantiated. These doubts should not be dismissed as mere delusions but should be rigorously examined and answered.
72. The View of Hakim Ilahi Qumshaei
73. Hakim Ilahi Qumshaei writes: “It can be said that belief in two resurrections is the opinion of Islam and its adherents, with the exception of a few individuals. My belief is also in both resurrections. Our evidence pertains to this belief, that in the Hereafter and in eternal Paradise, there are physical pleasures such as food, drink, marriage, beautiful sights, and beautiful forms—pleasures that are complete and more intense than those in this world, with the difference that in this world, they are transient, finite, and tainted with pain, whereas in the Hereafter, these pleasures are eternal and purer.” [257]
74. “Ten general arguments for proving the principle of resurrection have been presented, and philosophers have provided numerous arguments—more than forty—to prove the immateriality of the soul.” [258]
75. It should be understood that the immateriality of the soul as discussed by the philosophers refers to the separation from the body, not from matter in a broader sense, which is substance. However, God Almighty is not only separate from the body but also from substance, and in this sense, no being other than God can be considered entirely immaterial.”
76. In response to the objection regarding the eater and the eaten, after quoting the mutakallimun’s views on the essential particles, he says: “Philosophers argue that a person’s identity lies in their form, not in the substance, as the soul forms the essence of the body. The body is always accompanied by the soul and serves as its shadow. What is consumed is not the person’s body but the matter of their body, which is not dependent on the particular substance in either this world or the Hereafter. This answers the Islamic philosophers who believe in two resurrections. However, those who accept only the spiritual resurrection argue that after death, there is no need for a material body, and the individual remains with their sacred soul, which is superior to matter, as Socrates said in his response to his disciples about where and how to bury him: ‘If you find me after my death, bury me wherever you wish. I never saw myself as alive during my lifetime, so how will you find my dead body?'” [259]
77. He further states: “Avicenna considered the physical resurrection and its bodily pleasures and pains to be confirmed by the Sacred Law, while he believed that the spiritual resurrection could be established through reasoning, even though the position of prophethood also confirms it.”
78. This issue has long been discussed by philosophers: what happens to the soul after it separates from the body? Will it take on a bodily form, or will it be spiritual, or will it be in an ideal or intermediary state (Barzakh)?
79. Avicenna does not consider physical resurrection to be rationally provable and believes its confirmation relies solely on the Sacred Law. However, Mulla Sadra considers the physical resurrection to be rationally supported by the Qur’an and proves it using his philosophical principles. He argues that the essence of a thing is its form, not its material substance, and thus the elemental, material body—subject to change and transformation—does not play a role in the physical resurrection. Rather, the soul, accompanied by its essential bodily form, will continue in the eternal realm.” [260]
80. The ten arguments put forth by the esteemed Hakim Ilahi mostly pertain to proving the principle of resurrection and spiritual resurrection and are insufficient to establish the physical resurrection. Though he includes them as part of the discussion, as he states, “Our evidence pertains to both physical and spiritual resurrections.”
81. While this esteemed philosopher presents a complete and thorough view of the resurrection, with a clear, tangible description of the material pleasures such as food, drink, marriage, and other matters, he does not offer a specific argument or explanation for the nature of physical resurrection. He merely aligns with the views of Mulla Sadra, even though his conception of physical resurrection may not align with Sadra’s, and furthermore, the critiques raised against Mulla Sadra’s theory also apply to his own view.
82. Moreover, his statement on the philosophers’ notion of the immateriality of the soul, that it refers to the separation from the body and not from matter in a broader sense, while accurate, overlooks that the philosopher Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi considered the soul and higher-level immaterial beings to be separate not only from the body but also from matter.
83. The fundamental distinction for God Almighty is not the immateriality from matter, but the fact that He is necessary in Himself, something no other being possesses. While God is both necessary and immaterial, it is possible for beings other than God to be immaterial, though they cannot be necessary in the same sense. Although Hakim Ilahi’s view is accurate in that no being other than God is immaterial, Suhrawardi’s view should also be interpreted by considering the dissolution of essence in higher-level souls, or perhaps by rejecting essence altogether and returning to the concept of divine existence as the unity of appearances.
84. Hakim Ilahi Qumshaei adopted Mulla Sadra’s view on physical resurrection. In addressing the eater and the eaten objection, he says: “What is eaten is not the person’s body, but the matter of their body, and the body in either this world or the Hereafter is not dependent on the specific material.” This argument aligns with Mulla Sadra’s view that the human soul does not require the material body to exist.
85. It remains to be seen whether such a notion of physical resurrection aligns with the depiction in the Qur’an. We need to determine whether the Qur’an demands a material body in the Hereafter or not. If we accept that there is no need for material in the Hereafter, and we provide a scientific and philosophical description of physical resurrection without involving matter, does such a material existence hinder the eternal life of the Hereafter? If the existence of matter does not obstruct the resurrection, this aligns with the view of Avicenna, who refrained from delving deeply into the philosophical question and explicitly deferred it to the Sacred Law. If the material body is not necessary for the Hereafter, how does this fit with the material depiction in the Qur’an?
86. Finally, Hakim Ilahi presents some verses of poetry as the opinion of Socrates, as mentioned earlier, without fully addressing the type of citation or its content. It is well-known that this poetry is not from Socrates, and at least its authorship remains unproven. The content of the poetry seems to convey an idea that a Muslim might have transmitted to a disciple, questioning how to handle the body of the deceased—a perspective more in line with Islamic beliefs than with the views of ancient Greeks.
87. At the end, Hakim Ilahi states: “Avicenna does not consider physical resurrection to be rationally provable and believes its confirmation relies solely on the Sacred Law, whereas Mulla Sadra believes in the physical resurrection as rationally supported by the Qur’an, proving it through his own philosophical principles. He asserts that the essence of each thing is its form and that the material, elemental body is irrelevant to the physical resurrection. The soul will continue in the eternal world accompanied by the essence of the body that constitutes the identity of individuals.”
88. The soul in the Hereafter will be accompanied by the material body, as indicated by the Qur’anic verses, or the body of the Hereafter may be a form of luminous or immaterial substance, but in the former case, we encounter the same problem Avicenna faced, and if we consider the body as entirely non-material, this does not align with the Qur’anic depiction. This remains an issue to be explored within the context of Mulla Sadra’s views and the Qur’anic verses. In any case, Hakim Ilahi’s explanations do not fully resolve the issues related to physical resurrection, and two central problems emerge: If the material body in the Hereafter is understood as the physical body, how is its continuity and revival justified? And if it is something other than the material body, does this align with the Qur’an?
89. 2. The Doubt of the Eater and the Eaten
90. The human soul has a complete resurrection and nothing of its spiritual essence is diminished. Since it is a simple and immaterial truth, it is entirely resurrected. If the body and material of the human being also experience a full return, with all the parts of the body reunited during life, so that they accompany the soul in the reward or punishment for good and bad actions, then the doubt of the eater and the eaten arises. However, if it is stated that although the existence of the material body is essential in the afterlife and will be resurrected, the presence of all its atoms is not necessary for the afterlife’s materialisation, but only those parts which accompany the soul, and the body exists for them, then the doubt of the eater and the eaten remains. But if it is asserted that the material of the human body need not be identified, though the necessity of the material type exists, the doubt of the eater and the eaten will not arise. Although it is possible to raise the objection that the material does not correspond with the individual and is not suited to the recompense, we resolve this through the assertion of the soul’s power. The material of the afterlife, which is a type, is suited to the soul’s attachment to that body, and the presence of material in the afterlife serves neither to punish nor reward the body, but is necessary for the general resurrection and the communal gathering of human beings. Otherwise, the material does not possess any inherent qualities that would cause issues due to its reduction or change, thus negating many of the related doubts.
91. Since the soul is a simple and immaterial truth, in the afterlife it possesses a unique personality, and all pleasures, rewards, punishments, and torments are for the soul and the individual spirit. Since the body and material do not have immateriality or simplicity, they do not possess personal identity and their essence requires their materiality. The material does not have its own personal identity and its existence is shaped by the soul and spirit. It is not necessary for all parts of the human body to participate in the enjoyment of pleasures or the suffering of torments, in such a way that every part of the afterlife body would be the same material as the earthly body. The soul requires a body, but the material body is only the instrument of the soul’s activities, providing a space for the soul’s manifestation. It does not play an essential role in the process. The pleasure or torment experienced by the human being is, in fact, mediated by the soul, while the body does not have an independent cognitive role; it is merely an instrument of manifestation and subsidiary cognition, though it has its own perception, as is the case in the world. Without material, human beings lack practical power and accomplishment, and it is the soul that pursues all individual activities, experiences all comforts and discomforts, and all sensory perceptions follow the soul’s cognition. The body, without the perception of the soul, is like the garment of the soul and has no fundamental role.
92. The only difference between this world and the afterlife is the intensity of afterlife perception, even regarding the material of the human body. The entirety of the afterlife is filled with life, perception, and consciousness, and this does not contradict the perception of material being subordinate to the soul.
93. If the essence of a thing is considered its true identity, conditions of weightlessness may apply to it. Just as the true existence or real life does not inherently carry weight, though the material and bodily form of a thing in the mundane world, from a common perspective, comes with weight and heaviness, a closer look reveals that this is not the case. Material does not have weight and heaviness inherently; these properties are not part of its essence. Under special environmental conditions, the weight and lightness of objects can change. One can observe weightlessness in space, where the distance from gravity governs this weightlessness.
94. The idea that material inherently has weight and that all things are subject to natural heaviness is a mistaken thought that has been inherited from ancient natural philosophers. It is now clear that weight and heaviness are not inherent in matter and that gravitational force is what imparts different weights to objects in various locations, under specific conditions. Therefore, one cannot attribute a specific weight to material, except by considering the particular conditions governing its environment.
95. Considering weight and heaviness as inherent properties of objects, as if they are inherent in their nature, is scientifically incorrect. Many ideas about material and physical properties are now known to be mistaken, and there is no need to extend discussion on this topic.
96. The actions of an agent and the effects of the agent can be material, exemplary, or even immaterial, with a type of harmony between the action and its source and its outcomes. It doesn’t matter whether the agent is a human, an angel, a jinn, or even an animal. However, animals cannot produce immaterial effects on a large scale, although some animals may exhibit limited immaterial reflexes or show certain immaterial characteristics, or all animals may show limited, weak immaterial effects, just as they have numerous material traits. One could even argue that plants and objects also have a form of immateriality, which presents its own subtleties.
97. Among the created beings, humans, angels, and jinn have a far-reaching and varied realm of effects, and each possesses a unique capacity according to their existential power. They each display their strength in specific realms and reveal their particular power in their existential domains.
98. Scholars who accept exemplary worlds have no problem with the needs of the intermediate or incomplete beings after the death of the body, but the issue arises for those such as the Peripatetics, who deny the exemplary worlds and their immateriality, as previously critiqued.
99. Both the deniers of the exemplary world and the proponents of it agree on the necessity for those perfected in knowledge to be free from the need for a material or exemplary body. The illuminative and Peripatetic scholars view them as free from the body and connected to the celestial realm. This view, however, is rejected. It should be considered an unfounded belief, as it contradicts the apparent meaning of divine scriptures and traditions concerning the resurrection. A physical resurrection is affirmed for all human beings, regardless of their rank or status, and it is not the case that the perfected ones, including the infallible figures and messengers, would not have a physical resurrection. They all possess physical and exemplary attributes, and this does not detract from their perfection.
100. Moreover, according to the collective perfection required of the complete saints, physical resurrection is an essential component of their collective perfection. Collective perfection is far superior to the immaterial perfection, as the difference between the complete saints and the higher intellects lies in their possession of collective ranks.
101. The collective ranks of the perfected ones and their existential extent necessitate a broad collective reward, and physical resurrection for them is not due to any deficiency in their immaterial nature, but because of their collective rank.
102. In discussing the physical resurrection and the material resurrection of the afterlife, one should not simply accept common philosophical laws as definitive. Scientific laws should also not be regarded as absolute truths, and they must be rigorously examined with evidence in all philosophical and scientific domains. Just as heaviness and material change are inherent properties of the material in the mundane world, we do not accept their essential nature, and we should not consider scientific and experimental laws as fixed principles when dealing with afterlife matter, which may have fundamentally different characteristics from the material in this world.
103. Furthermore, physical resurrection cannot be based on the principle of the conservation of energy and matter, as posited by Lavoisier, or the death of matter and energy, nor should it be based on the concept of entropy, which suggests that matter and energy deteriorate and lose their capacity. These ideas are concerned with the material nature of this world, and they pertain to the unique characteristics of the material in this domain, but they are not inherent truths of matter itself, and in the event of afterlife phenomena, the properties of material in the afterlife could undergo significant transformations.
104. In the discussion of physical resurrection, one should not only focus on the characteristics and effects of the material world. The actions of a human being, whether as substance or accident, and whether these actions materialise into physical forms, representations, or otherwise, and whether the conversion of matter into energy and energy into matter is possible, should not lead to a convoluted or imprecise connection with the material existence in the afterlife. All of these attributes and interpretations of material pertain to the special nature of this world and the conditions that dominate it. In the afterlife, the material will manifest with different characteristics and effects, so much so that its nature will not resemble its earthly form, yet this does not mean that the afterlife material has ceased to exist or undergone any inherent transformation.
105. From these discussions, one should not be misled into thinking that the writer is denying well-established scientific or philosophical principles, or viewing them with doubt. The existence of such doubts about the material world does not invalidate these principles, and the unity of scientific and philosophical laws, which stem from rational cognition, is shaped by the conditions governing each realm’s existence.
106. 4. The Resurrection of the Non-Existent and the Sceptre of Takfir
107. In the discussion of bodily resurrection, many theologians, aside from considering its possibility, regard the resurrection of the non-existent as necessary and essential, seeing it as a genuine condition for the realization of bodily resurrection. So much so that, in his book on beliefs, the late Allama Majlisi considers anyone who denies the resurrection of the non-existent to be an infidel, stating: “Whoever believes that the resurrection of the non-existent is impossible and does not accept its realization is an infidel.” Meanwhile, philosophers and proponents of rationality, including prominent figures such as Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi, Allama Hilli—among the most distinguished scholars in Shia tradition—and similarly Mulla Sadra, have considered the resurrection of the non-existent, aside from not being realized, to be impossible. Despite this, they do not see the impossibility of the resurrection of the non-existent as incompatible with bodily resurrection.
108. What we aim to prove here is that no being actually becomes non-existent, so the discussion of the possibility and impossibility of resurrecting the non-existent does not arise. The debates about the possibility and impossibility of resurrecting the non-existent, which philosophers and theologians engage in, are misleading, and, moreover, are irrelevant to bodily resurrection. This is because death and dying do not entail annihilation or non-existence, thus the restoration or return of such an entity in the afterlife is not a resurrection of the non-existent. In fact, nothing dies or ceases to exist through death in such a way that the issue of such a resurrection would arise. Just as in the process of creation, nothing comes into being from nothing, but is merely an outward manifestation of God’s knowledge, so death is not the annihilation or disintegration of existence, but simply the change in its course as it moves from the world of material nature to a different realm, which is the separation of the soul from the physical body. After that, matter follows its natural course, and the soul continues its spiritual path until the Day of Judgment, when the conditions for the existential reunion of the two (soul and body) are made possible, without anything having ceased to exist or anything that was non-existent being revived.
109. Additionally, Mulla Sadra accuses those who deny bodily resurrection of being infidels and disobedient, while he himself introduces the intermediate or imaginary body, and despite rejecting allegorical interpretations, ironically engages in it himself, thereby embracing views that contradict his own stance.
110. Many of the accusations and slanders made have no clear subject or proper criteria, and can all be considered as religious embellishments and sectarian bias. This kind of attitude should be eradicated from the academic community, and one should not resort to such behavior when encountering differing opinions, even if the issue might relate to heresy or apostasy in religious matters. However, it is not the case that every disagreement should be considered heretical, ignoring the severe consequences of the afterlife and the legal consequences of such accusations.
111. Figures such as Avicenna and even Fakhr al-Din al-Razi regard the impossibility of the resurrection of the non-existent as self-evident, whereas many theologians, due to their belief in its connection to bodily resurrection, have considered those who deny it to be infidels, without giving due attention to the main discussion or the specifics of the resurrection, the subject of the resurrection, and its legal implications. How can the resurrection of the non-existent be linked with bodily resurrection when neither death nor dying equals annihilation or non-existence, nor is bodily resurrection the restoration of the non-existent? How can this phenomenon be considered an essential condition for bodily resurrection when rational philosophers and divine scholars deny the resurrection of the non-existent, yet still believe in the afterlife and Judgment Day, and many of them—especially those who have been labelled infidels—also believe in bodily resurrection? How unreasonable is it to label scholars and thinkers as heretics for disagreeing with a theological interpretation, without first having a clear understanding of the topic under discussion and the serious implications of such an accusation of heresy?
112. In Islamic jurisprudence, a kafir (infidel) is one who denies the divinity, the oneness of God, the prophethood, the resurrection, or any other essential aspect of Islam—such denial amounts to the denial of God and the Prophet. As stated by most jurists, the denial must also lead to a rejection of the necessary consequences of such beliefs. How can one hastily declare an individual a kafir for disagreeing on a theoretical issue, which has no direct bearing on religion or the essence of the divine, without considering the theological or doctrinal significance of the matter?
113. Attributing heresy to such individuals is not permissible because the original discussion is theoretical and intellectual, and the intellect itself struggles to reach a definitive conclusion on the issue. It is not self-evident, nor is there a religious necessity regarding the belief in bodily resurrection for all. The interpretation of such an idea from the Qur’an is itself a matter of debate, and one cannot consider the denial of it to equate to the denial of the essentials of Islam or the Qur’an. Although the belief in bodily resurrection is indeed provable and has clear evidence, its clarity is not such that denying it would imply the rejection of the fundamental tenets of religion and the Qur’an.
114. Unfortunately, our history is filled with such wrongful accusations and misattributions, which, when paired with sectarian and religious fanaticism, have been among the greatest factors in undermining intellectual thought, stifling the free expression of ideas, and obstructing human growth and development. This is particularly true when these matters are mixed with religious and sectarian biases, and unfortunately, our contemporary history has witnessed much of this.
115. Great figures such as Martyr I, Martyr II, Martyr III, and thinkers like Sheikh Ishraq have been victims of such social and traditional turmoil.
116. The parts of the human body are not foreign to the person, and it is not necessary for these parts to be identical to or the same as their worldly counterparts. As all the components of a person’s body in the world are necessary for both the realization of the afterlife and for receiving reward and punishment, it is not imperative that they remain identical or unchanged in the afterlife.
117. Although the body’s parts are not disconnected from the individual, they do not need to be pre-existing or ancient; instead, they can be the manifestations of the soul and the spiritual developments of the person, which align with the specific conditions of the afterlife. There is no need for a purely imaginary form or for the parts of the body to be identical to their worldly counterparts.
118. All of the assumptions and theories that have come down to us from the intellectuals in this field are based on incorrect premises, without due attention to the apparent texts and divine revelations. Moreover, the generalization or neglect, or the interpretation or denial of them, can be reconciled with the totality of the divine verses, without any ability to combine or reconcile these perspectives.
119. Perhaps the wisdom of the numerous divine verses on this matter and the further clarification provided is aimed at completing the argument against the extreme and shallow viewpoints, as after the concept of oneness, the most complete discussion in the Qur’an is that of resurrection and the manifestation of bodily resurrection, which demonstrates the Qur’an’s deep focus on this topic.
120. Therefore, in the realm of resurrection and bodily resurrection, one must avoid sectarian or group-based beliefs and focus fully on the Qur’anic evidence for bodily resurrection. One should hold firm belief in it and follow the truthful and divine guidance, free from any personal bias or philosophical objections.
121. In conclusion, after establishing the truth of both spiritual and bodily resurrection and the spiritual nature of the soul, which is essential for the complete realization of the human being in the afterlife and the actualization of the entirety of a person in their ascent, the question arises: what kind of bodily reality does a person possess in the afterlife? With which body and how much of it will they be resurrected and remain?
122. A broad outline of the answer is that the human body in the afterlife is made up of the same material components from this world, either in their entirety, in part, or in a form resembling them. The manifestation of the soul and the transformations of the person will align with the specific conditions of the afterlife, and the material components will be recreated without necessarily needing the identical form or pre-existing parts. Whether the body is composed of the same parts or formed from a different material, whether from the individual, from others, or from non-human creatures, or whether newly created, what is certain is that a person in the afterlife will be resurrected with a body and a true corporeal reality, without this body necessarily having a causative or special effect in the realization of the individual’s identity or in the execution of reward or punishment. Although the body is related to the individual, it is not necessary for it to consist of pre-existing or identical parts; instead, it can be created according to the needs of the soul’s manifestations and the individual’s spiritual development, reflecting the unique conditions of the afterlife.
123. All the theories and views we have received from intellectuals on this subject are based on incorrect assumptions and fail to give proper attention to the apparent texts and divine revelations. Furthermore, any neglect, reinterpretation, or rejection of these views can be reconciled with the entirety of the divine verses without any ability to combine or justify them.
124. Perhaps the abundance of divine wisdom in these verses and their further explanation is intended to complete the argument against these extreme and reductive views, as after the oneness of God, the most comprehensive discussion in the Qur’an pertains to the matter of resurrection and the manifestation of bodily resurrection, which reflects the Qur’an’s deep concern for this issue.
125. Matter and Connection
126. Apart from this, another problem that may occupy philosophical minds is the connection of matter. In the view of many philosophers, matter is a connected entity whose separability is equal to its connection, and its separability follows from its connection. Of course, this characteristic of matter follows another principle, which regards matter—i.e., the external body—as a composite of potential matter and form, considering the body as composed and believing that the external body manifests its characteristics and effects through a necessary combination of these two. However, as has been addressed elsewhere, all these principles are subject to criticism.
127. The connection of the body is a belief and philosophical principle that does not have a rational argument to support it. The argument of separation and connection presented by Shaykh in al-Shifa or the reliance on the tangible form of matter is open to criticism. Moreover, the connection of matter and body is an Aristotelian thought that the Peripatetics and Shaykh, without recognizing the scientific basis for it, have insisted upon, and the reasons for it in the natural philosophy show the superficiality of such an opinion. Plato also opposed this, and in the high thought of Democritus, who regarded matter and body as composed of atoms, this issue is emphasized. Furthermore, today, the conversion of matter into energy is considered a proven fact. While philosophical thinkers like Aristotle and Shaykh once ignored the words of Democritus, modern science has confirmed this theory. Although Democritus used the term “hard particles,” which implied that these small particles were indestructible, this belief is now regarded as incorrect.
128. The inherent nature of the accidents of matter or the connection of matter, or the specific combination of matter and form, as discussed in natural philosophy, does not hold scientific value, and one cannot insist on its certainty.
129. Moreover, when recognizing matter and the body, one cannot only follow the arguments of natural philosophy. Matter and the body have specific scientific and empirical foundations that should be considered from the perspectives of science and philosophy, and one should not pursue only one aspect of it—especially an incomplete one.
130. In light of the above, it can be said that matter, under specific conditions, undergoes motion and stability, and in its motion and stability, it manifests a particular form of infinity. With the emergence of various factors, it can accept reciprocal qualities. Matter, which changes and moves under external factors in this world, may have different effects in the afterlife or the world beyond. Instead of change and motion, it may experience stability and external persistence. Just as matter in this world possesses particular diversities, in the afterlife, it will also manifest its own unique diversities. Matter that exists in one form in this world and in another form in the afterlife, in heaven or hell, may take on a new form in the Barzakh (intermediate world). For example, the people of heaven are described as entirely pure and spotless, while the teeth of the disbeliever are said to resemble mountains. Even a small amount of their energy, which could fit in a handful, can form a sphere the size of the Earth under specific conditions. Compressed and accumulated matter can expand and manifest different characteristics, acquiring various qualities. Sometimes it is human, and at other times, it becomes something else, igniting in hell and providing fuel for the fire of hell. As the Qur’an explicitly states: “Fuel for it is people and stones” (Quran 66:6).
131. From this explanation, it becomes clear that in all these stages, matter exists, but it does not have a single state. Matter, in all its existential stages, takes on various forms with all its qualities, without creating any inherent contradictions or requiring a philosophical or scientific obstacle.
132. It is worth noting that we do not intend to claim in this context that all stages of the afterlife are material, as there may be stages, positions, and realms in the afterlife that are non-material, referred to as “Ridwan” and “Jannat al-Liqa” (the Garden of Meeting with God).
133. What is important here is that the existence of matter in the afterlife does not contradict eternity, permanence, stability, or infinity. It is possible for matter to exist eternally and stably in the afterlife. Just as Mulla Sadra speaks of the “divine body,” it is possible for a body to be eternal and stable. In this regard, we are only attempting to present the possibility and potential of this matter and to suggest that the change of matter is not necessarily proven or essential, and can be subject to scrutiny.
134. It is in light of this point that we can accept bodily resurrection as it is, without interpretation or justification, or denial or neglect, and humans can have a bodily form in all realms of the afterlife without encountering any philosophical issues.